# A New Defense of Natural Rights Human Rights: Fact or Fancy? by Henry Veatch **URL:** **By** Fred Miller, Patrick Steinbauer **Published:** September 1, 1987 --- “These three streams converge in a recent book by the philosopher Henry Veatch, Human Rights: Fact or Fancy?” Three streams of thought have gained prominence in philosophy during the past decade. First and most generally, normative ethics and political philosophy have regained a central place among academic philosophers. Many earlier twentieth-century philosophers had maintained that statements concerning what things are good and what a person ought to do were cognitively meaningless and incapable of rational justification. But these assumptions, common to positivism and analytic philosophy, have been widely called into question, and the publication of John Rawls’s _Theory of Justice_ (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971) ushered in a period of intense interest in ethical and political theory, and the application of such theory to questions of public policy. During the past few years, moreover, the concept of rights, long in disrepute, has become a focus of philosophical inquiry. Second, a genuine renaissance in the study of Greek philosophy began in the 1960s, practiced by scholars with finely honed interpretive and critical skills, who take the arguments and theories of Plato, Aristotle, and others very seriously. Since the appearance of John Cooper’s _Reason and Human Good in Aristotle_ (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), philosophers have been increasingly persuaded of the importance of Aristotle’s ethics and politics. Third, after a long period of obscurity, what may be called “classical liberalism,” “libertarianism,” or “individualism,” has emerged as a force to be reckoned with, especially following the publication of Robert Nozick’s _Anarchy, State, and Utopia_ (New York: Basic Books, 1974). These three streams converge in a recent book by the philosopher Henry Veatch, _Human Rights: Fact or Fancy_? Veatch has himself been in the forefront of the first two developments. In _For an Ontology of Morals: A Critique of Contemporary Ethical Theory_ (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1971) he defended traditional normative ethics against its leading twentieth-century critics, and in _Aristotle: A Contemporary Appreciation_ (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974) he argued for the relevance of Aristotelian thought to a whole range of modern philosophical issues. More recently, he has come to appreciate the force of classical liberal thought. Although he parts company in important ways with classical liberals, he has also been influenced by them. In chapter one Veatch surveys four types of ethical theory — state of nature, social contract, teleology, and deontology — and contends that each fails to provide an adequate justification for the law. In chapter two Veatch lays the foundations for his own ethical theory, following the tradition of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and Richard Hooker, for whom ethical truths are ultimately based on “natural laws.” These laws are different from the laws of nature (for example, gravity), according to which natural processes occur in the same way in the same circumstances. Rather, natural laws are analogous to the rules of skill appropriate to a particular art or technique: for example, the rules of the medical art enable the doctor to promote the end or objective of health. But whereas rules of skill promote specific ends that people pursue as a result of preference or whim, natural laws are needed for a human being to attain his natural end, that is, “the end or goal or fulfillment of human life as a whole.” Because this end is “set and determined by nature, or by man’s very nature as a human being,” we can say that “nature prescribes \[natural laws\] as being necessary to follow if one’s natural human end is to be achieved.” Hence, Veatch has an objective conception of the good: “What is the good of a thing if not its full being, or its fulfillment or perfection, toward which it is ordered by nature or by its own nature.” He embraces Aristotle’s characterization of natural human perfection as _eudaimonia_, that is, happiness or flourishing. He relies on Aristotle’s own justification of this theory of the good, recapitulating Aristotle’s “criteria for determining just what the good for man — his natural end or _telos_ — must consist of”: activity and exercise of human capacities; practical use of reason; choice and moral virtue, and personal freedom and autonomy in the living of one’s life. (Veatch concedes that the latter is not mentioned explicitly by Aristotle, but contends that it is “implicit in nearly all that he says.”) > Natural laws are analogous to the rules of skill appropriate to a particular art or technique. . . . In chapter three Veatch derives his theory of the common good and human rights. For Veatch the common good is a system or institutional arrangement for procuring the so-called goods of life that human individuals need and want if they are to attain their full life or their natural perfection. Borrowing a leaf from Aristotle, he argues that such a notion of the common good is consistent with the particular ends because each individual human being is a “political animal”— implying an integrated structure of ends, with the common good permeating the individual’s good. Veatch next embarks on his own derivation and analysis of rights. This is the real philosophical core of the book, and his most ambitious and original contribution. Veatch claims that all previous attempts to provide a justification of individual rights have failed, including traditional theories like _John Locke_’s and more recent efforts such as _Robert Nozick_’s and _Alan Gewirth_’s. To appreciate the problem of deriving individual rights, it is necessary to appreciate their peculiar moral force. The moral ‘bite’ of rights claims is found in their correlative duties. In the simple case of a debt, if Smith has a right against Jones to be paid ten dollars, then Jones has a duty to Smith to pay him ten dollars. More generally, if Smith has a right to freedom of action, then everyone else has a duty to respect Smith’s freedom of action. The problem is how to justify the ascription of such rights to individuals without arguing in a circle or committing a _non sequitur_. For example, to derive rights from the undefended assumption that individuals have duties towards each other would be to beg the question. The key move in Veatch’s argument is the claim that the rights of individuals are based on self-regarding duties derived from their natural ends. “For given the notion of an end or goal or perfection of human life that is determined by man’s nature, it follows that the business of living, for a human being, must consist of an ongoing enterprise of trying to become and be simply what one ought to be. That is, because man’s natural end is determined for him by nature, that end will be obligatory, and in consequence a person’s every action and his entire behavior will need to be governed by a regard for his duties toward himself.” Further, from the fact that Smith is under an obligation to do X, Veatch infers that Smith has a right not to be interfered with or prevented from discharging this obligation. Veatch suggests that this inference involves a variant of the principle that “ought” implies “can.” Veatch next considers whether people have merely negative rights to life, liberty, and property, which are rights against the initiation of force by others, or whether they also have positive rights to be provided with various goods and services that they need but are unable to procure by themselves. This is a serious problem for Veatch since he understands human rights in terms of ‘our human needs—that is, what is necessary to us if we are to acquit ourselves of our responsibilities as rational and political animals.’ This might seem to open the floodgates for a ‘veritable torrent of rights,’ namely welfare rights, including rights to food, clothing, housing, employment, etc. Veatch finds such rights problematic because it appears that ‘there is no way a government can acquit itself of this supposed obligation to guarantee men their positive rights without the government’s at the same time, and almost inevitably, having to violate some of men’s negative rights in order to do so.” Veatch argues that he can make a reasoned distinction between negative and positive rights: ‘we might be said already to possess such things as are said to be ours by negative right and . . . for this reason we are not to be deprived of them, at least not rightfully’; whereas ‘all of the so-called positive rights are those that human beings who are said to have a right to them do not possess, and therefore it is claimed that they have a right to become possessed of them.’ The fundamental difference between them is ‘the difference between claiming a right to what is already ours, either by nature or by dint of our own labor, and claiming a right to what is not yet ours but what we want to be ours.’ As for benefits such as food, clothing, shelter, education, health care, a minimum wage, etc., he says, ‘We are not initially entitled to these things because we are obligated to work for and provide ourselves with them.’ Veatch’s partiality toward negative rights is supported by his conception of flourishing or the good life as essentially ‘a do-it-yourself job,’ as opposed to the mere satisfaction or gratification of needs. > To appreciate the problem of deriving individual rights, it is necessary to appreciate their peculiar moral force. The moral ‘bite’ of rights claims is found in their correlative duties. Veatch thus agrees with classical liberals in construing rights as essentially negative rather than as positive ‘welfare rights.’ But he proceeds to construe the common good so broadly as to “vouchsafe” to individuals living in a political community ‘many of the substantive elements in so-called positive rights,’ for example, providing educational facilities, health care, transportation systems, etc. In chapter four Veatch discusses the possible underpinnings of his natural law ethics. He has said from the beginning of the book that a natural right should somehow be grounded in reality and it is in this chapter that he tries to make some room for this assertion. Veatch addresses a dilemma posed by _Leo Strauss_: the justification of natural rights and natural law presupposes a ‘teleological conception of the universe,’ but modern science has determined that the universe can be better explained nonteleologically. Nevertheless, Veatch offers cogent reasons why the natural philosopher need not surrender a teleological view of nature. From the foregoing summary, it should be evident that Veatch’s book is a rich and stimulating work. His argument gives rise to many questions and should be a stimulus to further research in several directions. We can only briefly indicate a few of them here. In the first place, while Veatch grounds his ethical theory on an Aristotelian conception of the human good as objective, involving the natural end of happiness or flourishing, this sort of theory has been criticized relentlessly in the modern philosophical literature. For example, Alasdair MacIntyre in _After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory_ (South Bend, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981) argues that the theory is based on Aristotle’s teleological theory, according to which living things belong to eternal species and behave according to final causes or purposes, and that this theory has been superseded by modern evolutionary biology; thus, “any adequate generally Aristotelian account must supply a teleological account which can replace Aristotle’s metaphysical biology.” The elaboration of such an account, if possible at all, poses a powerful challenge. The Aristotelian argument has been subjected to internal criticism as well. Aristotle states that “we are looking for the function peculiar to man,” and concludes that it is “the practical life of man as possessing reason.” But Bernard Williams has objected: “If one approached without preconceptions the question of finding characteristics which differentiate men from other animals, one could as well . . . end up with a morality which exhorted men to spend as much time as possible in making fire; or developing peculiarly human physical characteristics; or having sexual intercourse without regard to season; . . . or killing things for fun.” (_Morality: An Introduction to Ethics_ \[New York: Harper and Row, 1972\]). Recent commentators have argued that Aristotle himself recognizes (some of the time, at any rate) human beings have an irreducible plurality of ends, including at least theoretical contemplation and political activity. Some followers of Aristotle suggest that the natural end can accommodate such a plurality of ends, understood as fitting together into a harmonious whole. Against this, Bernard Williams in _Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy_ (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985) and Stuart Hampshire in _Freedom of Mind_ (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971) have suggested that it may be impossible to resolve the conflicting demands between the different components of human flourishing. One might of course try to rank these components, but it could then be objected that the attempt to advance one component of flourishing ahead of another implicitly assumes another set of unjustified values, and consequently that the theory of flourishing would lose its putative status as an objective ethic, reducing itself to a version of moral relativism. (This sort of objection is offered in Gilbert Harman, “Human Flourishing, Ethics, and Liberty,” _Philosophy \& Public Affairs_ 12 \[1983\], 307-322; for a reply see David L. Norton, _Reason Papers_ 10 \[1985\], 101-105.) Finally, John Gray (_Liberalism_ \[Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986\]) has raised a powerful objection against the natural law argument by posing a thought-experiment. “Let us suppose we are in a position (one we may well occupy in the middle future, given the possibilities of genetic engineering) to alter the content of man’s nature or essence: how could the natural law ethic of realizing man’s distinctive powers help us here?” Because the natural law theory simply takes it for granted that humans have the capacities they do, it could provide us with no ethical guidance as to whether humans ought to continue to have all of these capacities or whether they should cease to have some and acquire others. > The crucial move in Veatch’s derivation is his insistence that since an individual has a duty to pursue his natural end, he has a right to do so. A second area of concern is the justification of individual rights. The crucial move in Veatch’s derivation is his inference that since an individual has a duty to pursue his natural end, he has a right to do so. As mentioned, Veatch thinks that this inference involves a variant of the principle that “ought” implies “can.” > “Just as it is acknowledged that one can hardly be said to have an obligation to perform any action that one is totally incapable of performing, might it not be a logical inverse of this that, granting that I do indeed have a duty or obligation to perform a certain action, then to render me incapable or unable to perform the action would surely be a violation of my right?” Let us unpack this argument a bit. We grant the point that Smith has a natural end _E_, which requires that Smith perform as a means some type of action _M_. This yields the premise: 1\. Smith ought to do _M_. So far this is strictly a self-regarding duty, that is, a duty that Smith has to himself, as opposed, say, to a duty to Jones. Now, according to the “ought” implies “can” principle, 2\. If Smith ought to do _M_, then Smith can do _M_. From (1) and (2) it follows that 3\. Smith can do _M_. What is the “logical inverse” that Veatch needs for his argument? Suppose Jones interferes with Smith’s flourishing, using coercion to prevent Smith from acting. The “ought’ implies “can” principle does suggest that it would be unreasonable in such a case to insist that Smith ought to do _M_ and to blame Smith for failing to do it, when Jones was making it impossible for Smith to do so. This suggests the following argument: 4\. Jones brings it about that it is not the case that Smith can do _M_. 5\. If Jones brings it about that it is not the case that Smith can do _M_, then Jones brings it about that it is not the case that Smith ought to do _M_. 6\. Therefore, Jones brings it about that it is not the case that Smith ought to do _M_. Here (5) can plausibly be characterized as a sort of “inverse” of (2). Unfortunately, (6) is a far cry from what we need in order to infer that Jones is violating Smith’s rights if Jones prevents Smith from doing _M_. That, of course, would imply that Jones has a duty to Smith. But all that Veatch’s premises establish is that Smith has a duty to Smith. To establish the conclusion he wants, Veatch needs a premise stronger than the logical inverse of “ought” implies “can.” The following might do the trick: 7\. Nobody ought to bring it about that another person cannot discharge self-regarding duties. From this it would follow that Jones ought not to prevent Smith from doing M, from which one might infer that Smith has a right against Jones not to be interfered with. But such a derivation would depend on the unjustified assumption of interpersonal duties, a type of derivation that Veatch eschews as circular. Hence, it remains to provide a suitable bridge between self-regarding duties and other-regarding rights. Another objection (which Veatch considers) is that he has charged government with two incompatible duties: to promote the common good and to protect individual citizens in their rights. To meet this objection, Veatch argues that natural rights are not absolute, although they are inalienable. He explains his use of the term “absolute” by contrasting it with “derivative and dependent” and with “limited.” These uses are related: because rights for Veatch are derived from our natural, self-regarding duties, they are also limited by these ends to what is needed “if an individual is to live his life as a responsible rational and political individual.” Veatch is willing to concede that the promotion of the common good should be constrained by individual rights: the individual can be compelled to contribute to the common good “provided always that what is being demanded of him is not sacrifice of such life, liberty, or property as are essential and necessary to his being truly human. In this regard, and with respect to these truly inalienable rights of an individual, as Nozick rightly remarks, there can be ‘no justified sacrifice of some of us for others.’” Even this qualified position, however, raises serious questions. There is a disconcerting vagueness in the implication that one may be deprived of such life, liberty, or property as are not “essential and necessary to his being truly human.” Just how much is one entitled to have on Veatch’s account? The suggestion that this will be decided by “the courts” is not altogether reassuring, in view of the penchant of today’s courts for massive redistribution of property. Moreover, the implication that this limit can be determined for a person by a governmental authority seems inconsistent with Veatch’s thesis that flourishing is a “do-it-yourself job” and that it is up to individuals to determine what form their flourishing should take. Finally, in giving the state extensive powers to redistribute wealth, Veatch might be accused of compromising on his commitment to freedom and autonomy as an essential criterion of human flourishing. Veatch offers an important addition to the literature on human rights. His book includes an original and suggestive justification of individual rights and their proper place in public policy deliberations. He is a remarkably clear author, easily accessible to the nonspecialist, with a writing style that is elegant yet unpretentious, drawing freely on literary as well as philosophical sources. As an academic philosopher, Veatch is remarkable for his open-mindedness, his willingness to argue with, and to draw insights from, philosophers of widely different perspectives. As a result of this, the reader is introduced to a wide range of thinkers who appear on the scene as active participants in the current debate about human rights, rather than in a dull historical succession. As in his other works, Henry Veatch argues in a decidedly Socratic manner. And like the interlocutors of Socrates in Plato’s dialogues, the reader may expect to be informed, entertained, and — above all — provoked into further inquiry by Veatch’s arguments. _Fred D. Miller Jr. is professor of philosophy and executive director of the Social Philosophy and Policy Center at Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio. Patrick Steinbauer is a research assistant at the Center._