

THE
LIBERTARIAN
REVIEW

February 1980
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LIBERTARIAN

The Iranian Drama

The Trucking
War: Breaking
the ICC

PCP: Darkness
at the End of
the Tunnel

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
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
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THE LIBERTARIAN REVIEW

February 1980
Volume 9, No. 2



The Iranian Drama

by Roy A. Childs, Jr.
Iran has erupted after a quarter-century of U.S. intervention. The Editor of *LR* examines how the Shah's policies led to the revolution and details Khomeini's revenge on the U.S. for losing torture and murder on the Iranian people. Page...24

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COMMENTS

OPENING SHOTS

BILL BIRMINGHAM

CONGRESS DECLARED the American alligator an endangered species in 1967, hoping to save it from being hunted to extinction. Since then the reptiles have been breeding like big, ugly rabbits — with some populations increasing by 25 percent to 30 percent a year — with the result that, as a Louisiana official puts it, "We're up to our ears in alligators." In the late 1950s there were as few as 100,000 alligators in the whole South; now Florida alone has from 500,000 to 1-million of the beasts (Louisiana has 300,000), with lesser numbers in eight other states. Although Florida and Louisiana have recently been forced to start control programs, the alligator remains on the federal endangered species list; to the distress of Alabama Game and Fish Division Director Charles Kelley. Says he: "It's just illogical to keep them on the list when we get frequent calls about 'gators eating dogs and going in people's yards."

The Quotable Miz Lillian: "I don't know a gay from a hole in the ground—in my part of the country we don't have 'em.... My son the president is running for president again. He's doing the best he can about the Iran situation. When he's in trouble, I'm in trouble; when he's tense, I'm tense. Boy have I been tense lately." But "If I wasn't so old, I'd run against him." (Uttered before the Bow Lake Village, N.H., Men's Club, as reported by the *Washington Post*.)

The median income for a family of four, saith the Tax Foundation, was \$18,467 last year, or 66 percent higher than it was in 1972. During the same period

prices increased 75 percent, federal income taxes 82 percent and Social [ist] In] Security taxes went up 142 percent.

A reporter for the *Wall Street Journal* got a letter from a Michigan lawyer on the lawyer's brush with the Energy Research and Development Administration: the folks who are going to save us from the energy crisis with a multibillion dollar "synthetic fuels" program. He had sought a grant, for a Michigan researcher, from a special, \$10-million ERDA fund. "Sorry, said ERDA, only \$1 million was left; the other \$9 million had gone for 'administrative expenses.'" Notes the *Journal*, "Think of how much 'administration' the \$2 billion synfuel appropriation will buy."

Five months ago, yr hmb! srvt reported how Israeli chief of staff Rafael Eitan helped an Israeli army officer—one Daniel Pinto—escape punishment after he was convicted of torturing and murdering four Arab prisoners, and how it caused a mild public outcry in Israel. It seems that General Eitan learned nothing from the Pinto scandal, but went on to reduce the sentence of a *second* murderer, a Lieutenant Colonel Aryeh Sadeh. While in Lebanon during the 1978 invasion, Sadeh's men encountered three Arabs (who offered no resistance) and took them prisoner. Sadeh later decided one of the three "looked like a terrorist" and ordered him shot, which he was. A sergeant reported the crime and Colonel Sadeh was court-martialed and sentenced to two and a half years in prison and demotion to captain. The Appeals Court (at the prosecutor's request) raised it to five years and demoted Sadeh to private, but Eitan overruled

them and promoted him back to major. As in the Pinto case, Eitan ordered the matter suppressed in Israel, but Uri Avnery (member of the Knesset and author of the excellent *Israel Without Zionists*) leaked the facts to the foreign media; in this case the *British Spectator*. ("The murderers in Israel's army," November 3, 1979.) Eitan has not escaped all censure, however; the *Spectator* reports that a recent pay envelope of his contained not the usual check but a "verbal message: 'This man pardons murderers.' Inquiries soon revealed that the IDF [Israeli Defense Forces]'s central computer had been programmed to respond with this message to any request for information concerning the Chief of Staff."

In the finest spirit of free enterprise, Robert K. Brown, publisher of *Soldier of Fortune* magazine, is offering a \$10,000 reward (payable in gold Krugerrands) "for information leading to the capture alive by proper authorities and delivery to Uganda for trial" of former Ugandan dictator Idi Amin. A pity that Brown, whose magazine extolls the mercenary soldier (and CIA assassination attempts, for that matter) did not see fit to make it *dead* or alive, but no matter; readers with any information (all manner of people read LR, we've found) should write to *Soldier of Fortune*, Box 693, Boulder CO 80306.


The Only Thing We Learn From History Is That We Learn Nothing From History Dept.: "In the 1979 Gallup audit of the country's drinking pattern," writes John Koffend, author of "The Case for Alcohol" (*The Atlantic*, December 1979), "one person in five favored a return to national prohibition."

"Speaker of the House Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. said Monday that most members of Congress had not been aware of the repressive nature of the former Shah of Iran's regime. 'This is all new to me,' the Massachusetts Democrat said of recent [sic] reports of atrocities committed while Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi was in power. Congress was led to believe the Shah was a progressive and fair leader, O'Neill said." (*Los Angeles Times*, November 27, 1979.) The Speaker of the House, you will recall, is third in line for the Presidency, right after the Vice-President.

"The Shah's personal library in the Niavaran Palace," notes the *New York Times*, "has thousands of books in many languages, especially Persian, English and French. Nietzsche was represented by 'The Will to Power.'" Actually there was also a copy of *Beyond Good and Evil*, but he took it with him.

Perhaps you've heard the estimates that place marijuana as the third most valuable crop in Hawaii. Ah, but that was in 1978; now it is deemed number one. Police estimates put the value of the marijuana harvest — called *pakalolo*, or "crazy smoke," in Hawaiian — at from \$300-million to \$750-million a year. (The sugar crop last year was worth \$280-million, and pineapple, \$165-million.) State officials are complaining that the illegal, unreported income from *pakalolo* is significant enough to seriously warp their economic statistics. Still more proof, if it were needed, of the essential libertarianism of the drug culture.

Let us have a moment of silence, please, for Monsieur



Marc Quinquandon, the snail-eating champion of the world, who died in his quest to extend the limits of human achievement. He died with his boots on, so to speak, while training to break his old record (144 snails in 11 minutes 30 seconds; set in 1978). After consuming 72 snails in three minutes last November 24, he lost consciousness and died two days later. The doctors' verdict: indigestion.

The consummate mindlessness of the Pentagon's proposed MX missile system, especially the weird "race-track" deployment scheme currently planned for it, has even sent a few conservatives running for cover. One is conservative columnist James J. Kilpatrick (Shana

Alexander's old nemesis), who has never before been known as a critic of "defense" spending. In a recent column he denounced the racetrack scheme—which, he informs us, "is known as Goofy for the Walt Disney dog of the same name"—as "the nuttiest scheme to come along in the name of national security since the CIA proposed to depilate the beard of Dr. Castro." (And if the authors of a recent *Scientific American* article—"Land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles," November 1979—are correct, Goofy may be *more* vulnerable to a Soviet missile attack than the current Minuteman force!) But Kilpatrick does not content himself with calling for "better and cheaper alternatives." He calls for the defeat

of SALT II, not for the reasons usually heard in the fever swamps of the right but because "it would effectively compel our government to build and deploy all the launchers permitted under the treaty's terms.... Suppose there was no treaty. Common sense might inform a President that enough is enough, that we already have amassed sufficient nuclear power to devastate the whole world and that funds for national defense could be expended more sensibly elsewhere." It's "common sense" to thee and me, but it's "unilateral disarmament" to the boys in the fever swamps; and it might be nice to send Kilpatrick some words of praise to fortify him against the abuse they will surely heap upon him for his lapse into sanity.



Misguided missiles

ON DECEMBER 12 THE North Atlantic Treaty Organization authorized a five-billion dollar program to produce 572 long-range cruise and Pershing ballistic missiles, capable of striking Soviet targets from bases in Western Europe. The Soviets had launched the usual propaganda campaign against the weapons, but Soviet President Brezhnev also made the unusual offer "to unilaterally reduce the number of medium-range rockets stationed in the Western part of the USSR" if NATO would forego deployment of the new missiles. Even more significantly, the Soviets announced and began to carry out a unilateral withdrawal from East Germany of 20,000 troops and 1000 tanks—15 percent, albeit the bottom 15 percent, of their entire East German tank force. Some pundits (eg: the editors of the *Los Angeles Times*) claim that the Soviet eagerness to stop the NATO missiles proves that it would be a good idea to produce them. This does not follow, as we shall see.

NATO currently has some 7000 nuclear weapons

available for use in a European war, twice the number possessed by the Soviet Union and its allies. Most of the NATO weapons are short-range bombs, missiles and artillery shells (and even a few land mines), meant for use against targets in Eastern Europe or Soviet forces on Western European soil. By contrast, most of the Soviet warheads are mounted on medium-range ballistic missiles based in the USSR itself. (The advantages to the Soviets of keeping these weapons out of reach of the East Germans, Poles, Czechs and Hungarians should be obvious.) But NATO also has "theater-nuclear forces"—weapons that can hit Soviet targets from European bases, or vice versa—of its own; about 1800 warheads to 2200 for the USSR, according to the London-based Institute for Strategic Studies.

What of the dread SS-20, the mobile, multiple-warhead missile whose deployment by the Soviets is deemed to require a response from NATO? Since 1977, the USSR has been replacing its SS-4 and SS-5 medium-range missiles with the SS-20. As Congressional defense analyst Fred Kaplan points out in the December 9, 1979 *New York Times*

Magazine, "the feared SS-20 represents nothing fundamentally new... Europe as a general target is no more or less under the nuclear gun that it was two decades ago." NATO expects that the Soviets will eventually have about 200 SS-20s, according to the *Washington Post*, and will respond by deploying 108 Pershing-2 ballistic missiles and 464 Tomahawk cruise missiles capable of striking the Soviet Union, and phasing out 1000 nuclear devices—including those land mines—which are not.

The NATO missiles, then, "would radically alter the strategic situation on the continent," just as Brezhnev says. They would represent a fundamental shift away from a defensive nuclear strategy towards one based on attacking the Soviet Union, which would be very dangerous for the United States. For it seems impossible that American missiles—and the Pershings and Tomahawks would be both built and controlled by the US—could fall on Soviet soil without Soviet missiles falling on the United States. This strategy would also be costly even in peacetime. Besides prompting the Soviets to deploy even more medium-range missiles (as they have virtually promised

to do), it could ruin the prospects for limiting theater-nuclear forces in SALT III (it is estimated that as many as 100 of the new missiles will be deployed so as to be "unverifiable"). The expected effects on domestic European politics, and on the European countries' relations with the Soviet Union (especially on West Germany's *Ostpolitik*), lead some commentators to predict that the missiles will never be deployed. It is worth noting that while the member nations of NATO were unanimous in approving production of the missiles, they were less eager to commit themselves to deploying them. Over 90 percent of the total cost of the missile program, and all of the production and development costs, will be borne by the United States; by the time the deployment date rolls around in 1983 the European countries may have indeed backed out on the program, leaving the American taxpayer holding a five billion dollar bag.

Taking all this into consideration it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the Carter administration should kill this program immediately; indeed, that it should start listening to those heretics who hold that NATO should be stripped of its nuclear capabilities, or even dissolved altogether. Unfortunately this does not seem very likely. With no Democratic or Republican candidate willing to speak ill of even the most lunatic "defense" scheme (excepting Jerry Brown, who's so far out of the running that he can afford to indulge in sanity on occasion), our reelection-crazed President can hardly reverse himself on this issue. As Alan Wolfe, writing on these matters in *The Nation*, put it: "Europe's future, and ours, is in the hands of men who are dangerously unable to see past the next election."

—BB

Anger therapy

IT LOOKS AS IF, ONCE again, doctors are trying to make the idea of shock therapy respectable. Articles in recent issues of *Time*, *TV Guide*, and *U.S. News and World Report* tell us that psychiatrists are claiming that, whatever the public saw in *One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest*, this "treatment" is effective, safe, and humane.

Effective? Most of us tend to assume that doctors know what they are doing. With electroconvulsive therapy, or ECT, as it is called, they don't. Patients have been convulsed since 1938 at a rate which is now estimated at 100,000 people a year, and still, as the article in *Time* magazine delicately puts it, "no one is exactly sure how ECT works." Indeed they are not. Since a frequent result of the process is amnesia after the "treatment," a British survey which said that "fully half" of those who had undergone it fear ECT less than going to the dentist is hardly persuasive. All doctors *know* is that one result can be that some people who were depressed seem to be less so (at least temporarily) and that it does destroy memories.

Safe? It's a non-fatal form of electrocution. They strap a person down, attach electrodes to his or her head, and send 80 to 100 volts of electricity through the brain, causing a paroxysm which in turn causes convulsions. Psychiatrists are now proudly announcing that injecting the patients with muscle relaxants can minimize, but not eliminate, the chipped teeth and bone fractures that can result from the convulsions.

Humane? Most of the people subjected to ECT are inarticulate, and, as noted above, many of them don't remember what happened

to them. But ask the writers. Ernest Hemingway, who (coincidentally or not) later committed suicide, felt that the resulting memory loss ruined him as a writer. Poet Sylvia Plath, also a later suicide, remembered her ordeal. In her fictionalized account, *The Bell Jar*, she wrote:

"Something bent down and took hold of me and shook me like the end of the world. Whee-ee-ee-ee, it shrilled, through an air crackling with blue light, and with each flash a great jolt drubbed me till I thought my bones would break and the sap fly out of me like a split plant. I wondered what terrible thing it was that I had done."

If you get mad at a radio that doesn't work, and kick it, nobody says *that* is effective, safe, and humane, even though the radio may sometimes start up again as a result. Nobody says it is scientific, either.

Shock treatment is exactly the same idea—shake up the brain, kick it, and maybe it will function differently for a while—except what is being punished is not an inanimate collection of wire and parts but a living human being.

Let the doctors take out their anger on something else.

—JKT

Freeing up the market in radio

I WAS SO EXCITED I could hardly believe it. It was my first chance to produce a half-hour public affairs interview program, and for the top-rated radio station in Los Angeles. It almost didn't matter that my program would be heard at 3:00 AM on Sunday, or that all the station's other public affairs programming, of which I was in charge, aired in the wee hours too. When, six months after my pro-

gram went on the air, a 7:00 AM Sunday time slot opened, I breathlessly rushed into the program director's office to ask if I could move my program into that time period. "What?" he joked, "So you want to be on in morning drive?"

Four years later, when I began producing and hosting a half-hour interview program for an independent Los Angeles TV station, my program had virtually no budget. Furniture was donated, and I brought pillows and plants from home to dress the set. I was paid only 70 percent of union scale for my work because the show was categorized as public affairs and was aired without commercials.

Over the years, as I worked for other Los Angeles radio and television stations and freelanced as a public affairs consultant, I met many public affairs producers, news directors and program directors from all types of stations. And always the cry was the same: public affairs was the stepchild of entertainment programming; it got no money, no support, no motivation. Public affairs was done at all just to fulfill FCC commitments, to keep the station from losing its license to operate. The quality of the programming was generally considered unimportant.

But every now and then a show would succeed with the audience. And when it clicked, other stations somehow came up with more money and more support—enough to produce imitations of the successful shows.

There is a moral in this story for those who are now arguing against dropping the FCC's public affairs requirements. If public affairs programming is stronger today than it was a decade ago (it took nearly that long for "Sixty Minutes" to become the top-rated show on TV), that strength is attributable to the increased



Jim Gabbard, President of the National Association of Radio Broadcasters, bought this community access van to record "free speech messages" in order to please San Francisco listeners, not the FCC.

interest of the American people in public issues, and therefore in public affairs programming. It is attributable to the efforts of broadcasters to satisfy their audiences, not to satisfy the FCC or to serve better the "public interest."

And now comes a proposal by the Federal Communications Commission that it loosen its own yoke on radio stations. The FCC has been engaged in public hearings for the last several months on the idea of removing regulations which

limit the number of commercials a station may play and which require production of news and public affairs programs. And citizens groups are yelling. A petition has been filed by the American Civil Liberties Union, the Consumer Federation of America, the National Citizens Communications Lobby, NOW, the Pacifica Foundation and several other such organizations. The petition asks the FCC to present its evidence for deregulation more fully to the people and in a man-

ner easier for them to understand. The impression the citizens groups apparently have is that broadcasters are trying to pull the wool over the public's eyes and jam a kind of proto-deregulation down American throats before the populace knows it has been hoodwinked. The media groups claim that without the FCC, public affairs programming would soon disappear altogether, or survive only on public and listener-sponsored stations. They claim that stations broadcasting top 40

hits and rock would probably offer listeners only a slim diet of news and public service. Yet, under regulation, rock stations are *already* offering their listeners such starvation diets. For all practical purposes, what's the difference whether the public affairs programming is aired at 3:00 AM or not aired at all? And as to the clustering of news and public affairs on non-profit stations, that prediction is difficult to reconcile with the phenomenal growth over the past ten years, especially

in the major cities, of the all-news and all-talk format in radio. In most cases, these profit-making commercial stations are the most popular in their markets. The FCC does not insist that they air nothing but news and public affairs. They do it because this format draws the largest audiences. Similarly,

Jim Gabbard, President of the National Association of Radio Broadcasters, and an owner of radio stations in San Francisco and Honolulu argues that he recently purchased a community access van to record "free speech messages" in the San Francisco area, not to please the FCC, but to score points with the community and give his station the sound of local involvement and identity. And Gabbard is not unique. An FCC staff analysis conducted in 14 markets in Alabama and Georgia during the last year showed a large majority of stations carrying far more

than the minimum amount of news and public service programming required of them (and only about half the maximum 18 minutes per hour of commercial time they're now allowed).

Broadcasters, quite unsurprisingly, are more responsive to the demands of their listeners and viewers than to the demands of government bureaucrats. When their audiences demand news and public affairs, they supply such programming—in the quantity and at the times of day the audiences demand. When the FCC demands such programming, on the other hand, broadcasters supply it only to the extent that their audiences also want it. If the FCC demands more than their audiences want, they supply it only at 3:00 AM and on a very low budget.

If the citizens groups that are now crying foul have trouble gaining access to the

airwaves, could it be because they usually don't bother to create programming ideas with any potential for attracting audiences, but rely instead on persuading the government to force broadcasters to air their uncreative, uninteresting material at the point of a gun? If I managed to find stations willing to produce my own public affairs programs (albeit on a shoestring budget) in one of the largest and most competitive markets in the country, why can't NOW or the ACLU do the same? Aside from abrogating the First Amendment rights of free speech which broadcasters ought to share with publishers, the FCC public affairs and commercial time requirements only encourage citizens organizations in their already arrogant disregard for what the public wants to see and hear.


Let the media and citizens groups come up with creative programming ideas,

and they'll see how fast their public affairs shows can find support—not by all, but by those stations which find it profitable to encourage such types of programming. And in turn, let those who support public affairs programming speak out. Let them ensure the future of such programs on particular stations, by writing letters, by telephoning, by lending their support. Another action taken by the FCC late in 1979 is expected to increase the number of AM radio stations in this country by more than 30 percent in the next decade. This growth in the number of stations, in combination with a free market in radio news and public affairs programming, could lead to the kind of diversity in broadcasting which exists in the comparable but unregulated market in magazines. Indeed, with deregulation, the future of the electronic media burns brightly.

—LJN

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Goodbye George Meany

BRUCE BARTLETT

THE RECENT RETIREMENT of George Meany, longtime head of the AFL-CIO, has been widely interpreted as marking the end of an era for the U.S. labor movement. In fact, it is much less important than certain more fundamental changes that have been taking place within the labor movement during the course of Meany's leadership. The most important of these are the decline of unionism in general and the rise of public sector unions as a percent-

age of union membership. If these trends continue there will be profound implications not only for the future of organized labor but for the nation as a whole.

In 1956 union workers represented 25.2 percent of the labor force. Since then there has been a slow but continuous decline in union membership as a percent of the labor force. Union workers now represent only 19.7 percent of the labor force.

Unfortunately, the decline of unionism as a whole has been accompanied by an ominous change in the composition of organized labor. Public sector union workers now comprise a large and growing proportion of total

union membership, as private sector union membership declines. In 1956 unionized government workers—federal, state and local—comprised a mere 5.1 percent of all union membership. By 1978 public sector unions made up 16.7 percent of the union workers.

To illustrate how quickly the trend is going, consider the fact that between 1976 and 1978 union membership in manufacturing industries declined by 449,000, but union membership in the federal government increased by 82,000 and by 531,000 in state and local government. Between 1968 and 1978 unionism among teachers increased more than 200

percent while unionism among state and local government workers increased more than 180 percent. By contrast, the Teamsters Union, the nation's largest individual union, made up predominantly of private sector workers, increased its membership only 10 percent.

This trend is dangerous. The fact of the matter is that public sector unions are not like other unions and their growth undermines the historic relationship between labor and management. Although unions in general have too much power, due to special government protection which has been given to them over the past half century, unions would probably continue to exist in a free market. The ultimate check against excessive union power in the private sector is that if unions demand too much their employers will go out of business or find some way of eliminating the union. (Business is in fact becoming increasingly sophisticated about eliminating unions, see "American Union-Busting," *The Economist*, November 17, 1979.) Thus, in the long run, union power cannot negate market forces.

However, with public sector unions it is an entirely different matter. For one thing, public sector unions exercise power not only through traditional means, such as strikes and work slowdowns, but through political means as well. In many cities, like New York, the public employee unions exert enormous political power. If a government official stands up to the unions they will throw their support to a more favorable candidate in the next election.

A more serious problem with public sector unions is that there is no ultimate check on their power to demand excessive wages and benefits save the taxable ca-

capacity of the people. Public sector unions, therefore, can and do demand wage increases far in excess of productivity. In New York City garbage men are paid more than \$20,000 per year and are paid at a rate equivalent to policemen and firemen, whose services the public would certainly value more highly. Time and again it has been demonstrated that private companies could pick up trash in New York for far less than it costs now, but the sanitation workers union has always successfully fought any move in that direction, without regard to the taxpayers' interest.

Ultimately, there must be a confrontation between the private sector unions and the public sector unions. The problem is that every time the public sector worker gets a pay increase the private sector workers pay for it. As inflation and taxes eat into his standard of living and he comes to realize his lack of common interest with the public sector union worker, the unionized worker in the private sector will strike back by supporting tax cuts, government spending limitations, and restrictions on union membership in government.

Libertarians are in a unique position to exploit the coming confrontation between public and private sector unions. Liberals will side with the public sector unions but conservatives hate unions in general too much to support the private sector unions. Libertarians, however, have no ax to grind. They can show that the basic struggle is between the private sector and government, and that those with an interest in preserving and strengthening the private sector must work together, whether they be businessmen, stockholders or union members. It's an opportunity we cannot afford to ignore. ☐

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THE TRUCKING WAR

DOUG BANDOW



A fierce regulatory battle is now underway in Washington—over the Interstate Commerce Commission's control of the \$56-billion trucking industry. The Carter Administration, following its successful deregulation of the airline industry, has joined with Senate Judiciary Committee chairman Edward Kennedy in the far more difficult task of restricting the power of the ICC over the nation's transportation system.

The deregulation legislation is being supported by a disparate coalition which includes Ralph Nader, the American Conservative Union, the National Association of Manufacturers, and former Civil Aero-

navics Board chairman Alfred Kahn. However, it faces an uncertain future, with the trucking industry, according to U.S. Regulatory Council chairman Douglas M. Costle, having "put together a major lobbying effort on Capitol Hill to kill deregulation."

In fact, the trucking industry and the Teamsters Union, frightened by the spectre of competition—which would eliminate the industry's monopoly profits and the union's excessive wage agreements—have forged an alliance of expediency. Together, the 16,600 regulated truck lines (with at least one in every congressional district) and the 300,000 Teamsters Union members are presenting a far more united and effective opposition to deregulation than did the airlines industry.

The proposed legislation would reduce the ICC's control of truck freight rates by ending joint rate-setting by regional truck groups and allowing truck lines greater freedom in raising or cutting fares. It would also require the ICC to give more weight to the value of competition when weighing applications for new entrants, and would remove many restrictions on the routes taken, stops made, and commodities hauled by truckers. Finally, the legislation provides for the possible elimination of all ICC regulation of trucking after 1982.

A parallel deregulation movement has occurred within the ICC itself, which, under chairman A. Daniel O'Neal, who was a consumer-minded Senate Commerce Committee staffer before being appointed to the ICC in 1973 (and made chairman in 1977), has begun to voluntarily relinquish some of its regulatory authority.

For example, the ICC has abolished the rule preventing companies that haul their own goods from carrying freight for others on return trips. It has also scrapped an ICC prohibition on truck lines contracting to haul the goods of more than eight shippers; it has loosened entry standards, requiring a new truck line to prove only that it "will serve a useful purpose"; and it has held that as of January 1, 1979, only those carriers who actually transported traffic involved in an application were automatically entitled to participate in the proceedings.

Even more dramatic has been the ICC's shift away from the prosecution of illegal "gypsy" truckers, who operated without government sanction. The gypsy truckers, who provide lower prices, faster service, or both, were estimated to be conducting between \$500-million and \$1-billion worth of business in 1963; the figure is undoubtedly higher today.

Under Peter H. Shannon, Jr., director of the ICC's Bureau of Investigation and Enforcement, the ICC has also begun concentrating on policing regulations that directly affect consumers, such as moving abuses. In 1976 roughly half of the agency enforcement cases involved illegal operators. That figure has now dropped to 24 percent, and Shannon hopes to reduce it still further.

American Trucking Association (ATA) president Bennett C. Whitlock, Jr., has termed these shifts in emphasis "outrageous," and has complained that "there are literally thousands of unregulated truck operators looking for any opportunity to secure regulated cargo of any nature and description." But unsympathetic observers retort that violations occur precisely because the regulated industry is unable to meet shippers' demands. One Transportation Department official comments that "when so many people violate a law, you have to look not at the violator but at the law."

In fact, the ICC's self-deregulatory moves have prompted 50 trucking companies, Teamsters Union president Frank

Fitzsimmons, and a truckers' lobby, Assure Competitive Transportation (ACT), to call for O'Neal's resignation. They take their cartel seriously.

However, the ICC maneuvers, though welcome, fall far short of establishing a free transportation market. The Carter/Kennedy legislation would not dismantle the entire ICC regulatory apparatus either, but it would go the necessary next step toward competition.

Of course, the federal government is not the sole transportation regulator; most states regulate intrastate trucking. In California, the \$2.2-billion trucking industry lives, according to the *San Francisco Chronicle*, "in an economically protected cocoon of state-established charges and operating rules." The industry was placed under the control of the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) in 1938. Now, after 41 years, the California PUC is embarking upon a gradual deregulation program of its own. But the main action is at the federal level.

Federal trucking regulation grew out of the depression of the 1930s. The first step toward legalized cartelization was the submission of fixed-rate schedules and safety regulations under the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA). After the NIRA was held to be unconstitutional in 1935, the railroads and large motor carriers pressured Congress into passing the 1935 Motor Carrier Act; the admitted goal was to protect railroads from competition by truckers, and to protect large truckers from the "irresponsibly low" rates of smaller motor carriers. The regulatory scheme was completed in 1948, when Congress exempted truckers from the antitrust laws, and institutionalized industry price-fixing.

The Motor Carrier Act provides the basis for the ICC's regulation of the trucking industry—in particular, its control of entry into the industry, and the rates charged and the services provided by carriers. Approximately 44 percent of truckers are now regulated; the rest—local carriage, corporate fleets, carriers of raw agricultural products, and some others—are not directly under ICC authority.

However, the latter are indirectly regulated, since, for example, they are normally unable to carry anyone else's products on their backhauls. Such indirect regulation is itself expensive. The restriction on backhauls alone adds as much as 30 percent to the total mileage that exempt carriers must incur.

To enter the regulated trucking market, which encompasses the major proportion of freight traffic, a company must obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity. The applicant must prove that he is fit, willing, and able to provide the service, and that the public convenience and necessity requires his service.

Furthermore, though the ICC has recently eased its restrictions in this area, the applicant has traditionally had to demonstrate that no existing carrier can provide the service. It is not enough that customers are dissatisfied with existing shippers, or want another competitor in the business. According to the ICC, an applicant must make "a showing with specificity that the services of existing carriers have been tested, and that such carriers have been found to be unable or unwilling to meet the shipping public's reasonable transportation needs...."

Finally, the ICC seeks to determine whether the new service would "endanger" existing carriers—that is, cost them money. Though there are no cases in which the ICC has admitted that it denied an application solely because the earnings of existing carriers might be impaired, it has always found a threat to earnings to be an important factor.

For example, the Commission granted one application to

use a shorter alternative route, because a faster service was not contemplated, so no inroads would be made in any competitor's business. In another case, a carrier requested permission to rearrange its route to lessen circuitry by over 20 percent; the ICC denied the application since the alternative route would "constitute a new service which would work a detriment to existing carriers." In 1970, the ICC even refused trucker requests—supported by the Departments of Transportation and Defense—to allow direct routing of shipments of hazardous materials, since "existing competitive relationships might be undermined."

Thus it is extremely difficult to enter the trucking market; even the ATA admits that the only sure way to do so is to purchase operating authority from an existing carrier. Though the ICC approves an average of 80 percent of the applications for new and extended services—an average which has recently risen to 96 percent—many of these applications are to serve only one shipper, where no opposition is recorded because no traffic is diverted from any existing carriers.

Moreover, John Semmens, an economist with the Arizona Department of Transportation, has pointed out that many of the other applications are extremely narrowly drawn: he cites one request for authorization to haul blowers, and blower parts, accessories, and supplies, between Roselle, Illinois, and locations in 22 other states. As Jack Pearce, an attorney who represents small trucking companies, notes: "If you go for a limited thrust, you'll probably get it. But if you want common-carrier authority in 28 states, you'll get 280 protestants. It gets expensive."



Of course, the firms which lobbied for the 1935 Act have not had to make a similar showing; they were all "grandfathered in." Any firm which could demonstrate that it had carried a certain commodity over a certain route was

licensed to continue that service. About 27,000 applicants were ultimately so certified. But mergers and failures have since reduced the number by roughly half, resulting in a concentrated market, where the biggest four trucking companies in each of 350 different markets during 1976 had an average of 64 percent of the business on short and medium-distance routes, and 62 percent on long-distance routes. And the transferable certificates of necessity have become extremely valuable because of the entry restrictions. Semmens estimates the aggregate value of the monopoly operating rights to be between \$3- and \$4-billion.

The second level of ICC regulation pertains to the rates that may be charged by carriers. Truckers are required to adhere to certain minimum and maximum rates, most of which are fixed by regional industry rate bureaus. Though a shipper is theoretically free to set a rate independent of that fixed by the bureau, such a rate would have to be filed with the ICC, which could, and normally would, suspend and/or disallow it. In fact, when one carrier requested a lower rate for a nonexistent product, the rate was promptly challenged by fellow carriers and set aside by the ICC.

The crazy-quilt of regulation on what may be hauled, and to where, has led the ICC down tortuous judicial paths. For example, an unregulated trucker can haul railroad ties if they are cut from logs sawed crosswise, but needs the permission of the ICC to haul them if the logs are sawed lengthwise. Such a trucker can haul parrot food, but not hamster or gerbil food; riding horses for personal pleasure, but not race horses; and whole wheat, but not wheat germ.

Former Justice Department antitrust attorney Joe Sims has cited the ICC's recent decision that wine is a grocery item, while beer is not (meaning truckers with authority to carry groceries may carry wine, but not beer). Sims explains that: "The Commission pointed out that those trucking



Glen Delk, (left), an independent trucker, speaking to other independent organizers during last June's protest of higher diesel prices. (right) One of forty Independent Trucker rigs rides past the White House during the same protest.

firms that already hauled beer might be injured if other trucking firms that currently haul food-stuffs were also allowed to haul beer. Since one side might be hurt by declaring beer to be a food, and since the other side would not suffer by not declaring beer to be a food, beer is therefore found not to be a food."

This regulation has had a predictable effect on prices and services. The entry limitations combined with industry rate-setting have allowed established carriers to exact monopoly profits. Thomas G. Moore, an economist at the Hoover Institution, has estimated that trucking rates are artificially inflated between 7 and 20 percent.

Another study by Moore found substantially higher trucking rates in those European countries that regulated their industries than in those which did not. Similarly, economist James Sloss studied Canadian regulation—which is less rigid than our own—and estimated that regulation raised rates by almost 7 percent.

Even more impressive than these theoretical studies is the near-perfect controlled experiment that took place in the 1950s, after the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that fresh and frozen poultry were exempt from the Interstate Commerce Act. Prices declined between 12 and 59 percent in particular markets, with an unweighted average fall of 33 percent for fresh poultry and 36 percent for frozen; the weighted average drop was 19 percent. Similarly, the National Broiler Council surveyed its members and compared the average unregulated rate for fresh poultry with the regulated rate for cooked poultry. It found the unregulated rate to be 33 percent lower.

The effect on service has been equally deleterious. Moore's study of Europe found that strict regulation leads to poorer service and to a decline in efficiency. Another study by Moore found that regulated U.S. carriers prefer not to handle small shipments and shipments to smaller and more isolated communities.

Conversely, studies by the Department of Agriculture have found that exempt carriers offer many services that regulated carriers do not. In fact, when Congress held hearings in 1972 on a bill to eliminate the agricultural products exemption, not one shipper complained about the unregulated service. By contrast, the numerous poor service complaints against regulated carriers became so embarrassing that the ICC held hearings in 1970 on that problem.

The total social waste is horrendous. The Council on Wage and Price Stability has concluded that "the current system of regulation creates enormous inefficiencies and inequities" Barry Bosworth, director of the Council, estimates that ICC regulation adds \$5-billion a year to consumer prices. UCLA economist George W. Hilton figures the cost to be \$6.5-billion.

In 1972, Moore estimated the total cost of regulation to be upwards of \$10-billion, including excess freight charges, inefficiencies resulting from excess capacity and the prohibition on backhauls, and the loss to rail carriers of potential business. Semmens has more recently estimated the total cost to be up to \$15-billion.

The individual human cost of these pernicious and onerous restrictions is also significant. One recent example involves St. Louis trucker Timothy Person, who runs the family Allstates Transworld Van Lines. Person is seeking to become the first black to obtain a license to operate nationally.

Unfortunately, Person has run into a formidable obstacle—the ICC. Only 19 of the 150 major carriers are licensed for national operations, and it would cost up to 15 percent of their annual revenue (which could be more than \$15-

million) to purchase one. Therefore, Person is seeking to obtain an operating certificate by satisfying the requirements that the service is needed, and can't be provided by existing carriers.

Person, whose company's revenues reach \$200,000 in a good year, is being opposed by companies such as United Van Lines and Allied Van Lines, whose revenues exceed \$100- and \$200-million a year. Person has been turned down before, and may be forced to spend up to \$150,000 in the current hearing process.

The established carriers are opposing the application on the grounds that Person doesn't have the equipment and organization necessary for the job. But Person, who has dreamed of providing national service since he took over his firm in 1953, knows hundreds of local movers around the country and has kept in contact with them since he began working toward a national license. Moreover, if Person is incapable of providing the service, he obviously won't; the established firms' only reason to exclude him is if he *can* provide it.

The opposing carriers have also argued that the creation of another national carrier would "adversely" affect the market. To this, Person has acidly replied that "our forefathers didn't write that we would have free enterprise only so long as a handful of people are guaranteed profits."

However, despite the support of the Mayor of Birmingham, the Departments of Transportation and Justice, the General Services Administration, and the moving division of the Department of Defense, an administrative law judge has ruled that Person may have only an 18-state license. The ruling may be appealed to the full Commission, but a favorable outcome there is by no means certain.

The judge's opinion reflects the ICC's long-standing bias against competition: "No new entrant into the field should be granted nationwide operating rights without extremely convincing evidence just as a matter of simple fairness, in recognition of the time-consuming and expensive negotiations required by existing carriers to build up through the years their attractive nationwide authorities and operations."

Person's case illustrates the effect of ICC regulation on personal freedom, as well as the impact on minorities, of barriers to competition which stifle economic opportunities so necessary for minority advancement.

But perhaps "the most galling feature of the whole regulatory scheme," according to Semmens, is "that so little may be gained at such great expense." Semmens estimates that truckers gain only about \$300-million—scarcely two percent of his estimated total societal loss of \$15-billion. A direct subsidy of \$300-million would be far less expensive for taxpayers and consumers than ICC regulation.

However, the trucking industry would have a difficult time defending an explicit transfer of wealth from taxpayers and consumers to the industry. It needs an obfuscatory and indirect mechanism such as the ICC provides.

The trucking companies, of course, deny any adverse effects of ICC regulation. For example, against all the evidence, ATA president Whitlock maintains that "there's no question the end result [of deregulation] will be higher rates since there would be no control over them." Whitlock does not mention that fact that the industry's "control over" rates has caused industry profits to be artificially high; over the past eight years, the eight largest trucking firms on average earned more than 20 percent a year on shareholders' equity, which is substantially greater than the 13 to 14 per-

cent earned by businesses generally. Further, the truckers claim that regulation protects service to small communities. Never do they explain why the evidence is to the contrary, or why other consumers should be forced to subsidize small town customers. Finally, the ICC's Bureau of Economics claims that the ICC actually saves the economy \$9.2-billion a year. Its figures, as we have seen, are not credible. The Bureau's distorted method of accounting has led the Council of Wage and Price Stability to note that "too often the Bureau calculates the benefits from a given Commission action but neglects to deduct the costs that same action imposes on other groups." One example cited was the assertion that keeping unprofitable railroad lines open saves shippers \$300-million a year—the cost of maintaining those lines, which is borne by railroad stockholders and taxpayers, is ignored.

The industry has of late gone on the offensive; one of the regulatory scheme's most fervent apologists, the ATA Foundation, justifies ICC regulation by predicting an apocalypse if it is ended:

The Motor Carrier Act of 1935 was designed to protect the public interest by maintaining an orderly and reliable transportation system, by minimizing duplication of services and by reducing financial instability. It is an excellent law that does just that. "Deregulation" would mean that fleet owners would not be compelled to distribute goods to small out-of-the-way towns; truck service would be spotty; vicious competition would erupt for the limited profitable routings and shipping costs elsewhere would skyrocket. Investment "capital" for trucking operations, new replacement equipment and service expansion would flee from the resulting melee.

It would be difficult indeed to find a paragraph anywhere

more replete with specious half-truths and unsupported irrelevancies. Claims of ruinous competition and predatory pricing are the standard myths cited by every business which fears the rigors of the free market. If these concepts have any validity, it is only where there is a natural monopoly—which the trucking industry is not. In fact, no chaos occurred when Australia deregulated its trucking industry in the 1950s and when Great Britain did so in the 1960s.

Moreover, as the evidence demonstrates, regulated carriers abroad and here in the U.S. charge higher prices and provide inferior services compared to their unregulated brethren. None of the ATA's rationalizations have any basis in fact.

The need for deregulation at all levels is clear; for 44 years, the ICC has stifled competition, abrogated individual rights, institutionalized inefficiency, and ossified the American transportation system. But the new federal legislation faces an uphill struggle. Deregulation advocates have already lost an early round in the Senate; the legislation has been assigned to the Senate Commerce Committee, under chairman Howard Cannon, which is a less hospitable forum than the Senate Judiciary Committee under Kennedy. But the regulatory struggle is far from over; it is bound to become even more intense, and it is likely to last for year or more.

The struggle to end this pernicious regulatory system is perhaps the most important deregulatory battle to be fought this decade. It is one that we cannot afford to lose. □

Doug Bandow is a recent graduate of Stanford Law School, and a free-lance writer whose articles have appeared in a number of daily newspapers.


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
The Politicization of Society

Edited by Kenneth S. Templeton, Jr.

"The state has increasingly replaced the church in determining how we should behave," writes Oxford professor R. M. Hartwell in his introduction. "Politics is now religion." Fourteen scholars examine the central problem of modern society—the growth of the state—and its significance for the individual. They are Robert L. Carneiro, Felix Morley, Murray N. Rothbard, William Marina, Robert A. Nisbet, Jacques Ellul, Giovanni Sartori, Michael Oakeshott, Donald M. Dozer, Herbert Butterfield, John A. Lukacs, Jonathan R. T. Hughes, Butler D. Shaffer, and F. A. Hayek. Hardcover \$10.00, Paperback \$4.50.

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PCP: The Darkness at the End of the Tunnel

JACK SHAFER

The PCP menace—you've been reading about it in newspapers and magazines and hearing about it on the radio and seeing it on national TV. But documentaries like "Angel Death" (which has been making the rounds of NBC stations) and docudramas like "Angel Dust: The Wack Attack" (which has been screened all over the country by ABC) are only publicizing the latest in a long series of American drug Menaces originated by the State. Drug Menaces sprout from simple roots, as willing sellers meet willing buyers in private exchange. In the absence of fraud there are no victims and no complainants. It takes the State, aided and abetted by the media, to breed a Menace.

Drug Menaces invariably follow this pattern: law 'n' order legislation shoves the market for a drug into the criminal underground; busts and confiscations then push the drug into newsprint, giving it advertising that it could never hope to buy; titillating photo-features recruit new users, which leads the State to pass a new round of tough legislation, and the Menace spirals upwards. Therapy, research, and enforcement shake down the State for megabuck grants to battle the Menace. But eventually the upward spiral peaks. John Law chases the drug and its traders into the woodwork, and the story becomes yesterday's news.

The State then congratulates itself for saving America from depravity, dementia, suicide, amotivation, hypersexual behavior, brain damage, homicide, licentiousness, disease, and psychosis. But while nobody is looking, the suppression of the original drug gives rise to another drug and as

the State steps in to squash *it*, the cycle of drug Menace begins anew.

But not this time. PCP is breaking the pattern. The State has now managed to direct the illicit drug market to a white, crystalline chemical which is the drug Menace equivalent of the insecticide-proof supercockroach. After the body count, PCP will still be with us. PCP's analogs will also be with us. And scores of new drugs plucked by entrepreneurs from the pharmacopeia will also be popularized and marketed, all thanks to the backlash of the State. Until saner minds repeal drug prohibition altogether, the attempted suppression of drugs will only up the Menace ante, and continually spawn Menaces around drugs of ever higher octane.

There can be no doubt that PCP is now a growth industry of the typical drug Menace sort. Sales, busts, deaths, therapy, research, and news coverage are all booming. The PCP lexicon is booming, too. Besides its generic name of 1-(1-phenylcyclohexyl) piperidine, phencyclidine for short, or PCP for shorter, this drug answers to more than 100 street names, including angel dust, crystal, horse/elephant/or animal tranquilizer, and rocket fuel. If a drug's street name is new or sounds goofy, chances are it is PCP. PCP is also often misrepresented as one of the established street drugs like LSD, mescaline, peyote, cocaine, and cannabinal (THC), and is frequently used as an adulterant in a common street drug.

It began in 1956 during a routine search for better living through chemistry, when pharmacologist Graham Chen of the Parke-Davis company conducted tests for psychoactive potential on a compound synthesized in Germany in the twenties. Chen injected lab animals with the stuff—PCP. Rodents got speedy on the substance, dogs yelped and convulsed, and monkeys were sedated. Higher doses of PCP given to monkeys proved it was also an excellent surgical anesthetic.

Parke-Davis was unreservedly enthusiastic. Here was a drug that could be cheaply and easily synthesized from common chemicals (realities which would later appeal to illicit "kitchen chemists" too) and which worked quite satisfactorily. Parke-Davis trade named it Sernyl, took it away from the monkeys and gave it to humans in clinical tests. Several thousand volunteers stood up, took the medicine, and passed out. So far, so good. But the volunteers reported side effects the rodents, dogs, and monkeys hadn't been able to tell the scientists about. Some volunteers spoke of memory loss, hallucinations, and disorientation after being dosed. Given PCP during childbirth, some mothers came out of anesthesia denying the newborn belonged to them. Other test subjects became "schizophrenic," that psychiatric catch-all term which defines so many disparate behaviors that it has lost all meaning. Still other patients became violent on PCP, and patients leaping up from recovery room beds and duking it out with nurses hardly constituted surgical efficacy. Parke-Davis lost its enthusiasm, discontinued human tests in 1965, and soon gave the drug back to the monkeys with a new trade name, Sernylan. PCP then lan-

"In 1967, when street drugs were pure, potent, cheap, and plentiful, PCP was quickly branded a bumner drug by users."

guished in the pharmaceutical minor leagues of veterinary medicine until its manufacturer finally ceased production. Now if the monkeys want a PCP fix they either have to score on the street or go directly to Uncle Sam, who still commands a stash.

Uncle Sam would likely be a connection of last resort, however; thanks to its ease of manufacture, angel dust is widely available on the black market. In fact, PCP can be made easily by "kitchen chemists" working in a rented hotel room or "on the roll" in a van. The formula can be found in the right libraries or in *The Whole Drug Manufacturers Catalog*, a readily available cookbook of drug recipes. With \$100 worth of chemicals you can churn out \$100,000 worth of PCP. The kitchen chemists pay little attention to quality control, of course, and often cook batches of unreliable potency that are teeming with impurities. Though PCP can be eaten, snorted, or injected, most users smoke it—mixed with mint leaves, parsley flakes, or low-grade marijuana. It's the easiest way to keep the dose low.

"You gotta watch yourself," Bob, a steady user, told me. "You never know how strong the shit is gonna be." Did he ever miscalculate his dose? Bob grinned slyly. "Yeah, all the time."

PCP's primary chemical precursor, piperidine, is available from most chemical supply houses. New government regulation require buyers of piperidine to show positive ID and sellers to register each transaction. Law enforcement doesn't have the manpower to trace every sale, however, and every five gallon drum of piperidine that eludes the dragnet delivers roughly 300,000 doses to the street. But even if the State succeeded in throttling the chemical supply house source, the black market would quickly divert piperidine from the rubber and plastics manufacturers who use it by the tanker-load, or, even simpler, make it themselves.

PCP first appeared on the illicit market in San Francisco as the PeaCe [sic] Pill at the height of the Multiple Drug Menace of 1967. San Franciscans were busy gobbling down all the alphabet drugs they could lay hands on: LSD, STP, DMT and MDA, and smoking anything that would burn, while popping amphetamines and barbiturates with both recreational and spiritual relish. In 1967 street drugs were pure, potent, cheap and plentiful. PCP was quickly branded a bumner drug by users when their highs mirrored the highs of Parke-Davis's test subjects. The Summer of Love generation rejected PCP and had more compassion than to give it back to the monkeys.

It didn't take busts, therapeutic programs, or Advertising Council campaigns to reduce PCP use in 1967. That drug market was as self-policing as possible, naturally favoring pure and potent pharmaceutical uppers, downers, and psychedelics or an identifiable street preparation (e.g., Owsley's

acid) to drugs of dubious quality. One of the kingpins of PCP research, Steven Lerner, has found that the PeaCe Pill did develop a small hardcore of aficionados (proving that there is a market for everything), but the vast majority of druggies were slipped their PCP fraudulently, as it masqueraded as acid, mescaline, peyote, and other psychedelics.

Lerner, 32, and his associate R. Stanley Burns, M.D., midwifed the birth of the PCP Menace in 1975 with articles in the medical press. Their consulting firm of Lerner, Burns, Linder & Associates is devoted to PCP work and keeps busy doing PCP medical research, writing articles (*Clinical Toxicology*, *The Western Journal of Medicine*, *People*), appearing before legislative bodies considering new anti-PCP laws, giving testimony at trials in which angel dusters are tendering "diminished capacity defenses" (which since the Dan White case have come to be known as "twinkie defenses"), and administering programs like the \$310,000 State of California-financed PCP Training Project, which, by the end of Summer '79, had spread the anti-PCP gospel to at least 3,000 of the faithful in medicine, criminal justice, mental health, drug abuse treatment, and education—what has come to be known in the field as the "drug abuse industrial complex."

Treading the line between urgency and alarm, Lerner is careful not to repeat the errors of his predecessors during other previous drug menaces (e.g., the LSD-broken-chromosome-hoax). Hard science backs all his claims, because he knows that scare tactics only destroy medical credibility. And while Lerner never underplays the debilitating effects of PCP he has observed, he honestly reports the PCP fact that "clinical tests have demonstrated no positive organ damage as of yet."

Leslie Bragg heads the Los Angeles branch of the Do It Now Foundation, the prototype of the hippie crash pad-acid rescue-drug counseling center. "I hate to be cynical, and pardon the pun," she says, "but PCP has been a shot in the arm to the drug abuse industrial complex. Heroin was getting weaker and weaker, methadone programs were getting those people to work, and people had stopped worrying about marijuana." While Bragg considers PCP a dangerous drug, she believes it has been blown out of proportion. "PCP has taken on the tinges of a xenophobic crusade, like we're after some sort of aliens from Mars who are walking about the streets like dangerous zombies and should be wrestled to the ground in a choke hold. We are actually talking about our children! It makes good press."

It makes *terrific* press. And without media promotion no drug Menace can grow. It wasn't until 1977 that the popular media caught PCP fever, two years after the initial medical press flurry. *U.S. News & World Report* was first, with a story headlined, "On the Drug Scene: New Rival for


Heroin," which forced an absurd comparison between two totally dissimilar drugs. Satisfied angel dusters must have looked on the article as a product evaluation, and felt prompted to take "The Heroin Challenge" (presumably in controlled blindfold tests). *Time* gave it the next shot, trumpeting "PCP: 'A Terror of a Drug,'" and promising both heaven and hell on smoked mint leaves.

But 1978 was PCP's banner year in the media. *60 Minute's* Mike Wallace lent his inimitable sneer to the Menace (Wallace: "You *know* it's a terrible drug. Then *why* do you use it?" Angel Duster: "I dunno.") *Newsweek* titled its article "The Deadly 'Angel Dust,'" and illustrated it with four nifty photographs that showed how to take the stuff. *New Times* contributed "Angel Death," *Human Behavior* promised "High on PCP," the August *Reader's Digest* warned of "PCP: the Unpredictable Killer," *People* offered the Lerner-edited PCP confessional, "In His Own Words," and *Rolling Stone* printed a sympathetic portrait of San Jose car clubs that touched less sympathetically on PCP use, "Moonwalk Serenade." Except for *Rolling Stone* every publication emphasized the sensational aspects of PCP, the high, the danger of death, how to use it, the guarantee of superhuman strength and immunity from pain, and the adventure of flirtation with psychosis.

The popular media advertised PCP as a death drug. In late 1978, after devoting a two-page spread to the Menace, the *Los Angeles Times* fielded an editorial worthy of Harry J. Anslinger (first Commissioner of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and inventor of "reefer madness"). Said the wise editorial writers, "PCP kills as surely as if it were poison." Actually only a very few pharmacological overdoses have ever been recorded. The rest of the PCP deaths have been a result of what those in the complex call "behavioral toxicity," or impaired judgment. Like the infamous "Speed Kills" slogan of the late '60s (few pharmacological overdoses of amphetamines have been recorded either), the "PCP Kills" variant only offers stage directions for the suicidally inclined.

"Man Smokes Angel Dust: Has No Terrible Side Effects" doesn't make for pulse-boosting journalism. Grand Guignol stories do. The press is thick with PCPers gouging their eyes out, murdering their mothers, murdering their fathers, murdering their brothers, murdering their sisters, murdering strangers, committing suicide by flying out of tenth floor windows, walking into freeway traffic, hanging themselves, dying accidentally by drowning, falling off cliffs, being shot in confrontations with police, dosing sleeping infants by proxy, castrating themselves, committing rape and robbery, and drooling. While these stories do have some basis in fact, it should be pointed out that the source of all of them is the drug abuse industrial complex itself—which can only stand to gain bigger budgets, greater professional prestige, and more power by fanning the flames of the Menace. "The press comes here," says Leslie Bragg, "and they don't pay attention to the information I give them about *incidence* and *prevalence*. Recreational users come to our attention only if they flip out, get busted, or scared by the press. Most of the people who use it manage it and if they have a bumner they work it out." But damn the facts, the drug jingoists say, full speed ahead: let's have another drug Menace!

If the Grand Guignol is rivaled by the stories of PCP mutilation, death, and mayhem, then *Ripley's Believe It Or Not!* is outdone by the tales of superhuman strength and immunity from pain associated with PCP use. To believe the media is to believe that PCP does everything to the average human being that gamma rays did to turn Bruce Banner into the In-



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Now you will understand those stories about people who jump to their deaths, run in front of automobiles and attack armed policemen barehanded.

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"ANGEL DUST: THE WACK ATTACK"

Starring Vernée Watson and Philip Michael Thomas

10:00 TONIGHT 

"The next time you read a PCP horror story, just remember who directed the drug market from downers, psychedelics and weed to PCP: the State."

credible Hulk—except make him green. Non-green PCP Hulks have reportedly tossed a half dozen burly cops around like tenpins, taken pointblank shots in the chest without dropping, broken handcuffs, and burst leather restraints. Few of these reports ever reveal the source of the incredible strength they describe, though it's a source common to us all, adrenalin. A gorilla-size dose of PCP *can* help induce a state of fear which floods the body with the same strength-giving hormone that allows dainty mothers to lift Chevrolets off pinned daughters. Also, the anesthetic quality of PCP cancels pain. The onset of pain generally restrains us from exerting ourselves beyond our natural limits. Denied this natural restraint, heavily dosed PCPers over-stress their bodies and pay for such outbursts of strength with broken bones, torn ligaments, and an occasional .38 round in the chest.

Gerald De Angelis heads up Pride House, a Van Nuys, California rehabilitation program. De Angelis has worked on drug abuse in the Nixon White House and has established a reputation as a troublemaker. One year, for example, he and an associate presented a methadone conference with a paper which plugged the drug abuse field into the standard marketing model: they identified *sales areas* of treatment, prevention, enforcement, and research in which *salesmen* from hundreds of counseling operations, maintenance programs, and therapeutic systems hawked their *products* to the new *markets* of drug abuse in industry, and among minorities, gays, the elderly, women, the psychotic, etc., just as any other industry does. De Angelis stokes his pipe and laughs, "We were not well received."

Chronic PCP cases make up about 25 percent of the kids at Pride House. "We treat the kid, not the drug," says De Angelis. "If we put a sign out in front of here that said 'No PCP Cases Allowed' we would still have a waiting list. We ease PCP kids into the program because many suffer memory loss. For a young person not to be able to remember anything is frightening. We want them to understand that they're not crazy and they haven't destroyed their brains and they are just undergoing a chemical reaction and if they give it some time they'll come out of it. We have stolen a term out of Erik Erikson: we try to provide a 'moratorium' for the kids, a chance to get off the merry-go-round and begin to reflect on their lives."

Parke-Davis originally billed PCP as a "disassociative anesthetic." Steven Lerner calls it an "inside-outer" due to its unpredictable effects. PCP highs of euphoria, depression, exhilaration, sedation, dulled thinking, speedy or wired thinking, violent and aggressive behavior, submissive behavior, feelings of power, feelings of weakness, fearfulness, fearlessness, self-doubt, high confidence, happiness, sadness, and auditory and visual hallucinations starring angels,

demons, gods, devils, heaven, and hell have all been reported to medical researchers. PCP researchers point to these diverse reactions as proof of PCP's wild, unpredictable nature. But is this unique to PCP?

In *The Natural Mind*, Andrew Weil, M.D. stresses that "the combined effects of set [mind-set] and setting [environment] can easily overshadow the pharmacological effects of a drug as stated in the pharmacology text. One can arrange set and setting so that a dose of an amphetamine will produce sedation or a dose of barbiturate, stimulation." Weil places the high in the person, not the drug, and illustrates this by recounting tales of test subjects tripping on placebos and others getting only stomach cramps on high quality mescaline. The existence of the weeping drunk alongside the violent drunk tells us much more about the individuals than it does about the "unpredictable nature" of alcohol.

In addition to the twin considerations of set and setting, researchers are driven dizzy by the implications of the polydrug phenomenon. More than 99 percent of the PCP users surveyed state that they use other drugs beside PCP. On any given evening of serious drug abuse most users partake in as many chemicals as possible—booze, weed, pills, psychedelics, opiates—orchestrating the polydrug interaction until they get where they want to be: "all fucked up."

As has been noted, PCP has been labeled a schizophrenia trigger; even the Parke-Davis scientists noted its psychomimetic qualities, its ability to produce behavior which mimics the mythic "mental illness." The drug abuse industrial complex warns that PCP can push near-psychotics into the never-never land of full-blown psychosis. But is this unique to PCP? Or even to drugs?

Marital problems, emotional problems, the switching of jobs, the starting of college—all of these serious changes have been identified by the mental health establishment as potential psychosis triggers. Yet nobody says divorce, emotions, occupational changes, or higher education *cause* psychosis and nobody seeks to ban them because a few people react negatively to these experiences. "Psychosis does not come packaged in joints of marijuana, tablets of LSD, or spoons of cocaine," writes Andrew Weil. It doesn't come in joints of PCP either. Project Eden in Hayward, California, reports that most chronic PCP users who have come in for counseling have had low self-esteem, criminal records, trouble in school, and difficulty keeping a job, *prior* to using PCP and had been trying to escape bad things they felt about themselves. They preferred the PCP high to those bad feelings. "An awful lot of kids are self-medicating themselves so they can feel better," says De Angelis. "The kids say, yeah, we know PCP is the pits, and we ask them why they do it anyway. One kid said he did it because he just gets

blotto on it. 'All my problems go away. Mother, father, school.' Take this week, for instance. The temperature is hitting 105 over in Boyle Heights (a barrio in Los Angeles) and they're frying without air conditioning. It makes sense to take something to feel better, doesn't it?" Dr. Ronald Siegel, a psychopharmacologist at UCLA, told the *L.A. Weekly* recently that PCP was not a "magical elixir that automatically turned people into werewolves. We began our study because we were under the impression that more than any other psychoactive drug, PCP really turned people schizophrenic. Well, it isn't true. Emotionally stable people under the influence of low doses of PCP probably will not act in a way very different from their normal behavior." De Angelis seconds that opinion, explaining, "It's just another drug that's come along. The drugs are only a symptom of a deeper problem."

Around 1974 PCP hit the incline of its growth phase as users started to turn up in emergency rooms and morgues. But it wasn't until toxicologists turned their mass spectrometers (so sensitive that they can detect opiate metabolite in the urine of a person who has eaten a poppy seed roll) to the search for PCP traces that the bum trippers and stiffs began to be identified as PCP cases.

How was it that PCP, a drug that the drug culture had turned thumbs down on, and which to this day receives nothing but scorn from the drug cognoscenti, made a comeback in the '70s? The Controlled Substance Act of 1970 holds the key.

The Controlled Substance Act of 1970 was the State's response to the Multiple Drug Menace of the '60s. Muscled through Congress by the Nixon Administration and superseding all other federal drug laws, the Act classified controlled drugs into five different Schedules. Schedule I contained the medically *verboten* drugs: heroin, marijuana, and LSD. No physician could prescribe these drugs and only a Federal dispensation could even make them available for research purposes.

Schedule II semi-nationalized the pharmaceutical industry, effecting governmental production quotas. To plug leaks of certain drugs onto the black market, the government required order forms to be filled out with each transfer. The tail end of the distribution was also tightened up, as written rather than phoned-in prescriptions became the law. Also, new import-export regulations and security measures were mandated. Schedule II's first occupants were the raw opiates: codeine and morphine.

Schedule III contained amphetamines and barbiturates originally and only limited the number of refills and the life-spans of the phoned-in prescriptions. But the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), which later became the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), quickly agitated for the transfer of amphetamines to Schedule II to dry up the black market supply. That wish came true in 1971, and by 1973 production quotas had slashed amphetamine production in America by nearly 90 percent.

Next the DEA had the potent barbiturates amobarbital (Amytal), secobarbital (Seconal), and pentobarbital (Nembutal) moved to Schedule II. This 1973 tightening of the barbiturates market steered the recreational downer market to methaqualone (Quaalude, Sopor). A short Quaalude Menace raged until this previously uncontrolled substance raced directly to Schedule II in 1973 like a hit record with a bullet through it. The pharmaceutical downers of guaranteed purity, potency, and low price were thus squeezed off the black market.

The stage was now perfectly set for the triumphant return

of PCP. There was an enormous gap in the market for a cheap downer. As the potent barbiturates and methaqualones vanished, PCP, an imperfect downer by anyone's measure, returned. 1978 saw the standard State reaction to the Menace: PCP was transferred from Schedule III to Schedule II; but since more than 90 percent of black market PCP came from the labs of kitchen chemists, this did nothing to curb supply. The PCP Menace was exploding.

The crackdown on illicit manufacturing of LSD and amphetamines included new restrictions on the esoteric chemical precursors of those drugs. As a result, homemade LSD and amphetamines became exceedingly difficult and expensive to make properly. John Van Diver, Western regional director of the DEA, has told the *New York Times* that many labs that formerly produced illicit LSD and amphetamines have now switched to PCP because the ingredients are cheaper and easier to produce. And not only did the State's moves recruit new manufacturers, they also recruited new customers—with The Great Paraquat Scare of 1978. As Federal monies aided the Mexican government in dumping the toxic herbicide Paraquat on Mexican marijuana farms, many grassers switched to PCP. "We had people calling up saying we're going to smoke dust because at least we know what's in it. We've had a lot of people trying other drugs because of the Paraquat affair," Leslie Bragg says.

"We'll switch drugs fairly soon and another chemical will replace PCP," muses Sgt. Michael Guy. More likely it will supplement PCP. There are more than 35 PCP analogs whose similar chemistry allows them to mimic PCP's psychoactive effects. Currently only the TCP analog is illegal, while PCE and PHP are perfectly legal and on the street. It only makes sense to brew the analog which doesn't carry the 5 year/\$15,000 felony rap.

For those who feel sympathy for Parke-Davis, believing all they got out of PCP was poor publicity and a lot of crazy monkeys—relax. Parke-Davis eventually developed a PCP analog without all the bad side effects, ketamine (Ketalar), and besides its surgical applications it is already turning up on the sophisticated Dr. Feelgood circuits.

The drug abuse industrial complex would have you believe that there is no answer to the question, why do people take PCP? Yet the answer is simple. People take PCP for the same reason they take every drug Menace drug—because it is cheap, plentiful, and they want to medicate themselves. There are 35 million Americans currently consuming prescribed psychoactive drugs, but because they have medical sanction their consumption is called *use*. The 7 million whom the government estimates have tried PCP in self-medication or recreation have their consumption defined as drug *abuse* because they have not been given that medical sanction. Let us not delude ourselves by thinking that drugs enjoy a brief popularity until their street reputation catches up with them and they are replaced by new drugs. Peter Koper ended his *New Times* PCP article with the comment that "a society gets the drug it deserves." No way. A society only gets the drugs the State can't keep from it. The next time you read a PCP horror story about a madman slashing throats with a straight razor just remember who directed the market for drugs from downers, psychedelics, and weed to PCP: the State.

And once and for all let us banish the notion that PCP is "the drug of choice." What choice? The obvious solution—the abolition of the drug laws—would banish PCP to an idiot coterie as the return of quality pharmaceuticals made the concept of "the drug of choice" reasonable once again.

During the nineteenth century America was a doper's

"Short of abolishing the drug laws there is nothing the State can do that won't fuel the PCP Menace and many new Menaces."

paradise. No laws restricted drugs: opiates were sold freely over the counter. Users of drugs were impossible to distinguish from non-users. The concept of the drug addict had not yet been born. Dr. Thomas Szasz writes in *Ceremonial Chemistry* (Doubleday, 1975) that no pre-twentieth century definition linking the word addiction to drug use can be found in the *Oxford English Dictionary*. Nineteenth century America had no drug laws, no concept of addiction, and no drug Menace.

Then, around the turn of the twentieth century, during the heyday of the Progressive "reform" movements, a number of state and local governments began enacting restrictive laws against drugs. And by the middle of the new century's second decade, the federal government had jumped on the bandwagon with the Harrison Narcotics Act.

The Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914 provided the mold for every drug Menace we have since enjoyed. After the U.S. ratified the Hague Convention Treaty, which was negotiated to end the Opium Wars, the Harrison Act was passed to fulfill our treaty obligations. Designed to regulate rather than prohibit narcotics, the Act was interpreted by law-enforcement officials to exclude prescription of narcotics to habitual users because habitual use was not considered a disease, and prescription for any non-medical purpose was declared outside a physician's "professional practice." Physicians were arrested, convicted, and imprisoned for prescribing opiates. And, as the crackdown evaporated the quality licit market, the sleazy black market we associate with opiates was created.

Prohibition of alcohol spurred a 13-year-long Menace until the moralists finally gave up the ghost. But during the "Noble Experiment" Americans began their own noble experiments with alternatives such as another eventual Menace, marijuana. Harry J. Anslinger did his successful best to spark the marijuana Menace once booze was legal again, planting reefer madness stories in the press and lobbying for marijuana legislation patterned after the Harrison Act (which he finally got in 1937). Chances are we would have had our marijuana Menace in the '40s except that during the war years menace spoke with Japanese, German and Italian accents.

The 1940s saw popularization of the recently synthesized amphetamines and barbiturates. Controls on uppers and downers were lax, and Americans in factories and on the war fronts used them judiciously to wake up and go to sleep. A post-World War II mini-Menace grew up around barbiturates, but not even gunslinger Anslinger really wanted to tangle with this potential Menace. Anslinger told Congress, "I would prefer to see the barbiturates problem remain a medical problem... rather than to suddenly make it a police problem. I think we would probably be as popular as the

Prohibition Bureau if this thing [barbiturates legislation] went into effect."

The 1950s reared no new drug Menace of its own until the eclipse of the decade, which saw the emergence of the first pop drug Menace of the 1960s. The drug? Glue.

According to Edward M. Brecher's study, *Licit and Illicit Drugs* (Little, Brown, 1971), the first published reference to glue sniffing came in an August 2, 1959, story in the *Denver Post* which told of juveniles in the West cupping glue to their faces and inhaling the fumes. Other *Post* articles pictured how to inhale glue fumes from a handkerchief and described the high—dizziness, drowsiness, altered reality. One article tied in an earlier industrial study that showed that prolonged exposure to volatile fumes could result in brain damage. The headline read: SOME GLUES ARE DANGEROUS, *Heavy Inhalation Can Cause Anemia or Brain Damage*. By June, 1960, Denver police had investigated 50 cases of glue sniffing and a new headline advertised the Menace thusly: COULD BE FATAL, *Plane Glue Gives Kids a Kick*.

Quickly the Menace went nationwide. The media ignored the medical findings that no physical damage was in evidence in even the most serious users. *Time* headlined its story "The New Kick." *Newsweek* came back with "The New Addicts." The FBI urged legislation limiting the sale of glue to those over 21. And Brecher points out that every step of the anti-glue sniffing campaign directed by the State and the media was to be repeated during the LSD Menace in the '60s. Brecher writes that both campaigns "featured solemn warning of dire damage... sensational police raids, scientific studies demonstrating hazards—and an endless bombardment of publicity. Both campaigns were followed by increased use of the drugs attacked." The PCP Menace grows directly out of this tradition.

Like the fool who has stuffed himself with prunes and believes that the bulk contained in the next mouthful will return him to regularity, the State believes that one more round of get-tough legislation, a new "no-knock" law, another damning article in the press, and one more drug seminar will solve the drug Menace. Yet short of abolishing the drug laws there is nothing the State can do that won't fuel the PCP Menace and other new Menaces.

The military cold warriors in Vietnam similarly believed that they could see "the light at the end of the tunnel" and pleaded for more time, more money, more power, more bodies. The drug abuse cold warriors plead the same case. But as one of the grunts who actually spent time exploring the intricate tunnels the Viet Cong built told Michael Herr in *Dispatches*, "I been down in that tunnel. There ain't no light."

Jack Shafer writes frequently for LR.

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
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
The Iranian Drama

ROY A. CHILDS, JR.

Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi has left the United States, bringing the Iranian drama nearly to a close. The final act in the drama is not yet over as we go to press. We do not know whether the hostages who have been held in the American embassy in Teheran since November 4 will be "put on trial immediately," as the Iranian students told ABC News, or whether they will be released and allowed to return home.

In the meantime, the Shah of Iran has taken flight. On Saturday, December 15, he mysteriously left his sanctuary at the Lackland Air Force Base outside of San Antonio, Texas, and with little fanfare arrived at a small island off the coast of Panama. Whether this will prove to be a permanent haven for the deposed ruler, no one seems to know. For months now, the international pariah has been bounding ceremoniously across the world from one temporary refuge to another: Egypt, Morocco, the Bahamas, Mexico, the U.S., and now Panama.

After he was admitted to a New York City hospital on October 23, for supposed "emergency" medical care, the Carter Administration began nervously looking for a refuge for the Shah, but at first had little luck. It was assumed that after receiving "medical treatment," the Shah would return to Mexico, but on Thursday, November 29, the Mexican government an-





nounced that it would not renew his visa, throwing the situation into chaos. One by one, possible sanctuaries were eliminated. The Shah did not want to go to Egypt, or to South Africa. Switzerland would not admit him, claiming that they could not "guarantee his safety." Bermuda's Premier David Gibbons said that the Shah could not return there "for security reasons," and both Brazil and Argentina pretended never to have heard of him. Presidential candidates made the situation even touchier: Ronald Reagan said that we should grant the Shah "permanent asylum" because he was our "friend," while Edward Kennedy, who put his foot in his impressive mouth more than once during the crisis, insisted that the Shah should leave the country as he promised he would do. Carter decided to have it both ways: he insisted that the Shah would decide when he would leave, and then sent Administration officials scurrying off to find somewhere for him to go. Finally, Panama agreed to give him refuge on an offshore island, and the Flying Dutchman landed, thanking the people of Panama and announcing his eagerness to get to know "Panama's culture" better. It was quite a comedown for the "King of Kings."

The roots of the crisis

If the Shah's departure was dramatic and mysterious, even more so was the battle within and without the Administration from January 1979 on over whether to admit the Shah into the United States. For it was that decision, on October 22, which led to Khomeini's heated denunciation of the U.S. on November 1, which in turn led the students to seize the



embassy and their 60 hostages three days later.

When the Shah left Iran on January 16, 1979, handing over the reins of government to his Prime Minister, Shahpur Bakhtiari, it was assumed by many that he would go to the United States. He left Iran for Egypt, and the next day, January 17, President Carter announced that "he's now in Egypt and he later will come to our own country." But, deluded by the hope that his "extended vacation" would soon come to an end and upset with lack of support from the Carter Administration during his final weeks in Iran, the Shah instead left Egypt for Morocco, hoping to be invited back to Iran by the Bakhtiari government or by the military. It didn't happen. Instead, the return of long-exiled Shi'ite leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini led to the toppling of the Bakhtiari government, dashing the Shah's hopes. The Shah at that point hoped to come to the U.S., but by that time, the Carter Administration had decided to attempt to normalize relations with the new regime and felt that granting asylum to the deposed Shah would make that impossible. The Administration informed the Shah that the time was "not right" for his admission into the U.S. The Shah was angered and dismayed, and turned to two old and powerful friends for help: David Rockefeller, his longtime friend and banker, and our Secretary-of-State-in-exile, Henry Kissinger.

Kissinger claims that he was first involved at the request of the Administration itself: that in January of 1979, the Carter Administration asked him to help find a "suitable residence" for the Shah in this country, to hasten his departure from Iran. Working with Nelson Rockefeller, Kissinger arranged for the Shah to stay at the Palm Springs estate of the former Nixon ambassador to Britain and publisher of *TV Guide*, Walter Annenberg.

But it was not to be. When the Carter Administration decided to stall the Shah, his Imperial Majesty turned to the Rockefellers and Kissinger for help directly. In his report for the *New York Times* on "Key Events of Eight Months of Debate," over the U.S. decision to admit the Shah, Bernard Gwertzman wrote that

By then, the Shah, often working through his former Ambassador to the United States, Ardeshir Zahedi, had begun asking the Rockefeller family and Mr. Kissinger for help. Through Nelson Rockefeller, the Shah had had the services since January of Robert F. Armao, a public relations man who served until August as an unpaid



"The Shah is a symbol of the kind of unsavory relationship which the US has typically forged in its interventionist foreign policy, supporting dictators and tyrants in the name of an illusory 'stability.'"

The Shah in glittering full dress regalia, symbol of the power given to him in part by the money and influence of his friend Nelson Rockefeller, then the Vice-President.

official greeter for New York City.

David Rockefeller, the chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank, gave him the help of a close personal aide, Joseph V. Reed. Mr. Reed, whose usual duties include serving as advance man for Mr. Rockefeller's trips, visited 26 countries this year alone and in several made inquiries on behalf of the Shah.

The problem was that Morocco did not want the Shah to remain, and other nations were not eager to have him either.

Mr. Kissinger volunteered to use his influence in Washington. In late March, it was leaked to a newspaper by sources close to Mr. Kissinger that the Administration was refusing the Shah admission. Mr. Kissinger was able to persuade the British to help get the Shah temporarily into the Bahamas, where he arrived on March 30 with Mr. Armao serving as his chief of staff. (*New York Times*, 11/18/79)

But it was always understood by David Rockefeller and Kissinger that the Bahamas were only a temporary refuge. Kissinger met with Secretary Vance in early April to try to change the Administration's mind. He was put off, and so flew to Mexico in April to persuade the Mexican government to admit the Shah. The Mexicans wavered, then granted the Shah a three-month temporary visa. Rockefeller and Kissinger immediately began working on the Carter Administration, pressuring it to admit the Shah. The Administration, in turn, passed the information about the pressure along to acting Ambassador L. Bruce Laingen in Teheran, who responded that admitting the Shah would not be advisable, and would jeopardize the embassy and its personnel. The continuing pressure was stepped up. Mexican authorities said they wanted the Shah out by October, so Rockefeller and Kissinger looked for a way out of the dilemma. Vice President Mondale was the first major figure in the Carter Administration to cave in, saying that the Shah should be admitted into the U.S. because he had been a "good friend."

Almost as though it were too coincidental to be true, in late September, Joseph Reed began badgering the State Department, telling them that the Shah was becoming seriously ill, and that he needed treatment only to be had in New York City. The State Department seemed uninterested, so Rockefeller sent a prominent American doctor, Dr. Benjamin H. Kean, to visit the Shah in Mexico. Kean was told that the Shah had had lymph cancer for six years, something which allegedly came as a "complete surprise" to the State De-



partment, and was suffering from jaundice, as well. Secretary Vance finally concluded on "humanitarian grounds" to let the Shah come to New York, damn the consequences.

And the consequences were known. In April, the Iranian government warned Mexico, without success, that bilateral relations would be harmed if it admitted the Shah. On April 23, Iranian officials warned Washington by diplomatic note that any grant of asylum for the Shah from the United States would be considered an "unfriendly act." According to Don Oberdorfer, writing in the *Washington Post*, a number of other statements of the same sort came from the Iranian government. Vance sent a message to the American embassy in Teheran on July 26, reporting that the Shah could remain in Mexico only until October, and asked the embassy its assessment of the effect which the entry of the Shah might have "on the well-being and security of the American residents in Iran and especially the employees of the embassy and the relations between us and the Iranian government." Acting Ambassador Laingen replied with a concern for the possibility that Americans could be taken as hostages. Laingen contacted the government in Iran—at the time, Prime Minister Bazargan and Foreign Minister Yazdi—and told them that the admission of the Shah was being "considered seriously." The Iranians warned him that the admission of the Shah was "not acceptable." Then, in late October, U.S. diplomats informed the Iranians that the Shah would arrive in New York City late that night. The Iranians protested, and asked at least to see the Shah's medical records, or to have independent doctors examine the Shah, to see if the medical reasons were in fact valid. The proposals were rejected in official Washington. A few days later, when Bazargan and Yazdi left Iran for a meeting with Brzezinski in an Arab country, their government fell. Khomeini took to denouncing the U.S., the crisis erupted, and the rest is history.

That the admission of the Shah into the U.S. was in the main not a medical but a political decision can now be confirmed. Administration officials tried desperately to give the impression that the Shah was terminally ill, which proved to be a ruse, and doctors at the New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center quickly leaked the news. The Shah's cancer, which he had had for six years, was not terminal, and it had

"It is in fact American foreign policy that was responsible for sending Iran careening backwards to a dogmatic Islamic Republic, headed by the fierce and fanatical Ayatollah Khomeini."

The Ayatollah Khomeini (left) in the cemetery where he made his first political speech in 15 years, and (right) surrounded by followers while still in exile in Paris.



not prevented him from brutally governing Iran, or from skiing for that matter, and the type of treatment he allegedly received was very mild at best—otherwise it would have interfered with his recovery from the operation for gallstones. The gallstone operation, of course, could easily have been performed in Mexico City. David Rockefeller himself has claimed that the aim in aiding the Shah was completely a "humanitarian" one, and Henry Kissinger has echoed the same line.

But to question this canard is to raise the question of the real motives behind the admission of the Shah. And it is fitting that the two figures most involved in the decision, Rockefeller and Kissinger, are themselves virtually symbolic figures in the world arena. David Rockefeller is the symbol of amoral international finance, the partisan of State Capitalism, bankrolling the most oppressive regimes, from the Soviet Union to Iran, ever fomenting "business-government partnerships," which blur the distinction between public and private sectors. A partner in business with the Shah of Iran—he was the Shah's banker, remains so to this day—Rockefeller befriended the Shah for more than twenty years, forming a joint banking enterprise with him, named Chase-Iranian, owned in partnership by the Iranian government and Chase Manhattan. The Shah also required that all letters of credit issued to Iran be done through Chase Manhattan, which meant that the billions of billions of oil revenues which Iran received over the years—including those since the OPEC price hikes (led by the Shah) in 1973—would be funnelled through Chase. When Rockefeller intervened to aid the deposed Shah, Khomeini, knowing full well their relationship, tried to strike back and withdraw Iranian funds from American banks—mainly Chase Manhattan. But before he could make a move, the Administration, protecting Rockefeller, froze billions in Iranian assets in American banks—mainly Chase Manhattan. Chase then proceeded to what is called "off-setting," and helped itself to Iranian funds to pay back loans made to the Shah, which Khomeini had balked at paying. The international battle between bankers and governments, scrambling like vultures over as much as \$15 billion in Iranian assets, is continuing to this day.

Kissinger, too, is a symbol, of amoral statecraft, the partisan of an interventionist foreign policy, supporting with

arms and cash the most oppressive regimes, ever-ready to blur the distinction between private business transactions and the political economy of foreign policy manipulation, and to use foreign policy as a tool for business interests, or to sacrifice business interests as a tool for foreign policy. A strong supporter of the Shah of Iran—much of the Shah's aggrandizement came during the Nixon and Ford years, i.e. the Kissinger years—Kissinger helped build the power of the Shah, cemented him onto his people's backs. The Shah became the foremost instance of the Kissinger-inspired "Nixon Doctrine" in practice, whereby other countries would serve as "proxies" for the U.S., building up their own military power to serve American interests. While Rockefeller was involved in helping to bankroll the Shah's domestic "modernization," Kissinger was involved in helping to build him up as a military power in the Persian Gulf, instrumental in selling the Shah the arms he needed to make Iran into the superpower of the future that he so desperately wanted.

The Shah as a symbol of US foreign policy

Seeing Rockefeller and Kissinger as symbolic figures—the one, of state intervention in the economy (using political power to amass economic power), the other, of an interventionist foreign policy used to cement "American" interests (setting up a global political order in which power elites can freely interact with stable governments, no matter how oppressive)—can help us to understand a great deal of the background to the Iranian crisis. In fact, the two men exist in a symbiotic relationship. Kissinger, the intellectual, came to the Nixon Administration straight from obscurity through his advisory role to Nelson Rockefeller, and he is also an advisor on international affairs for Chase Manhattan. Rockefeller, the power-broker, is the financial backer. Kissinger, the architect of "world systems," helped produce the situation in the Middle East which enabled the Shah to ram through 1973's massive price increases for crude oil. (His foreign policy "achievements" helped produce the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, with the unification of OPEC and the oil embargo as results. Nixon's wage and price controls further played into the hands of OPEC, by tying the hands of domestic oil producers.) Rockefeller's Chase Manhattan, on

the other hand, collected all oil receipts owed the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) because of the price hike. A cozy relationship, to be sure.

But I do not mean to imply that it is economic interest by itself which motivated Rockefeller and Kissinger in their schemes to aid the Shah. Far from it. The real concern of Kissinger and Rockefeller in their "humanitarian" aiding of the deposed tyrant, was the foreign policy implication of *not* granting the Shah asylum. *It is the breakup of American foreign policy that they feared.* Kissinger himself has stated this as clearly as anyone, in a lengthy op-ed page article in the *Washington Post* of November 29, entitled "Kissinger on the Controversy Over the Shah." Kissinger pointed out that the Shah had been one of our closest allies in foreign policy, and had been seen as such by every recent president:

Every American president for nearly four decades had eagerly accepted the shah's assistance and proclaimed him as an important friend of the United States. President Truman in 1947 awarded the shah the Legion of Merit for his support of the Allied cause during World War II and in 1949 praised him for his "courage and far-sightedness" and his "earnestness and sincerity in the welfare of his people." President Eisenhower in 1954 paid tribute to the shah for his "enlightened leadership." President Kennedy in 1962 hailed the shah for "identifying himself with the best aspirations of his people." President Johnson in 1964 lauded the shah as a "reformist 20th century monarch," and in 1965 praised his "wisdom and compassion... perception and statesmanship." President Nixon in 1969 declared that the shah had brought about "a revolution in terms of social and economic and political progress." President Ford in 1975 called the shah "one of the world's great statesmen." President Carter in 1977 praised Iran as a "very stabilizing force in the world at large" and in 1978 lauded the shah for his "progressive attitude" which was the "source of much of the opposition to him in Iran."

Kissinger pointed out that such quotations could be multiplied endlessly. Precisely so. The Shah of Iran was a symbol of the kind of relationship which the U.S. had formed in its interventionist foreign policy, supporting dictators and corrupt tyrants in the name of illusory "stability." Kissinger himself acknowledges:

I do not doubt that wrongs were committed by the shah's government in his long rule; the question is how appropriate it is to raise them, after four decades of close association, in the period of the shah's travail. I have been deeply worried about the foreign policy

consequences of spurning him. What will other friends of the United States in the area, in comparably perilous situations and perhaps more complex domestic circumstances—leaders essential for a moderate evolution of the whole region—conclude if we turn against a man whom seven American presidents had lauded as a loyal ally and a progressive leader?

In short, Kissinger is striking at the heart of the matter: to give up the Shah, to refuse him refuge, is to give up America's interventionist foreign policy, with its decades-long record of support for tyranny whenever convenient. We cannot expect brutal tyrants to trust the American government if, in the event of revolt, that government cannot or will not guarantee their safety.

In thinking that, Henry Kissinger is quite right. And so, to keep our foreign policy, Kissinger is eager to provide asylum for the Shah. He never considers the alternative: to be honest about the Shah precisely when it *has* become an issue, to face squarely who and what we have so gleefully supported over the past few decades, and to reexamine, and reject completely, the foreign policy which has led to the Iranian crisis in the first place. And more: the foreign policy which, if continued in an age of crisis and revolution, will lead us down the road to war.

The Pahlavi dynasty

His Imperial Majesty Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, Shah of Shahs, King of Kings, Light of the Aryans, was born a commoner, the son of Reza Khan, in 1919. Though he often staged vastly expensive ceremonies to celebrate the Iranian monarchy and the Pahlavi dynasty—one, in the early 1970s,




cost more than \$100 million—the dynasty itself lasted barely 53 years.

Reza Khan was born on March 16, 1878, son of Abbas Ali Khan, a major in the Savadkuh Regiment of the Persian army. Reza Khan joined the Russian-officered Cossack Brigade at the age of fifteen, and rose steadfastly from the ranks to officer level, taking part in a number of military campaigns against unruly tribes in the mountain areas of Gilan, Mazandaran and Azarbaijan—this last, the same area that was recently in revolt against Khomeini's rule. He rose to the position of commander of his majesty Ahmad Shah's Cossack division in 1921, gained in power, and helped stage a coup against the Shah, whom he considered a weakling. In short, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi's father got the Iranian throne by seizing it. On October 31, 1925, the Majles (lower house of the Iranian legislature) passed a bill deposing the Qajar dynasty, appointing Reza Khan head of state.

On December 12, 1925, the Constituency Assembly voted to vest the monarchy in the person of Reza Shah Pahlavi—he had taken the name to link himself to Persian tradition—and his male successors. Four months later, Reza Shah Pahlavi placed the crown on his own head, and his six year old son became the crown prince.

Born in violence, Reza Shah's reign continued in the same vein. With Reza Shah we begin the path, followed by his son, of so-called "modernization" aided by continual growth in government revenue from oil. Reza Shah is known by many as the "father of modern Iran," and there is more than a germ of truth to the claim. He began the process



of shaping Iran into the image of the West, using violence and brutality to create replicas of Western institutions.

This indeed is the continuing contradiction which lies behind so much of the "modernization" or "Westernization" which is taking place in the Third World, one with which Western development economists have never come adequately to grips. There are in fact always two routes to progress: the path of free, spontaneous development, of free men and women engaging in voluntary exchanges, producing economic growth through their own voluntary saving and investment, changing their own social mores through their own growing understanding; and the path of state coercion, violence, and planning, which imposes a preconceived notion of progress on men and women at the point of a gun. The Pahlavi dynasty has always followed the second route, backed by Western governments anxious to use Iran's oil resources for their own benefit.

Building a "Modern State"

We can see how Western partisans of the Pahlavis' "modernization" perceive the situation in Iran by glancing at the Hoover Institution's *Iran Under the Pahlavis*, edited by George Lenczowski. The book is dedicated to "the people of Iran whose ancient and unique civilization is experiencing in the mid-twentieth century a spectacular resurgence and progress for the benefit of their own and the world at large," and never once, in its comprehensive, twenty-page index, condescends to mention the word "torture." Reza Shah's accomplishments, according to the study, "could be summed up under three headings: building up the infrastructure of a modern state, asserting independence from foreign domination, and launching socio-cultural reforms." He laid down "the foundations without which a modern state could not function. These included assertion of government authority and national unification in the face of various centrifugal and anarchistic forces; the creation of a reliable army under national command; establishment of a modern fiscal system based on rational organization; and development of the minimum of communications and transportation facilities compatible with the requirements of a modern state."

The facts are that Reza Shah seized a quarter of Iran's ar-



"As late as 1978, the Carter Administration regarded the Shah as a force for 'stability' and 'progress,' but by 1979, it took personal intervention by Henry Kissinger and David Rockefeller to get the Shah into this country."

US foreign policy toward Iran is currently in the hands of these men: President Carter, The Shah, Secretary of State Vance, Vice-President Mondale and Secretary of Defense Brown.

able land as his own, "becoming probably the biggest landowner in Asia at the time" and brutally crushing anyone who resisted his land theft, as William Forbis writes in his newly published work *Fall of the Peacock Throne: The Story of Iran* (Harper & Row, Publishers). The "assertion of government authority" and the advancement of "national unification in the face of various centrifugal and anarchistic forces" of which the Hoover Institution study writes, in reality came down to the fact that the Shah tried to smash the nomadic tribes in Iran, bringing them under central government control. He poisoned their water, a heinous crime in any desert area, and attempted to drive them into populated regions where they could be controlled. He instituted the draft—that "creation of a reliable army" we read about—and used his army to combat his people's "anarchistic tendencies," which meant their desire to live free of central government control. The "establishment of a modern fiscal system" amounted to the systematic imposition of taxation and the creation of central banking, which would later lead to the explosion of inflation under his son. He did indeed build "the infrastructure of a modern state," but in this age of totalitarianism, that is an ominous accomplishment.

Reza Shah's positive reforms—the status of women was improved—are very real, but they pale in comparison with his crimes. His son was to follow in his footsteps, this time enlisting all the aid which Western technocrats, econometricians, and Welfare-Warfare State "progressive reformers" had to offer.

Reza Shah was caught in the crossfire of World War II, and it led to his downfall. He was sympathetic to the Axis powers, and Iran was occupied by the Russians and the British during the war. He was forced to abdicate on September 16, 1941, and handed over the frayed reins of power to his son, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, who was all of twenty-one years old. Installed by the Allied powers during the war, the young Shah was a virtual puppet and had almost no power for several years. He had been educated in Western ways in Europe, and slowly set about consolidating his power over his countrymen. Western statesmen were to help: Franklin Roosevelt began the process in 1943, when he began to think of Iran as a "showcase of American development aid after the war," as Forbis writes. But more important still was the growing importance of oil.

Oil had been discovered for the first time in the Middle East on May 26, 1908, and, as Robert Graham, correspondent for the *Financial Times* of London wrote in his book *Iran: The Illusion of Power*, "the impact of this discovery was felt only slowly; and at first more by Britain than Iran. The formation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) in 1909 and first production in 1912 was a major factor in deciding the British Admiralty to switch from coal to oil on the eve of the First World War. Also, because Winston Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty wanted Britain to own directly at least part of the nation's oil needs, this led to the purchase of a British government stake in APOC." Oil production and revenue increased dramatically, and after World War II, led to a power struggle in Iran which was to see Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi a Western-backed victor.

The real power in Iran at the beginning of the 1950s was in the hands of Mohammed Mossadegh, Prime Minister of Iran, who came to power on April 28, 1951, at the age of seventy. Mossadegh attempted to sharply reduce the power of the young Shah, whom he correctly saw as corrupt and ruthless, and led a battle against the control of Iran's oil by foreign governments, notably Britain and the United States. The British Labour government had already begun, in Britain, the process of nationalizing industries, so Mossadegh decided to nationalize oil. All hell broke loose.

The Seven Sisters, major international oil companies—mainly British, French and American—who formed a state-backed cartel in controlling Iranian oil (and much of the other oil in the Middle East) set out to isolate and strangle Iran's oil production. The British government blocked the sale of Iranian oil, and from 1951 to 1954 the Iranian oil industry virtually closed down.

A power struggle ensued between Mossadegh and the Shah. On August 16 the Shah attempted to replace him, lost, and fled the country. A few days later, the American CIA, taking the initiative, led a coup which deposed Mossadegh and returned the Shah to power, where, with CIA backing, he was to remain for the next 25 years. The second ruler of the Pahlavi dynasty had come into his own; he intended to rule with an iron hand. He had gotten grandiose ideas from his education in Europe, and intended to return Iran to its days of empire and glory.

"The students in Iran told the American news media this precisely and explicitly: they like Americans, it is only the US government they hate. What they are demonstrating against is American foreign policy."

With justifiable outrage, veiled women and angry students outside the US Embassy in Tehran protest the "humanitarian" gesture of the US granting asylum to the tyrannical Shah.



State planning and the Shah

That his rule would be "harsh" was a foregone conclusion. He himself told interviewer Oriana Fallaci, in this respect: "Believe me, when three quarters of a nation doesn't know how to read or write, you can provide for reforms only by the strictest authoritarianism." The strictest authoritarianism it was to be, backed by the continual support of the United States. He decided to "modernize" Iran as quickly as possible, and adopted all the latest Western techniques. State economic planning, implemented with the help of Western-trained technocrats armed with the latest gadgets of macroeconomics, led to fine tuning, forced industrialization, centrally-planned investment, monetary inflation, price controls, and economic chaos. Even torture was aided by the West: SAVAK, set up as the Shah's secret police in 1957, was trained in torture techniques by the CIA and Israeli Secret Service. Western technicians from Harvard, MIT, and a host of other elite establishment institutions flooded into Iran, tens of thousands of them, to help the "progress" along. Harvard meant business when, in 1968, it awarded the Shah an LL.D., claiming that "the shah is a 20th-century ruler who has found in power a constructive instrument to advance social and economic revolution in an ancient land." In a deep, spiritual sense, the Shah was as much a Harvard man as Henry Kissinger.

Thrown in for spice was a rotten corruption which permeated the entire Iranian government, particularly the royal family, who over the years skimmed billions of dollars from the oil revenue and taxes. Iran was a veritable "kleptocracy," to use Stanislaw Andreski's felicitous phrase, a country ruled by graft and corruption. No one did business in Iran without payoffs to the Shah and members of the royal family. And no one did business except by coordinating their activities with the Iranian state. The industrial "private" sector was usually financed by the government, and when it wasn't the Iranian government, it was foreign governments: the United States, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, the World Bank, *ad nauseam*.

While the techniques of political control were adapted from the latest Western economic doctrines, the framework

—a series of fluctuating, unstable and erratic five year plans — was borrowed intact from the Soviet Union. The plans made a shambles of the Iranian economy as they attempted to force industrial "progress" on the nation, complete with a Welfare-Warfare state which the Shah had wanted to use to turn Iran into a veritable superpower. Massive arms purchases were added to the industrialization, and the two combined to wreck the country. Stepped up after the Shah's "White Revolution" of the early 1960s, which infuriated the clergy, and even more after the OPEC price hike of 1973 saw Iran's oil revenue skyrocket, the plans worked the way state planning always works: disastrously.

In his book *Iran: The Illusion of Power*, Robert Graham reports on the successes and failures of the plans. In the area of housing, the Shah decided to make a major new effort, since it was seen as "an essential part of the transformation of Iran." But "a large-scale housing program was only possible if the government prohibited construction in other sectors." This it proceeded to do. Those in the private sector protested, but "there was no doubt that government projects came first, especially if military." The private sector was devastated, and resorted to graft and the black market to get the construction materials it needed for the real, not state-determined, needs of the people.

To fulfill production targets, a massive amount of cement was needed, so a revised plan in the early 1970s "blandly stated that 'annual production of cement mills will increase from 3.6 million tons to about 20 million tons in the final year of the Fifth Plan.'" In fact, production rose only to a quarter of that goal. The government then issued permits to contractors "which theoretically enabled them to obtain the required quantity of cement at the official price." But there wasn't any to be had—no government plan has ever been able to command cement into existence. So, in practice, the much-heralded plan meant that cement was virtually impossible to obtain—except for military projects. In area after area, the plans paraded a set of pompous, unrealistic goals, which were almost never achieved. And when the targets of the plans were achieved, they were generally financial and organizational disasters, laced with corruption.

But there was money, from taxes and oil, and what Iran could not produce, thought the Shah and his advisers, they could buy. Once self-sufficient in food, Iran was reduced to

importing most of what it needed. But food was not all that was imported: Iran's docks began to clog with thousands upon thousands of tons of imported material. Ships often had to wait weeks and months to unload. But again, there had been poor planning: material was unloaded—and left to rot and rust. There were not enough trucks to carry away the imported materials; thousands of trucks were imported. But there weren't enough drivers. At one point, eight thousand Koreans were brought in to solve the problem. What resulted was an economy which looked like something out of the Keystone Cops.

In *Fall of the Peacock Throne*, William Forbis writes:

Pinning an exactly descriptive label to Iran's economy is difficult. A long-time American adviser to the Shah mulled the question a moment and told me: "Public-sector management—maybe that's it." The economist Ali Fekrat observed that "the government has moved into center stage in leading the economy and in providing expanded social and economic service."

Tens of billions of dollars were squandered in one area after another. The Plan and Budget Organization, the government's main tool for "guidance," as it is so quaintly called, was in the forefront of this "planning." Writes Forbis:

Abustle with economists, sociologists, horn-rimmed administrators, and typewriter-pounding secretaries, the Plan Organization weighs and balances its goals and then prepares the government's budget. In the \$42 billion budget for the Iranian year 1978-1979, for example, the various goals received allocations as follows: economic development, \$17.2 billion; the military, \$10 billion; health, education and welfare, \$8.5 billion. ... The Plan Organization drew down criticism for insufficient stress on agriculture, communications, and literacy; for deficiencies in contingency planning; for waste, white elephants, and pet projects. Worse, its largely foreign-educated staff were what one Iranian sociologist called, in Persian, *masachusettsi*—technocrats who might have graduated from Massachusetts Institute of Technology. *Masachusettsi*, he thought when I talked to him, were homogenizing Iranians, neglecting religion, relying too heavily on bureaucracy, and were, in fact, Marxian in their faith in planning growth, centralization, change, and preference for cities over villages. They were cold people, he told me: "They think about Iran as they would think about Ghana or Guatemala. Quantification is everything. Too much 'macroeconomy.' The horrible traffic in Tehran shows that they are wrong. I'm very happy about the traffic. It may bring

down the technocrats."

Forbis draws the obvious conclusion: "Certainly the Plan Organization's way of thinking was a major cause of the revolt against the Shah." And, indeed, quantification is part of what led macroeconomic-oriented Westerners to admire Iran's "progress." "Progress" is measured by looking at the growth in GNP, and GNP is calculated by adding together consumption, investment, and government spending. The greater the oil revenues—and after 1973 they were fantastic—the greater the government spending. And the greater the government spending, the greater the measurable "well being" of the people. When the Shah spent billions on arms, their well being "increased." When food rotted on the docks, the people ate better—because more money was being spent on food. When SAVAK spent money mutilating human beings, the standard of living of the Iranian people again shot upwards. Such are the measurements of technocrats, which found virtue in the American intervention in Iran and in the Shah's "modernization."

As the oil revenues flowed into Chase Manhattan, and from there to the Shah, the Shah, possessed of delusions of grandeur, recklessly began to escalate his spending on arms. When Britain decided in the late 1960s to pull out of the Middle East, the Shah, encouraged by Nixon and Kissinger to acquire the latest and best in American weaponry, decided that he would become the new superpower in the Persian Gulf.

Five and a half billion dollars was spent on arms in 1974, \$7.6 billion in 1975, \$8.2 billion in 1976, and \$7.9 billion in 1977-78. In the four-year period up to 1976, \$10 billion

was spent on arms from the U.S. alone. In 1978, the Shah came to Carter with a request for \$10 billion worth of new military hardware. As Michael Klare reported in *The Nation*,

According to Industry sources, the Shah's "shopping list" includes: another seventy Grumman F-14 *Tomcat* air-superiority fighters (Iran currently has eighty); 140 more General Dynamics F-16 "NATO" fighters (160 are already on order); thirty-one advanced-model McDonnell Douglas F-4E *Phantom* fighter bombers armed with 1000 *Shrike* air-to-surface missiles; 150 Lockheed C-130 *Hercules* transport planes; and three Boeing 747 and twelve Boeing 707 aerial tankers. (10/21/78)

Klare noted that the particular types of weapons included in the above tally sounded an ominous note:

The items now requested suggest *offense* rather than defense. The F-4s, F-14s and F-16s, when combined with the fleet of Boeing tankers, would enable the Shah to mount air strikes against targets thousands of miles from Iran's borders.

And since each *Hercules* transport can carry ninety-two fully equipped soldiers, the 150 C-130s could carry an invasion force of some 13,800 troops. The aggressive nature of these requests is further indicated by the 1000 *Shrike* missiles, which are intended to knock out air-defense sites during air assaults deep into enemy territory.

That all this arming was taking place in a nation bordering the Soviet Union did nothing to help U.S.-Soviet relations, and the speed of this burgeoning militarism must have given the Soviets cause to worry, adding fuel to the arms race. But the American-backed militarism was also disturbing to the people of Iran, who have had a long history of being manipulated by foreign powers. And a Senate study in 1976 pointed out that because of this foreign interference, "Anti-Americanism could become a serious problem in Iran ... if there were to be a change in the government." Precisely so—and now our weapons are in the hands of the Ayatollah Khomeini.

To pay for these massive shipments of arms, oil revenue was not enough, and so the Shah began to churn out money. By 1968, the Iranian equivalent of M1 was 105 billion rials. By 1972, it had increased to 210 billion rials. But the money supply's growth then began to accelerate, to pay for the "modernization" and the arms: 273 billion rials in 1973, 375 billion rials in 1974, 452 billion in 1975, 664 billion in 1976, 821 billion in 1977, and an astonishing leap to 1398 billion rials by the time the Shah was deposed. This growth in the money supply led to fantastic inflation, as prices skyrocketed in Iran. The Shah responded in typical Nixonian fashion: he clamped price controls on the economy, and the bazaars suffered, as did small merchants who could no longer function. Shortages broke out, and harsh penalties were dealt out to those who dared to violate the Shah's controls. It was at this point that the Shah lost the support of even those who had still supported him. It was all too evident that, with American help, he was wrecking their economy and their lives. Anti-Americanism began to rise. Demonstrations and protests began in late 1977 and early 1978, and the Shah brutally crushed the demonstrators, killing thousands over the course of the year.

SAVAK, too, stepped up its work, ugly work which saw torture become rampant. It had become one of the most feared secret police agencies in the world, numbering some 30,000 to 60,000 employees, holding tens—some say hundreds—of thousands of Iranians prisoner. People were picked up by SAVAK and swept away, never to be heard from again, in classical terrorist style. Americans had better face squarely the things our government has helped to pro-

mote.

In his book *The Crowned Cannibals*, Reza Baraheni, whom *Harper's* has called "Iran's finest living poet," described what he and others went through:

They tie you to the upper bed on your back and with the heat coming from a torch or a small heater, they burn your back in order to extract information. Sometimes the burning is extended to the spine, as a result of which paralysis is certain. There were also all sizes of whips hanging from nails on the walls. Electric prods stood on little stools. The nail-plucking instrument stood on the far side. ... The gallows stood on the other side. They hang you upside down and then someone beats you with a club on your legs, or uses the electric prod on your chest or your genitals, or they lower you down, pull your pants up and one of them tries to rape you while you are still upside down. ... Not every prisoner goes through the same process, but generally, this is what happens to a prisoner of the first importance. First he is beaten by several torturers at once, with sticks and clubs. If he doesn't confess, he is hanged upside down and beaten; if this doesn't work, he is raped; and if he still shows signs of resistance, he is given electric shock which turns him into a howling dog; and if he is still obstinate, his nails and sometimes all his teeth are pulled out, and in certain cases ... a hot iron rod is put into one side of the face to force its way to the other side, burning the entire mouth and the tongue. A young man was killed in this way. At other times he is thrown down on his stomach on the iron bed and boiling water is pumped into his rectum by an enema. ... A heavy weight is hung from the testicles of the prisoner, maiming him in only a few minutes. ... In the case of women, the electric baton is moved over the naked body with the power increased on the breasts and the interstices of the vagina.

Last spring, according to *Time* magazine, "Anne Burley, an Amnesty International researcher, was shown by the government a SAVAK file that she deems authentic, containing pictures of victims who had been tortured to death. Several were women, she says, and 'in each case the breasts were mutilated.'" According to the December 10 *Time*, the Shah, "under international pressure to liberalize his regime ... gave the secret police a terse oral order in 1975: 'Don't take any prisoners. Kill them.'"

Remember this, the next time you hear David Rockefeller or Henry Kissinger prating about their "humanitarian" concerns for the poor deposed Shah.

The lessons of Iran

During the months that they labored to find a refuge for the Shah after the people of Iran had thrown him out like so much garbage, David Rockefeller and Henry Kissinger were desperately trying to save the foreign policy they, and so many other members of the establishment, had worked to erect over several decades. The American technocratic elite had worked with the Shah to achieve his "modernization," helping to implement the five year plans, the forced industrialization, the breaking down of older ways of life, the militarization of Iran. This was not "progress," and when the people of Iran revolted against it, there was a backlash against things foreign, and things American in particular.

American foreign policy had in fact sent Iran careening backwards—to an Islamic Republic, headed by the fierce, dogmatic, fanatical Ayatollah Khomeini. As we said last month, Islam *has* awakened, and America today quite simply lacks the power to impose its will on the Third World. We saw this in the series of riots and demonstrations which rocked American embassies all across Asia.

On November 20, Islamic extremists seized the Great Mosque in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, the holiest site in Islam.

Khomeini falsely blamed this on the United States and Israel. "Moslems, rise up and defend Islam!" he thundered.

On November 21, angry Pakistanis stormed and burned the U.S. embassy in Islamabad, killing two Americans; Khomeini called it a "great joy." For the next few weeks, embassies in one country after another were under assault. An American cultural facility was burned by a mob in Islamabad the same day, another was burned in Lahore, Pakistan; Islamic students attacked a U.S. consulate in Izmir, Turkey, on November 22; in Dacca, Bangladesh, Moslems demonstrated in front of the U.S. embassy. On Friday, the 23rd, Moslem mobs stoned both the U.S. and Soviet consulates in Calcutta, India, setting fires. A week later, on the 10th day of Moharram, one of the holiest days of the Shia Moslem calendar, bombs rocked the U.S. embassy in Thailand, and mobs were beaten back from the embassies in Kuwait and the Philippines in a flurry of anti-American violence. In tiny Kuwait, a mob of several thousand chanting Moslems marched on the U.S. embassy, only to be driven off by tear gas. On December 2, two thousand demonstrators stormed the U.S. embassy in Libya.

What they are demonstrating against is American foreign policy. The students in Iran told the American news media this precisely and explicitly: they *like* Americans, they proclaimed, it is only their *government* that they hate. And they hate that government because its foreign policy intervenes in their affairs, saddling them with tyrants who murder, torture and rob. Look at the outrage of the American people at the treatment of 60 American hostages in Teheran. Consider how much greater must be the outrage of the people of Iran. The U.S. installed a tyrant who killed an estimated 60,000 people and then made off with countless billions of dollars. Then, in a "humanitarian" gesture, two of the

people most responsible for his recent crimes arranged to have the deposed Shah admitted to the United States for "medical treatment." Is it any wonder that our embassies are being sacked? Can we expect anything less?

In an article in the December 10 issue of *New York*, Tad Szulc quoted a respected diplomat, who said a few weeks ago that "the eighties will be the crucible of intense crisis for the United States. You Americans are the target. And no matter what happens, the Middle East and the world won't ever be the same again. A historical line has been crossed, and you lack the power to draw new lines."

He was wrong. We do have the power to draw new lines. We have it in our power to take up Kissinger's challenge: give up the Shah, and you give up our interventionist foreign policy, he said. The U.S. should resolutely renounce both. We should make it clear that the Shah is no longer welcome in this country, and we should make it clear to him *why* he is no longer welcome. We should stop supporting tyrants, and stop offering deposed tyrants asylum. And to seal the bargain, we should abandon the foreign policy which has brought us to the stage where Americans are vilified and damned and held hostage. We should set to work dismantling government coercion at home, and tell men like Kissinger that they are no longer needed to run our foreign policy and men like David Rockefeller that if they cannot make it in a world free from government privilege, then they cannot make it. Then, repudiating the ugliness of the past few decades, in foreign and domestic policies alike, we should once again become a beacon of hope and of liberty for all the peoples of the world.

Related articles by LR Editor Childs include "Energy and American Foreign Policy" (7/79), and "The crisis in Iran" (1/80).

HE'S SICK, HOMELESS AND UNLOVED.

ABANDONED BY HIS FRIENDS.
AFRAID TO SHOW HIS FACE.
LET HIM KNOW THERE IS
SOMEONE WHO CARES ...
SOMEONE WHO WANTS TO
HELP. HE DOESN'T NEED
MUCH. A CHAUFFEUR, A COOK,
A GARDENER, THE BARE
NECESSITIES. PLEASE HELP.

ADOPT A SHAH



ADOPT A SHAH

YES I'D LIKE TO ADOPT A SHAH ... ☐
I PREFER TO MAKE A CONTRIBUTION
TOWARDS A ISLAND RETREAT ... ☐
VILLA ... ☐ YACHT ... ☐
NAME
ADDRESS
SWISS BANK ACCOUNT NUMBER

FOR MORE INFORMATION
WRITE TO:
H. KISSINGER
CHASE MANHATTAN
BANK
N.Y. N.Y. 10022

DAYTON DAILY NEWS 1978

Total evil and total stupidity

BILL BIRMINGHAM

Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia, by William Shawcross. Simon & Schuster, 467 pp. \$13.95. Paperback edition: Pocket Books, \$2.50.

ON JULY 30, 1974, THE House Judiciary Committee took up Article IV of the bill of impeachment against Richard Nixon. It charged that Nixon, "on and subsequent to March 17, 1969, authorized, ordered, and ratified the concealment from the Congress of the facts and misleading statements concerning the existence, scope and nature of American bombing operations in Cambodia in derogation of the power of Congress to declare war, to make appropriations, and to raise and support armies, and by such conduct warrants impeachment and trial and removal from office."

The bombing operations were called Operation Menu. For fourteen months from 1969 to 1970 American B-52 bombers made 3630 sorties over Cambodia, dropping 100,000 tons of bombs. The records of the bombing were falsified; each raid was listed as having taken place in Vietnam. Congress was not told, except for a few trustworthy hacks, and almost no reports appeared in the press. (*New York Times* Pentagon correspondent William Beecher filed one story on May 9, 1969, saying that "according to Nixon Administration sources" B-52s were hitting Cambodia, but no one followed it up. And the administration embarked on a series of wiretaps to uncover the "leak," the first of the "White House Horrors" known as Watergate.) Menu remained

secret until 1973, whereupon Congressman Robert Drinan of Massachusetts introduced the first motion to impeach Nixon, later taken up by Congressman John Conyers, a senior Democrat on the Judiciary Committee.

The Judiciary Committee voted Article IV down, 12 to 26. This was in large part due to the opposition of Chairman Peter Rodino, who feared it would provoke claims that "Nixon's the guy who saved the world, brought peace and all that crap.... It's going to damage the credibility of the Committee to the extent of jeopardizing our efforts.... The primary charge is abuse of office and we have already proved that." Watergate was the chief exhibit; Cambodia was merely a sideshow.

This was not inappropriate. "During the early seventies," writes William Shawcross, "Cambodia was often referred to as a 'sideshow.' Journalists who covered the war there used the term with irony; in Washington some officials employed it almost as a matter of policy." That policy made Cambodia what it is today. *Sideshow* tells how it happened.

Prince Norodom Sihanouk, ruler of Cambodia until 1970, kept his country neutral by not objecting too loudly when its neutrality was violated. The Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army maintained semi-permanent base camps near the Vietnamese border: the fabled "sanctuaries," which the U.S. blamed for its lack of success in Vietnam. Since the Cambodian army was too weak to move against the sanctuaries, Sihanouk suffered them to remain. For similar reasons he allowed North Vietnam to move supplies through the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville. Members of the royal family and some senior army officers, such as the rabidly anti-Communist General Lon Nol, trans-

ported the supplies to the border, assuaging their anti-Vietnamese sentiments with a fat rakeoff. (Cambodia behaved much as Sweden and Switzerland did in World War II, when those countries preserved their neutrality by trading with Germany and even allowing German troops to pass through their territory.) The U.S., in addition to making desultory artillery and air strikes across the border, also made secret, small-scale raids (code-named "Salem House;" later, "Daniel Boone") to plant "sanitized self-destruct anti-personnel" land mines and gather intelligence. In short, the Prince let the combatants do pretty much what they liked in Cambodia, as long as they left his people alone. Until 1969 both parties generally honored this restriction.

On his first day in office, President Nixon, who was widely deemed to have a "secret plan" to end the war, asked the Pentagon how the United States could "quarantine" Cambodia. General Creighton Abrams, the American commander in Vietnam, offered a proposal for a "surgical strike" by B-52 bombers against Base Area 353, reputed home of COSVN — the legendary "Central Office for South Vietnam," supposedly the central command center for the Communist war effort. After deliberation Nixon and Kissinger agreed, provided the attack was mounted in utter secrecy. So it was that on March 17, 1969, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized Abrams to launch 60 B-52s against "legitimate targets of your choice" in South Vietnam — and secretly divert 48 of them to Base Area 353. The attack was made early the next morning.

This was the first part of Operation Menu: Operation Breakfast, to be followed in due course by Operations Lunch, Snack, Dinner, Dessert, and Supper.

Each was concealed in the same manner as Breakfast. Nixon and Kissinger were later to claim the cover-up was necessary to avoid embarrassing Prince Sihanouk, who they claimed had "authorized" the bombings. "The evidence," says Shawcross, "indicates that 'the Sihanouk excuse' was merely that; the secrecy, the wiretaps, the burning and falsification of reports, were principally intended to conceal the administration's widening of the war from the American people. Even after 1970, when Menu had ended and Sihanouk, exiled, no longer needed protection, Nixon, Kissinger, Rogers, Laird, Elliot L. Richardson and other officials all continued to assure Congress, press and public, without equivocation, that the United States had scrupulously declined to attack Communist positions in Cambodia before spring 1970. Official, highly classified Pentagon computer printouts of the bombing of Indochina continued to show 'Nil' for Cambodia in 1969."

Menu did not destroy COSVN or the sanctuaries, nor did it hamper the war effort in the South. But in Cambodia, it made the Communists "disperse over a greater area than before," the Joint Chiefs reported in a secret memo. "The raids spread the fighting out from the border areas, where it had been contained, and diminished the main claim that Sihanouk still had to legitimacy — that he had kept his country out of Vietnam's conflict." Indeed, by the time Menu ended, Lon Nol had overthrown the Prince, in a coup that was supported, if not instigated, by the United States and helped along by a CIA "misinformation" campaign.

The U.S. certainly had reason to support a coup. By the fall of 1969, the Joint Chiefs had admitted Menu was a failure. But the lure of



destroying COSVN remained. General Abrams proposed an invasion of Cambodia, specifically Base Areas 353 and 352, the targets of Breakfast and Dinner. "Since the bombing had begun, the two locations had been plastered with about 29,000 tons of bombs, but even so, Abrams claimed that COSVN was still in place, and some United States officers continued to conjure visions of a Communist Pentagon East, telling the gullible that COSVN was a reinforced concrete bunker, 29 feet underground, that housed about 5,000 officials and technicians. *Newsweek*,

among others, believed and reported it. So did Nixon."

Defense Secretary Melvin Laird authorized secret South Vietnamese ground attacks across the border in February 1970, but "a full-scale invasion was still ruled out, because of the certain opposition of Sihanouk." Lon Nol ousted Sihanouk on March 18 (the first anniversary of Breakfast); 41 days later Nixon, fortified by several showings of "Patton," authorized the U.S. invasion. "Elliot Richardson told Congressmen privately that it was only Sihanouk's overthrow that allowed the invasion even to be 'considered.'"

Cambodia burns

The Americans and South Vietnamese followed a scorched-earth strategy in Cambodia, "firing and burning whatever might be of use to a returning enemy... driving the residents, Vietnamese and Cambodian, before them. The Americans found it almost impossible to separate friend from foe, and the South Vietnamese made no effort to do so. They plunged into Cambodia raping, looting and burning in retaliation for the murder of Vietnamese in Cambodia the month before." (Lon

Nol, in an effort to counter his lack of support among the peasantry, had launched a pogrom against the country's large ethnic Vietnamese population, denouncing them as Viet Cong. Hundreds were massacred.) Scores of towns and villages were annihilated, such as Snuol, a town of two thousand people which was bombarded for twenty-four hours, then pillaged by American soldiers. "Their commander, Lieutenant Colonel Grail Brookshire, ... later recalled the event, laughingly describing himself as 'The Butcher of Snuol.' But he admonished a reporter, 'You guys said my men systematically looted the town. My God, my men couldn't do anything that was systematic.'" COSVN was never found.

Nor did the invasion cripple the NVA as hoped. The Defense Department summarized the CIA's analysis: "Although U.S. and ARVN [South Vietnamese] cross-border operations have disrupted NVA operations in Cambodia to some extent, these operations have not substantially reduced NVA capabilities in Cambodia. Approximately 25 percent of the Vietnamese Communists' reserve stocks have been lost. Captured supplies can be reconstituted in about 75 days. ..." Hanoi simply shifted its supply lines to the west away from the border. But now, for the first time, Hanoi had an incentive to encourage the growth of the Khmer Rouge—which until then was ineffectual, numbering less than 4000 guerillas—so that they "could later relieve Vietnamese divisions from the defense of these lines and the sanctuaries against attack by Lon Nol forces." This they proceeded to do.

The fall of Sihanouk also boosted the Khmer Rouge. Before, their propaganda against corruption and landlords (who weren't especially oppressive in Cambo-

dia anyway) was neutralized by the enormous popularity of the Prince. After the coup, Sihanouk, believing that he could never return to Phnom Penh (a belief which, says ex-agent Frank Snepp, the CIA deliberately encouraged with more "misinformation"), made common cause with his former enemies to overthrow Lon Nol. The Khmer Rouge used this "to win precisely that mass support which the rhetoric of revolution had failed to engender. In Sihanouk the Khmer Rouge at last had a national and international identity and appeal."

Washington, for its part, had in Sihanouk a potential weapon against the Khmer Rouge. Had it so wished, the United States could have ousted Lon Nol—who became completely dependent on American support—and invited the Prince to return and declare a ceasefire as head of the Royal Government of National Union. The Khmer Rouge leadership, Pol Pot and the rest, would have had to go along, Shawcross argues persuasively (an opinion shared by Etienne Manac'h, the French Ambassador to Peking and Sihanouk's personal friend). "Thousands of their troops would undoubtedly defect, were they ordered to continue to fight." But this option became riskier the longer the war lasted, as the Khmer Rouge gathered strength and the Prince lost influence—a process the U.S. exacerbated by ignoring Sihanouk and insisting on a military solution. The "brilliant" Kissinger finally decided to ask Sihanouk to return to the capital on April 11, 1975, six days before the Khmer Rouge overran it. Needless to say, by then it was far too late.

The American invasion came as a surprise to Lon Nol. "He told an Asian diplomat, who told the U.S. embassy, that he greatly regretted that the United

States had not consulted Cambodia first. He wished that the Americans had blocked the Communists' westward escape route before attacking, instead of spreading them across Cambodia.... He did not seem to realize," observes Shawcross, "that Nixon was more interested in avoiding American casualties than in finding the North Vietnamese or that the invasion was actually intended to push the Communists away from South Vietnam's border." When Alexander Haig came to Phnom Penh, Lon Nol asked for American troops to deal with the NVA. Instead he got aid, intended to build his army into a force of 220,000 men. Cambodia was to be neutral no longer; it would be a client of the United States, and fight North Vietnam on its behalf. In this manner Cambodia became an example of "the Nixon Doctrine in its purest form"; the policy that "Asian forces would be required to fill the gap between Washington's ambitions and the willingness of American citizens to die on behalf of those ambitions in foreign fields. ... [Never] did Nixon ever seem to consider what effect the introduction of American assistance might have upon a client country or what might happen if, after Washington had committed its prestige, that client proved unable, in a Nixon phrase, 'to hack it.'"

As had been predicted by the Pentagon's Systems Analysis Office, Lon Nol never could "hack it." But Nixon and Kissinger made the commitment anyway, and the result was perhaps the most incompetent and corrupt army that ever existed. Shawcross provides the grisly details. "Artillery officers worked only to a very strict schedule: from 0630 to 1300 or 1400 hours five days a week. On Saturdays and Sundays they invariably rested." Pilots "of-

ten demanded bribes from ground units before providing air support. The T-28 fighter-bomber pilots would not descend below 3,000 feet; bombs and napalm dropped at sharp angles from that height were usually inaccurate. They undoubtedly killed a lot of people but not necessarily those who were targeted." The officer corps was, as the Pentagon observed, the army's "greatest shortcoming." In 1974 one brigade was placed under the command of a deserter. Others stayed in their Phnom Penh villas and rarely saw the troops they commanded. The troops squandered ammunition, and "hundreds of thousands of rounds were sold every month to the Khmer Rouge. One of the worst offenders was the military commander of Battambang province, who supplied the Communists with weapons on the understanding that they be used against any government positions save his own." Many commanders would not pay their men, who "often resorted to pillaging villages, alienating the peasants." More lucrative was the practice of pocketing the salaries of non-existent "phantom soldiers." "In its Termination Report, the Agency for International Development concluded that 20 to 40 percent of all military salaries were lost in this way." This proved disastrous during the final Khmer Rouge offensive in 1975. "One battalion commander paled when told to deploy his full unit strength to Phnom Penh; for years he had carried four hundred phantoms on his payroll and in fact had only forty soldiers ready for combat.... The phantom soldiers marched their comrades to defeat."

Lon Nol lasted as long as he did only because of American bombing. (After the bombing halt in August of 1973, Lon Nol's army sub-

stituted artillery. By mid-1974, 87 percent of all American military aid was being spent on ammunition, which meant that if Congress balked at continued aid, or the Khmer Rouge could restrict the flow of supplies, then the army would be crippled. "Both these things did happen and each contributed toward making the fall of the regime inevitable.") The B-52s dropped 539,129 tons of bombs from Operation Breakfast to the bombing halt. (For comparison, only 160,000 tons fell on Japan during all of World War II.) "Almost half of these bombs, 257,465 tons, [fell] in the last six months ... many ... on the most heavily populated areas of Cambodia." The Joint Chiefs of Staff admitted that it was impossible to assess the number of civilian—or for that matter, military—casualties from Operation Menu. And during the last days of unrestricted bombing in 1973, William Harben, chief of the American embassy's Political Section, "did what others might have done":

He cut out, to scale, the "box" made by a B-52 strike and placed it on his own map. He found that virtually nowhere in central Cambodia could it be placed without "boxing" a village. "I began to get reports of wholesale carnage," he says. "One night a mass of peasants from a village near Saang went out on a funeral procession. They walked straight into a 'box.' Hundreds were slaughtered."

The Madman Theory

Such atrocities are customarily explained away as being justified by dire military necessity. But Shawcross reveals that the level of bombing was completely unrelated to military needs, real or imagined. One senior Pentagon analyst compared the use of air power in Southeast Asia to a fire hose "running under full pressure

most of the time and pointed with the same intensity at whichever area is allowed, regardless of its relative importance in the scheme of things." The reason that the bombs fell so thickly on Cambodia in 1973 was simply that, with the ceasefire in Vietnam, the Seventh Air Force could give Cambodia its undivided attention. The policy was set years earlier:

Just before the invasion, Laird's representative, Warren Nutter, suggested at a meeting of the Senior Review Group that enemy activity did not justify the current [bomber] sortie rates and that these could be made more flexible in future. Kissinger refused to hear of it and demanded that the number of tactical airstrikes and B-52 sorties that had already been approved for the next financial year be flown regardless of the military situation. Laird was furious. "Anyone that addresses the problem starting with a set number of sorties doesn't understand the problem and isn't qualified to discuss it," he said the next day.

For Nixon and Kissinger, that such a policy was insane was, if anything, a point in its favor:

... Each believed in the value of unpredictability, of appearing "irrational" to one's enemy. Nixon publicly declared that "the real possibility of irrational U.S. action is essential to the U.S.-Soviet relationship." Privately he was more explicit. H. R. Haldeman records that in 1969 Nixon explained to him that "the threat was the key ... Nixon coined a phrase for his theory which I'm sure will bring smiles of delight to Nixon haters everywhere. ... He said, 'I call it the Madman Theory, Bob. I want the North Vietnamese to believe I've reached the point where I might do anything to stop the war. We'll just slip the word to them that "for God's sake, you know Nixon is obsessed about Communism. We can't restrain him when he's angry—and he has his hand on the nuclear button"—and Ho Chi Minh himself will be in Paris in two days begging for peace.'"

"A problem with this theory," Shawcross observes, "is that reputations

for irrationality have to be established, and that can be done only by irrational actions." In Cambodia, Nixon and Kissinger found it no problem at all. "We had tried," said author Robert Anton Wilson of his paranoia trilogy *Illuminatus*, "to imagine Total Evil combined with Total Stupidity, but Nixon had actually lived out our fantasies."

As the reader is no doubt aware, *Sideshow*, appearing as it did in the teeth of a massive right-wing revival in foreign policy, has excited no end of controversy. Most of the critics, besides engaging in endless hair-splitting about whether or not Nixon had Sihanouk's permission to murder Cambodians, charge that Shawcross is an "apologist" for the Pol Pot regime, or even, as the *Wall Street Journal* put it, that he claims "that the Khmer Rouge turned into fanatic murderers mainly because we tried to stop them." As usual when it comments on foreign affairs, the *Journal* vulgarizes the issue. Shawcross, who minces no words in condemning the government of "Democratic Kampuchea," set himself the task of determining what part American policy played in

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff admitted that it was impossible to assess the number of civilian—or for that matter military—casualties from Operation Menu."

the rise of the Khmer Rouge to power, and how they conducted themselves when they got it. In both cases, he concludes, it was considerable.

The Khmer Rouge claimed that the first act of their rule, the forcible evacuation of Phnom Penh and other towns, was "necessary" for several reasons. First and foremost, that

there was no food for the urban population and they would starve *en masse* unless they went to the countryside where there was at least some rice and land to grow more. Other reasons given were to foil extensive CIA spy rings in the towns, and the possibility that the United States was going to bomb them. The last was not unrealistic—within the month, the *Mayaguez* incident would show that the Madman Theory was alive and well in the White House—and as for the second, we have Frank Snepp's testimony that the CIA did indeed have spy rings in the towns, which were broken up by the evacuation. And as for the threat of starvation: starvation was already a reality for the more than two million refugees in and around Phnom Penh (who, to a large extent, had fled the American bombing). The situation was little better for the rest of the citydwellers. "There was little or no food to be had by anybody—refugees, civilian or soldier," said the U.S. Aid Termination Report. "Malnutrition became rampant, especially in Phnom Penh, and spread to all classes of the Khmer society." The U.S. embassy

estimated that even under these conditions the government—which fed most of the people of Phnom Penh—had at most a ten-day supply of rice on April 11, six days before the Khmer Rouge entered the city.

The reason for this is plain enough. The war had utterly destroyed Cambodian agriculture—it's rather hard to grow rice in a B-52 box—

and "about 95 percent of all income came from the United States," whose non-military aid never was very generous, and finally trickled to a stop. Small wonder the Cambodians starved by the thousands—if not the hundreds of thousands—after the war's end.

Not all the victims can be charged to American policy; the brutal, collectivist methods of the Khmer Rouge—to say nothing of the bloody coercion necessary to enforce them—ensured that many would die unnecessarily. But the U.S. AID report, written just before the fall of Phnom Penh, deserves to be quoted: "Without large-scale external food and equipment assistance there will be widespread starvation between now and next February. ... Slave labor and starvation rations ... will be a cruel necessity for this year, and general deprivation and suffering will stretch over the next two or three years before Cambodia can get back to rice self-sufficiency." And so it came to pass. The reader of *Sideshow* may well wonder whether Henry Kissinger, who replied to the critics of his secret bombing that "I fail to see the moral issue involved," would have behaved any less ruthlessly than Pol Pot. The answer, of course, is that up to April 1975, he didn't.

Shawcross sums up the behavior of the Khmer Rouge as follows:

All wars are designed to arouse anger, and almost all soldiers are taught to hate and to dehumanize their enemy. Veterans of the combat zone are often possessed of a mad rage to destroy, and to avenge their fallen comrades. It does not always happen, however, that victorious armies have endured such punishment as was inflicted upon the Khmer Rouge. Nor does it always happen that such an immature and tiny force comes to power after its country's social order has been obliterated, and the nation faces the danger of takeover by

a former ally, its ancient enemy. In Cambodia that did take place. In the last eight years, degree, law, moderation had been forsworn. The war and the causes for which it was fought had brought desolation while nurturing and then giving power to a little group of zealots sustained by Manichean fear.

One would think that Mr. Shawcross, if he desired to play the "apologist" for the Khmer Rouge, could do better than this. In any event this reviewer liked his explanation better than that offered by the authors of the *Wall Street Journal's* favorite Cambodia book, *Murder of a Gentle Land* by John Barron and Anthony Paul. According to Jean Lacouture's review of their book, "the main reason they found for this madness is the reported sexual impotence of the (apparent) head of the Khmer Rouge, Khieu Samphan, now head of state."

After South Vietnam and Cambodia fell, Henry Kissinger and Gerald Ford urged that there be "no recriminations." The recriminations came later, as the facts of American involvement in Southeast Asia receded from memory. There has been a steady parade of hawks coming forward to claim that the misery of the people of Southeast Asia, which was caused by the policies they supported, proves that they were right all along, and we should follow them once more. William Shawcross has dealt a mighty blow to their hopes (and hopefully, a mortal one to Kissinger's Senatorial prospects). No wonder Bill Buckley, Norman Podhoretz, Edward Luttwak and the rest are squealing. *Sideshow* is an indispensable book, come at just the right time to remind us that "Cambodia was not a mistake, it was a crime. The world is diminished by the experience."

Bill Birmingham is an LR staffwriter and research assistant.

The renaissance man

DAVID LAMPO

An American Renaissance: A Strategy for the 1980's, by Jack Kemp. Harper and Row, 207 pp., \$8.95.

AS THE LIBERTARIAN movement comes into its own, it becomes more and more important that it separate itself entirely from the conservative movement, both organizationally and philosophically. To a certain extent, the conservatives themselves will help us do this. Ernest van den Haag's recent article in *National Review* is an excellent example of a piece by a conservative who really *does* understand the implications of libertarian principles, and, happily, wants no part of them. But libertarians must now take the lead by continually pointing out that they have fundamental and irreconcilable differences with the conservative movement—differences that cannot be glossed over simply because we happen to have a certain number of positions in common.

Congressman Jack Kemp, a conservative Republican from a Democratic district in Buffalo, New York, has now written a book which can only serve to sharpen the differences between libertarianism and conservatism. *An American Renaissance: A Strategy for the 1980's* will no doubt take on added importance if Ronald Reagan becomes the Republican Presidential nominee because Kemp has just been named to an important post in the Reagan campaign, both as "campaign spokesman" and Chairman of Policy Development.

Congressman Kemp is best known for the tax-cutting proposals which he has introduced in the last

several sessions of Congress (they have been introduced in the Senate by Bill Roth of Delaware). Basically, the Kemp-Roth bill would cut income taxes by one-third over a period of three years. While it would cut everyone's income taxes, the bill specifically attacks the progressivity of the tax schedule, or the marginal tax rate: the rate of increase in taxation as income rises. The thrust of Kemp-Roth is that by cutting the marginal tax rate, you increase incentives and therefore productivity. And when you do *that*, tax revenues actually *increase*. In fact, Kemp's economic mentor, Professor Arthur Laffer of USC, actually argues that the reason we should cut taxes is a la Kemp-Roth is that it would *maximize* government revenues. If you think that reason stinks you are, of course, absolutely correct, but according to Kemp, "tax relief is not so much an end in itself as a means of getting this economy moving again." In fact, economic growth through tax cuts is practically the theme of his entire book. The issue of *individual rights* is never mentioned, and after reading the book, one begins to understand why.

Kemp begins with a folksy little analogy (one of the few in which he does *not* invoke football) in which government is portrayed as a wagon. The Democrats spend their time unloading the wagon (via food stamps, welfare, etc.) and the Republicans help load the wagon (presumably by being "pro-business"). Our current economic malaise stems from too much unloading and not enough loading. Since the Democrats are the party of redistribution, the Republicans must be the party of economic growth. According to Kemp, the system works best when both parties do their jobs. In his only reference to libertarians, he chastises us for want-



Jack Kemp, the newly appointed spokesman for the Reagan campaign and author of *An American Renaissance*.

ing no redistribution at all. "The people, as a people," he writes, "rightly insist that the whole look after the weakest of its parts. This is a primary function of collective action, of government." Lest you think this a mere fluke, a small bone thrown to liberal critics, Kemp sets the record straight a few pages later. After lamenting the fact that transfer payments account for 40 percent of the federal budget, he tells us, "Social Security is in trouble and must be saved. It is perfectly legitimate for a democratic society to require that people set aside something to provide for their old age, their survivors or unexpected hardship." After all, he continues, "a prosperous private economy can easily afford a strong safety net of public services ... private affluence does not [have to] mean public squalor." Kemp even goes

on to endorse national health insurance for "catastrophic illness." So much for conservative devotion to free enterprise.

But lest you get the impression that there is nothing in this book a libertarian can be happy with, the chapters on inflation and energy are generally quite good. Although Kemp does not call for abolition of the Federal Reserve monopoly, he does effectively argue for a return to the gold standard as a way to end inflation and bring monetary stability. While he does not believe passage of the Kemp-Roth bill would result in a larger budget deficit (due to increased revenues), Kemp opposes the proposed constitutional amendment which would require a balanced Federal budget. He believes Congress would have to either raise taxes or "slash the safety net." He

seems not to possess the will to push for even the very modest spending cuts which would be required by the balanced budget amendment.

The chapter on energy contains much good information, especially useful now that Carter (among others) is trying to push some form of "windfall profits" tax through Congress. The President has demanded a strong windfall profits tax before he will approve decontrol of crude oil prices. Kemp has joined with others in Congress in forming an anti-windfall profits tax caucus, a move not destined to endear him to some of his cold, upstate New York constituents. For this, at least, he can be admired.

The Congressman also discusses foreign policy in this book, one of the most emotional issues for conservatives and his views are what we might expect. He recites the usual conservative litany of how American prestige and power have declined in the face of the "relentless Soviet build-up," and repeats many of the half-truths and distortions that supporters of the American Empire usually employ. For example, he warns of the 800,000 troops added to the Soviet army since the mid-1960s, yet he fails to tell us that more than half of the Soviet military force engages in construction work and internal security, while a huge number is posted on the Sino-Soviet border, hardly a threat to Western Europe.

Unfortunately, it is not only in conventional armaments that Kemp advocates large increases, but in strategic nuclear weapons as well. Like his conservative cronies, he seems unconcerned about where this perpetual military build-up will lead. It can, of course, have but one conclusion: the nuclear destruction of this planet.

Conservatives have always entertained a double standard in foreign policy. The very same actions that they characterize as evil in Soviet foreign policy—spies and secret police, military aggression, influencing foreign political institutions and policy-makers—all become both good and desirable in the service of *American* interests, interests which are defined by the power elite in service of the power elite. And as usual, it is the American people who must pay the price. This nation's interventionist foreign policy has taken a huge toll in both lives and money, and yet the conservative prescription is more of the same. Libertarians must renounce and denounce this kind of foreign policy again and again and again.

There are several points that we must begin to stress, especially during the upcoming election year, in light of Kemp's newfound status in the Reagan campaign.

First of all, it is the Federal government of the U.S., *not* the Soviet Union, which is the primary threat to our liberties. Throughout the ages, foreign threats, real and imagined, have been used by governments to consolidate and expand their powers. In the United States, the greatest growth in the cost and scope of the Federal government has taken place in time of war, and the "communist menace" has been used to justify our military presence in more than 100 nations. Libertarians must declare that empire is not only a huge drain on our resources; it is also just plain wrong.

Secondly, it has been our support of dictators around the world which has often paved the way for communist revolution. Americans must begin to look at our foreign policy from the perspective of its *victims* to realize why the United States is hated in so many places around the globe. Iran, of

course, is only the latest example.

Third, libertarians have to make people aware of how our own government props up the Soviet state which poses this alleged mortal threat. For example, the Import-Export Bank has subsidized trade with the Soviet empire to the tune of about \$100-billion. Were it not for the serious consequences our foreign policy has had, it could rightly be considered a joke.

There are many issues not covered in this book; the whole area of victimless crime laws, for example, is ignored. In a book devoid of any reference to individual liberty, I suppose this is not very surprising. It is, however, disappointing.

It is rumored that much of this book was written with the assistance of Alan Reynolds, a Chicago economist, alleged libertarian, and regular columnist for *Reason* magazine. If this is the case, then it simply emphasizes how vigilant the libertarian movement must become in order to avoid being

co-opted by conservatives, many of whom would rather gut it than see it emerge as a fully independent and consistent alternative.

David Lampo is publications coordinator in the national office of Students for a Libertarian Society and a past chairman of the Libertarian Party of San Francisco.

Reclaiming the American dreamer

JOAN KENNEDY TAYLOR

Welfare: The Political Economy of Welfare Reform in the United States, by Martin Anderson. Hoover Institution Press, 251 pp., \$10.00.

MARTIN ANDERSON IS a remarkable political figure. An economist and longtime Republican with libertarian leanings, he has mounted attacks on policies that significantly erode our

freedom, and has been surprisingly effective in these attacks. At the same time, he has moved back and forth between academia and positions of influence and power with both Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan, somehow seeming to manage to maintain both the influence to accomplish a surprising amount of what he wants, and the mobility to disassociate himself from the power lusts and "dirty tricks" that invariably seem to be part of the entourage of major political party candidates today.

Thus, he joined the Nixon campaign in its successful bid for the presidency in order to work for the establishment of the volunteer army. He became an aide in the Nixon White House for the same reason and was the White House liaison with the Gates Commission, which reported on the feasibility of the All-Volunteer Armed Force. He also worked as Deputy to Arthur Burns when the latter was made Nixon's domestic policy advisor, and is the only member of the working group that developed Nixon's Family Assistance Plan who opposed its submission to Congress.

What should be of special interest to Libertarians is that he left the Nixon White House at what seemed to be the height of his influence, to accept a position as Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace. Whether coincidentally or not, by leaving the White House well before the summer of 1972 (in fact, in the spring of 1971, even before the break-in at the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist), he was able to leave with his reputation intact, clearly unassociated with the Watergate cover up and Nixon's downfall.

In 1976, Anderson was an advisor to Ronald Reagan during the latter's unsuccessful bid for the Republi-

can presidential nomination, and was Reagan's Deputy Campaign Director for Policy Development during his unofficial campaign for the presidential nomination in 1979. Shortly after Reagan announced his official candidacy, however, Anderson announced that he was returning to his position at Hoover, and would work with the Reagan campaign only on a consulting basis. No one knew why, and Anderson wasn't telling, but, as Evans and Novak wrote in their newsletter, it seemed to be a sign "that all is not well within the campaign."

But important as Anderson's forays into the political arena have been, it may be his books that will turn out to have most influenced the politics of his time.

His first book, *The Federal Bulldozer* (1964) is still considered to be the definitive attack on urban renewal, and has been credited with providing many anti-urban renewal groups with the ammunition they needed to be successful.

His second book, *Conscription: A Select and Annotated Bibliography* (1976) is the first volume of a three-volume work which will include a book of selected readings (due later this year) and an essay on how to raise an armed force in a free society. Perhaps the most complete bibliography on the draft ever compiled, it covers books, unpublished manuscripts, articles, pamphlets, reprints, speeches, government publications and congressional hearings.

Anderson's latest target is *Welfare* (1978). More specifically, it is any variation on the idea of the guaranteed income (including its conservative variation, the "negative income tax"), an idea which is trotted out by welfare bureaucrats periodically, whenever administrations or power blocs change.

The book has received some impressive endorse-



Martin Anderson, Ronald Reagan's Deputy Campaign Director for Policy Development until Reagan announced his candidacy.

ments. Columnist William Safire called it "the most penetrating study ever written on the knottiest problem in U.S. politics." Arthur Burns said it was "impressive and important." A former Commissioner of Welfare, Robert Carleson, added that the book was "an extremely important and valuable contribution to the impending debate over welfare reform." And the free market's own Henry Hazlitt called *Welfare*, in a review in *The Freeman*, "the definitive refutation" of the idea of a guaranteed income. Even Milton Friedman, the originator of the concept of the negative income tax, has quoted Anderson and says his analysis of the impossibility of radical welfare reform is right, in his own just-published book *Free to Choose*.

Its critics have to admit the validity of its argument;

even the negative or partially negative reviews which I have seen of *Welfare* seem for the most part to contain only niggling technical criticisms, essentially wishes that Anderson had written a different book. Thus John Bishop, writing in the Fall, 1978, issue of *The Public Interest*, quarreled with Anderson's handling of the biases inherent in some field studies he analysed, felt that the book implied that the planners did not foresee some problems to which they had in fact postulated false solutions, and held that some unacceptable figures were made more so by Anderson's reporting the upper estimate of a range of estimates. But Bishop himself admits that none of these points in any way alter the validity of Anderson's basic theses or his findings. In fact, his quarrel with the book is that it is, in

his words, "a masterfully written brief," whereas Bishop sees "a need for an up-to-date, popularly written book that provides a balanced and thoughtful summary of the findings and policy implications of this research."

Robert Lekachman in *The New York Times Book Review* (July 9, 1978) also wanted Anderson to write another book, possibly the Piven and Cloward classic, *Regulating the Poor*. His basic complaint was that Anderson "argues this classic conservative case," and "gives no sign of having ever visited a welfare center or of comprehending the hassles and humiliations of life on welfare." But even he had to admit that the book "is a sharp demonstration that three essential objectives of a tolerable welfare approach are in sharp opposition to one another."

It seems important, in the light of such reactions, to realize what this book is and is not. It is a devastating attack on the guaranteed income and the negative income tax. It is a well-written, careful, systematic, documented, and above all *practical* overview of the costs and consequences of the welfare "reforms" that have been endorsed by the administrations of Nixon, Ford, and later, Carter. One could call it Everything That Today's Policy-maker Needs to Know About the Guaranteed Income, But Was Afraid (or not knowledgeable enough) to Ask.

To many libertarians, it will not seem to contain everything that the policy-maker needs to know, since one of the things the book is not is a theoretical attack on the idea of welfare from a libertarian point of view. Neither is it an attack on welfare institutions from the viewpoint of how they harm those whom they purport to serve—the poor.

The case that Anderson is interested in making is pres-

ented in eight chapters, each of which is summarized in a beginning thesis. These (summarized even further) are as follows:

- 1) The war on poverty has been won, when we look at the benefits and services available to the poor, as well as the cash given through welfare.
- 2) These programs, however, have created a dependent caste, barred from getting off welfare by the "poverty wall" of what would be lost by working.
- 3) Overwhelmingly, Americans oppose a guaranteed income and favor welfare only for those who can't take care of themselves.
- 4) "The clamor for radical welfare reform comes essentially from a small group of committed ideologues who want to institute a guaranteed income under the guise of welfare reform."
- 5) If we had a guaranteed income, low income workers would withdraw from the work force in massive numbers.
- 6) No radical welfare reform plan can simultaneously provide politically acceptable levels of benefits, incentives to get off welfare, and an acceptable cost to the taxpayer, as these factors are inversely related. (It is the "elegant demonstration that when any two of these three basic elements of radical welfare reform are set at politically acceptable levels, the remaining element becomes unacceptable" which Henry Hazlitt considers to be the most original contribution of the book.)
- 7) We should return to a philosophy of welfare reform that eliminates fraud, minimizes cost, and gives help only to those who are unable to support themselves.
- 8) President Carter's Program for Better Jobs and Income (which was presented in May '77 and died in Congress in the summer of '78) would be even more difficult to administer than the present system, adding millions to the welfare rolls and billions to the cost.

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Each of these theses is fleshed out with charts, tables, examples, and citations, and the result is, in the words of Henry Hazlitt, "such a thorough job of theoretical and factual analysis that it would seem hereafter impossible for anyone with a candid and open mind to read it and still take the guaranteed income seriously."

Still, libertarians may well be disappointed that Anderson has deliberately restricted the book's purpose to three aims: "to examine the essentials of [the welfare reform] debate, to try to explain the reasons behind the current unrest about our welfare system, and to discuss the major reasons why all attempts to radically change our welfare system have resulted in dismal failure." His conclusion is that either President Carter's plan will fail and be supplanted by a similar new plan or that "on the other

hand, Congress may be so weary of denying the welfare professionals that it might finally decide to try radical welfare reform to see if it works. It could be a costly experiment."

Contrast this quotation with an earlier one from the introduction to the paperback edition of *The Federal Bulldozer*, written on December 25, 1966, before Anderson had access to the seats of power. After summarizing the ways in which urban renewal programs violate rights, he wrote:

"This kind of a program is not logical, it is not practical, and it is not moral. For no government program should exist that threatens the life, the liberty or the property of any person."

Should we conclude, from the striking difference in tone between these two quotations that Anderson has changed his mind? I strongly doubt it. He states clearly in *Welfare* that "any proposal

that includes a right to an income necessarily implies that someone is to provide that income, and the rights of the person who is to supply that income are almost always quietly ignored."

But this recognition of rights is embedded in an approach that is narrowly practical, and at least implicitly endorses existing programs, even though they too ignore the rights of the person who is to provide the income. Because Anderson has thrown in his lot with the two-party system, he accepts the thesis that in order to make our society nearer to the libertarian ideal, he must set himself just such limited, practical goals—to implement this program, to stop the worst excesses of that, to support the best he sees available within the present major parties.

There is, of course, an alternative. Now that the Libertarian Party is growing faster than anyone expected,

it could very well directly influence our society and change social institutions, just by articulating the issues in principle and challenging the other parties by threatening to take away a crucial margin of votes. With men like Martin Anderson advising Libertarians, rather than Republicans, the Libertarian Party influence could be impressive indeed.

Perhaps, instead of preserving his mobility in order to maintain his integrity with respect to Republican politics, as he seems to have been doing, Martin Anderson will decide to break once and for all with the politics of expediency and go back to the politics of principle, where his statement in *The Federal Bulldozer* shows he belongs.

This man was meant to be not only libertarian but a Libertarian.

Joan Kennedy Taylor is Senior Editor of LR.

On View


Alone together

DAVID BRUDNOY

EVEN THE MOST VAPID marriages, even those in which the passions have long since cooled and the common ground of interest much eroded, are saved sometimes, if only in name, by reference to the pious argument: we stay together for the sake of the children. How *The Children* are benefited by constant exposure to a loveless marriage is not often explained; it is enough to mouth the platitude, to hope that repetition will inspire belief and belief reality. Our grandparents may have longed for divorce but they rarely ran with their longings, if they felt such longings. They made do. For better or worse. All in all, the American marriages of our grandparents' generation seemed workable enough, and for the woman, being miserable together with her man at least beat being scandalous alone without him. *For the sake of public opinion* sufficed as an encompassing reason to stick with the wrong mate. *For the sake of the children* came into vogue later, and most likely it worked about as well, masking real emotions with a presumed virtue.

Nowadays neither routine washes. The divorce rate rushes to meet the marriage rate; at present nearly at the half-way point, in future it will most likely go well beyond that mark. The census statistics tell a morose story: in the next decade we had best expect that half the youngsters will grow up in one-parent households; weekend fathers and to a much lesser extent weekend mothers will number in the many tens of millions—McDonald's parents, some sophisticates call them. The children will also make do.

COLUMBIA PICTURES



Dustin Hoffman and Justin Henry as the abandoned father and son in *Kramer vs. Kramer*.

The cinema, contrary to myth, is rarely ahead of the public in depicting experience. Movies are usually found trailing a few lengths behind Real Life. As witness *Kramer vs. Kramer*, closely based on Avery Corman's novel of the same name. Here we have one of the few film treatments, and among that few the best, of an increasingly common phenomenon: the broken marriage, the deserting wife, the father raising his child alone. In the beginning they were three: Joanna and Ted and little Billy. Then Joanna cut loose, and now there are two: Ted and little Billy. It is the choice stuff of soap opera in theme, though genuinely affecting and quite convincing in Corman's hands. And even more so in Robert Benton's flawlessly acted movie, a movie as carefully and intelligently made as any we have seen in recent years. *Kramer vs. Kramer* tells a story to which only a stone would be unresponsive. It is

at once a broad, generalized statement about contemporary American marriage and a unique incident unmistakable for any other.

Just what went wrong in Joanna and Ted Kramer's marriage is never entirely clear, either to Ted and Joanna or to the audience. These are the most decent of young moderns: bright, attractive, considerate, upwardly mobile—he does brilliant things for his advertising agency; she moves along, as expected, in his world; they adore their six-year-old son; they are ideal. At least they look the part. But Joanna packs her bags, kisses her sleeping son goodbye, waits for Ted's return from the office, tells him to pick up the dry cleaning, and off she goes. He thinks it's a phase: she'll come back. She doesn't. He can't understand why, nor can Billy, with whom suddenly the father must now make a life. The story could not be more mundane for the next three-quarters of an


hour, as Ted learns how to balance work and raising a son, how to expand himself until the boy can survive the loss of his mother, how to do, as Billy puts it, what "the other mothers" do—how, in some cases, not to do what "the other mothers" do, at least not so well.

We see the love between Ted and his son in the most humble situations: this is not the story of the debonair playboy shepherding his heir to the glittering watering holes of the world; it is dad taking the kid out to a park, escorting him to school, rushing him to the hospital when he falls from a height, cheering him on through the agonies of a kiddie pageant. Joanna disappears from our thoughts as from their lives.

And Joanna reappears after seventeen months, having found herself at the other end of the continent, having come back to New York City from California, ready at last to reclaim her son. The title refers, of course, to the court battle for custody, in which, for all that our sympathies are almost entirely with Ted, Joanna makes the simple and ultimately successful point that whatever her faults she is still Billy's mother. The Law, as millions of divorced fathers know, rarely denies custody to an attractive, gainfully employed, contrite, and obviously loving mother. If Joanna played the villain at the start, she manages to convince the judge that she has been reborn. Ted must prepare Billy for changed circumstances. Joanna comes to claim the child. A very gratifying thing happens. Curtain.

Could the story be more carefully constructed to leave us bawling in the aisles? Benton's triumph, and his cast's, is in transcending the plot outline by the film realization. Every chance to milk an extra sob is passed by: the child is wounded in that fall but he

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
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COLUMBIA PICTURES

Dustin Hoffman and Meryl Streep battle over the custody of their son, in a divine screen symbiosis portraying the end of a less than heavenly marriage.

doesn't lose his eye. The friendly neighbor lady is not transformed into the fairy godmother of the motherless Kramer household. Ted does not become a celibate: he brings home a voluptuous date who chances, nude, to meet Billy, pyjamaed, on the way to the john. We are subjected to no saints-and-sinners nonsense, nor are we thought incapable of appreciating the poignancy of the situation without being buried in glop. The movie is funny as well as tender, and hard-nosed about everything: Ted loses his excellent job because his work suffers, and he bullies his way into another, though lesser, job in order to stand a half-chance at winning custody in the courtroom; the child is adorable but no paragon of little-manly heroism, in fact he is a pain; the flow of events and of characters, throughout, is matter-of-fact. Even more than Avery Corman's novel, which is underwritten, spare, loath to settle for cheap sentiment-

ality when genuine sentiment will suffice, Robert Benton's film is constructed on the less-is-more foundation. It never overdoes.

Dustin Hoffman and Meryl Streep made Ted and Joanna as familiar to us as our best friends. Streep (*The Deer Hunter*) has to date had no better role than this, nor, since *Midnight Cowboy*, has Hoffman. Hoffman's Ted is a man pushed nearly to the edge but intent upon parenting properly, and intent also upon holding on to his boy. Streep, in this least sympathetic of all her screen roles, manages to whiplash the audience: we are sorry for her, then we say good riddance to her, then we know just how she feels, after which we hate her guts, and finally we love her dearly. Streep's voice never turns shrill, her face never contorts in anger, she never says an unkind word, she

manages within those constraints to run us ragged through her emotions as if they were ours, or at least as if we could imagine them ours. Ted and Joanna's marriage wasn't made in Heaven, but Streep's and Hoffman's screen symbiosis is divine.

In a year that presented us with Ricky Schroder (*The Champ*) and the giant economy size Kleenex box to help us abide the movie that so cynically instructed us to adore that child, audiences may come to Justin Henry's Billy in *Kramer vs. Kramer* expecting the worst. But save for the fact that the neophyte actor does not look as if he has aged seventeen months, he does win us totally, the brat and little-boy-lost rolled into one. Also notable are Jane Alexander as the neighbor and Howard Duff as Ted's expensive, savvy attorney, as well as the two dozen players with lesser parts.

The elements jibe. Benton's writing carries the

story with a bare minimum of pontification, the music (by Purcell and Vivaldi) is infrequent and never intrusive, the acting (it cannot be said too many times) is superlative. If *Kramer vs. Kramer* were intended as propaganda for some Divorced Fathers In Quest of Justice lobby, it might well have been assembled with a shrewder eye for polarity; it would have required a martyr bursting out of Ted and a bitch simmering within Joanna. This is no ideological tract, however, either on the page or on screen. This is a prolonged episode in the lives of three people who would very much rather have stayed together if they could, but who couldn't, and so didn't, and, in a contemporary way, a way repugnant to the generations of our past, managed to make do.

Three other recent films work kindred material with varying results. *Rich Kids*, saddled both with an atrocious title (for this particular

story) and with a stupid climax, plays around the fringes of the effect of divorce on children. Jamie (Jeremy Levy) is a young old-pro at the separate families game, swift and bearably cunning in his exploitation of the potential gains to be had from two families, and he nicely instructs his new friend Franny (Trini Alvarado) in precisely how to handle the revelation scene to come. The girl will be taken to a restaurant—better make it a cuisine you won't mind detesting ever after, he advises her—where mom and dad will announce that they are going their separate ways, after which it is expected that the child willretch. It's a sly little flick, which tosses in a modicum of sociology to lay claim to some merit outside itself, along with some pedagogical worth, but concentrates wisely on gently tickling us with the awkwardness of adults and coyly teasing us with the possibility (as it happens, unrealized) of barely pubescent sexuality. The most these two brainy darlings do is bubble-bathe together, but getting there is most of the fun, and all the fun is *Rich Kids*' commercially successful manner of refusing to grapple with the grim reality of divorce and the junior products of divorce. *Rich Kids* has a little bit of something for almost everyone, but not a whole lot for anybody interested in sustained mood, much less for anybody who might like to spend his four bucks and his two hours with a movie committed to seriously exploring a troubling theme.

If *Rich Kids* centers on the kids (which at least gives it an almost fresh perspective, because these youngsters are gifted without being unendurably adultish) but slides right by the central problem, *Running* remembers now and again that divorced parents have children, and when the children make an appearance the movie is the

better for it. But at heart it is the story of a man who can sustain nothing—not his marriage, not a job, not his father-daughters relationship—until he can buckle down and run himself right into the Olympics. The worst burden the two daughters bear is the thought that their father is nuts, which is overcome in an instant when he qualifies for the Olympic team; suddenly his mania for running seems more than passably normal to his blithe, blonde, conformist children, not to mention all the children left over from *Rocky II*, who jog along in Michael's path and cheer him on to the big race. Michael Douglas plays Michael, Susan Anspach, his wife, and both are good, as is the movie, for a movie about a man who can bear to say adios so long as he has his Adidas. But, like *Rich Kids*, *Running* doesn't quite know what to do with the leftovers; that is, the children.

The Last Married Couple in America is the most recent of the four pictures we are considering, the latest to misuse the talents of George Segal, and the least cogent of the movies in its treatment of the subject of marital discord. This comedy should win at least one star for bothering to provide its squabbling couple with three sons, and even permitting one of them to be pudgy, but then neglecting to make any of them at all memorable. I got the feeling watching Natalie Wood and Segal struggle with their material that the committee that had slapped the movie together remembered only at the last minute that Mr. and Mrs. America are supposed to have children, then ran out to La Cienega Boulevard and dragged in the first three lads they met.

Most likely that impression grew simply out of my perverse desire to throw the book at director Gilbert Cates, screenwriter John

Herman Shaner, and producers Edward S. Feldman, Al Ramrus, and Shaner. Quite unfair of me, I grant, like their atrocious movie, which is unfair to the talented actors who were obliged to make fools of themselves, unfair to the types who are so grotesquely transformed into stereotypes, unfair to the movie audiences who deserve better than such cynical manipulation. A farce would be nice; even a slapstick comedy has its advantages; but a witty, comic gloss thinly applied over a dark theme would be swell. *The Last Married Couple in America* might even have offered something memorable had it consciously worked to lead us at the end to the sudden realization that we were dealing here with a couple so Me-oriented that they never considered their children at all. But that's not it, not in the least. Every fifteen minutes or so the boys are trotted out, dropped into some bit of nonsense, then caused to disappear.

It is a film that lacks the courage of any conviction. Its "goofy" co-star is Dom DeLuise, who is untethered for ten minutes to do a plumber who would rather be an X-rated film actor but who settles for an affair with a grey-haired hooker. It offers us Valerie Harper ("Rhoda") with a bleach job, in the role of the wife's best friend, conniving to seduce the husband. It lets Richard Benjamin go: Richard Benjamin is routinely let go these days, flipped into one mediocre movie after another, wherein he is ordered to flop about and be silly. In this thing he plays the guy who supposedly delights in not being married any longer, but who really ... and of course you get the picture. Segal and Wood are expected to convince an audience that they are the only couple in their set, even including the gay couple, who are still madly in love and

ecstatically content, and then that one awkward fall into somebody else's bed is enough to make of the perfect husband a louse in wifery's eyes. Within the space of half a year Mr. Segal has been teamed with Glenda Jackson (*Lost and Found*) and with Ms. Wood, both of whom offer more substance in their pinkies than he can manage in his whole frame. With Jackson, Segal crumbled beneath the actress; with Wood, Segal goes down before a hideous script, a pointlessness of view that is appalling, and an obliviousness to the meaning of the characters' unraveling marriage upon those sons we are expected to believe they cherish. *The Last Married Couple in America* is the last movie anybody who enjoys movies ought to be forced to see.

But in a sense it is exactly what the American cinema seems best able to do, at least in the vast majority of cases. Since, as I have remarked perhaps too often in this space over the months, the movies don't reflect reality except inadvertently, at least most of the time, a piece of fluff like *Last Married Couple* is far closer to the audience's expectations than a gloriously whole endeavor like *Kramer vs. Kramer*. How could anybody hope that a film that can't even do the Weird Party scene properly would want to waste a moment contemplating the meaning of "splitville" on the children? This is a film for those who couldn't care less. *Kramer vs. Kramer* asks something a bit more demanding of its audience: that we don't mind having to think. □

LR's film critic reviews also for WNAC-TV (CBS) in Boston, hosts "The David Brudnoy Show" on WHDH-AM, also in Boston, and writes a thrice-weekly newspaper column. He is Deputy Sheriff of Middlesex County, Massachusetts.

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
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
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