# Superstition in All Ages / Primitive Survivals in Modern Thought By Jean Meslier / By Chapman Cohen **URL:** **By** George H. Smith **Published:** June 1, 1974 --- “In 1972, Arno Press, with Madalyn Murray O'Hair as advisory editor, published a series of reprints under the series title of “The Atheist Viewpoint.” Many of these books had long been out of print, or were available only through obscure distributors.” In 1972, Arno Press, with Madalyn Murray O'Hair as advisory editor, published a series of reprints under the series title of “The Atheist Viewpoint.” Many of these books had long been out of print, or were available only through obscure distributors. These reprints, like other works published by Arno, are rather expensive editions directed primarily at the library market. The cost of the entire set is prohibitive for the average reader; but several of the books, if purchased individually, are a bargain at any price, and provide the reader with excellent insight into what is commonly referred to as the free thought movement. Jean Meslier's _Superstition in All Ages_ and Chapman Cohen's _Primitive Survivals in Modern Thought_ are among the finest volumes in “The Atheist Viewpoint” series. Jean Meslier (1664-1729), perhaps the least restrained atheist of the French Enlightenment, was an unknown Catholic priest throughout most of his life. In the 1720's, he wrote his _Testament_—a scathing attack on theism, Christianity, and political authority—which he kept secret during his life because, he explained, he did not wish to be burned until after his death. _Superstition in All Ages_ is that portion of the _Testament_ which deals specifically with Meslier's critique of theism and Christianity. This work differs from much of the anti-clerical writing that was to appear during the Enlightenment period because, unlike later freethinkers who promulgated deism, Meslier was unabashedly atheistic. He simply refused to compromise on any issue. “I will not sacrifice my reason,” he wrote, “because this reason alone enables me to distinguish good from evil, the true from the false.” Theology was viewed by Meslier as “a continual insult to human reason,” and religion he defined as “the art of occupying limited minds with that which is impossible for them to comprehend.” Much of Meslier's writing has a surprisingly modernistic ring. Those philosophers who herald the alleged innovations of contemporary philosophy in its analysis of theism—especially the principle that the concept of God must be defined and scrutinized before any attempt is made to establish the existence of God—would do well to consult this atheist of over two centuries ago: > Can one honestly say that he is convinced of the existence of a being whose nature is not known, who remains inaccessible to all our senses, and of whose qualities we are constantly assured that they are incomprehensible to us? In order to persuade me that a being exists, or can exist, he must begin by telling me what this being is; in order to make me believe the existence or the possibility of such a being, he must tell me things about him which are contradictory, and which do not destroy one another. As for the concept of God, Meslier concludes, “what has been said of Him is either unintelligible or perfectly contradictory; and for this reason must appear impossible to every man of common sense.” No aspect of Christianity escapes Meslier's barbed comments. The idea that God can forgive crimes, for example, he finds unconscionable: “He who has the power to pardon crimes, has He not the right to order them committed?” The ethics of Jesus and the New Testament he regards as “opposed to man's nature”; “it must be divine,” he quips, “because it is impracticable for men.” The doctrine that “the truths of religion are beyond reason” he rejects totally: “To say that there are objects on which reason should not be consulted, is to say that in the most important affairs, we must consult but imagination, or act by chance.” The theological notion of creation is dismissed by Meslier as absurd: “\[T\]he universe is a cause, not an effect; it is not a work, has not been made, because it was impossible that it should be made. The world has always been, its existence is necessary.” Even the Christian stress on charity is taken to task: > The Christian and Mohammedan States are filled with vast and richly endowed hospitals, in which we admire the pious charity of the kings and of the sultans who erected them. Would it not have been more humane to govern the people well, . . . to permit them to enjoy in safety the fruits of their labors, than to oppress them under a despotic yoke, to impoverish them by senseless wars . . . and afterward build sumptuous monuments which can contain but a very small portion of those whom they have rendered miserable? The preceding passages hopefully convey some of the spirit and imagination contained in this amazing book. In summary I can but second the evaluation of Voltaire: “Know that this book is very rare; it is a treasure!” Chapman Cohen (1868-1954)—third president of the National Secular Society of Britain, author of many books and over 2,700 (!) articles, and editor of a leading freethought journal for 35 years—was among the most astute and prolific members of the freethought movement. _Primitive Survivals in Modern Thought_ contains five of his best essays: “On Splitting Hairs,” “What is Religion?,” Why Agnosticism?,” “The Ghost of a God,” and “Are Miracles Impossible?” “On Splitting Hairs” deals with what Cohen regards as the greatest danger to philosophical truth: imprecise language. “Words should convey exact thought,” he writes, and “the objection to splitting hairs, and to discussing the meanings and implications of words, is part of a dislike for exact and careful thinking.” Cohen then criticizes the leading scientists of his day who defended theism, such as Jeans and Eddington, for “indulging in sheer theologizing,” camouflaged in sloppy language. “What is Religion?” is Cohen's reproach of fellow freethinkers who, although atheistic, persisted in using religious terminology. “The Freethinker,” Cohen argues, “is . . . distinctly out of order when he deliberately and gratuitously uses words heavily charged with religious significance to express ideas that are in fundamental antagonism to religion.” After demonstrating “belief in the supernatural” to be the defining characteristic of religion, Cohen issues this call-to-arms: > \[T\]o say plainly and deliberately, “I do not believe in a God of any kind, I have no religion of any kind” to say this in the simplest possible language, and without the slightest equivocation, implies a degree of mental clarity and moral courage, of which but a minority of people are capable. In “Why Agnosticism?” Cohen demolishes the notion that agnosticism is a coherent third alternative to theism and atheism. Focusing on T. H. Huxley’s original derivation of the term, he shows that Huxley’s view of the universe “is completely atheistic, since it leaves God out.” As for the agnostic’s claim that one should suspend judgment on the existence of God, Cohen remarks: “We cannot suspend judgment concerning an inconceivable proposition.... \[I\]t is committing intellectual suicide to say, > “I suspend judgment concerning a thing, the meaning of which I have not the slightest comprehension.” In the next essay, “The Ghost of a God,” Cohen drives home his point that atheism is simply the absence of belief in a god: So far as a belief is concerned one either has it or one is without it.... If one believes in a God, then one is a Theist. If one does not believe in a God, then one is an A-theist— he is without that belief. The distinction between Atheism and Theism is entirely, exclusively, that of whether one has or has not a belief in God. Finally, in “Are Miracles Possible?” Cohen examines Hume’s attack on miracles within the context of Hume’s denial of necessity in causation; and he concludes that, “if Hume’s statement of causation is correct, then a large part of his argument against miracles loses its force.” Moreover, Cohen argues, it is not enough to show, as Hume did, that no evidence can be produced in favor of an alleged miracle; rather, we should support the much stronger position that, given the nature of reality, miracles are impossible. Hence: > “Knowing the constitution of water and of wine, I do not say that I do not believe there is evidence enough to prove that Jesus turned water into wine; I say I know he did not.” In recommending these two books, as with other books sympathetic to atheism that I have reviewed in the past, I do not wish to imply that they have any direct connection with libertarianism. Libertarianism, a political theory based on voluntarism, is neither theistic nor atheistic. It should be remembered, however, that the strength of libertarianism rests principallyon its uncompromising appeal to reason, on its insistence that man has nothing to lose, and everything to gain, from the truth. Atheism, in my opinion, is simply the extension of reason into another sphere of human inquiry. Thus, although there is no substantive correlation between atheism and libertarianism, there is a definite methodological affinity. Both are the result of man’s quest for truth, often in the face of tremendous opposition. It is for this reason that _Superstition in All Ages_ and _Primitive Survivals in Modern Thought_ will unquestionably appeal to the readers of _Books for Libertarians_, and it is for this reason that I commend them to your attention. _Reviewed by George H. Smith / Philosophy / Superstition (339 Pages) / BFL Price $15 / Primitive Survivals (141 Pages) / BFL Price $7_