# LR Editorials (July 1981) **URL:** **Published:** July 1, 1981 --- “What American allies need is the freedom to act on their own perceptions and pursue their own interests; they are laying claim to this freedom right now, and true U.S. interests — peace and security — will be served only by giving it to them.” One of the presumptions behind America’s apparently endless series of alliances, treaties, and multinational agreements is that the interests of America and of its allies are one and the same. The Reagan administration is finding out that this isn’t necessarily the case. In fact, intentionally or not, some of the Reagan administration’s recent moves in the international arena are helping to destablize the governments of some of its allies. Two decisions by the administration have played a key role here: the decisions to carry through on President Carter’s proposal to station 572 new nuclear weapons on European territory, and to pressure Europeans and the Japanese to increase their military capabilities. In his very first press conference, Reagan announced his conception of Soviet intentions and capabilities and attacked the Russians with classic right wing cold war rhetoric, claiming that they were after world domination and that they would do anything—lie, cheat, steal, you name it—to achieve their goals, which had not changed, he alleged, since the time of Lenin. Last February, Alexander Haig went public with a collection of captured documents purporting to demonstrate Soviet coordination of the shipment of massive amounts of military equipment to the rebels in El Salvador — even through a careful reading of the documents themselves showed neither “Soviet coordination” (in fact, the Soviets had given Salvadoran communist Handal the cold shoulder) nor any evidence of “massive” arms transfers. And in March, Reagan national security adviser Richard Allen chided our Western European allies for their alleged “pacifism” and urged them to increase their defense spending by at least 3 percent per year in real terms over the next five years. Finally, talks were initiated with the Japanese to convince them to reverse the anti-military policies which they have followed since the end of World War II. All these U.S. moves have helped to undermine the positions of Western European and Japanese leaders, and may even have helped defeat France’s President Giscard d’Estaing and elect Socialist Francois Mitterrand in his place. France withdrew from NATO and adopted an independent posture in 1966 because it conceived its own national security needs to be quite different from those Americans thought necessary. In recent years, however, Giscard had cooperated closely with the U.S. and NATO in their defense plans and had formed a particularly close relationship with West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. In this year’s election, Giscard’s major opponent, Francois Mitterrand, indicated that while he is anti-Soviet and pro-NATO, he would, if elected, reverse Giscard’s policy of discreet military cooperation with the U.S. and return to the independent path. In the heated debates which preceded the elections, Mitterrand said that he would try to “insulate” France from Soviet-American rivalry, and would oppose the bipolarization of global politics. A good many French voters were apparently wary of an increasing militarization of Europe, for Mitterrand (with a little help from the U.S.) achieved what many had once thought to be impossible, defeated Giscard, and called for new parliamentary elections. West Germany is another American ally whose leader faces trouble because of American foreign policy. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt has long been regarded as a leader of unusual stability, he has cooperated more closely with the United States than has any other European leader — and he has been under fire in his country for it. When Schmidt finally gave in to Reagan administration pressure to increase defense spending, he came under assault from a growing faction in his own Social Democratic Party as well as from leftist opponents who support negotiations with the Soviets and partial disarmament. His talks with Reagan during the week of May 18 failed to get the Reagan administration to back off from its policies; the best he could get was a promise that Reagan would initiate new talks with the Soviets about demilitarizing Europe. Schmidt had said he would “stand or fall” by the NATO decision to station the 572 new nuclear weapons — partially on German soil — and it appears increasingly likely that he will fall. In a recent West Berlin election, Schmidt’s Social Democrats suffered their worst losses since World War II, and the left wing Alternative Party, which took a strongly anti-NATO stand, more than doubled its previous vote, winning nine seats in the city parliament. In Britain, a third ally affected by Reagan foreign policy measures, the Labour Party is making gains by campaigning, not just against the deployment of the nuclear missiles, but for complete British withdrawal from NATO. And Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government is raising taxes — rather than slashing them, as she proposed when running for office — partly to pay for the defense buildup which Americans want Britain to undertake. Reagan’s foreign policy, in short, is partly responsible for the fact that Thatcher is finding it difficult to follow a “Reaganite” program for economic recovery. And in Japan, the government of Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki is reeling from the effects of American foreign policy moves. Suzuki, visiting the U.S. in early May, told American reporters shortly before talking with Reagan that the Japanese people wouldn’t stand for an increase in defense spending and indicated that, if he attempted to push for more, he might lose the next election and open the door for a Socialist-Communist coalition government in Japan. Nevertheless, the Reagan administration continued to press the Japanese Prime Minister, and by the time he left Washington he had signed a joint U.S.-Japanese communique which said that Japan would make greater efforts to improve its defense capabilities in its surrounding sea and air base. Japanese public reaction to the communique was so sharp that, within days, Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ito resigned, taking full responsibility for the communique. Resigning as well was Administrative Vice Minister Masuo Takashima. And a week later, when a former U.S. ambassador to Japan asserted that Tokyo had permitted American warships to carry nuclear weapons in and out of Japanese harbors, still more debris hit the fan. Embarrassed Japanese officials made a host of excuses, claimed to know nothing about the matter, then hedged and hedged again. Another “pro-American” government had been undermined by U.S. foreign policy pressures. It is becoming more and more apparent that the interests of France, the NATO countries, and Japan are rapidly and dramatically diverging from those of the United States. For too long, American foreign policy makers have assumed that the post-World War II global polarization of nations into the “American bloc” and the “Soviet bloc” would last forever. But it hasn’t. By such Reagan advisers as Richard Allen this divergence is seen as “a failure of will” or “pacifism,” but our allies see it differently. To them, American perceptions of Soviet intentions and capabilities are exaggerated to the point of being a caricature of reality. Since Reagan’s ascent to power, the gap between American perceptions and those of our allies has widened more rapidly than ever before. Conservative or centrist foreign leaders draw close to the United States and its incessant lectures on the Soviet threat — and their domestic support starts to unravel. Naturally interested in political survival, they try to walk a difficult line between their more left-leaning critics at home and the American policy makers who are urging them to respond to Soviet threats they’re not even sure exist. Libertarians are no great fans of the governments and leaders of the Western-style democracies, whether they be conservative, centrist, or socialist. We find it difficult to declare with certainty whether or not a European mixed economy state under, say, a Schmidt is any “better” than one directed by a Mitterrand. Nor do we prize stability of regimes as the ultimate value in shaping American foreign policy, unlike the American policy makers who for years have labored desperately to hold together a network of global alliances to force the interests of other nations to mesh with our own. And this, in a sense, is the whole point. The network of alliances on which U.S. foreign policy is built is coming un-glued, whether Americans like it or not. We spend hundreds of billions of dollars “protecting” Europe and Japan with our troops and our nuclear umbrella — and, not surprisingly, the Europeans and Japanese are beginning to see our efforts less as a protection than as a threat. Particularly in Europe, the U.S.-instigated plan to station 572 new nuclear missiles, far from being a security measure, threatens to transform the entire European continent into a nuclear “sponge,” which would, in the event of a war, absorb hundreds of Soviet nuclear warheads sent to counter this threat to Soviet security. And, questions of military strategy and tactics aside, American pressure for Europeans and Japanese to increase their military spending is less than welcome in countries whose economies were shaken by the latest series of global recessions. The Reagan administration is well aware that over 60 percent of the incredible $1.5 trillion it proposes to spend on “defense” over the next five years will be allocated, directly or indirectly, to Europe and Japan. But even this is not enough: With no lessening of the American role, the Europeans and Japanese must spend more themselves. America’s continuing dominant role in shaping the affairs of other nations may well be the key to the problem. The Western Europeans and Japanese simply don’t agree with the American analysis of the allegedly changing balance of power in the world, and American insistence on using money, weapons, and pressure to extort their acquiescence has upset the very “stability” which the Reagan administration claims it wants. What American allies need is the freedom to act on their own perceptions and pursue their own interests; they are laying claim to this freedom right now, and true U.S. interests — peace and security — will be served only by giving it to them. The U.S. should announce or negotiate a withdrawal from our political and military involvement in these countries, and cut its own defense spending accordingly. If such an abrupt foreign policy reversal would require a complete reevaluation of American foreign policy interests, then the sooner the better. The present American position can’t be held. One and a half trillion dollars in military spending will not only undermine Reagan’s hope of “an economic program for recovery,” but it plays havoc with the domestic politics of other nations and will probably push them in a leftward direction. And, most important, all those dollars do nothing to enhance our own security, but do much to escalate tensions and crises. Reagan’s call for “a new beginning” will ring hollow unless it includes turning our back on a failed foreign policy which is making us all poorer and less secure. □ —RAC