# Knowing and the Function of Reason By Richard I. Aaron **URL:** **By** Louis A. Rollins **Published:** May 1, 1974 --- “However, Richard Aaron, in opposition to both rationalism and empiricism, argues that philosophers must recognize that men can be completely certain even though they are capable of error.” Philosophers have traditionally been divided into two opposed groups: the rationalists, who believe that "pure Reason" or a capacity for "intellectual intuition" can provide men with "certain" (meaning: infallible) knowledge of reality, and the empiricists, who base knowledge exclusively on sense-perception and who consequently either deny the existence of certain (infallible) knowledge or who restrict such certainty to claims about sensations in the present moment. Although rationalists and empiricists hold radically different views on the nature of cognition, they share one basic premise: that certainty presupposes omniscience or infallibility. However, Richard Aaron, in opposition to both rationalism and empiricism, argues that philosophers must recognize that men can be completely certain even though they are capable of error. Philosophers have long needed to take this step; it is Aaron's key insight which obviates both the rationalists' futile search for absolute (infallible) Truth and the empiricists' abdication from the task of establishing certain knowledge. If this were the only virtue of Knowing and the Function of Reason, it would make it a book very much worth reading. It is, however, not the book's only virtue. For one thing, Aaron's analysis of certainty also constitutes a breakthrough for modern philosophy. Aaron views certainty as a personal experience—which in no way makes it a subjective issue. For Aaron, certainty is both issue-settling and constraining. This means basically that: (1) no one else can be sure for me; (2) when I am certain, then for the time being there is no room for doubt, and the issue is settled; and (3) when I am certain I find myself, in effect, compelled to accept something as true. For Aaron, this last notion, constraint, is crucially related to that of objectivity. "If we are constrained, what constrains us is objective; on the other hand, what we freely conjure up in ourselves is subjective." Aaron's central purpose in Knowing and the Function of Reason is to present a new concept of the function of reason. While knowledge involves a certain element of constraint for Aaron, thinking is "spontaneous," or relatively unconstrained. For example, by means of thought one can create complex systems which may have no application to the real world. The function of reason then is to judge one's thinking by viewing it in the context of what one already knows. In this way, reason brings thinking to serve the purpose of extending one's knowledge. In the course of developing and applying this conception of reason, Aaron analyzes a variety of issues. While some of his analyses may be erroneous or inadequate, most of them are of great value, much as his criticism of behaviorism, his discussion of the logical/factual truth dichotomy, and his refutation of the idea of "alternative logics." While Knowing and the Function of Reason is by no means a comprehensive work on the theory of knowledge, it is an exciting and novel treatment of a number of fundamental philosophical concepts and issues. It is an important defense of reason, objectivity and certainty. I highly recommend it to readers interested in philosophy and related fields. _Reviewed by LOUIS A. ROLLINS / Philosophy (276 pages) / BFL Price $12_