# The Basic Tenets of Real Liberalism, Part II: Tolerance and Moral Autonomy **URL:** **By** Walter E. Grinder, David Hart **Published:** December 1, 1982 --- “To call for toleration of only that which one already approves of is hypocritical.” ## Recommended Reading Lysander Spooner, _Vices Are Not Crimes: A Vindication of Moral Liberty_ (Cupertino: Tanstaaf1, 1977). Robert Nozick, _Anarchy, State, and Utopia_ (New York: Basic Books, 1974), part 3. Albert Jay Nock, “On Doing the Right Thing,” in _Our Enemy the State_ (New York: Free Life Editions, 1973). Robert Paul Wolff, _In Defence of Anarchism_ (New York: Harper and Row, 1976). Tolerance of differences in thought and beliefs, as well as diversity of lifestyles, goes hand-in-hand with the real liberal position on individuality and privacy. It does not mean that one must necessarily accept, approve, or condone the beliefs and actions of others, but only that one refrain from initiating the use of force against them. To call for toleration of only that which one already approves of is hypocritical. Hence, one must also allow those beliefs of which one strongly disapproves, if the meaning of toleration is to have some sensible content. In addition, if one is to be consistent, one is required to extend the concept of toleration from thoughts and beliefs (the most intimate and private activity of human life) to toleration of action that is in accordance with those beliefs (especially peaceful economic activity). Tolerance of beliefs without tolerance of action is rightly seen to be a sham of the highest order. However, the so-called “tolerance” of the actual invasion of anyone’s rights would indeed be an abdication of one’s liberal principles. Thus one requires a method by which rights-violating behavior can be distinguished from unpleasant, obnoxious, or irrational, but uncoercive behavior. The means to make this distinction has been provided by the liberal tradition. It has been best expressed by the great nineteenth century English liberal, Herbert Spencer. His _law of equal freedom_ states that “every man \[and woman, ed.\] has freedom to do all that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man” (_Social Statics_ (New York: Rqbert Schalkenbach Foundation, 1970), p. 95). If Spencer’s equal liberty doctrine is universally applied, it provides a powerful method of distinguishing criminal activity from morally permissible, but perhaps offensive, activity. If a person’s beliefs lead to actions which violate the person or property rights of others, then and only then can that person be forcibly restrained and compelled to pay restitution. However, it is important to bear in mind the vital distinction between the rights-violating action and the beliefs themselves. In the strict sense, rights-violating crime that can be subject to legal action— “natural crimes,” to use the felicitous expression of Patrick Edward Dove, _The Theory of Human Progression and Natural Probability of a Reign of Justice_\- (Boston: Benjamin B. Mussey, 1851). The rule is, so long as person and property rights are not violated by actions, there should be no valid legal reasons for using force against anyone. Even if a person’s beliefs condone or suggest natural crime, the rule forbids using force against him, until he steps from belief to action. This distinction between the violent invasion of one’s property, and behavior that may transgress custom or even natural law, but does not violate anyone else’s property rights, was brilliantly perceived by the American individualist anarchist, Lysander Spooner, in his 1875 pamphlet, _Vices Are Not Crimes: A Vindication of Moral Liberty_ (Cupertino, California: Tanstaafi, 1977). The distinction noted by Spooner is a fundamental aspect of liberal political, social, and legal philosophy. It leads to the conclusion that all violations of property rights must be declared illegal, but vice (to use Spooner’s term), whilst perhaps immoral in some broader sense, must be allowed to flourish, and even be given the full protection of the law. Crime, in this view, exists only where there is an individual victim of some act of force or fraud (which can be defined as implicit force). But beyond this strict legal definition of tolerance and respect for rights lies another related dimension. Tolerance does not just mean that one respects the peaceful and voluntary activity of one’s fellow human beings solely by recognizing the law of equal liberty. This deeper meaning involves the traditional liberal regard for civility and manners (i.e. the art of getting along with one’s fellows in a social context). One expects to be treated by others as a rational and law-abiding individual and to be accorded the respect and dignity due such a person. Reciprocally, one should also grant these same niceties to others for the simple reason that, like you, they are individuals with similar feelings and rights, and have an equal desire to seek fulfillment, however they perceive it. Thus, one should be liberal and open-minded about all noncoercive human activity. > Each society has structures for carrying on conflict with other societies and structures for carrying on sustenation . . . the militant type, characterized by the \[former\], is framed on the principle of compulsory co-operation, while the industrial type, characterized by predominance of the \[latter\], is framed on the principle of voluntary co-operation . . . > > — Herbert Spencer, _Principles of Sociology_ There are sound natural law and utilitarian reasons for tolerating the apparently abhorent or annoying, but peaceful, activities of others. Because of the uniqueness of every individual and the very different ends which individuals choose to pursue, it is often the case that what appears to be “immoral” or obnoxious is just the result of that person’s efforts to be true to his or her self. It is impossible for an outsider to say whether this course of action will indeed lead to the fulfillment of that person’s potential. One may have strong doubts that this will happen and the desire to “save that person from themselves” may be well-intentioned and charitable. However, for moral and physical reasons one ultimately cannot live the life of another, and so one must respect that person’s natural right to seek self-fulfillment in his own way. In many cases, the obnoxious behavior of others may have beneficial economic consequences. However, it is certainly not “heroic,” as Walter Block has argued in _Defending the Undefendable: The Pimp, Prostitute, Scab, Slumlord, Libeler, Moneylender, And Other Scapegoats in the Rogues Gallery of American Society_ (New York: Fleet Press Corporation, 1976). A word of caution about Block’s book: it is a hardhitting and extreme defense of all voluntary interactions from both a moral and economic perspective. Most of the chapters are valid and cleverly done, but it is not to be recommended as an introduction to libertarian theory (especially for the tender-hearted) or as a guide to polite company and good manners. A far better (and more civilized) introduction to the problem of victimless crimes is Spooner’s above-mentioned _Vices Are Not Crimes_. Spooner, at least, does not claim that the practitioners of vice are heroes. Another utilitarian argument, besides Block’s economic one, for respecting the different beliefs and lifestyles of others is the argument concerning the greater diversity and richness of life that such activity brings into being. Because of the limitations on our knowledge of future events (see F. A. Hayek’s _The Use of Knowledge in Society_ (Menlo Park: Institute for Humane Studies, 1977) Studies in Economics no. 3) it is sometimes difficult to determine the ultimate consequences of a different way of life unless someone experiments with it. It may well be that this way of life has unexpected beneficial consequences that no one could have foreseen. This discovery may contribute immeasurably to the richness and diversity of our culture and increase, both for our children’s and our own benefit, the stock of experiences we can use and learn from. The most brilliant presentation of the possible beneficial results of allowing competing “Utopias,” operating within the framework of a libertarian legal code, is Robert Nozick’s _Anarchy, State, and Utopia_ (New York: Basic Books, 1974), Part III, “Utopia.” Anthony Sampson, in his chapter on “Liberalism and Creativity,” in _Liberty and Language_ (Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 37–89, makes the very important point that diversity of lifestyles and the freedom to practice them result in a considerable increase in cultural, scientific, and technological creativity. The result of this increase in creativity, nearly always unexpected and unpredicted, is a richer and more productive life than we would have had in its absence. Although extremely utilitarian in his defense of toleration, Samuel Brittan, in his _Capitalism and the Permissive Society_ (London: Macmillan, 1973), perceptively and sensitively shows that only under a regime of private property and free exchange can diverse lifestyles and opinions exist and be protected under the law. These utilitarian arguments for toleration are all very well, but the basic defense of toleration must ultimately lie with the natural right of each and every individual to live a life unmolested by others; free to seek personal fulfillment in whatever manner seems appropriate, as long as he or she does not initiate the use of force or fraud against any other individual. There is a second moral argument in defense of toleration, which goes to the heart of what it means to be a morally autonomous human being. One can argue that vice must not be made illegal, because vices are mistakes, whether witting or unwitting, with regard to natural law and the correct course of action which men and women should take in any given situation. One can learn the correct behavior only if one is allowed to make mistakes, and to learn from those mistakes. Spooner, in _Vices Are Not Crimes_, p. 32, is quite explicit about the importance of making mistakes, suffering the consequences and thereby gaining wisdom. This attitude is also a key insight in the thought of the Spencerians, such as William Graham Sumner (1840– 1910). See “On the Case of a Certain Man Who is Never Thought of” in _What Social Classes Owe to Each Other_ (Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton, 1961). In the delightful essay, “On Doing the Right Thing,” (an essay appended to _Our Enemy the State_ (New York: Free Life Editions, 1973 originally published in 1928.) ed. Walter E. Grinder), the great stylist Albert J. Nock argued that the moral development of the individual is stunted each time the State extends its activity into new areas, because the area available for the unhindered and free exercise of the human moral faculties is thus reduced. In fact, in moral philosophy there is a fundamental assumption that individuals are responsible for their actions. It makes no sense to say that an individual should or should not do something on moral grounds—i.e., place a bet on a football game—if that individual cannot freely choose between courses of action—i.e., if betting is illegal. There literally can be no such thing as morality unless one has the freedom to choose between alternatives, without external sources of coercion. > _And if these questions, which no one can really and truly determine for anybody but himself, are not to be left free and open for experiment by all, each person is deprived of the highest of all his rights as a human being, to wit: his right to inquire, investigate, reason, try experiments, judge, and ascertain for himself, what is, to him, virtue, and what is, to him, vice . . ._ > > — _Lysander Spooner, Vices are Not Crimes_ This notion of autonomy and toleration is a basic tenet of the classical liberal tradition and the linchpin of liberal moral and social philosophy. The great classical tradition of respect for the individual was revived by the thirteenth-century medieval philosopher Saint Thomas Aquinas, who argued that each individual must examine his or her own actions in the light of his or her own knowledge and his or her own conscience. (Walter Ullman, _The Individual and Society in the Middle Ages_ (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966).) This classical revival began a tradition of philosophic and religious self-examination, which finally led religious thinkers during the Reformation to begin demanding autonomy for the individual in religious matters. Unfortunately, it was only as a result of the physical exhaustion and horror at the atrocities of torture, imprisonment, and religious warfare in the name of salvation that many philosophers and theologians were led to demand an end to religious persecution and to call for recognizing the right of the individual to be left alone. However, many Protestant theologians, such as Luther and Calvin, presented excellent justifications for the autonomy of only their own particular sect in the battle against the coercive monopoly of the Roman Catholic Church. Both Lutherans and the Calvinists were more than willing to persecute others when they were able to achieve some political independence from Rome. The most persecuted sect of the Reformation, the Anabaptists (literally those baptised again), produced some of the best tracts calling for religious toleration and the fundamental right of the individual to pursue religious and political activities in peace. On Anabaptist ideas on peace and toleration, see G.H. Williams, _The Radical Reformation_ (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1962) and Peter Brock, _Pacificism in Europe to 1914_ (Princeton University Press, 1972). On the question of religious toleration in general during the Reformation the following books are recommended: Joseph Lecler, S.J., _Toleration and the Reformation_, 2 vols., trans. T.L. Westow (London: Longman, 1960); _Persecution and Liberty: Essays in Honor of George Lincoln Burr_ (New York: The Century Co., 1931); _Autour de Michel Servet et de Sébastien Castellon_, ed. B. Becker (Haarlem: H. D. Tjeenk Willink, 1953) on some key figures in the movement for religious toleration; Guido Kisch “_Toleranz und Menschenwürde_ (Tolerance and Human Dignity),” _Miscellanea Medievalia_, 4, (Berlin: 1966) on the particular problem of toleration towards the Jews in this period; and Roland H. Bainton, _The Travail of Religious Liberty_ (Hamden, Conn.: Shoestring Press, 1971). The dean of the liberal humanists was the Dutch classicist, Desiderius Erasmus (1466-1536), whose pleas for the cessation of hostilities and the settlement of religious disputes in a civil, restrained, and peaceful manner are still moving today. All of Erasmus’s work is infused with a spirit of tolerance towards his fellows and despair at human folly in waging pointless wars and in persecuting religious minorities. His best known and remembered works are _The Complaint of Peace_ (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1974), in which the personification of peace chastises mankind for indulging in the absurdities of constant warfare, and _Praise of Folly_ and _Letter to Martin Dorn_ (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973) trans. Betty Radice, in which Erasmus pokes fun at the hypocracies of his age. Roland Bainton’s _Erasmus of Christendom_ (London: Collins Fontana Library, 1969) is a very useful study of the life and thought of this great humanist scholar and liberal. On Erasmus’s views on war and peace, see Robert P. Adams, _The Better Part of Valor: More, Erasmus, Colet, and Peace, 1496–1535_ (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1962) and José A. Fernández, “Erasmus on the Just War,” _The Journal of the History of Ideas_, 34, 1973, pp.209–26. Specifically on toleration, see Wallace K. Ferguson, “The Attitude of Erasmus toward Toleration,” in _Persecution and Liberty: Essays in Honor of George Lincoln Burr_ (New York: The Century Co., 1931), pp.171–81. One of the first real liberals to put his mind and pen to the pressing problem of religious toleration in an age of religious intolerance was the great English poet and radical thinker, John Milton (1608–1674). Milton lived and wrote in a period of extreme social and political upheaval. During the English Civil War he wrote three great libertarian tracts defending religious toleration and the autonomy of the individual, _Areopagitica_, _Eikonklastes_, and _A Treatise of Civil Power in Ecclesiastical Causes_. (All are included in _The Student’s Milton_ (New York: F. S. Crofts and Co., 1947) ed. Frank Allen Patterson, pp. 731–53, 775–863, 863–914.) Milton argued for extreme tolerance in both the religious and secular world. The best modern treatment of Milton as a radical thinker is by the British Marxist, Christopher Hill, _Milton and the English Revolution_ (New York: Penguin, 1979). The main reference work on toleration in England is W. K. Jordan, _The Development of Religious Toleration in England_ (Harvard University Press, 1938). > War is that kind of evil which, when once admitted, cannot be excluded again at will; but usually, from a little one, becomes a very great one; from a single one, multiplies into a complication; from an unbloody contest changes to carnage, and at last rises to a storm, which does not overwhelm merely one or two, and those the chief instigators to the mischief, but all the unoffending people also; confounding the innocent with the guilty. > > — Erasmus, _The Complaint of Peace_ Later in the seventeenth century, two classics of tolerationist thought were published in the religious and political haven which was the Netherlands United Provinces. The first is _Commentaire philosophique sur les paroles de Jésus-Christ ‘contrains-les d’entrer’_ (Philosophical Commentary on Christ’s Words ‘Compel them to enter’) available in Elisabeth Labrousse, _Oeuvres Diverses_ (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1964–68) 4 vols., vol. 2. The author, Pierre Bayle, convincingly refuted, in exhaustive detail, all arguments which had been put forward in defense of persecution. Bayle was unusual in that he even extends toleration to include Jews, Moslems, Catholics, and atheists, although he retained certain restrictions on the free propagation of “anti-social” ideas by Catholics and atheists in particular. The best single work on the life and thought of Pierre Bayle is available only in French; Elisabeth Labrousse, _Pierre Bayle_, vol. 1: _Du pays du foix à la cité d’Erasme_, vol. 2: _Hétérodoxe et Rigorisme_ (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1963–64), especially chapter 18, “Tolérance ecclésiastique et tolérance civile,” pp. 520–43, and chapter 19 “La liberté de conscience,” pp. 544–91. There are two useful English works, Karl C. Sandberg, _At the Crossroads of Faith and Reason: An Essay on Pierre Bayle_ (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1966), especially chapter 8, “Faith and Tolerance,” pp. 68–80; and the collection by Walter Rex, _Essays on Pierre Bayle and Religious Controversy_ (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1965). Bayle’s best-known work is his _Historical and Critical Dictionary_, which is expertly introduced and edited by Richard H. Popkin (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965). The second classic published in the freedom of the Netherlands was John Locke’s _Epistola de Toleratia_. _A Letter on Toleration_, trans J. W. Gough, introduced by R. Klibansky (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968). This essay is a glorious statement in defense of toleration, in spite of Locke’s unfortunate qualification of tolerance in the case of atheists. It was a common view at the time that because atheists refused to take oaths, they were therefore a risk to security and social cohesiveness. Klibansky’s introduction and J. W. Gough’s essay, “The Development of Locke’s Belief in Toleration,” in _John Locke’s Political Philosophy. Eight Essays by J. W. Gough_ (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973) are good introductions to Locke’s thinking on the question of tolerance. The Dutch philosopher, Benedict Spinoza (1632–1677), should also be mentioned in connection with the idea of toleration. As a Jew and a rationalist, he was particularly aware of the problem of persecution. Like Bayle and Locke, Spinoza sought refuge in the relative security of the Netherlands, where he wrote his famous _Ethics_ (1677), in which he deals with the problem of individual autonomy. The best edition is _Ethics_ preceded by _On the Improvement of the Understanding_ (New York: Hafner, 1949), ed. James Gutman. On the importance of the Netherlands as a political refuge and as a source of tolerationist thought, see John J. Murray, “The cultural impact of the Flemish Low Countries in sixteenth-and seventeeth-century England,” _American Historical Review_, 62, 1956–57, and C. Louise Thijssen-Schouten, “La diffusion européenne des idées de Bayle,” in _Pierre Bayle. Le Philosophe de Rotterdam_ (Paris: Librairie Vrin, 1959) ed. Paul Dibon, pp. 150–195. In Germany, the jurist and political philosopher, Samuel von Pufendorf (1633–1694) made fundamental contributions to the natural-law defense of individual sovereignty and religious tolerance. Pufendorf built upon the work on natural law by the Dutch humanist and jurist, Hugo Grotius (_De Jure Belli ac Pacis_—_On the Law of War and Peace_ (1625) (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution, 1913–25) 2 vols.). Pufendorf’s argument for the right of the individual to legal equality and liberty, presented in the 1672 work _De Jure Naturae et Gentium_—_On the Law of Nature and Nations_ (New York: Oceana, 1964) 2 vols., was based on his theory of the dignity of men and women and their inherent sociability. Pufendorf vigorously defended the individual’s freedom of conscience and the idea of tolerance in general in _De Habitu Religionis Christianae ad Vitam Civilem_ (On the Attitude of the Christian Religion to the Civil Life, 1687). Useful introductions to the thought of these giants of international and natural law include Leonard Krieger, _The Politics of Discretion, Pufendorf and the Acceptance of Natural Law_ (University of Chicago Press, 1965); Charles S. Edwards, _Hugo Grotius. The Miracle of Holland. A Study in Political and Legal Thought_ (Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1981); and the relevant chapters of Richard Tuck, _Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development_ (Cambridge University Press, 1979). > Others must recognize the inalienable right u mankind, to profess doctrines which we believe with the truth. > > — Pierre Bayle, _Letter IX in Oeu_ These theoretical advances in defense of individual autonomy and toleration were not quickly translated into political or social reform. Mankind had to wait almost two centuries until the political successes of the Enlightenment (largely due to the intellectual activity of Voltaire and the Philosophes) for the autonomy of the individual in regard to religious matters to be even partially recognized, and then extended, to the domain of political and economic activity. The best introduction to the Philosophes’ struggle for religious toleration is “Toleration: A Pragmatic Campaign” in _The Enlightenment: An Interpretation, Volume II: The Science of Freedom_ (New York: Norton, 1977), pp. 398–407, by Peter Gay. A brilliant and explicit attempt to push religious protestantism into the political realm (classical liberalism could perhaps be seen as a form of political protestantism) is Edmund Burke’s (1729–1797) early essay, “A Vindication of Natural Society; or a View of the Miseries and Evils Arising to Mankind from every Species of Artificial Society” (1756). A modern critical edition edited by Frank N. Pagano, has just been published as _A Vindication of Natural Society_, (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1982). Burke argued that deistic attacks on the privileges of the state church are, in theory, similar to the radical natural-law attack on all forms of “artificial” political society and its privileges. He further reasoned that, if it was wrong for the church to impose its monopoly of belief and worship, then it must also follow that it is wrong for the state, in any form, to impose its political monopoly of coercion. In Burke’s view, all voluntary activities and associations make up what he called “natural society.” Opposed to this was what he called “artificial society,” which included all coercive and political institutions. These institutions (governments, monopoly state churches) were the creation of some deliberate act of power which had as its aim, the control or destruction of voluntary activity. Scholars are not certain whether Burke’s essay was a piece of youthful radicalism, or an exercise in rhetoric and satire, because the views expressed in this pamphlet are very different from Burke’s later, very conservative political philosophy. In support of the view that the “Vindication” is a serious and radical document, see Isaac Kramnick, _The Rage of Edmund Burke: Portrait of an Ambivalent Conservative_ (New York: Basic Books, 1978) and the article by Murray N. Rothbard, “A Note on Burke’s Vindication of Natural Society,” in _Journal of the History of Ideas_, 1958, pp. 114–18. Perhaps the classic statement of individual autonomy can be found in the writings of the German Enlightenment philosopher, Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). We have mentioned Kant in a previous essay in the _Humane Studies Review_ (vol. 1, no. 2) so we will not deal with his thought at length here, except to mention that the best statement of his views on autonomy and individual sovereignty can be found in the _Groundwork of a Metaphysic of Morals_ (New York: Harper and Row, 1964) ed. H. J. Paton. A modern version of Kant’s theory of autonomy has been very effectively used by the philosophers Robert Paul Wolff and Antony Flew. Wolff’s short classic, _In Defense of Anarchism_ (New York: Harper Colophon, 1976) is must reading. The first chapter is important, especially sections 2 and 3, “The Concept of Autonomy” and “The Conflict Between Authority and Autonomy.” The English philosopher Antony Flew convincingly argues for a neo-Kantian version of personal equality based upon individual autonomy, and argues against various forms of coercive egalitarianism in “The Procrustean Ideal: Libertarians v. Egalitarians,” _Encounter_ 1978, vol. 1, no. 3, and in his book _The Politics of Procrustes_ (London, M. Temple Smith, 1980). > By sure and uncontested principles, the greatest part of the governments on earth must be concluded tyrannies, impostures, violations of the natural rights of mankind, and worse than the most disorderly anarchies. > > — Edmund Burke, _Vindication of Natural Society_ As Immanuel Kant, Anthony Flew, and Robert Paul Wolff demonstrate, in order to be a truly human and social being, every individual must retain and exercise his or her moral autonomy. He or she must be left free to act according to the dictates of his or her conscience and reason. The individual may make mistakes, but these errors do not excuse the individual from responsibility. If moral autonomy is to have any meaning, each individual must assume full responsibility for all his or her actions. Tolerance is crucially important in protecting the moral autonomy of the individual. In effect, tolerance creates the conditions that allow each individual the maximum number of alternatives. Furthermore, tolerance is morally necessary, if each individual is to be allowed to live a moral life. Only in choosing among alternatives can an individual attempt to achieve moral perfectibility. In theory, moral perfection is attainable by every individual, if each makes a persistent and constant effort to choose the good and act accordingly. In practice, given the failings and weaknesses of the human spirit, such persistence will prove difficult, but it is clearly not a physical or logical impossibility. Any impediment blocking or hindering the exercise of one’s free will, or preventing one from living in accordance with the “inner vision” provided by one’s conscience and reason (subject, as always, to the doctrine of equal liberty), should not be countenanced. This liberal concern for the unhindered pursuit of one’s vision is a major element of two of the greatest statements of man’s moral perfectibility: William Godwin’s _Enquiry Concerning Political Justice_ (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978), ed. Isaac Kramnick, and Condorcet’s “Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind,” in _Selected Writings_, ed. Keith Michael Baker (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1976). Real liberals must strenuously oppose all intolerance and all coercive impediments to individual moral development. This must be done not only because diverse lifestyles and beliefs are likely to benefit all individuals in society with increased creativity and a larger choice of alternatives, but primarily because it is the morally correct thing to do. We will continue to describe the basic principles that real liberals consider to be morally correct in further issues of the _Review_.