# The Basic Tenets of Real Liberalism, Part I: Individuality and Privacy **URL:** **By** Walter E. Grinder, David Hart **Published:** September 1, 1982 --- “The first being the right of the individual to own justly acquired property; the second being the right of the individual not to be aggressed against.” ## Introduction In the following series of articles we will be examining the basic tenets of real liberalism. It is our contention that liberalism comprises a coherent body of principles which is held together and given meaning by two fundamental moral principles. The first being the right of the individual to own justly acquired property; the second being the right of the individual not to be aggressed against. All the tenets of real liberalism which we will discuss flow from these two fundamental rights of ownership and non-aggression. It is our aim in these articles to show exactly how and why these two must be fundamental, and to outline the consequences this has for a political philosophy of real liberalism. In Part I we begin with the twin ideas of “Individuality and Privacy,” showing how the individual is defined by his or her physical uniqueness and so has the potential to develop into a mature and responsible acting individual. We will show how the individual’s uniqueness forms the basic element of all social interaction and is the source of the division of labor and the exchange process. Similarly, privacy is shown to be the result of recognizing the dignity, worth, and sanctity of every individual. Only by permitting the individual to enjoy his or her property unmolested, within the protected sphere defined by the self-ownership principle and the derivative right to own property in other physical objects, can there be true privacy and protection of the private side of human life. In a future article, the problems of “Toleration and Moral Autonomy” will be discussed. The argument is that tolerance results from the recognition that all individuals are potentially morally perfectable. As long as no property rights are violated, then all consenting, peaceful activity must be legally protected, especially if this activity is offensive or obnoxious to some groups. Tolerance is vital because it allows each and every individual to be truly humane, i.e. to exercise moral autonomy. Only by being free to choose between different courses of action can the individual learn from past mistakes and so strive for moral perfection and self-fulfillment. Other articles will deal with the social consequences of the right to own property and the non-aggression principle. When people are left free to pursue their own interests it is inevitable that they will trade and exchange goods and services amongst themselves. When justly-held titles to property are freely exchanged, then we have “Social Harmony, Free Trade, and Peace,” (addressed in Part II). When the State— or any other organized, coercive body—interrupts free trade amongst individuals the result is “Interventionism, Social Conflict, and War.” The net result of the myriad of exchanges and voluntary associations constantly formed in the marketplace is a “Spontaneous Order,” a subtle and extremely complex network of relationships that give unity and flexibility to the market process. The prerequisite for a justly-and efficiently-operating spontaneous order is a legal system which identifies and protects property rights. With “Justice and the Rule of Law” we have the legal framework that enables the exchange process—and all voluntary relationships—to develop in a safe and protected environment. As the market system is gradually extended and given greater protection under the rule of law, it is not surprising that classical liberals are convinced that an era of “Reason, Optimism, and Progress” will begin, where individual rights will be respected and people will be completely free of impediments to prosper and grow, both economically and spiritually. But before this age of prosperity and growth can begin, there are many hard years of struggle ahead. Part of this struggle will involve the attempt of individuals to regain their political sovereignty. It is a consequence of the ownership of one’s body and the moral autonomy that springs from this ownership that no one can act on any individual’s behalf unless expressly and formally delegated to do so. This means that individuals will have to begin claiming their rights of self-determination, the right to withdraw or secede from any political organization that is not to their liking, the right to resist political intervention in their social and economic activities, and most importantly, the right to resist the ultimate theft, taxation by the state. Hence the importance of the idea of “Popular Sovereignty and the Right of Resistance.” > _Whenever a ruler makes himself a dictator, all the wicked dregs of the nation—I do not mean the pack of petty thieves and earless ruffians who in a republic, are unimportant in evil or good—but all those who are corrupted by burning ambition or extraordinary avarice, these gather round him and support him in order to have a share in the booty and to constitute themselves petty chiefs under the big tyrant._ > > — _Etienne de La Boetie, Discourse of Voluntary Servitude_ As these economic and political measures to restore individual rights are gradually taken, the problem of undoing past crimes and injustices must be faced. Not only must individual property rights be respected in the present and in the future liberal society, but where possible, all past aggressive actions must be corrected. This involves returning stolen property to its rightful owners (where they can be identified) or to their descendants. It also means morally assisting the just struggle of other people in their efforts to liberate themselves from their own oppressive State apparatus. And once the restrictions have been lifted, a constant watch must be made to ensure that organized violence does not again raise its head and restore the State in a new form. We will conclude “The Basic Tenets of Real Liberalism” with a section on the problems of “Liberation, Restitution, and the Revolution of Permanence.” In short, our aim is to show that real liberalism or libertarianism is a comprehensive set of principles that explains the social world in which we now live. It also describes the manner in which one should interact with one’s fellow human beings in order to create a just and viable social order. It offers principles, policies, and broad programs to alter the existing political reality, and it points the way for the peaceful development of the institutions that are necessary to sustain this newly-created social order, once it has been attained. ## Part I. Individuality and Privacy ## Recommended Reading Wilhelm von Humboldt, _The Limits of State Action_ (Cambridge University Press, 1969). John Stuart Mill, “On Liberty,” in _The Utilitarians_ (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1973). David L. Norton, _Personal Destinies, A Philosophy of Ethical Individualism_ (Princeton University Press, 1976). Yehoshua Arieli, _Individualism and Nationalism in America_ (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1966), Chapters 6, 8, 9, and 12. Governments all around the world intrude massively into the private lives of their citizens and thereby attempt to mold their lives and minds. This is usually done in order to make the citizens conform to some broadly-defined notion of the “public interest,” and/or the desires of the ruling elite. These two disturbing facts of modern political life are in direct opposition to one of the most basic of libertarian tenets: the concept of the uniqueness, worth, dignity, and sanctity of the individual. This central concept of individualism is derived in large part from the Judeo-Christian tradition, especially as the concept was revived by the thirteenth-century philosopher, Saint Thomas Aquinas. According to Aquinas, what makes human souls quite different from one another is their union with different physical bodies (see F. C. Copleston, _Aquinas_, Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1955, 1966). This idea of the uniqueness and worth of the individual was further developed by the Dutch humanist, Desiderius Erasmus (1466– 1536); and the innerlight Protestants of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, who believed that every individual carried the divine presence within his or her soul. For a general history of this concept, see Wilson H. Coates, Hayden V. White, and J. Salwyn Schapiro, _The Emergence of Liberal Humanism: An Intellectual History of Western_ _Europe_, vol. 1, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), especially chapter one, “The New Religious Outlook: Toleration and Intellectual Freedom,” and chapter nine, “Intellectual and Religious Freedom.” Later, the twin concepts of individualism (which would perhaps be more properly named individuality, to avoid the often derogatory connotations of the word “individualism”) and privacy were more fully and consistently developed, both in their philosophical and political dimensions, by real liberals such as John Locke; Wilhelm von Humboldt, whose treatise _The Limits of State Action_, ed. J. W. Burrow (Cambridge University Press, 1969) is an elegant plea for the government to stay out of the lives of the people, which he argued would ensure moral autonomy and foster the richness and diversity of the individual, thus leading in his opinion to a higher civilized order; and the Marquis de Condorcet. His _Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind_ (trans. June Barraclough, New York: Noonday Press, 1955) was written while he awaited certain death at the hands of the Jacobins during the French Revolution; it is one of the premier testimonials to the unfettered human mind and to progress. Other liberal writers to whom the concepts of individuality and privacy were paramount include Benjamin Constant, _De l’esprit de conquête_ (On the Spirit of Conquest) in _De la liberté chez les modernes_ (On the Modern Concept of Liberty) ed. M. Gauchet (Paris: Livre de Poche, 1980); and John Stuart Mill, _On Liberty_. Others were Thomas Paine whose _Common Sense_ and _Rights of Man_ serve as two of the most passionately reasoned statements of natural law and individual rights ever written; and the individualist anarchist, William Godwin (1756–1836). Godwin’s _Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and its Influence on Modern Morals and Happiness_ (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1976), is a brilliant argument by an unreconstructed individualist for the necessity of social interaction and the absence of coercion for the full development and happiness of the individual (p. 757). For a recent analysis of Godwin’s thought, see John P. Clark, _The Philosophical Anarchism of William Godwin_ (Princeton University Press, 1977). Individuality means that while sharing with one’s fellow human beings a number of general characteris-tics—reason, purpose, will, rights—each individual is in fact unique, and potentially has something no one else has to offer his or her fellows (i.e., society). Although the eighteenth-and nineteenth-century liberals based their defense of individuality firmly on moral principles drawn from natural law, there is another dimension to the meaning of individuality that deserves mention. Developments since the Second World War in biochemistry and genetics have indicated that there are sound scientific reasons to support the idea of individuality. Roger J. William’s pathbreaking study, _Biochemical Individuality: The Basis for the Genetotrophic Concept_ (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1956, 1977) demonstrates, with a formidable array of evidence, that each person is genetically distinct from every other individual. This means that each individual has not only different physical characteris-tics, but is endowed with a mix of talents, propensities, and potential unlike any other person’s. He or she is thus truly unique and irreplaceable. This is an important scientific highlighting of the real liberal tenet of individuality or individuation. Such individuation is of obvious importance to the theory of the division of labor and social integration—topics which we will discuss at length in future sections of this paper. Furthermore, William’s findings seem to undercut much of the typical egalitarian case for redistributivist measures. Williams should be read alongside the following: Hampton C. Carson, _Heredity and Human Life_ (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963); Felix Morley, ed., _Essays on Individuality_ (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1977); and the title essay in Murray N. Rothbard’s _Egalitarianism as a Revolt Against Nature_ and _Other Essays_ (Washington, D.C.: Libertarian Review Press, 1974). > To universalize our behavior under given circumstances is not to hold that under these circumstances all persons ought to behave in identical fashion to ourselves, but rather to hold that every other person ought to act so as to express his unique personhood with respect to these circumstances, as we ourselves do. > > — David L. Norton, _Personal Destinies_ That each and every individual has something unique and valuable to offer his or her fellows is a view eloquently defended by the philosopher David L. Norton in _Personal Destinies: A Philosophy of Ethical Individualism_ (Princeton University Press, 1976). Norton’s work is a modern restatement of the philosophy of Eudaimonism, the roots of which lie in the ancient Greek Stoic school of philosophy. Following the Socratic instruction to “Know Thyself,” Eudaimonism offers the further instruction to “Become What You Are,” or in other words, “Be Thyself.” It is the philosophy of self-knowledge and self-actualization. Given a proper self-knowledge (i.e., what one genetically is and can do) then the pursuit of self-knowledge is synonymous with the pursuit of happiness. This of course has been a key element of real liberal thought throughout its history. Many liberals insisted that the individual has to be free so that he or she is able to pursue his or her own happiness directed only by his or her own unfettered powers of critical choice and conscience. These liberals did not necessarily believe that each individual would choose to be a self-actualizer in this fashion, but rather that individuals have to be free of outside political constraints so that they at least have the possibility of making these choices. One of the most interesting of Norton’s ideas is the concept of the “complementarity of excellences,” by which he means that “every genuine excellence benefits by every other genuine excellence. It means that the best within every person calls upon the best within every other person” (p. 10). This idea leads to a strong philosophical foundation for the division of labor and spontaneous order theories of social integration. Norton can be read along with Abraham Maslow, _Toward a Psychology of Being_ (New York: Van Nostrand, 1968); J. S. Mill, _On Liberty_; Herbert Spencer, _Social Statics_ (New York: Robert Schalkenback Foundation, 1970); Humboldt, _The Limits of State Action_; and Auberon Herbert, _The Voluntarist Creed_ (London: W. J. Simpson, 1908). All are classic statements on the uniqueness of the individual. The fact of individual uniqueness becomes especially important when we consider the process of social integration. Individual uniqueness implies differences, and it is these differences that establish the natural conditions of exchange, which in turn leads to the division of labor, specialization, comparative advantage, and the socio-economic exchange process. This important insight into the motives and conditions for mutually beneficial exchange and social integration was first made by the classical economists of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. It became a key insight of David Ricardo in his theory of comparative cost in the chapter “On Foreign Trade” in _The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation_, first published in 1817 (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, Everyman edition), ed. Ernest Rhys, pp. 77-93. On Ricardo’s contributions, see Samuel Hollander, _The Economics of David Ricardo_ (University of Toronto Press, 1979), “Comparative Cost and Specie Distribution,” pp. 459-473. Ludwig von Mises also stressed the idea that individual differences are the basis for social cooperation. His term for the economic aspect of the complementarity of excellences is the “law of association,” by which he means that through the division of labor both the less endowed, as well as the more talented, the more industrious, the more able, will mutually benefit from exchange. In fact, like William Godwin, Mises goes so far as to argue that not only is the individual better off by trading with his or her fellows, but actually requires society as the means for attaining all of his or her individual and personal ends. See _Human Action_ (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1949, 1963, 1966), “The Ricardian Law of Association,” pp. 159-164, and “The Individual Within Society,” pp. 165-166. The real liberal doctrine states that since each individual is unique and has the potential of practically unlimited growth and self-development, he or she is of inestimable worth both as an individual and as a member of society. Furthermore, each individual is an end in himself and therefore must be treated as such, never involuntarily serving as merely a means to another’s ends. The classic formulation of this position is given by Immanuel Kant in the _Groundwork of a Metaphysic of Morals_, H. J. Patton, trans, and ed. (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964). Although it is true that we all make use of others as means in our social and economic relationships, and although it is true that occasionally we “use” others “involuntarily” (for example, a member of one sex often derives pleasure from the welcome “externalities” emanating from the passing-by of a member of the opposite sex), we must always bear in mind Kant’s warning: under _no_ circumstances must we really involuntarily (i.e., by means of force or the threat of force) use another to achieve our ends. Each person is and must remain an end in him or herself. Each individual, being potentially morally perfectable, deserves to be treated as an equal by his fellows and by the law. (On human perfectability, see Condorcet’s _Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind_. In particular, the Tenth Section deals with the struggle between reason and superstition and power throughout history. It ends, in the Tenth Epoch, with a poetical vision of the future, a future of the free human mind, of science and a future worthy of optimism.) Each person, being a potentially dignified human being, deserves to be treated in a dignified manner (i.e., that one’s rights and privacy be respected). As long as a person refrains from infringing upon the equal rights of others, he or she must be accorded the rights to think, to act, and to exchange as he or she sees fit. This then is the essence of the real liberal doctrine of individuality and privacy. There must be a protected space around each individual which is reserved and protected for that individual’s unique enjoyment. An individual’s thoughts (whether religious or secular), property, and peaceful actions must be beyond the reach and jurisdiction of any individual or institution whatsoever. Unless the individual engages in some violent, criminal activity, he or she should on no account be interfered with. There are many histories of individualist thought and, unfortunately, they are of very uneven quality. A useful modern introduction is Steven Lukes, _Individualism_ (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), and “Types of Individualism,” by the same author, in _The Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies in Selected Pivotal Ideas_ ed. Philip P. Wiener (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1973), Vol. 2, pp. 594-604. Lukes’s works must be used with caution because the author is too tied to the ideas of egalitarianism and democracy to be sufficiently sympathetic to the subject of individualism. A far better, but much older work is by Albert Schatz, _L’Individualisme économique et sociale_ (Social and Economic Individualism) (Paris: Armand Colin, 1907). Schatz, being a classical liberal, is far more sympathetic than Lukes to the subject at hand, and is far more knowledgeable of the more radical strain of individualist thought that existed in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. For example, he is one of the few historians of liberal and individualist thought to give space to pioneer thinkers such as Jean-Baptiste Say, Charles Comte, Charles Dunoyer, Gustave de Molinari, and Benjamin Tucker. It is with Schatz’s book that any serious researcher of individualist thought must begin. > _In this respect, living in America is like serving in the army; ninety percent of conduct is prescribed by law and the remaining ten percent by the esprit de corps, with the consequence that opportunity for free choice in conduct is practically abolished._ > > — Albert Jay Nock, _On Doing the Right Thing_ Another classic presentation of individualism is Warner Fite, _Individualism: Four Lectures on the Significance of Consciousness for Social Relations_ (New York: Longmans, 1910, 1924), although it should be used with caution because Fite does not always draw real liberal conclusions from his work. One should not forget the contributions of F. A. Hayek, whose essay “Individualism: True or False,” in _Individualism and Economic Order_ (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1948, 1972) forms chapter one. It is provocative although fundamentally flawed because Hayek is excessively enamoured with English utilitarian social philosophy and misunderstands the nature of the European (especially the French) natural-law defense of individualism and individual rights. Other useful histories of aspects of individualist thought include K. W. Swart, “‘Individualism’ in the Mid-Nineteenth Century (1826–1860),” _Journal of the History of Ideas_ vol. 23, 1962, pp. 77–90; W. Ullman, _The Individual and Society in the Middle Ages_ (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966); and C. B. Macpherson, _The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke_ (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962). An important contribution to the history of individualist thought as it developed in the United States is the work of the Israeli historian Yehoshua Arieli, _Individualism and Nationalism in American Ideology_ (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1964, 1966), especially chapter six, “ ‘Natural Society’—The Evolution of a Social Ideal,” pp. 88–120; chapter eight, “The Jeffersonian Ideal—Social and Political Democracy,” pp. 156–178; chapter nine, “A European Concept Crosses the Atlantic,” pp. 179–206; and chapter twelve, “Foundations of the American Ideal of Individualism,” pp. 242–272.