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De-Industrializing America

Milton Mueller and Doug Bandow look at the stagnation of the U.S. economy and the special interests that are proposing more-of-the-same “cures” — increased government bailouts, protectionism, and regulation.

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by Milton Mueller

The Politics of Protectionism
by Doug Bandow

“Someday There Will Be...”
by Victoria Varga

The punch line for the latest Polish joke is that it only takes one Polish economist to discover the free market, but 199,999 workers to hold off the Russian tanks. LR's managing editor discusses the possibility of real freedom in Poland.

The Government Gets Religion
by Joan Kennedy Taylor

A religious revival and a bureaucratic revival are on a collision course, because both factions are calling for an increase, rather than a limitation, of government power.

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The lesser of two frights

IN 1980 THE AMERICAN people voted out of fear. A poll conducted in September by Time magazine showed that of those planning to vote for Anderson, 61 percent saw themselves as voting against Carter and Reagan. Forty-three percent of those who planned to vote for Reagan were in fact voting against Carter, and 34 percent of those planning to vote for Carter were actually voting against Reagan. Only about 5 percent of the voters had a really favorable impression of Anderson, compared with 9 percent for Carter and 11 percent for Reagan. Seventy-five percent of the voters, in short, voted against someone they feared, not for someone they wanted.

What were they afraid of? That if Carter was re-elected, the U.S. would slide further into recession and economic chaos. That if Reagan won, there would be war. It really was just that simple. Among voters more concerned with foreign policy, Carter took an early lead: an October 23 Lou Harris poll found that by a margin of 48 percent to 20 percent voters believed that Carter, rather than Reagan, "would be most steady and patient, and not overreact in a crisis." Among voters more concerned with economic policy, the margin clearly belonged to Reagan: that same Harris poll showed that by 48 to 30 percent voters thought Reagan "would do a better job of handling the economy."

In the end, American voters decided they'd rather risk war than risk economic collapse. Why? Because many of them had come to be persuaded during the last days of the campaign that while economic collapse was a near certainty under Carter, war would be only a possibility under a Reagan administration, not a certainty — and it was obviously already a possibility under Carter. We knew Jimmy Carter would be a disaster; we'd seen him in action for four years and had more than enough of his talent for economy-wrecking. Ronald Reagan, on the other hand, had never been in a position to start a war, so we didn't know with comparable certainty that he would start one if we granted him the authority. Moreover, Reagan had put a lot of concentrated effort during the last two weeks of the campaign into moderating his foreign policy image as a bellicose cold warrior who wasn't too sure a hot war might not be a bad idea either — with heat by nuclear power.

Beginning with his half-hour, televised speech to the nation on October 19, and climaxing in his October 28 debate with Jimmy Carter, Reagan repeatedly emphasized his commitment to nuclear arms reduction and his passionate desire for Peace (which, of course, he felt could be guaranteed only by a U.S. military establishment strong enough to "lead the free world"). He seemed sincere when he said these
things, but he had doubtless worked long and hard to perfect exactly such an air of sincerity. He knew that he had to moderate his warlike image and do it quickly, or he would lose the election. He had finally realized that anti-war sentiment among the voters is now running higher than at any time since the height of the Vietnam war.

Writing from Boulder, Colorado for the October 24th New York Times, E.J. Dionne claimed that

The popular worries about war and peace in this university community in the foothills of the Rocky Mountains do not run as high as they did during the Vietnam war. But when Senator Gary Hart told a group of University of Colorado students earlier this week that he rejected getting the United States into a “war for oil,” the response was thunderous.

“Who the hell cares who’s President,” said Linda Fenter, a Hart campaign worker, “as long as he doesn’t get us into a war.”

Nor were these University of Colorado students unusual in their view of things. “Fear of war,” Dionne wrote, was a popular theme this Fall “with an electorate for whom military policy has become increasingly important.” Dionne found that “as memories of the Vietnam war recede, the electorate remains wary of a bellicose foreign policy.” He cited as typical the case of “34-year-old Ivy Zahn, who lives in a cabin in Ward, Colorado, and who was motivated by her fear of war to register to vote for the first time. “Reagan scares me,” she said. “He’ll go out with all six-guns blazing. I want to live in a country at peace, a country that doesn’t believe it has to get out and protect the whole world.”

Ivy Zahn is typical. If it is clear from Ronald Reagan’s election alone that a majority of American voters rejects Jimmy Carter’s economic policies, it is equally clear from numerous public opinion polls and from the Reagan campaign’s abrupt switch to a pro-Peace strategy two weeks before election day, that the majority of voters also rejects the foreign policy which, up until then, our new President had unequivocally stood for. The majority of voters doesn’t want the big government at home against which Mr. Reagan himself railed constantly and effectively, true enough. But they don’t want a bellicose foreign policy either. They want tax cuts, less regulation, and an adequate national defense—but they are leery of foreign interventions.

This is why libertarians should see the outcome of the 1980 Presidential election as a positive sign for the future. The voters have expressed their fear of both economic collapse and war, and have chosen to risk war only after receiving impassioned assurances that the risk was smaller than they had believed. The typical Reagan supporter on November 4 was probably much like hotel owner Keith Dever of Estes Park, Colorado, who told E.J. Dionne that he was supporting Reagan “in part because he doubts any President could start a war ‘all by himself.’”

A vote for Reagan was a vote against Carter and a wager that if Reagan became bellicerent in his conduct of American affairs with other nations, someone would stop him. A vote for Reagan was a vote motivated by fear, rather than by any belief that Reagan would work for the tax reductions and the freedom from foreign entanglements which the electorate so obviously wants.

The voters chose Ronald Reagan last month because they were even more frightened by the most likely alternative. And in many cases they withheld their votes from genuine alternative candidates like Ed Clark, who actually voiced their positions on the issues, because they feared the consequences of not working to prevent the re-election of Jimmy Carter — which meant working for the election of whatever candidate had the best chance of beating him, even if that candidate was someone like Ronald Reagan. The vote totals of all the 1980 independent and third party candidates suffered as a result. But one of those candidates, Ed Clark of the Libertarian Party, has every reason to consider his performance at the polls a heroic success.

The Clark campaign brought libertarianism to nationwide public attention on a scale which would have been considered impossible by almost everyone only four years ago. It reached tens of millions of Americans who had never before heard the word libertarianism, and gave them the message that only libertarianism holds the solutions to the problems they consider important: taxes, inflation, defense, and war. Libertarians want to slash taxes again and again, until the only revenues collected by government are those which people contribute voluntarily. They want to balance the budget at drastically reduced levels and end permanently the inflation of our money supply. They propose an adequate defense through the unique approach of rethinking the purpose of our defense policies; they want to concentrate our money and forces against a possible attack on the United States itself and reject the role which the American government has assumed of policeman to the world. Only by so doing, they believe, and correctly, can we avoid becoming involved in — or starting — another war.

In a nationally syndicated column about the Clark campaign, conservative-turned-liberal Garry Wills heaped lavish praise upon Ed Clark for showing that “you don’t have to be a warmonger to believe in the free market.” In some ways this was the most effective and possibly the most lasting impression which Clark made on voters and journalists alike. It is truly a shame that he didn’t get the attention he deserved from the three TV networks and from the major newspapers. But the attention he did get was largely respectful, considerate, and above all else, thoughtful. And that gives us all the more reason to be hopeful about all the campaigns to come.

—Roy A. Childs, Jr.
Jeff Riggenbach

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Of the eligible electorate, 51.8% turned out, which is the lowest percentage since 1924.
Israeli Fantasy

IMAD-AD-DEAN
AHMAD

ISRAEL HAS FOSTERED a second tragedy besides the dispossession of the Palestinians: the spectacle of otherwise decent human beings firmly affixing Zionist blinders so that they may believe the falsehoods that they must transmit to defend the colonization of Palestine. This, I presume, is the explanation for David Brudnoy's fallacious and misleading "correction" to Bill Birmingham's review of Edward Said's The Question of Palestine.

To answer each of the points raised by Brudnoy with the detailed treatment it deserves in the space of anything less than a small book is impossible. Yet, this particular broadside must be answered. One charge in particular must be thoroughly exposed and ended forever, the untrue allegation that all individuals who make statements critical of Israel are "those who loathe the Jews of Israel." By the broad stroke of this charge Mr. Brudnoy hopes to dismiss every source quoted by Mr. Birmingham, including myself. The tactic is to falsely identify any questioning of the morality of the Jewish state as a "rhetorical war against the Jews," and thus to obscure the distinction between the state of Israel and persons who are Jewish.

Let me state this distinction now for clarity: Jews are persons; Israel is a state. Specifically, Israel is a state which claims all Jews as citizens whether they wish it or not, which, though self-professedly a "Jewish" state, claimed sovereignty over a land whose inhabitants were mostly not Jewish and where only 6 percent of the land was owned by Jews. Jews, being persons, can only be evaluated as individuals. Israel, as a state, is a corporate entity which should be evaluated by its nature, and which is the proper subject of this ferocious controversy. The question "What do you think about Israel?" and the question "What do you think about Jews?" are two different questions; Zionists acknowledge no difference. Surely there is no more militant opponent of Israel than Yasir Arafat, and yet he favors the presence of Jews in Palestine. Indeed, his organization, Al Fatah, not only recognizes all Palestinian Jews as full citizens of Palestine, but accepts the principle that any Jew from anywhere in the world is entitled to come to Palestine to live in peace conditional only on his or her acceptance of the concept of equality under the law of all citizens regardless of religion. If this is the view of Yasir Arafat, who are those "who loathe the Jews of Israel?" Perhaps they loathe, not Jews, but the seizure of private property, the coercive destruction of a native culture, and the system of apartheid which are the policies of Israel and the defining traits of modern Zionism. Once more for clarity: a Jew is a person who identifies himself with the Jewish religion and/or culture, a Zionist is a person who supports the colonization of Palestine.

I will comment on as many of Brudnoy's statements as space allows, and cite some very enlightening facts.

Zionism and Islam

Brudnoy states, that "Zionism ... reflects a great respect for Islam." But there is a vast gulf between condescension and respect. Respect requires a measure of understanding which the Zionists remarkably lack, although it is true that Zionists have often appointed themselves as advocates for Islam. It is a defense Islam can well do without. For example, in Israel, Muslims must substitute a Friday Sabbath for the Saturday Sabbath imposed on Jews. But in fact Islam has no Sabbath. In their condescension, the Zionists have converted the Muslim day of communal prayer into a Sabbath, which Islam expressly forbids.

Brudnoy also states, "[T]he only country in the Middle East demonstrating total respect for the holy places of all three great Western faiths, as well as the only country in which Christians, Jews, and Muslims are elected to parliament, is Israel."

The second half of this statement is completely false — Lebanon, the little nation that Israel continues to blast with American weapons, has had Parliament members of all three of these faiths. Further, the concept of allowing free access to holy places was not introduced to Palestine by the Zionists, but had been the general practice of the Muslims for almost all of the thirteen hundred years before 1948. Further, the respect shown by the Zionists seems less than "total" when one considers the hole which Israeli artillery shot through the wall of the Dome of the Rock mosque, or when one hears the Arabs of Jerusalem complain that authorities denied some fire trucks access to Al Aqsa mosque when they were brought to put out a fire set there by a Zionist fanatic, or when one reflects that at this very moment the Haram esh-Sharif is being desecrated by Israeli excavations. These are the facts to be set against Mr. Brudnoy's fantasy of the state of Israel's "total respect" for the holy places of Muslims.

Brudnoy states, supposedly answering Birmingham, that "[T]he claim that the Jewish settlers were 'making the desert bloom' ... is accurate..." But this confuses the issue. This slogan of making the desert bloom is
not a reference to particular orchards planted by Jewish settlers. It is an attempt to deny that Palestinians had grown such orchards before the land was seized by the colonists. Therein lies the myth. The fact is that there have been records of orchards in Palestine for many centuries.

Brudnoy states, “[T]he Arab citizens of Israel enjoy the highest standard of living of any Arabs in the world excepting only the handful of oil-rich sheiks ...” The typical Arab citizen of Kuwait enjoys a much better standard of living than the average Arab-Israeli. The typical Arab-American enjoys a standard of living at least as good as the typical Arab-Israeli. Even if Brudnoy’s statement had been true, would a high standard of living justify a loss of freedom? Should we libertarians abandon our fight for justice and liberty in the United States because we have one of the highest standards of living in the world?

Brudnoy states that “the Arabs living in the areas now under Israeli control since 1967 have also begun to approach that standard of living, enjoy practically no unemployment, and pay practically no taxes to Israel.” The fact is that Arabs of the West Bank pay exorbitant taxes.

An Arab elementary school teacher of my acquaintance in occupied territory has 65 percent of her income withheld, and a relatively prosperous owner of a small factory in a poor West Bank village was imprisoned when he was unwilling or unable to pay a confiscatory $400,000 tax bill. As for low unemployment and the rising standard of living, the same phenomenon can be seen in Jordan and has nothing to do with good treatment by the Israeli overlords. On the contrary, Palestinians in Jordan are better able to enjoy their economic boom because of the relatively sound currency of that country.

**Big Brother?**

Brudnoy states that he observed “brotherhood” between the settlers and the indigenous people. I too have visited those people and that land, and Brudnoy’s impression of brotherhood between the colonists and indigenous Arabs only shows how thoroughly well-fixed are the blenders which many Zionists have donned. More perceptible American Jews have returned from Israel disheartened by the bigotry of the dominant European Jews toward the Sephardic Jews—let alone toward non-Jewish Palestinians. It is illustrative to record how one Palestinian woman now living in the United States explains the lack of outrage exhibited by many of her people toward Israeli mistreatment.

When her brother was a high school student, he commented to some of his classmates that it was outrageous that the Israelis had replaced their history books with ones lacking reference to any of Palestine’s Arab history—indeed with no mention of the word Palestine. He was arrested and released later with his legs broken. I asked her if she had been outraged by this. No, not then. She had no consciousness of such questions. The Israelis had the guns, the power, the title of government. She accepted the breaking of her brother’s legs as most American mothers have accepted their sons being drafted to die in foreign wars. It was just the way things are. In retrospect, the lack of outrage embarrassed her, but she knew of no alternative, as Americans know of no alternative to taxation. She had broken out of that mindset only on coming to the United States, and only with such pangs of consciousness raising as Malcolm X describes regarding the oppression of blacks in his autobiography. It takes an effort to overcome the inertial acceptance of the status quo as a fait accompli, the acceptance of second-class citizenship as the natural order. Such incursion to atrocities is not “brotherhood.”

Brudnoy states that the attitude of the Arab family he visited towards the Israelis is one of “Friendship, gratitude, affection, respect.” Yet once again Brudnoy confuses attitudes toward Jews with attitudes toward Israel. The positive attitude of most Arabs toward Jews is not a denial of their negative attitude toward the state of Israel (nor vice versa).

Friendship, affection and respect between Muslim and Jew has been the rule throughout the history of Palestine. Even today, most Arabs have positive feelings toward the Israelis as individuals. This, I repeat, does not contradict a total opposition to Zionism, that is, to the proposition that a Jewish state should be imposed upon a people who, at the time of its birth, were mainly not Jewish.

Brudnoy states, “I have seen the houses built with Jewish tax money, by the Israeli government, for the Arab residents of the Gaza ... Is there a Jewish tax? As I have explained, Arabs are taxed, and heavily. Does the provision of a government housing project undo the evil of having driven those people from their own homes?” I have seen houses, built by Palestinians with their own labor and money, standing empty on land that has been seized and given to colonists to build a factory. I looked closely at the land on which those buildings stand. It had been seized from my father.

Brudnoy states, “Every adult Arab in Israel votes ... Arab Muslims are Members of the Knesset (Parliament).” In Israel you must vote for party slates. No party representing the principle desire of the Palestinians for secular government is allowed, leaving the Arabs to choose between the (in their eyes) token opposition of the Bedouins’ party or the Communists.

Brudnoy states that “the Israeli government pays for the education of every Arab child in Israel in schools providing the same fundamental education as it provided to the Jewish children of Israel, as well as special emphasis on Arab culture, the Arabic language, and the Muslim religion.” I don’t think I need to explain to libertarians the propagandist purpose to which public education (“separate but equal” or otherwise) is put. I would point out that teaching the colonists’ version of the native culture to the natives is a particularly effective means of alienating a people from its culture and its past.

The Israelis are now forcing the “blessings” of a government education down the throats of college students as well, with their recent moves to grant themselves the same control over faculty membership and reading material in the private Arab colleges that they had already taken in the public high schools.

Brudnoy states, “The Israelis do not have a First Amendment but they come as close to it as any nation besides our own...” This is absurd. Israel engages in regular censorship of the press and closing down of newspapers which countries like, say, Sweden would never duplicate. Brudnoy refers to “fanatical Arab publications easily available in Israel—in Israel!—despising Jews.” I visited many Arab bookstores in the West Bank and saw no Arab publications despising Jews. None. I would be very interested to have Mr. Brudnoy produce one such publication confirming his statements on
Arafat on Jews

Brudnoy states, "Mr. Yasar Arafat, leader of the PLO, is amply on record calling for the destruction of Israel." This is presented as if it refutes Birmingham's characterization that "The people who think the Palestinians 'want to drive the Jews into the sea' are generally those who believe—and perhaps still believe—that the U.S. was 'defending freedom' in Vietnam or Iran." It does not. While Zionists may refuse to distinguish between the state of Israel and Jewish persons, others (including Jews like Alfred Lilenthal, author of What Price Israel?) do make this distinction. Arafat, Mr. Brudnoy will find if he ever chooses to visit him for coffee, shares the feeling of friendship, affection and respect for Jews which Brudnoy has observed in other Arabs. Here is what Arafat has said of Jews:

If the immigration of Jews to Palestine had had as its objective the goal of enabling them to live by side by side with us, enjoying the same rights and assuming the same duties, we would have opened our doors to them, as far as our homeland's capacity for absorption permitted. Such was the case with the thousands of Armenians and Circassians who still live among us in equality as brethren and citizens. But, that the goal of this immigration should be to usurp our homeland, disperse our people, and turn us into second-class citizens—this is what no one can conceivably demand that we acquiesce in or submit to. Therefore, since its inception, our revolution was not motivated by racial or religious factors. Its target was never the Jew, as a person, but racist Zionism and undisguised aggression. In this sense, ours is also a revolution for the Jew, as a human being, as well. We are struggling so that Jews, Christians and Muslims may live in equality, enjoying the same rights and assuming the same duties, free from racial or religious discrimination.

We do distinguish between Judaism and Zionism. While we maintain our opposition to the colonialist Zionist movement, we respect the Jewish faith.

In my formal capacity as Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization and as leader of the Palestinian revolution, I proclaim before you that when we speak of our common hopes for the Palestine of tomorrow we include all Jews now living in Palestine who choose to live with us there in peace and without discrimination.

In my formal capacity as Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization and as leader of the Palestinian revolution I call upon Jews one by one to turn away from the illusory promises made to them by Zionist ideology and Israeli leadership. Those offer Jews perpetual bloodshed, endless war and continuous thralldom. We invite them to emerge from their moral isolation into a more open realm of free choice, far from their present leadership's effort to implant in them a Masada complex.

We offer them the most generous solution that we might live together in a framework of just peace, in our democratic Palestine. (from Arafat's 1974 U.N. speech).

It is the racist state of Israel, Mr. Brudnoy, and not the long-suffering Jewish people that Arafat would drive into the sea.

Brudnoy states, "When... seven Israelis were ambushed and killed, and several others wounded, presumably by Arab extremist, as the Israelis were returning from Sabbath services in Hebron... the United Nations uttered not a word of condemnation. The world remained mute.

"When, exactly one month later, the cars of three Arab mayors were bombed, presumably by Jewish fanatics, leading to the mutilation of two Arab mayors and the blinding of the Israeli bomb expert who was attempting to defuse the third bomb, the United Nations Security Council condemned the Israeli government."

The truth is the UN Security Council, in addition to condemning the bombing, expressed "deep concern that Israel, as occupying power, has failed to provide adequate protection to the civilian population in the occupied territories." There is nothing improper about expressing such a reasonable concern. As to the case of the attack in Hebron, Brudnoy is sympathetic to the illegitimate occupiers, condemns the vigilantes who attacked them, and is outraged that the world doesn't share his perspective. He wants to give the impression that terrorism by Zionist fanatics gets glaring publicity while that by Palestinians is quietly overlooked. It is only because Zionist terrorism is so successfully played down that such an inversion of the facts seems true.

For instance, a Bethlehem College girl was mowed down in the streets by "presumed" Zionist fanatics about the time of Mr. Brudnoy's visit to Israel. It was not covered in this country. Even in Israel, the government tried to force the girl's family to bury her at night in their attempt to cover up the incident.

Brudnoy states that, when the cars of the Arab mayors were bombed, Prime Minister Begin promised that "Until the perpetrators of those crimes are apprehended we shall continue our investigations night and day."

Yet as of this writing, four months after the maiming of the mayors, this alleged investigation has produced nothing. Yet a number of arrests have been made by the Israelis with regard to the attack on the Israeli settlers.

Begin's protestations of evenhandedness don't amount to much in practice. I don't expect the government that tries to force the families of victims of pro-government terrorism to bury their dead at night to ever apprehend their violent supporters.

Brudnoy's final statement is, "We are not all Palestinians... nor, Mr. Birmingham, need libertarians feel any inclination to accept your conclusion, that American support of Israel enables Israel to murder and oppress the Palestinian people."

Mr. Brudnoy is not a libertarian. His pro-civil liberties conservatism (he calls himself a "liberservative") does not qualify him to prescribe foreign policy views for libertarians. To those of us who believe that the right to life, liberty, and property extends to individuals in the third world, use of American tax money to support Israel is a double crime: against the American taxpayer who pays the bill and against the victims of the bombs and napalm in Lebanon and of the seizure orders in Palestine.

Imad-ad-Dean Ahmad, a Palestinian American, is Solicitor of the Libertarian Party of Maryland and a physical scientist. He traveled in Palestine, and among Palestinians in Jordan and Syria, from 21 June through 3 July 1980.

The Movement is an occasional LR column of news on the movement for liberty: short items describing the activities of individuals and groups fighting the draft, high taxes, nuclear power, government regulation of the economy, oppression of minorities (including women, children, gun owners, drug users, and homosexuals) and other official policies inimical to freedom; and short essays exploring controversies within the movement. LR welcomes contributions and will pay $20 for each short item and $75 for each short essay used.
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"Reindustrialization" has become a political buzzword so quickly it must have set a new record. Sociologist Amitai Etzioni, formerly of Columbia University, is said to have coined the term while working on a memorandum for a Carter administration task force on "industrial policy." Shortly thereafter, the term surfaced again, when Richard D. Bolling, the Missouri Democrat who chairs the powerful House Rules Committee, chaired a special Harvard University conference on competitiveness which found that there was a "great need to build a consensus on economic and trade policy." On June 30, Business Week magazine gave reindustrialization its first big shove into the public arena, with a 100-page special section on "The Reindustrialization of America." Within weeks all the major newsmagazines had followed suit, with cover stories of their own. And in late August, President Carter himself proposed a mammoth economic program whose elements had obviously been forged with the newly fashionable idea of reindustrialization firmly in mind.
It's not surprising that the idea has found such a responsive audience. The economic problems Business Week cited in its special issue are part of the everyday conversation of most Americans. Most Americans are painfully aware of the rising cost of living, the stagnation, and the wave of plant closings choking the U.S. economy. The U.S. standard of living ranked first in the world in 1972; today it runs a poor fifth. For the first time in history, the U.S. inflation rate is higher than the average for all industrial countries. Savings as a percentage of disposable income has fallen to a mere 3.4 percent in the U.S., compared to 14 percent for West Germany and 20 percent for Japan. The productivity of U.S. workers increased only 0.7 percent from 1973 to 1979, and actually decreased last year. And for three years in a row, the average worker's standard of living has fallen in real terms. Everyone knows the economic malaise must be addressed sooner or later. The concept of reindustrialization has catalyzed this spreading awareness and reduced it to a single word.

Business Week's call for reindustrialization, however, is more than vague editorializing about the need to revitalize the economy; it is a carefully thought-out political program that, once implemented, would mark a definite transition from today's frayed political capitalism to a full-fledged corporate state. At the core of that program is a call for a "new consensus," or more grandly, a "new social contract." "All social groups," says Business Week, "must come to understand that their common interest in returning the country to a path of strong economic growth overrides other conflicting interests." These appeals for consensus are followed by much gesticulating in the direction of Germany and Japan, whose healthy economies are alleged to be the product of just such a national consensus on economic priorities. There is, of
course, nothing inherently wrong with forming a new social contract, nor with emulating the Germans and Japanese. I for one would be happy to sign a contract, social or private, which called for the immediate implementation of Ed Clark's "White Paper on Taxing and Spending," which cuts taxes in half and balances the budget by making $201 billion in federal spending cuts. If we are to emulate Japan, we might dismantle our military empire and spend one percent of our GNP on defense as they do instead of the five percent we spend now. We could imitate West Germany at the same time by steadfastly refusing to inflate our money supply, a policy which has kept their inflation rate far below ours. But such steps as these are not what the reindustrializers have in mind.

The sort of "new consensus" they're after is the sort which would reconsolidate political control over the economy after the turmoil of the '60s and '70s, allowing the government to take strong initiatives. Business Week cites the aforementioned Rep. Bolling approvingly:

[Bolling] believes that the great growth the U.S. enjoyed after World War II resulted from a national consensus that led to the Marshall Plan, the Full Employment Act of 1946, and the civil rights laws in the mid-'60s. The war in Vietnam ended that consensus, according to Bolling. The congressman now talks of putting together a new coalition that could pass a fundamental piece of legislation—alogous to the Full Employment Act—to encourage industrialization of the U.S.

What we need, in other words, is central direction of the economy, with a broad national consensus strongly behind it; a consensus fueled by a stirring vision of American workers, like those in Japan, joyously singing the company song before each shift.

It is not difficult to see why Business Week and so many other establishment figures would feel this way—why they would prefer to imitate the repressive aspects of the Japanese and West German systems rather than the comparatively deregulated aspects which are responsible for the prosperity in those countries. For some time now, ever since Vietnam and Watergate destroyed the postwar ruling consensus, we have been living in a period of near-complete governmental paralysis. Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon were thrown out of office; Gerald Ford was little more than a caretaker; Jimmy Carter has been spinning his wheels helplessly on energy and the economy. This paralysis at the national level has encouraged a more individualistic, libertarian attitude toward government, and has left political initiative, to a greater extent, in the hands of the people. Consequently we have seen grass-roots political movements, from anti-tax to anti-nuclear, from feminist to fundamentalist, from consumerist to environmentalist, flourish in the power vacuum. The "explosion of government regulations placed on business to achieve social goals" noted by Business Week has been largely the creation of the movements which emerged from the wreckage of the consensus.

But a highly politicized economy is a delicate, unstable thing. It must literally be run from the top. Without a cohesive ruling consensus, the political pressures intrinsic to a democracy cannot be integrated into the system, and contradictions begin to build up. At a deeper level, without a consensus the government cannot act decisively to adjust to the long-term distortions caused by political control of the command posts of the economy, distortions like simultaneous inflation and unemployment, energy shortages, and the breakdown of international order.

Thus the government's paralysis, while politically desirable in some ways, also means that the entire American political economy must lurch toward collapse unless fundamental changes are made. And there are really only two paths which those changes could take: either dismantle the government and allow market forces to clear out the problems, or else establish a new political consensus and take bold steps to rationalize government's control over the economic system. By "rationalization" I mean the process whereby government ceases to intervene in an unintegrated fashion and instead attempts to approach its control of the economy systematically. Decision making is centralized, contradictory policies are rooted out, and the overall goals and priorities of intervention are defined.

Naturally, then, rationalization is a theme which runs throughout the Business Week reindustrialization program. There are several explicit statements of this goal in the special issue:

Right now, government industrial policy is split into efforts to save jobs, break up trusts, taxes and trade. Policy is reactive and waits for huge unemployment to develop in an industry such as steel or autos before it does anything. And even then its knee-jerk response is protectionist. "What we need is a basic philosophy for a selective national industrial policy," says a Commerce Department official.

"Someone has to look at the totality of industry structure and develop a comprehensive strategy including taxation, trade, investment, manpower resources and technology." (emphasis mine)

If the government is going to direct the economy, says Business Week, it ought to do it consistently, not piecemeal. But it cannot integrate the system without a renewed national consensus of the sort Business Week perceives in Germany and Japan.

The reindustrializers are attempting to build their new consensus by shrewdly offering enough enticements to the major interest groups to make reindustrialization politically feasible, if not economically sound. Business is offered an easing of government regulation, a favorable reworking of the tax code, and subsidies for exports and research and development—if it acquiesces in government planning and promises to be nice to labor and minorities. Labor is offered selective bailouts, government help for workers in industries which are allowed to die, the promise that reindustrialization will create millions of new jobs, and a role in policy formation—if it agrees to tighten its belt and "limit wage gains in the first phase of reindustrialization." Government bureaucrats and academics are offered a chance to plan the whole show through a national economic commission—but they must hold the budget line and rein in their regulatory "excesses." Minorities are promised jobs through the use of

Reindustrializers want a consensus of the kind FDR wanted for his National Recovery Administration.
“transfer payments as a source of investment capital” in new, presumably publicly funded, enterprises—but they must realize that social betterment depends upon constantly expanding economic growth. Such is the basis of the new social contract proposed by Business Week and the other reindustrializers. Several of the elements of this new contract are worth more detailed examination.

Direct federal control of credit allocation is probably the single most destructive blow to the market economy in the entire reindustrialization program. As Business Week recognizes, all discussions of industrial revitalization ultimately deal with the allocation of capital. It is thus a perfectly logical consequence of carrying out a governmental “industrial policy” that government should step in and directly shape the flow of capital in the economy. Currently the most popular mechanism for such shaping seems to be a revival of the Depression-and World War II-era Reconstruction Finance Corporation. The new RFC, a quasi-governmental agency with the authority to issue $10 to $15 billion in loan guarantees, would be unlike the old RFC in that it would not just rescue ailing firms, but would also invest in private corporations “to [as Business Week puts it] channel capital toward ideas and processes that can increase U.S. productivity and competitiveness.”

Of course, there is already substantial government involvement in credit allocation. In times of recession the government borrows huge sums to finance its budget deficits. And government agencies such as the Commodity Credit Corporation, the National Mortgage Association, the Farm Credit Administration, and the Export-Import Bank all are in the business of dispensing credit. Business Week, however, feels that all this intervention is disorganized and in need of an overhaul, that it is time to “re-examine policies that allocate huge amounts of credit to politically favored interests, particularly housing and agriculture, at the expense of credit for industry.” Even the spectre of “lemon socialism”—in which the taxpayers are saddled with one inefficient money-loser after another—does not shake Business Week’s faith in this idea.

But Business Week never asks why government, and not the market, must steer capital toward competitive industries? If a business is competitive, why won’t profit-motivated investors put capital into it voluntarily? Doesn’t government’s misdirection of credit to housing and agriculture for political reasons only point up the need for an end to political intervention in capital allocation, rather than an expansion of it? These are questions the reindustrializers refuse to explore.

According to Business Week, the U.S. must “regain the role of Yankee trader.” Just as a new social contract is needed at home, so we need a “new international concord” with our overseas trading partners.

It is undeniable that the world economy is becoming highly integrated and the U.S. must adjust to this. For industrial countries, exports average 13 percent of the Gross National Product today as opposed to 7 percent in 1961. From the beginning, our allies in Europe and Japan have built their economies with the global market in mind, whereas U.S. businesses have kept their eyes fastened on our vast domestic market—which has made us less competitive in the international arena. To Business Week, the proper response is strong government action to keep foreign markets open to American goods and to encourage exports—sometimes to subsidize them outright.

Libertarians can agree with the reindustrializers’ call for the removal of much restrictive regulation of foreign trade, such as the post-Watergate Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, anti-trust laws, and the like. But the editors of Business Week would go far beyond the mere removal of government restrictions. They actively promote Senator William Roth’s
More ominously, *Business Week* calls upon the U.S. government to blast open tariff and other import restrictions on American goods by threatening to "retaliate by closing off all imports and investments from [protectionist] countries." There is of course, a new wave of protectionism in the world. And ironically, *Business Week* recognizes that its primary cause is reindustrialization in other countries: "The same thrust for reindustrialization that is occurring in the U.S. is also occurring in Europe and Japan, and the attempt to re-vamp entire industries is at the heart of the new protectionism." But while making this observation, *Business Week* does not seem to fully grasp its implications. Welding industry and government together through planning and reindustrialization inevitably unleashes protectionist impulses. For, under such circumstances, economic competition is no longer among private businesses, but among nation-states. And governments, unlike private businesses, have the power to shut out competitors from their own domestic markets and will use that power whenever they think they can gain by doing so. Thus the rise of fascistic economies in Europe and Japan during the 1930s led to a major tariff war, and this was shortly followed by a military conflagration called World War II, which was not unconnected to the trade wars. Yet *Business Week* proposes that we respond to the development of the same kind of protectionist dynamic in the 1980s by jumping feet first into both reindustrialization and retaliatory protectionism. Given the turbulent international realignments due in the 1980s, this is cause for alarm.

*Business Week* notes with alarm the lack of long term investment and the difficulties of capital formation. Savings represents less than 4 percent of disposable income in the U.S. and inflation eats away at the incentive for long term investment at a time when there is a pressing need for it. Its policy response centers on changing the tax structure to "make saving worthwhile again," cutting the corporate income tax, liberalizing depreciation allowances to make amends for the ravages of inflation, increasing the investment tax credit, and encouraging specific industries through the use of targeted tax credits. To encourage capital formation, it advocates a major shift in the burden of taxation—away from income to consumption.

At first glance, these proposals seem like a reasonable loosening of the tax bite on the vital process of capital formation. Taken in political context, however, they lose much of their libertarian lustre. *Business Week*—and an increasing number of economists and congresspeople—wants tax changes that benefit business and investors without necessarily reducing the overall tax burden on the rest of us. This tax shift, moreover, is part of a broader thrust toward more consistent use of tax incentives and loopholes as a governmental planning device to encourage reindustrialization.

In fact, *Business Week* is not ashamed to express disapproval of any sweeping tax cuts aimed at the paychecks of working and middle class Americans, such as the Kemp-Roth proposal for a 30 percent cut in income taxes. It is willing to countenance payroll tax increases in the short term to prevent business tax cuts from taking away the government revenue "needed" for reindustrialization and related welfare measures. It warns that any "supply-side" tax cuts "must compete for funds with industrial policy measures aimed at helping specific industries." Instead of viewing taxation as a parasitic growth on the productive economy, it sees it as a useful tool in the implementation of an industrial policy.

The editors of *Business Week* make no specific proposal for national planning (other than the new RFC), but their survey of the various planning proposals being put forth by corporate and government spokespeople makes it clear they like the idea. "The challenge," they say, "is to develop a consensus-forming framework under which government, business, labor and other major interest groups—without compromising their traditional roles—can agree on trade-offs that would both strengthen the economy and, in the end, prove beneficial to all."

Corporate supporters of planning cited by *Business Week* include Felix Rohatyn (of course) and John D. Ong, chairman of B.F. Goodrich. Rep. Henry S. Reuss (D-Wis.) and Arnold Packer, Assistant Secretary of Labor, are highly placed figures in government who support planning of some sort. And President Carter's newly-created Economic Revitalization Board, headed jointly by DuPont chairman Irving Shapiro and AFL-CIO president Lane Kirkland, is said to be modeled after Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Information (MITI), which pinpoints those industries which are supposed to have the best growth potential.

"An effective industrial policy," *Business Week* says, "implies a plan and a process for determining which industries are to be encouraged and which are not." *Business Week* seems to side with Arnold Packer's view that government should concentrate on "picking winners," that is, actively favor dynamic industrial sectors as Japan allegedly does, rather than save dying industries.

A full critique of the economic consequences of reindustrialization is beyond the scope of this article. Enough has been said already, however, for libertarians to realize the importance of preventing the creation of any "new consensus" among government, business, labor, and an increasingly frantic public around a program that is, in essence, nothing more than an American fascism. Unfortunately, calling it fascism will not by itself convince people that reindustrialization is not the way to go—especially in a time of general economic decline. We must be ready with an ideologically coherent alternative to reindustrialization that people will perceive as politically feasible.

Reindustrialization itself, needless to say, won't work. Its inherent flaw is that it merely rationalizes political control over the economy while leaving the fundamental causes of our economic problems unsolved and even undiagnosed. For example, in more than 100 pages devoted to the need for reindustrialization, the editors of *Business Week* never once attempt to define the cause of our chronic, accelerating inflation. They note that inflation penalizes savings, makes profits harder to calculate, pushes businesses into short-term strategies, and makes it harder to update plant equipment; yet they devote not a single sentence to explaining its cause or proposing a cure.

Chronic inflation is, however, the key to many of the economic problems faced by the U.S. As Austrian economists like Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek, and Walter Grindler have shown, expansion of the money supply via the Federal Reserve system pushes investment capital into businesses for which little or no consumer demand will ever materialize. This causes a cycle of boom and bust, as investment is stimulated by the inflationary expansion, only to collapse in recession and unemployment when the entre-
preneural errors become manifest. Then, as unemployment mounts, politicians have to resort to ever-higher doses of inflation in order, to re-stimulate the economy.

This cycle of inflation and reflation has been going on for more than 35 years; no government-managed consensus, no new bailout agencies, can undo the harm it has caused. Unless government control of the money supply is relinquished by abolition of central banking and a return to “hard money,” investment will continue to be misdirected, businesses will continue to fail, and the demand for bailouts and reflation will not abate. The value of the dollar will continue to decline—making savings worthless and pushing businesses into the kind of short-term strategies lamented by Business Week.

By thus ducking the crucial problem of inflation, the reindustrializers will probably be forced into the kind of “lemon socialism” that even they recognize is a mistake. The government money necessary to bail out ailing industries and support unemployed workers will also keep government spending at high levels—which means that government will have to either continue to run deficits or raise taxes to cover the costs; neither is an appealing choice.

And the idea that government planners can somehow “pick winners” better than the market can is simply wrong. Businesses “win” by providing products and services that people want; the only way to determine what people actually want is by finding out what they actually buy—in the market. Anything else is simply guesswork—the examination of bird entrails dressed up in econometric jargon. It is especially absurd for planners to pretend to be able to pick winners in those high technology industries which offer the greatest hope for future economic expansion. Look at government’s record: Britain and France thought they were stealing a march on the rest of the world by rushing to develop the Concorde, which turned out to be the greatest albatross in aviation history. The U.S. has its nuclear industry to be ashamed of, and Japan’s government has to live down the fact that it actually discouraged the Japanese automotive industry, which its planners thought had no future. The U.S. is currently putting billions of dollars into synthetic fuels. If this program turns out to be an economic failure like nuclear power, massive amounts of precious capital will have been wasted. And in the case of synfuels, political considerations have had much more to do with the government’s choice to invest in it than any sincere attempt to pick a “winner.”

The potential signatories of any new “social contract” of the kind Business Week is pushing need to get some good advice from libertarians about what they’re getting into. For business, reindustrialization means more, not less, government control. Business Week exhibits a naive sense, typical of privilege-seekers, that government planning can somehow be contained at precisely the level businesspeople would like.

And when, might I ask, has government ever limited its role after its tentacles have come to embrace a new slice of the economy? How many “temporary,” “emergency” interventions have become permanent and gone on to expand their scope?

Labor, on the other hand, must be told that it is bound to be the junior partner in the reindustrialized corporate state. It will find that a centralized government agency is far more powerful, and therefore capable of driving a much harder bargain, than even the biggest corporation. When Douglas Fraser abandoned his demands for a wage increase in exchange for a seat on the corporate board of the newly bailed out Chrysler, he fell into the pattern of co-optation which is endemic to corporate state economies. In West Germany, union representatives sit on corporate boards of directors—but they may not act against the “best interests” of the company. Interestingly, Felix Rohatyn, according to Business Week, “argues that an independent RFC Board would be able to set much tougher conditions on companies—including wage freezes—than Congress and the Administration can manage in ad hoc cases.” (my emphasis)

Consumers and taxpayers should be warned that they are bound to get the shortest end of the stick under reindustrialization. "Industrial policy" would inevitably be most responsive to the powerful political interests in Washington, not to the choices of consumers or the needs of the average taxpayer. Working people would end up footing the bill for senseless bailouts like Chrysler and expensive boondoggles like synthetic fuels. A long, hard look at the record of Italy’s Instituto per Riconstruzione Industriale (created by Musolini) and Britain’s National Economic Development Council—both of them bureaucratic havens for inefficient industrial dinosaurs—is good medicine for any consumers or taxpayers who might succumb to the siren song of reindustrialization.

In the area of international trade, as previously mentioned, reindustrialization would translate into a move toward autarky and protectionism, with heightened international tensions and possibly war as a result. But perhaps this is what the reindustrializers are planning for. Felix Rohatyn says quite blatantly that reindustrialization is a “national security necessity, since we should not have to depend on foreign steel any more than we should have to depend on foreign oil.”

The impetus for reindustrialization is coming from the top—the established elites in business, government, academia, and even labor. As a program, reindustrialization represents a strategically timed attempt to rationalize the consequences of previous government interventions before the economy collapses altogether. By shaking out the contradictions set in motion during the post-Vietnam era, the reindustrializers hope to preserve the political and economic status quo. In the process, they hope to appeal to the widely appreciated need for some kind of action to solve our economic problems. The kind of action they propose, however, will only create economic problems and accelerate the trend, unhappily already begun, toward the de-industrialization of America.

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America seems to be sliding into a new age of protectionism, a new vision of "independence" being pushed by those unions and companies that are most affected by foreign imports. Groups are forming—the Automotive Materials Industry Council of the U.S. (AMICUS) is a recent example—to lobby for special favors to protect their own economic interests.

These pressure groups have found willing bedfellows in politicians like steel Senators Heinz and Schweicker of Pennsylvania and Presidential candidates Carter and Reagan. And there's nothing strange about it: companies want to maintain prices and profits, labor unions want to preserve jobs, and politicians want to win elections.

Distressingly, these pressures have also received a warm response from the public. According to a June 1980 New York Times/CBS News poll, 71 percent of the people favor protecting jobs at the cost of higher prices; only 19 percent favor lower prices from imported goods. Clearly, free
traders have not succeeded in selling the benefits of open markets.

Of course, the U.S. has never experienced entirely free trade. So-called "orderly marketing agreements" have long been negotiated with Taiwan and South Korea to limit shoe imports, and with Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea to limit color TV imports. Similar agreements have been reached to limit textiles. Quotas have been imposed on sugar imports. And industries have historically pressed hard for protection in such areas as the production of nuts, bolts, and screws, Danish butter cookies, microwave ovens, and tomatoes. But the old protectionist pressures are now becoming far more serious, and are beginning to focus on such basic industries as automobiles and steel.

There is no doubt that these industries are in trouble. In the auto industry, for example, domestic sales in May fell to the lowest level in 22 years, and sales were down 21.7 percent in September from sales of a year before. As of mid-September, General Motors' sales for the year were off 19.3 percent, Ford's were off 33.5 percent, and Chrysler's were off 34.9 percent.

Sales of imports, and in particular of Japanese imports, are also off, but not as much as domestic autos. They have captured upwards of 28 percent of the U.S. auto market, up from 23 percent in 1979. In the first six months of 1980, Japan produced more than one million cars more than the U.S. However, imports are not the cause of the U.S. automakers' problems. Over the past two years, the increase in imports accounts for only about one-eighth of the decrease in domestic sales.

This sales loss has devastated the industry. In the second quarter of 1980, all four domestic manufacturers lost record amounts of money: Chrysler $536.1 million, Ford $467.9 million, GM $412 million, and AMC $84.9 million. Plants closed, auto layoffs passed 300,000, and supplier industry (such as rubber) layoffs hit 650,000.
By the late 1960s, Japan's policy of industrial expansion had produced a sizable trade surplus. Shown is a Japanese television factory, circa 1970, whose inexpensive and high-quality products were mainly earmarked for the United States.

It is this economic disaster that has created political dynamite. Ronald Reagan and 23 Senators have announced their support for "voluntary" Japanese import limits. Former Presidential contender Edward Kennedy and House Speaker Tip O'Neill have endorsed U.S. restrictions on foreign imports. The UAW has filed a complaint with the International Trade Commission (ITC) seeking five years of quotas and tariffs. And Ford Chairman Philip Caldwell has urged that foreign manufacturers be required to use at least 75 percent American parts and labor in their cars before being allowed to sell them in the U.S. (Ironically, U.S. automakers themselves use foreign parts. One Ford spokesman concedes that there's probably "something foreign in everything."

In July, President Carter proposed that we earmark $50 million to help communities and firms hard-hit by layoffs, implement special loan guarantees of between $200 and $400 million to help car dealers finance car sales, create an industry-labor-government committee to discuss common problems, and urge the ITC to speed up its ruling on the UAW complaint. Some of these proposals, such as the community assistance and the loan guarantees, are little more than restatements of what is already available. All of them are meant to buy votes. Not that buying votes is new; it was, of course, the Carter Administration that supported $1.5 billion in loan guarantees to bail-out the Chrysler Corporation.

The steel industry's difficulties are chronic, though currently less severe than the auto industry's. According to the Steel Tripartite Advisory Committee, domestic shipments of steel in 1980 are expected to have been 20 percent below 1979 levels. Sales started to fall in March, imports rose to 21 percent of the market in May, and by July capacity utilization had fallen to 50 percent, far below the profitable level of 80 percent.

Profits plummeted 63 percent in the second quarter of 1980 compared with the same period in 1979, and plant closures spread across the country. Steel employment fell from 1979's peak of 354,000 to the lowest point since 1933—264,000—in July and has only slowly edged upward since.

The concentration of steelworkers in the industrial states has given them pivotal political power, which they have used to protect themselves from competition. One already existing mechanism to protect the steel industry is the Commerce Department's anti-'dumping' procedure, which is designed to prevent the sale of imports below "fair value." U.S. Steel claims that foreign steel is being imported at 40 percent to 70 percent below production cost. But the industry's own May 1977 trade white paper admitted that "it is difficult to ascribe a significant cost advantage to Japanese producers resulting from incentives or subsidies." Further, the FTC figures the total value of such subsidies to be less than 1 percent for three of the major exporters—Japan, West Germany, and Italy. Proving a charge of dumping in the face of such facts is expensive and time consuming. In one case, U.S. Steel filed 67 cartons of documents, weighing 1,000 pounds. An anti-dumping investigations may take 13 months or more.

In May 1978, to help speed up the anti-dumping process, the Trigger Price Mechanism was instituted. The TPM was set at the production cost plus the transportation cost of the most efficient producer—Japan. If imports entered below that price, the Commerce Department would initiate an investigation. American steelmakers agreed to rely on this automatic mechanism and not to clog the bureaucracy with additional petitions. The TPM was suspended in March 1980, when U.S. Steel broke this "gentlemen's agreement" and filed an anti-dumping petition.

The steel industry was never entirely happy with TPM,
because it didn’t keep out enough imports. But it did set an
effective floor price under steel imports. Robert Crandall of
the Brookings Institution, who helped design the system, has
estimated that import prices were increased 10 percent while
U.S. steel company prices went up only .1 percent. In 1978
alone, he estimates, the prices of everything from autos to
toasters were increased by some $1.25 billion. (Interestingly,
despite U.S. Steel’s attack on Japanese imports, it is now im-
porting small quantities of Japanese steel in order to cover
supply shortages.)
Another convenient protection for the steel industry has

Even “dumping” is good for us.
Who would complain
about below-cost oil imports?
Why, then, steel?

been government “buy American” laws. Federal preferences
have been partially suspended to fulfill multilateral trade
agreements, but 27 states currently bar government pur-
chase of imported steel.

We moved further toward outright steel subsidies in 1978
when the Carter Administration committed the federal gov-
ernment to $550 million in loan guarantees for industry
modernization. Later, Chrysler would point to these
guarantees to justify its own pleas for aid.
But all these existing protective measures were not enough
in an election year when a Republican and a Democratic
candidate for President were both lusting for industrial state
votes. On September 16, Ronald Reagan proposed a steel
program which included accelerated depreciation,
stretched-out environmental regulation compliance times,
and TPM reinstatement. Two weeks later, President Carter
responded with similar proposals for accelerated deprecia-
tion, a three to five year reinstatement of an “improved” (i.e.,
more restrictive) TPM, a discretionary environmental regu-
lation compliance time stretch-out, and a potpourri of fed-
eral spending measures.
Yet there is no one who seriously believes that import
restrictions or federal subsidies will do anything but post-
pone the inevitable adjustment to a competitive world mar-
et. As The Wall Street Journal puts it, such protectionist
measures offer “no real long-term solution to the industry’s
problems of efficiency and profitability.”
The irony of such proposals for more government inter-
vention is that it is government intervention in the first place
that has so damaged the auto and steel industries. The gov-
ernment may not be able to make cars and steel, but it cer-
tainly can prevent private industry from doing so.
In particular, federal regulation and tax policies have
damaged both industries, though other factors, such as
credit controls, have also been important.
Estimates of the total cost of regulation to the economy
range from $23 billion by the Council of Economic Advisors
to $135 billion by the Purchasing Agents Association.
Perhaps the most authoritative estimate is from Dr. Murray
L. Weidenbaum’s study for the Joint Economic Committee
in 1978—$103 billion. This massive burden drains funds
from needed investments, and modernization, and impedes
innovation. These effects are magnified in the steel and au-
tomotive industries, which desperately need to modernize.

The auto industry will need to spend $80 billion by 1985
to convert to a new generation of fuel-efficient cars and to
meet federal regulations. This is double the figure of any past
comparable period. GM alone has talked of spending $40
billion through 1984, roughly what the company spent be-
tween 1965 and 1979. In 1975, Congress set corporate aver-
age fuel economy (CAFE) standards, starting at 18 mpg in
1978 and increasing to 27.5 mpg in 1985. Proposals are now
circulating to set the standard at 40 mpg in 1995.
These regulations may be Washington’s worst. They arbi-
trarily set government standards for performance that
should be set by the market.
The effects have been devastating. Companies are
restricted in their ability to meet changing competitive con-
ditions, needed investment funds are taken to meet inter-
mediate standards, and companies have had to limit their
sale of large, and the most profitable, cars, when they are in
demand, thus losing needed profits (or to sell their small cars
at a loss — some analysts believe that GM was losing $200-
$300 on every 1978 Chevette sold in fall 1977).

The steel industry is deplorably antiquated: 15 percent of
domestic basic steel production still occurs in open hearth
furnaces, compared to 1 percent in Japan. Forty percent of
these furnaces are more than 30 years old. Continuous cast-
ing, a modern process, is used in 31 percent of Japan’s mills,
but in only 9 percent of U.S. mills. And 40 percent of all U.S.
plate mills are more than 30 years old. The Office of
Technological Assessment estimates that the industry will
need $5.2 billion per year over the next decade to modernize.
The American Iron and Steel Institute estimates the indus-
try’s needs at $7 billion per year. By contrast, capital expend-
itures over the past decade have averaged less than $3 billion
per year.

Yet the industry is caught in a regulatory vise. In Decem-
ber 1976, the Council on Wage and Price Stability published
a 235 page book on the more than 5,600 regulations on the
steel industry administered by 27 different federal agencies.
The CWPS pointed out that steel regulation “has become
significantly more extensive and complex” in recent years.
Regulations have become more specific, more voluminous,
more changeable, and more conflicting. Environmental regu-
lations alone had required the investment of $3.7 billion by
1978, plus annual operating and maintenance costs of $550
million.
The incremental cost of environmental protection is stag-
gering. A Battelle Institute report (allegedly suppressed by
the EPA) estimated, for example, for carbon steel, that it cost
$.26 per kilo to eliminate 90 percent of the pollutants, $4.98
per kilo to remove 97 percent, and $32.20 to eliminate 99
percent. In just one year, the spending necessary for the last 5
percent to 10 percent could instead build four energy saving
continuous casting mills for rolling-steel, which would help
transform the industry.
Both the auto and steel industries are heavily capital in-
tensive. Unfortunately, American tax policy focuses on his-
torical costs and allows capital recovery, through deprecia-
tion write-offs against current income, over about the
longest time period in the industrialized world. The law also

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Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the federal government cowed the steel industry into reducing prices, and thus its profitability. Between 1970 and 1978 the average return on equity averaged 7.6 percent compared to 12.5 percent for all manufacturing. This, of course, hampered the industry's ability to attract capital.

Counterproductive federal rules and laws are evident elsewhere, as well. President Carter's imposition of credit controls in early 1980 sharply cut the demand for cars when potential customers could not find financing. Energy price controls created an artificial demand for big cars and postponed the auto industry's retooling. Then federal misallocation of gasoline, by causing the gas lines of 1979, pushed consumers away from large cars and toward small cars before domestic manufacturers could respond.

To solve our trade problems, we must first recognize that our difficulties are mainly self-induced. Only a thorough reform of the regulatory, tax, energy, and pricing policies of the federal government will increase the health and competitiveness of our domestic industries. Even Lee Iacocca admits that “we can hide behind surcharges or quotas, but in the end we've got to compete.” Also important are our basic export industries of agriculture and capital goods, which remain strong. Export disincentives, such as antitrust laws and taxation of Americans abroad, should be eliminated, but there is no need for export subsidies, such as through the Export-Import Bank. Companies should compete without taxpayer support.

They should also compete without protection from imported goods. Imports provide lower-cost, higher-quality products. That is why they are purchased. It is perverse when our ambassador to Japan calls the importation of low-cost, fuel-efficient cars a “trade problem.” Import restrictions punish the Japanese for providing the American consumer with what he or she wants. Moreover, tariffs and quotas don't work. The ITC concluded in September that import restrictions could not guarantee that consumers would buy American cars. Instead, they might simply hold on to their present cars longer.

Even more important is the fact that those countries which have permitted the most rapid growth of imports are on the average those which have enjoyed the most rapid growth in output, and ultimately in employment and standard of living. Indeed, imports do directly create jobs; for example, some 4,500 imported auto-dealers in the United States employ 145,000 people. And as imports rise, so will exports: foreigners sell only in order to buy. And we all gain, due to specialization and “comparative advantage.” It is estimated that exports are responsible for one out of eight jobs in America.

It is, of course, argued that trade barriers “protect” jobs. Actually they do so only if the nation whose goods they shut out does not retaliate in kind. And even then, the price is immense. A June 1980 FTC study found the cost of preserving one textile worker's job to be $85,000 per annum. In October, the FTC testified before the ITC that the cost to preserve one autoworker's job would be between $81,000 and $90,000 per year. And Crandall of Brookings estimated in August 1980 that an annual subsidy of $110,000 would be necessary to protect one steelworker's job.

But import limitations inevitably lead to retaliation, destroying our export sales and the jobs that depend on them. GM Chairman Thomas A. Murphy, who has courageously opposed import restrictions, has noted that the adoption of protectionist policies is counterproductive and harmful to the long-term best interests of the country, the consumer and the automobile industry…protectionism contributes to inflation and to other world economic dislocations. And we believe it invites retaliation that in the long-run would only limit our own entry into global markets.

Even dumping is good for us—foreigners are selling us goods at below cost. The auto and steel industries have no right to prevent American consumers from enjoying such a good deal. Who would complain about below-cost oil imports? Why then, prevent below-cost steel imports? Especially when one of the ironies of the war on imports is that the more protection afforded the steel industry, the worse the problems of the auto industry will become.

U.S. Steel Chairman David M. Roderick declared in support of his company's latest dumping petition that America is "lapsing into economic servitude." Indeed, America is lapsing into economic servitude—servitude to special interests desiring that we rape the entire economy to afford them special protection.

The fact is, we must be prepared to accept the possibility that some of our industries may not ever be efficient enough to maintain their large current market shares. As William Drayton, Jr., Assistant Administrator for Planning and Management of the EPA has noted, “To offer subsidies to an industry in which the United States no longer has a competitive advantage would be the worst possible economic policy. It would drain our resources and put us firmly on the path toward lemon socialism.”

We should not engage in the self-defeating protectionist game and adopt the policy of mercantilism which has failed in so many other countries. We should recognize that free trade is morally right—individuals have the right to deal with one another irrespective of national borders, the viability of a domestic industry, or someone's desire to remain a textile worker. Protectionism is but a euphemism for exploitation.

Doug Bandow is a contributing editor of *The Libertarian Review.*
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**December 1980**
In the West, tales that express dreams traditionally start, “Once upon a time….” In Poland they begin, “Someday There Will Be…”
VICTORIA VARGA

Most of the post-war rebellions in Poland have been sparked by the day-to-day inability of the socialist system to deliver goods and services. There used to be a saying that if there ever was a revolution against Communism then it would be started by someone who had to stand too long in a line. If the August strikes can be called the revolution, and it looks right now as if they can, then it was started by a whole lot of someones who stood too long in a line, only to find when their turns came that the prices had gone up. Although the 1970 protests, which toppled Wladyslaw Gomulka and put Edward Gierek in power, and the 1976 strikes, during which Gierek only held onto his leadership by capitulating, were both touched off by government attempts to raise food prices, there were important differences in the nature of the protests. By 1976 the intellectuals and the workers had learned to join forces. And by this August, another lesson had been learned: non-violence. Random vandalism, the derailment of a tractor engine near Warsaw, and the ransacking of the Party headquarters in Radon in 1976 gave the authorities an excuse to reply in kind and, in the eyes of the people, invalidated the moral force behind the protests. In 1980 the workers demonstrated a wisdom and maturity that had not been seen before. And it worked. At the height of the first series of walk-outs, 200,000 workers were on strike, idling peacefully in the factories, and the government was forced to acknowledge that it needed the workers, not the reverse. More important, the workers realized it too; and conditions may never be the same in the Soviet Bloc again.

It is true that many of the economic demands that were granted—the wage gain of as much as 25 percent, the increased pensions, the lengthened maternity leaves, and the Saturdays off—will do little to increase Poland's sagging productivity. The new benefits will cost the government millions of złotys, which it will finance by printing more money and thus fueling an inflation rate that had already reached 15 percent back in 1978. The new costs will also hit government at a time when it is so strapped for funds it cannot even meet the interest payments on its enormous debt.

The process of putting Poland so deeply in the red began in the early 70's when Edward Gierek tried to modernize industry and free his country from its trade dependence on the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. Partly as a result of the restructuring of East-West economic relations, Gierek was able to borrow heavily from Western banks and import modern Western machinery in an attempt to create a modern industrial state that would produce goods for trade with the West. By 1979, Poland's hard currency debt was $20 billion, higher even than the Soviet Union's at $10.2 billion. Bankers in the West are now wondering if further investment in Poland and the rest of Eastern Europe is sound. As the British magazine, The Economist, pointed out late in September, "Western bankers and governments [a]re not merely lending the money to cover the whole of these countries' trade deficits with the west, but [a]re also lending the money to pay the interest and amortizations on their own loans." And if the Bloc countries were suddenly to succeed in their campaign to produce and sell enough goods to the West to balance their currency payments and pay back their loans, which is unlikely, would the West be happy? Are Western governments prepared to accept a torrent of goods from the east? Unfortunately, it's not likely.

"But," The Economist asks, "if western bankers are not lending to these countries so that they can sensibly create export industries to earn the foreign exchange to pay back their loans, why are they lending to them?" The answer lies somewhere in that great murky mine-field of the mixed economy, where businesses are encouraged by government to make deals that they normally would not consider economically sound, because they are promised government intervention if the deal does not work out. The New York Times reports that some European bankers have secretly admitted that if the troubles in Poland had gotten out of hand, they would have welcomed Soviet intervention to keep the interest payments coming.

There is, happily, a better way than Soviet intervention for getting Poland out of debt and staying off economic chaos: the way of the free market. Although we certainly cannot hope for an instant conversion of the Polish economy to the free market, and although we cannot necessarily equate their cry for freedom with a call for free enterprise, such a call is not out of the question.

Economic reform—the introduction of a price system, profit, real cost accounting, and real incentives for management and labor—is by no means unknown in Eastern Europe. The Polish economist Oskar Lange suggested a socialist version of this type of reform in 1956, and his ideas were even disseminated by Yevsei Liberman in the Soviet Union. Alternately called "new economic mechanisms" or "Libermanism," Lange's reforms contradict every basic tenet of Stalinism. John Dornberg in his book Eastern Europe, explains it very well:

In its ideal and most far-reaching form, it limits the number of plan targets to two: total output and delivery date. However, instead of output, an enterprise's performance is judged by its sales, efficiency, and the money it earns. These standards, in turn, determine the bonuses, premiums, and wage increases for management and labor. Reinvestment capital, instead of being allocated and budgeted by
the state, must come out of profits or be borrowed from the state banks at interest. Market forces of a sort—that is the law of supply and demand—should prevail. These in turn would determine prices. Suppliers and manufacturers, manufacturers and wholesalers, wholesalers and retailers—all of course state owned—should deal directly with one another instead of channeling deliveries and requisition orders through the bureaucratic ministerial maze.

In a sense it is capitalism and the profit system without private capital or profit.

Of course, to Communist bureaucrats and Party members who value their power over the economy, such reforms allow far too much independence. This is why, though they have been instituted at various times in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Romania, and even, in a form virtually guaranteed to self-destruct, in the Soviet Union, they have always been abolished either by national government edict or by armed intervention of the Soviet Union, as in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Only Hungary, of all the Soviet Bloc nations, has adopted the reforms and kept them to this day. And predictably, Hungary is the freest and economically the most viable country in Eastern Europe. Prices there are allowed to fluctuate according to market demands, wages are decided by collective bargaining in individual factories, and one quarter of all personal services and 60 percent of all semi-industrial services are supplied by the private sector. The Hungarians' very unsocialist goal has been to satisfy the consumer.

Hungary's economy is not fully free, of course, and to the extent that it is still centrally planned, it falls far short of assuring prosperity. Recently, the economic stagnation that is the perennial problem of all the controlled economies in the Comecon trading bloc has also affected Hungary. Its growth rate has declined drastically since 1977, and has lost it some of its attraction as a model for Eastern European economic reformers. Although no details have been given out, it has been reported that the new, young planners of Poland are now attempting to create an economic system that is freer than the Hungarian model.

The Polish people have been attracted to capitalism for a long time. The Polish philosopher, Leszek Kolakowski, whose own dreams of freedom are dressed in socialist clothes, observed in his 1968 essay, "The Escapist Conspiracy."

As we well know, the lure of capitalism is very great in Poland. This social amnesia—deplorable, but practically incurable—does not present capitalism as it existed in pre-1939 Poland: crippled, technically backward, obscurantist and clerical in culture, fascist in politics. Today capitalism appears as the high standard of living in West Germany, Great Britain's political democracy, the technology of the United States. ... To try and overcome capitalism's attractiveness with historical information is a pipe-dream. Its attraction does not stem from ignorance of past history but from events taking place now.

Since 1968, the Poles have had another twelve years to look at capitalism, and to see it first hand. Travel is more widely available now, and for those who visit both West Germany and the Soviet Union, the contrast can be devastating and very enlightening. On the one hand a "capitalist" country—actually a comparatively unregulated mixed economy—which seems blindly clean and prosperous, and on the other, the Soviet "ideal," grey, drab, depressing. Television, the one luxury that many Polish families now enjoy, offers another glimpse into the Western world and another source of discontent for the Polish consumer, who must spend an average of two hours a day in line to buy staple items, many of which are not widely available because they must be exported to pay off Poland's debt to the West.

Capitalism is also attractive to the Polish because it fits so nicely with their long tradition of anti-government feeling. It is important to realize that the Poles do not equate society and government. The student rebellion of 1968, for example, was not a rebellion of students against society like many of the student uprisings of the same period; it was a movement of students against the government and for society. The Polish people seem to have a great deal of confidence in the ability of society, i.e., themselves, to combat and solve problems if only government can be kept out of the way. The Wall Street Journal (September 22, 1980) quoted one of the leading advisors to the Gdansk strikers as saying, "These unions must enable society to regain control over its government," and quoted Jacek Wosniokowski, a prominent Catholic editor, as calling the same unions "the beginnings of a change toward more social control of authority." (emphasis added) Amazing words from men who have been stilled from birth in Communist ideology.

But the Poles have had something other than Communist
and when the Communist Party, Soviet Union (CPSU) disclosed the fact and terrible extent of Stalin's crimes, the restlessness of the people exploded in the bloody Poznan riots of June 1956. The aftermath of this first revolution under the modern Soviet state saw the beginning of a slow and unsteady liberalization, as the new regime of Władysław Gomulka (prudently, in view of constant Soviet observation), tried an approach rather alien to the Polish psyche: gradualism. A limited amount of private business was allowed, agriculture was partially decollectivized and several other half-loaf solutions were applied to the economy which slowly but surely took it away from the Soviet line.

One of the most important of Gomulka's reforms was his reversal of the policy of forced collectivization of agriculture which had been started, and brutally, in the first years of the decade, and which had led by 1951 to a harvest worse than any since before World War II. Gomulka allowed farmers to contract out of the collectives they had been forced to join—and within six months the number of such collectives had dropped from 10,500 to 1,700. Today 80 percent of Polish agriculture is privately owned, while agriculture in the rest of the Eastern European countries is mostly collectivized. Gomulka performed a few other valuable and rather courageous actions in the cause of gradual liberalization. For instance, he insisted, when addressing the Central Committee for the first time as Party leader, on the right to mutual confidence and criticism and equality of rights with the Soviet Union. But the head of an Eastern Bloc nation has a ridiculous and thankless task. Even a well-intentioned leader will inevitably find it impossible to satisfy both the people's desire for greater freedom and the Soviets' demand for complete order and obedience. Also, running a country by the irrational means of making all decisions bureaucratically (such as price and wage levels and the number of buttons to be produced in a year) is bound to encourage incorrect decisions. Gomulka made his worst such decision when he raised food prices by fiat just before Christmas 1970. The people revolted, and the riots that resulted took over 200 lives.

In the wake of these strikes, Gomulka was toppled from leadership, and Edward Gierek replaced him. As we have seen, Gierek completely reversed Gomulka's policies of thrift and austerity by investing, largely with funds borrowed from Western bankers, in an industrialization program to spur the lagging economy. He also promised greater political freedom. But the Soviets, while they encouraged the investment and borrowing, had by 1974 become uneasy ideology to sustain them. They have been fighting for freedom and autonomy for centuries. Polish soldiers fought in the American and French revolutions, but were unable to save their own country when it was devoured by Prussia, Austria, and Russia. Thaddeus Kosciusko, a Polish general who played a key role in the American Revolution, made a last ditch effort in 1794 to save Poland from partition, but failed. During the nineteenth century many Polish patriots and intellectuals migrated to Paris, which became the major center of Polish revolutionary activity. But Poland was not to be an independent state again until 1918, and that independence was shortlived; Hitler invaded Poland in 1939, the Soviets "liberated" it in 1945, and the Iron Curtain fell immediately thereafter.

The Stalin years in Poland have been compared to George Orwell's 1984. The economy was cruelly exploited by the Soviets, and Russian "experts" openly manipulated the government, culture, and economy to fit the Soviet model. By the mid-fifties, the whole of Polish society was dissatisfied,
Constitution as a symbol of their aspirations toward a democratic and humane society. So great is their concern that the Party’s proposal in 1976 to amend the 1952 Constitution spurred a unified and overwhelming intellectual opposition — and the dissidents had good reason to protest. The proposed amendments were designed to bring Poland into line with the rest of the Eastern Bloc by officially linking it to the Soviet Union, and by characterizing it officially as a socialist state, with the Communist Party instead of the democratic voice of the people as the leading force of that state. The amendments also connected the rights of Polish citizens with certain duties to the state. In an unprecedented response, groups of intellectual leaders sent hundreds of petitions to the Sejm. They expressed, in brilliant and moving language, the fears of the people for their freedom. Even though the Constitution had been ignored countless times, neither the secular nor religious leaders could allow it to fall as a standard. One opposition paper, “The Manifesto of the 59,” listed the basic rights which its authors believed should be guaranteed by the Constitution. Two of these basic rights had a startlingly libertarian ring to them:

**Freedom of work.** There is no such freedom while the State is the sole employer, and while Trade Unions are forced to conform to the administration of the Party, which actually wields the power in the State.

**Freedom in education.** There can be no freedom in education as long as the criteria for the selection of teaching staff and subjects for study are determined by State authority, and as long as these criteria are of a political nature.

The Manifesto ended with a powerful admonishment to all those who feel state coercion is a necessary precondition of order: “...where there is no freedom, there can neither be peace nor security.”

Despite these protests, not one member of the Sejm was willing to risk reprisals and vote against the amendments, though one member did abstain. But the wording of all the controversial amendments was made less blatantly repressive. The “inviolable fraternal bond” with the Soviets was changed to a pledge of friendship between Poland, the USSR, and other socialist countries. The Party was termed the “guiding political force in the construction of socialism,” instead of the “leading political force” of the nation. And the rights of the people were not tied to their duties toward the motherland. There were, of course, reprisals against the signatories of the petitions. Traveling privileges were denied, some of the most prominent signers were dismissed from their jobs, and many artists’ works were banned or denied performance. If these reprisals don’t seem very serious, especially when compared with those used by the Soviets against dissenters, a statement written by Szymon Szech, a Polish Jew and a dissenter, and published in the book, *In the Name of Tomorrow*, may clarify the issues involved:

Yes, there have certainly been changes. When all is said and done we do not have thousands of people rotting in camps, nor is murder the reward for political opposition. Surely these things mean progress ... Or do they? Since when has history been a matter of murder statistics? Progress is not measured in terms of corpses, but of the liberation of the human mind. It makes no difference that there are fewer corpses, if thought is still in chains and the whole of life is based on irrational principles.

It was this spirit which erupted in the 1980 strikes and left the world holding its breath at the thought that the Soviets might invade Poland. Fortunately for the Polish people, there are several reasons why the Kremlin is unlikely to intervene militarily in Poland as it did in Czechoslovakia in 1968. In Czechoslovakia, Soviet tanks halted the too-liberal reforms of a known Communist government and moved against a people whose folk-hero, Good Soldier Schweik, fakes submission to authority in order to survive. In Poland, Soviet tanks would face a united and fiercely nationalistic people, whose centuries-old blood feud with Russia would make them far less likely to submit. In addition, the Soviets know very well that an invasion of Poland would destroy an already damaged detente with the United States and would encourage the U.S. to escalate the arms build-up in Europe, which the Soviets feel obliged to match. As it is, the Soviets are already faced with crises all along their border: the continuing battle in Afghanistan, the new possibility of a Chinese-Japanese rapprochement, the Iranian-Iraqi war, and the unexpected revival of Islamic fundamentalism in Asia. It is clear to most observers that the Soviets will avoid military intervention in Poland if at all possible. They have replaced Party boss Edward Gieriek with Party apparatchik Stanislaw Kania, whose past record as a hard-liner in charge of the police, the militia, and armed forces completely qualifies him as the man to crack down on liberalism. But as of this writing, if Kania and the Soviets do eventually intend to crack down, then they have very intelligently decided to talk quietly of reform for now and wait until the dust clears before swinging any newly repressive sticks.

Because it was clear from the beginning of the August strikes that the workers were demanding real reform this time, that they would not be bought off again by higher wages, lower prices, and a cosmetic change of the government. In the 1956 and 1968 revolts, the faces of the leadership were changed and reform was promised but not really delivered. After the 1970 strikes were over, union officials herded the workers back into their factories with the words, “Back to work, cattle!” And the people will never forget it.

What they demanded this time—and got—was the right to strike (formerly unheard of in a Communist country), the right to form unions independent of the party, release of all political prisoners, access to the media for the Catholic Church, and an end to censorship. If the Poles are ever to solve their problems, the last of these concessions, the right of free expression, will be their greatest ally. (Although the right to strike, which they bravely took from the authorities without permission, and the right to form independent unions, which will, one hopes, enable them to keep what they have won, are also important.) Until the unrest, no Polish economist was allowed to question publicly the basic premises of the centrally planned economy. As one Polish journalist said, “You could write that we use too much energy and that our transportation system is terribly inefficient and that labor discipline is poor, but you could never take the next step and ask what was wrong with the system that produces such bad results.” (Los Angeles Times, September 7, 1980)

Polish economists and philosophers can now, openly, ask such questions. They and the rest of their countrymen and women are intensely interested in discovering the truth about socialism. Their determination and valor in pursuit of the truth cannot be praised or encouraged enough — and it should not be underestimated. As Vladimir Bukovsky, the author of *To Build a Castle— My Life as a Dissenter*, said at his trial, of the much less promising situation in his own country, the Soviet Union, “…the process of [our] society’s spiritual regeneration has already begun and there is no stopping it.”

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We are living in a time of religious revival. In the 1970s, a number of unfamiliar religious organizations — commonly called cults — sprang up in the United States, rapidly gaining membership and money. The Rev. Sun Myung Moon's Unification Church, which now claims over 30,000 members in the U.S. and 3 million members all over the world, was supposedly collecting between $1 million and $3 million a year, even in the early '70s, from panhandling. In 1978, the Church of Scientology declared that it had an income of $8.5 million. At Senator Robert Dole's four-hour hearing on cults held in February 1979, Jackie Speier, an aide who had travelled to Guyana with Congressman Leo Ryan on his ill-fated visit to the People's Temple commune, stated that there are 10 million members of various cults in the United States today.

But the cults are only the rather gaudy tip of an iceberg. The phenomenon of born again Christianity has attracted increasing attention from the media as, over the last two years, born again Christians have become newly interested in political action. Jeremy Rifkin and Ted Howard, in their book *The Emerging Order: God in the Age of Scarcity*, say there are 45 million evangelical Christians in this country. Articles in *Newsweek* and *The New York Times* have estimated that number to be as low as 30 million and as high as 80 million.
Whatever the exact figure is, the new evangelicals are reached and influenced by a growing number of radio and television preachers. A recent headline in the Los Angeles Times called it “Electronic Church—Billion Dollar Business.” If we add together all the figures on listener and viewer response claimed by all the various church programs, we find that a total of 130 million people see or hear these broadcasts. Obviously, however, there is a great deal of audience overlap among them. The New York Times recently quoted the Rev. Robert Maddox, President Carter’s Special Assistant for Religious Liaison, as saying that the 130-million figure is exaggerated, that “there are something like 10 or 14 million people who watch all those programs.”

In any case, it is clear that the number of people whose primary self-identification is “Christian” is growing. One out of every 7 radio stations is operated by Christian broadcasters—approximately 1,400 in all—and a new one goes into operation every week. A new Christian owned-and-operated TV station is licensed every month, and as of a year ago, such stations were being watched by 20 percent of the viewing public. There are 66 cable systems that specialize in Christian broadcasting and 4 Christian TV networks.

Christian booksellers now have an annual convention which is covered respectfully in a special issue of Publishers Weekly, the trade magazine of the book business; and religious book sales in 1976 amounted to one-third of the gross sales of the entire commercial book market, although the fact is not apparent to the average newspaper and magazine reader because The New York Times and other influential publications refuse to include religious books on their bestseller lists.

There are Christian nightclubs (serving non-alcoholic beverages), Christian business directories (the owners sign an oath that they have been born again before they can be included), Christian women’s clubs and charm schools, Christian industrial chaplains (to counsel workers on the job in Christian businesses)—even an entire Christian city being built in Florida, complete with a senior citizens’ home, an orphanage, and a college.

Not only is religious identification growing, but religious organizations are taking increasingly political stands. Churches are becoming politicized and polarized, sometimes setting member against member, as when Roman Catholic Archbishop Humberto Cardinal Medeiros of Boston mailed a letter (which was also printed on the front page of his church paper) to all of the parishes in one electoral district, attacking the liberal, pro-choice candidate for Congress who was supported by retiring Congressman Robert Drinan. But it is not only Catholics who have become polarized. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (the Mormons) excommunicated Sonia Johnson, the founder of Mormons for ERA. Even members of Jimmy Carter’s own religious denomination, the Southern Baptists, were reportedly not sure to vote for him in November because the Democratic Platform adopted several planks that were not, as conservative evangelicals put it, “pro-family.”

To be pro-family, according to a morality score card used by a lobbying group, Christian Voice, which has rated all the members of Congress, is to be against, among other things, abortion, gay rights, pornography, busing, the ERA, and the Department of Education.

There are even more disputes being generated between members of religious groups and those outside the groups. Fights between parents and children over cult membership and deprogramming. Fights between conservative women and feminists over the ERA. Fights between cult members and the members of evangelical groups who want to convert them. There are even fights between liberal and conservative evangelical groups over which set of political principles is more Christian.

Until recently, conservative fundamentalist leaders took the position that their role was spiritual enlightenment, not political activism, and they criticized the involvement of liberal Christian leaders in civil rights demonstrations, anti-war protests, and other political causes. An estimated 25 million fundamentalists normally do not vote. This outlook has changed, the leaders of fundamentalist groups charge, because the government is in effect establishing an anti-religion, “secular humanism.”

TV evangelist Jerry Falwell, the founder of the activist group Moral Majority, which in just under two years has gained a national membership of 400,000, including 72,000 ministers and priests, has been quoted by The New York Times as saying, “Fifteen years ago I opposed what I’m doing today, but now I’m convinced this country is morally sick, and will not correct itself unless we get involved.” The Rev. Falwell said when he formed the group that its purpose was to unite the “vast majority of Americans” against secular humanism. He urges his member ministers to register people to vote during church services, and apparently they do: Moral Majority claims to have registered up to 3 million new Christian voters, and Falwell predicted in September that the number would reach 4 million in time for the November election. Once registered, these new voters do remain concerned, a fact which is apparently responsible for election surprises like the defeat of Senator Mike Gravel in the 1980 Alaska primary.

This populist groundswell makes some people, especially bureaucrats, nervous. This September, Patricia Roberts Harris, Secretary of Health and Human Services, gave a speech in which she warned that the political activity of some of these religious groups was “at best exclusionary and at worst a dangerous, intolerant and polarizing influence in our political system.” To which Jerry Falwell replied in a news conference, “She warns of an ‘invasion of the political process.’ This was known in pre-Harris days as ‘registering to vote.’”

Harris is not alone in her thinking, however. We are living in a time of religious revival, as I said before, but we are also living in a time of growing government bureaucracy. As the religious revival in this country causes more and more people to define large areas of their behavior as religiously connected, they are on a collision course with what bureaucrats see as their mandate to regulate larger and larger areas of behavior in the name of the public good. And the conflict is augmented by the fact that government has preempted entire activities, such as broadcasting, welfare, and education, as its own turf.

Perhaps the most dramatic example of the conflict between religious groups and the federal bureaucracy has been the battle over the tax exempt status of religious schools. Gary Jarmin, the Washington representative of Christian Voice, “pegs the birth of the new movement [of evangelical political activism] to the IRS effort to make a religious school’s exemption from federal income tax contingent on the school’s providing proof that it did not discriminate on the basis of race.... ‘This was a landmark victory for Christian activism,’ according to Jarmin. ‘It is the one issue which has done more to ignite the Christian community to get involved than anything in the past ten years. That was the issue that woke up the evangelical community because they are the ones who stood to lose the most.’” (James C. Roberts,
Most conservative evangelists, including television minister James Robison, have joined lawyer Phyllis Schlafly (inset) in her crusade against the Equal Rights Amendment.

As far back as 1969 when Congress passed the Tax Reform Act it included a controversial section that required church-owned schools and hospitals to file annual tax forms even though they were not required to pay taxes. In August 1978, another step toward government control was taken when the IRS came up with a list of 14 criteria to determine a religious group's tax exempt status, including a "recognized creed and form of worship" and "a distinct religious history." (One wonders if a Quaker Meeting, in which members sit in silence unless "the Spirit moves" one of them, would meet the first requirement, and how long "history" must be. Would Black Muslims qualify?) The IRS, in conjunction with HEW, then issued regulations which would have automatically removed the tax exempt status of certain private schools suspected of racial discrimination, requiring that they prove themselves innocent of the charge on appeal. This is how James C. Roberts describes it:

HEW issued new regulations that would in effect find many private schools guilty of segregation until they proved otherwise. Specifically the new procedure would define any private school as a "reviewable school" if it had been formed or substantially expanded at or about the time of the desegregation of the public school system of the community in which the school was located and if the school's enrollment were less than 20 percent of the percentage of minority students in the district, i.e., if a school district's population were 50 percent minority, a private school would have to have at least 10 percent minority students. Schools in this reviewable category would automatically lose their tax exemptions unless they proved they were making a "good faith" effort not to discriminate. Such a demonstration, it turned out, would require a school to meet a long list of requirements such as minority recruiting, minority scholarships, minority hiring, etc.

At stake were thousands of evangelical Christian schools. Gary Jarmin, who was the legislative director of the American Conservative Union at the time, mailed a "legislative alert" from ACU to the members of the National Christian Action Coalition, urging that they send letters of protest to the IRS. This resulted in over half a million such letters. A second mailing brought thousands more letters to Congress, resulting in a vote in the House on July 13, 1979 (297-63), and in the Senate on September 6 (54-31), adding a rider to an appropriations bill to deny the IRS the authority to put the new eligibility regulations into effect. But the battle is not over, as appropriations are re-examined annually.

The conflict politicized thousands of formerly apolitical fundamentalist evangelicals. Billy James Hargis of Tulsa, who took political stands when other evangelists were not doing so and was penalized by the FCC for using charitable funds for political causes, was quoted in The New York Times last January. "The fellows on the right were afraid when I took a stand on public prayer, but now they're following me," Mr. Hargis said recently. "Just tell 'em Daddy welcomes 'em to the flock.'"

Many people are saying that such organized political activity is forbidden by the First Amendment to the Constitution. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," it says. In 1802, President Thomas Jefferson wrote in a much-quoted letter to the Danbury Baptist Association that the function of this clause was to build "a wall of separation between church and state."

Today, people generally agree that this means the state must not try to influence the church. But can the church try to influence the state? Opinions differ. Gloria Steinem fantasizes in print about an ideal future: "All church attempts to influence legislation on contraception, sexuality, abortion, the family, and other private matters comes to an immediate halt. We actually achieve separation of Church and State." But Anthony Lewis points out, in a column in The New York Times, "Ministers, like other Americans, have a right to speak out under the First Amendment." TV evangelist James Robison says at a meeting of evangelical ministers in Dallas, "There is no way you can separate God from government and have a successful government," only a few months after the Lutheran Council in the U.S.A. issues a statement saying, "It is unnecessary and unbiblical for any church group or individual to seek to 'Christianize' the government."
And Christianize it is exactly what they would like to do. William Billings, executive director of a lobbying and research group, the National Christian Action Coalition, said that his group wanted to prove to Governor Reagan, if he became President, that Christian votes made the difference, in order to make sure that he is surrounded by “the right people.... Perhaps we'll be able to have some type of veto power over those he chooses to surround himself with.” (Sometime after he said that his father, the Rev. Robert Billings, was hired by Reagan to assist in the election campaign.) Jerry Falwell has stated that conservative evangelists have been disappointed by Carter on the same ground. “We’re 40 percent of the electorate,” he said early in 1980. “If he named good Christians to 40 percent of the good jobs, we'd think about supporting him.” Instead, these groups claim, most of Carter's appointees and associates have been “humanists,” despite the President’s born again Christian credentials.

The founders of this country, these evangelicals believe, intended America to be Christianized along the lines they themselves desire. One evangelical put it this way: “I want a President who opposes drafting women, homosexual rights, the equal rights amendment, abortion. I want to get back to the original concepts on which this country was founded.”

Many people who don't think Jefferson and Madison had intended America to be Christianized along the lines they themselves desire. One evangelical put it this way: “I want a President who opposes drafting women, homosexual rights, the equal rights amendment, abortion. I want to get back to the original concepts on which this country was founded.”

As to the contention that the founders intended our country to be religious in a non-sectarian way, the record seems to some to be ambiguous. Many of the colonies had religious establishments, although there was diversity among them. The Continental Congress picked an Episcopalian clergyman as its chaplain in 1775, began each session with prayer, and, according to constitutional lawyer Leo Pfeffer, “legislated upon such subjects as morality, sin, repentence, penance, divine service, fasting, prayer, reformation, mourning, public worship, funerals, chaplains, true religion, and Thanksgiving.”

However, a change in the entire American concept of the relation of church and state took place during the Revolutionary period. In 1784, a battle began in Virginia over an assessment bill proposed by Patrick Henry and supported by George Washington and John Marshall, to levy a tax to support “teachers of the Christian religion.”

The bill was opposed by Thomas Jefferson, George Mason, and James Madison. Madison wrote a Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments in 1785, saying, “Who does not see that the same authority which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other religions, may establish with the same ease any particular sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other sects?” Virginia did not pass the proposed religious assessment bill; instead, at the urging of Madison, it passed in 1786 the Virginia Act for Establishing Religious Freedom (authored by Thomas Jefferson in 1779, but rejected by the Virginia legislature at that time as too radical) which proclaimed that it followed from the premise “Almighty God hath created the mind free” that “no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatever.”

The late constitutional authority Edwin S. Corwin held, [It is probably due to his part in this fight that in his later years Madison carried the principle of separation of church and state to pediatric lengths....] He put himself on record as opposed to the exemption of houses of worship from taxation, against the incorporation of ecclesiastical bodies with the faculty of acquiring property, against the houses of Congress having the right to choose chaplains to be paid out of national taxes, which, said he, is “a palpable violation of equal rights, as well as of Constitutional principles,” and also against chaplains in the Army and the Navy. (“The Supreme Court as a National School Board,” Law and Contemporary Problems, Winter 1949.)

Leo Pfeffer holds that two opposing groups in Revolutionary times, one deeply religious, the other skeptical and anti-clerical, both agreed “that religion was beyond the delegated jurisdiction of political society,” and joined to change political philosophy in a few short years. Writes Pfeffer: What perhaps most clearly expresses the change that occurred in less than a dozen years is the treatment of God in the Declaration of Independence and in the Constitution. The former short document contains no less than four references to the Deity; the latter, many times longer, contains not a single one. Indeed, the only reference to religion in the Constitution is the negative one prohibiting religious tests for public office.

This change in the conception of the relationship of religion and state was so rapid it can fairly be called revolutionary. (The Liberties of an American, Beacon Press, 1963.)

But is tax exemption an establishment of religion? William Stringfellow, an Episcopal lay theologian, has suggested that the conflict between church and state would be eliminated if we eliminated all religious tax exemptions. “The government has leverage on religious groups because of the tax-exemption privilege,” he said. Libertarians feel that the assumption behind such a position is that everyone's income belongs naturally and rightfully to the government, so that it is a “privilege” if a person or organization is allowed to keep earnings or property. Some official figures have even gone so far as to list such tax exempt monies as “government expenditures,” holding that they would have been government income without the exemption, and therefore the government is spending its rightful income on the exempt organization.

Supreme Court legal reasoning, however, does not consider tax exemption an establishment of religion. In part of a long and scholarly opinion that held Bible-reading in public schools to be unconstitutional in 1963, Justice William J. Brennan addressed himself to the issue, and Milton R. Konvitz summarized his reasoning in a 1966 book.

Regarding tax exemption, Justice Brennan argued that it should not be held violative of the Establishment Clause if it is made “incidentally available to religious institutions.” If religious institutions are allowed to share benefits which government makes available generally to “educational, charitable, and eleemosynary groups,” it does not mean that the taxing authorities “have used such benefits in any way to subsidize worship or foster belief in God.” But the benefit must be available to all such organizations, those “which reject as well as those which accept belief in God.” (Expanding Liberties, Viking, 1966.)

How can the growing conflict between religious groups and bureaucracy be defused? By a return to the principle that was even more crucial to our founders' political thinking than that of religious faith—the principle of limited government. This is the heart of the disestablishment of religion: the idea that government must not only be restrained from making people act badly and from itself doing evil, it must also be restrained from doing good.

For years, big-government liberals have used government power to enforce their vision of the good. It has forced us all to be charitable by taxing us to erect a welfare system, and
the result has been millions of impoverished people trapped in desolate ghettos. It has forced us all to be studious by compulsory schooling laws that define for us what education is, and the result is plummeting literacy and rising juvenile delinquency. It has forced us to be tolerant and integrated by setting racial quotas for school systems and employment and housing, and the result is a society in which it is becoming illegal not to keep records about race. Can we seriously think that the way to solve all these problems is to ask those same bureaucrats to force us to pray?

A return to limited government means a return to the freedom of people to be wrong, if their wrongness does not damage the rights of others. To be uncharitable, uneducated, intolerant. But also to deviate from the vision of the good held by fundamentalist evangelicals: to be homosexual, or atheist, or alcoholic, or enamored of pornography. And above all, a return to limited government means avoiding the temptation to seize the existing bureaucracy and use it to benefit “us” instead of “them.”

If the fundamentalist evangelical movement, in its search for principle in politics, invokes a real limitation of government, it may in fact enlist a majority in its cause. There is a genuine anti-bureaucratic sentiment rising among the evangelicals. Some of them are even calling, as in the days of the American Revolution, for a refusal to pay taxes on principle. According to a story in the Los Angeles Times of October 2, 1980, “As many as 70 churches (in California) face loss of their properties because they stopped filing the appropriate forms in the last year or two. The Reverend Harry Jackson, pastor of Calvary Baptist Church in Fairfield, said his church has a lien placed on it for failure to pay property taxes... ‘I know many pastors who are not going to pay the taxes or file the forms,’ Jackson said.” (The churches in question have been stripped of their tax exempt status by the state of California for making political statements in keeping with their religious faith. And you might say they’re mad as Heaven.)

For all their anti-governmental stance, however, and their aversion to busing and racial and sexual quotas as “anti-family,” the conservative fundamentalist evangelicals are not averse to a little affirmative action thrown their own way. If only Carter had given 40 percent of the “good jobs” to good Christians, they would have supported him, as Jerry Falwell said. And the August 1980 Conservative Digest reported approvingly on a student speaker at the June convention of the National Right to Life Committee, who “looked ahead to a major legal struggle” to use “affirmative action principles” to make [his] school actively recruit pro-life students to compensate for past hostility to them.

Unfortunately, the newly political evangelicals are not really devotees of limited government. They want the bureaucracy to be limited, but they don’t foresee any mistakes or tyrannies that might result if the moral majority had unlimited power. The Rev. Robert G. Grant of Christian Voice said in 1979, “If Christians unite, we can do anything...We can pass any law or amendment. And that is exactly what we intend to do.”

If this prediction comes to pass, then the battle between church and state will go on in another guise. We will have an established Christianity on the one hand, using state power to try to define out of existence the unorthodox, the kooky, and the new religious groups. And we will have a conservative vision of the good forced on us to replace the liberal vision which has prevailed for so long.

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The sage at 100

JEFF RIGGENBACH

IT IS CONVENIENT TO begin, like the gentlemen of God, with a glance at a text or two. The first, a longish one, is from Huntington Cairns's "Mencken of Baltimore," published this year by Alfred A. Knopf as part of a festschrift called On Mencken, issued in honor of the centennial of H.L. Mencken's birth. "Mencken," Cairns wrote, "would live in no other city than Baltimore."

During his lifetime many offers came to him as a newspaperman to establish a connection with some paper elsewhere, but he was never really tempted. He was deeply attached to his home, ... and he saw Baltimore with the friends he made there as an extension of his home life. He observed in the Baltimore Evening Sun in 1931 that a Baltimorean was a special kind of person, he was not an average man. He was of Baltimore in the European fashion of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, when the best men were marked by adding their geographical localities to their names.

Not even the attraction of Periclean Athens could have taken him away from his native city, and his undying love for it despite all the changes it underwent during his lifetime is but one example of his extraordinary consistency. The unity of his thought, his work, and his life was phenomenal.... Mencken's love for Baltimore was not only manifest, but manifold. Many times, in the Sunpapers and elsewhere, he wrote of his good fortune in having learned from its institutions, prospered from its food and drink, savored its atmosphere, suffered amiably its climate, enjoyed its people and the music he made with them and of them.

The emphasis in the last
sentence of the foregoing passage is mine, not Cairns's, but it belongs there all the same. For when Mencken wrote of his favorite city—which he did, as Cairns asserts, often—he wrote much more eloquently and at much greater length of its food and drink, and especially of its food, than of its institutions and atmosphere and climate and people. Witness his first national piece on Baltimore, the essay “Good Old Baltimore,” which appeared in the Smart Set for May 1913, when Mencken was 32. As reprinted by Cairns in On Mencken, “Good Old Baltimore” occupies 14 pages of which 7, fully half the total, are given over to culinary matters. “Even the fellow who denounces Baltimore most bitterly,” Mencken writes, “will tell you that, whatever the hunkerousness, the archaic conservatism of the Baltimoreans, they know, at all events, how to cook victuals.” Baltimore is, Mencken asserts, “by Oh, the mellowness of it! Oh, the yellowness of it! A rich, a nourishing, an exquisite dish! A pearl of victualry, believe me, and not for swine. The man, who appreciates and understands it, who penetrates to the depths of its perfection, who feels and is moved by those nuances which transfigure it and sublimate it and so lift it above all other potpies under the sun—that man is...no mere footman of metabolism.

This, as I say, was in 1913. A quarter-century later, in the third chapter of Happy Days, the first volume of his autobiography, Mencken devoted 19 pages to a fond description of “The Baltimore of the Eighties.” And again, he devoted half his space to food and drink, especially food. He declared in his very first paragraph that Baltimore’s “indigenous victualy was unsurpassed in the Republic” during the last years of the nineteenth century, and that this fact was universally acknowledged by travel-book writers of the period. “Baltimore lay very near the immense protein

factory of Chesapeake Bay,” he continued at the beginning of his second paragraph, “and out of the bay it ate divinely.” What followed was 2500 words of rhapsodic prose on the glories of Baltimore crabs, terrapin, oysters, vegetables, and beer.

There’s simply no getting around it. Baltimore was to H.L. Mencken as Los Angeles was to Raymond Chandler or Dublin was to James Joyce: the foundation of his literary character, the seminal element in the complex and brilliant personality whose distinctive voice seems to deliver Mencken’s many works like so many sadonic orations. And to H.L. Mencken, Baltimore was food.

It should come as no surprise, then, that Mencken also saw a good deal more than the city of Baltimore in culinary terms. Is he famous as a critic of literature? “There is,” he wrote in 1917, in one of the best known of his literary articles, “no such thing as a flawless masterpiece. Long labored, it may be gradually enriched with purple passages—the high inspirations of widely separated times crowded together—but even so it will remain sporty, for those purple passages will be clumsily joined, and their joints will remain as apparent as so many false teeth. Only the most elementary knowledge of physiology is needed to show the cause of this zig-zagging. It lies in the elemental fact that the chemical constitution of the blood changes every hour, almost every minute. What it is at the beginning of digestion is not what it is at the end of digestion, and in both cases it is enormously affected by the nature of the substances digested. No man, within twenty-four hours after eating a meal in a Pennsylvania Railroad dining car, could conceivably write anything worth reading. A tough beefsteak, I daresay, has ditched many a promising sonnet, and bad beer, as everyone knows, has spoiled hundreds of sonnets. Thus inspiration rises and falls, and even when it rises twice to the same height it usually shows some qualitative difference—there is the inspiration, say, of Spring vegetables and there is the inspiration of Autumn fruits.

“Man is what he eats,” Feuerbach wrote in 1850—and so, therefore, are his books. “Some books,” as Francis Bacon put it in 1597, “are to be tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digested.” I cite both aphorisms as they appear in A New Dictionary of Quotations, selected and edited (1942) by H.L. Mencken.

Is Mencken famous as a music lover, amateur musician, and writer on musical subjects? “The genuine music-lover,” he wrote in 1918, “may accept the carnal husk of opera to get at the kernel of actual music within, but that is no sign that he approves the carnal husk or enjoys gnawing through it.” Seven years later, in a letter to a friend, he passed along his sister’s recipe for “chicken a la Creole” and recommended the dish for its ability to “produce an agreeable melancholy, like the music of Chopin.”

Is Mencken famous as a detractor of democracy? “Democracy,” he wrote, in one of his most characteristic utterances on the subject, “is system of government under which the people, having 60,000,000 native-born adult whites to choose from, including thousands who are handsome and many who are wise, pick out a Coolidge to be head of the state. It is as if a hungry man, set before a banquet prepared by master cooks and covering a table an acre in area, should turn his back upon the feast and stay his stomach by catching and eating flies.”

Is Mencken famous as a critic of American culture? The reason is nowhere so plain as on display as in his 1927 essay on “Victualy as a Fine Art”:

What ails our victualy, principally, is the depressing standardization that ails everything else American.... The American hotel meal is as rigidly standardized as the parts of a Ford, and so is the American restaurant meal.... The bill-of-fare is the same everywhere, and nowhere is it interesting. Within the past year I have been in the heart of New England and in the heart of the South. In both places the hotels offered the same standardized cuisine. In neither was there any culinary sign that I was not in Chicago or New York.

What Mencken demanded of cookery, in the end, was the same thing he demanded of everything and everyone else: that it be individual, that it be unabashedly, unapologetically itself—which is why his work is so astounding all of a piece, and why his philosophy of cookery is, in effect, his philosophy of life.
And why not? As James Boswell puts it, on page 221 of Mencken's Dictionary of Quotations, "Man is a cooking animal. The beasts have memory, judgment, and all the faculties and passions of our mind, in a certain degree; but no beast is a cook." And whatever a man may cook up, be it a plate of scrambled eggs, a novel, a symphony, or a critical essay, he should season it, whether with herbs and spices or with his own distinctive personality, his own unique perspective on life, until he achieves a blend that is unmistakably his, a piece of work that fits him "tightly and yet ever so loosely, as his skin fits him...which is, in fact, quite as securely an integral part of him as that skin is," a piece of work which is an "outward and visible symbol" of the man who made it.

Mencken certainly seasoned his own work in this fashion; over-seasoned it, some would say. It was not for nothing he was known as the Sage of Baltimore. And the sheer, mind-numbing volume of his output! The prodigy of it! By his own estimate, he produced "well beyond 5,000,000 words" of published copy in a career that lasted half a century. A little old fashioned long division will tell you that that reflects an average output of about 100,000 words per year, enough words to fill every page of a 333-page volume every year for 30 years. A shelf of books at least six feet long, and each and every one of them so highly seasoned, such a bracing, invigorating, exquisitely idiosyncratic blend of literary hot peppers, fresh mint leaves, and more than a dash of bitter herbs, that American literature has never recovered from the shock of the very first taste. Mencken wrote in 1948 that a good deal of the 5,000,000 words he had ushered into print were devoted to "journalism pure and simple—dead almost before the ink which printed it was dry. But I certainly do not regret that I gave so much of my time and energy, especially in my earlier years, to this journalism, for I had a swell time concocting it, and in its day it got some attention."

That it certainly did. By 1920, when Mencken's career as a professional writer was scarcely two decades old, his dispatches in the Baltimore Sun, the New York Evening Mail, and his monthly magazine, The Smart Set, had made him a household name, had seen him denounced from pulpits and state legislatures all over the country as a destroyer of American civilization, and had won him more than a few threats of lynching if he so much as set foot in certain states or parts of states. By 1925, college and university students nationwide were debating the proposition "that the school of thought typified by Mencken is a harmful element in American life." By 1928, his writings had brought such a deluge of denunciation down upon him that he could collect the most vituperative and splanchnic of the lot into a book of more than 130 pages and publish it (to his personal profit) under the title Menceniana: A Schimpflexikon.

And what was the doctrine which aroused Mencken's critics to such spluttering paroxysms of uncontrollable rage, which scalded the sensitive palates and raised hives on the delicate skins of clergymen and teachers and literary critics and public officials from Bangor to Seattle and from San Diego to Miami? As we have seen, Mencken's doctrine was a kind of individualism—the kind that says to the individual: be yourself, realize yourself, be true to yourself, and whatever you do, do it your way, season it liberally with your personality, and let the mob, with its muling spirit of cringing conformity and abject creative sterility, be damned! Mencken demanded an American culture teeming with diversity and individual eccentricity, and an American language and literature freed from the narrow, European-minded rules and formulae of the schoolma'ams and schoolmasters, an American literature in which unclassifiable individuality of vision and expression was the only rule, an American literature of literally innumerable genres and movements, each consisting of a single writer. As he demanded creative, individual use of spice in his cuisine, so he demanded variety in his cultural milieu. He understood, with William Cowper, whom he quoted on page 1243 of his Dictionary of Quotations, that "variety's the very spice of life."

He understood also that variety could endure only in a society from which government had been extracted. "I am," he wrote in The Smart Set in 1922, "a libertarian of the most extreme variety. He was "against jail men for their opinions, or, for that matter, for anything else." And he considered that the ideal government would be one "which lets the individual alone—one which barely escapes being no government at all." He believed, he said in 1930, "that all government is evil, in that all government must necessarily make war upon liberty." But he was not sanguine about the prospects for getting rid of government, or even for reducing it to a tolerable minimum. The ideal of a government which barely escapes being no government at all, he said, "will be realized in the world twenty or thirty centuries after I have passed from these scenes and taken up my public duties in Hell." He was even dubious about the prospects of personal freedom in Hell. "The religion of Hell is patriotism," he quoted on page 528 of his Dictionary of Quotations, citing as author his old friend James Branch Cabell, "and the government is an enlightened democracy."

And if we look closely at the America Mencken observed and wrote about during his best years, the three decades between 1910 and 1940, it is hard not to sympathize with his pessimism. "Ask the average American," he wrote in 1920, what is the salient passion in his emotional armamentarium—what is the idea that lies at the bottom of all his other ideas—and it is very probable that, nine times out of ten, he will nominate his hot and unquenchable rage for liberty. He regards himself, indeed, as the chief exponent of liberty in the whole world, and all its other advocates as no more than his followers, half timorous and half envious. To question his ardor is to insult him as grievously as if one questioned the honor of the republic or the chastity of his wife. And yet it must be plain to any dispassionate observer that this ardor, in the course of a century and a half, has lost a large part of its original burning reality and descended to the estate of a mere phosphenic superstition. The American of today, in fact, probably enjoys less personal liberty than any other man of Christendom, and even his political liberty is fast succumbing to the new dogma that certain theories of government are virtuous and lawful and others abhorrent and felonious. Laws limiting the radius of his free activity multiply year by year: it is now practically impossible for him to exhibit anything describable as genuine individuality, either in action or in thought, without running afoul of some harsh and unintelligible penalty.

"In no other country in the world," he continued a few pages later in the same long, satisfying, and too often neglected essay (his "Preface" to The American Credo), "is there so ferocious a short way with dissenters; in none other is it socially so costly to heed the inner voice and to be one's
Did his readers desire examples? Mencken had them, and in plenitude. "The Boobus americanus," he wrote, is led and watched over by zealous men, all of them highly skilled at training him in the way that he should think and act. The Constitution of his country guarantees that he shall be a free man and assumes that he is intelligent, but the laws and customs that have grown up under that Constitution give the lie to both the guarantee and the assumption. It is the fundamental theory of all the more recent American law, in fact, that the average citizen is half-witted, and hence not to be trusted to either his own devices or his own thoughts. If there were not regulations against the saloon (it seems to say) he would get drunk every day, dissipate his means, undermine his health and beggar his family. If there were not postal regulations as to his reading matter, he would divide his time between Bolshevist literature and pornographic literature and so become at once an anarchist and a guinea pig. If he were not forbidden under heavy penalties to cross a state line with a wench, he would be chronically unfaithful to his wife. Worse, if his daughter were not protected by statutes of the most draconian severity, she would succumb to the first Italian she encountered, yield up her person to him, enroll herself upon his staff and go upon the streets. So runs the course of legislation in this land of freedom.

As a longtime newspaperman, Mencken knew first hand what he was talking about. He had seen the effects of laws regulating private conduct and had seen their enforcement "by police who supply the chance gaps in them extempore, and exercise that authority in the best manner of prison guards, animal trainers and drill sergeants." He had himself been transformed into a criminal by the enactment of Prohibition in January of 1920. And within six more years he would himself be arrested and jailed in Boston for selling subversive literature, namely, a copy of his magazine, The American Mercury. A decade before, his commentary on American foreign policy had been indirectly but very effectively silenced by government when a series of vigorous prosecutions of outspoken activists and writers who, like Mencken, opposed U.S. participation in World War I, frightened the Baltimore Sunpapers into dropping him as a columnist for the duration of the conflict. Mencken hated laws against what today would be called victimless crimes, and he hated them for good and personal reasons. It is hardly surprising, then, that he devoted so much of his energy during the 1920s to lam­pooning and vilifying them. At the time, such laws were arguably the greatest clear and present danger to the freedom of Americans.

But times change. With the 1930s came repeal of Prohibition, a new freedom for writers to express themselves as they liked—and the New Deal and a growing threat of American involvement in another European war. As a libertarian, Mencken reasoned that meddling in a man's business was just as heinous a violation of individual freedom as meddling in a man's private life. And he knew that taking a man's money and using it to finance an orgy of destruction and murder profits nobody but government; he knew that war is both the health of the state and the plague of civilization.

Saying so in print, however, made him more enemies, and more vociferous ones, than anything he had written in the 'teens and 'twenties. If his name had been notorious then, it became anathema in the 'thirties and 'forties. Not a few of his less scrupulous detractors tried to use his opposition to American involvement in World War II as evidence that he was a racist, and specifically an advocate of anti-Semitism. Many of them bolstered their arguments with out-of-context references to Mencken's pet...
distinction between "the superior man," the natural aristocrat, and the mob, "the undifferentiated herd." One or two of them, like the detestable Charles Angoff, bolstered their arguments with "remembered" — that is, invented — snatches of Mencken's conversation. All of them, however they cooked up their arguments, were wrong. Mencken believed that some men were better than others, all right, but not on account of such accidents as their race or their color or their nationality or their religious background or their socioeconomic class. He believed that some men were better than others because some men were more competent and creative than others. But he believed in freedom for everybody. He believed that progress was possible "only if superior men are given absolute freedom to think what they want to think and say what they want to say." And he saw that "the superior man can be sure of freedom only if it is given to all men."

Fortunately, times have changed again since the days when all this was so grievously misunderstood. Mencken's idea that a man should do his own thing and be left alone about it, that he should realize himself and leave others unmolested to realize themselves is fast becoming the conventional wisdom. His libertarian doctrine that the government is best which governs least grows daily in respectability and influence, as does his belief that "in the long run all battles are lost, and so are all wars." And his own books are coming back into popular favor.

To my way of thinking, this is exactly as it should be. I believe that H.L. Mencken had a clearer vision of life, that he came nearer to its elements and was less deceived by its false appearances, than any other American who has ever presumed to manufacture generalizations, not excepting Emerson, Thoreau, or even Mark Twain. I believe that, admitting all his defects, he wrote better English, in the sense of cleaner, straighter, vivider, saner English, than either Melville or James. I believe that four of his works — The American Language, the Prejudices, Notes on Democracy, and The Days of H.L. Mencken — are alone worth more, as works of art and as criticisms of life, than the whole combined output of Hawthorne, Dreiser, Fitzgerald, Thomas Wolfe, Norman Mailer and Saul Bellow. I believe that he ranks well above Hemingway and certainly not below Poe or Miller or Faulkner. He was one of the great writers of all time, the full equal of Cervantes and Dickens, Swift and Oscar Wilde. He was and is one of the few authentic world-class giants of our national literature.

How could it be otherwise? Before technological advance displaced it from its role as a preservative, sage was used, like many other spices, not only to make dishes individual in flavor, but also to make them last. And the spicy, everlasting individual flavor the Sage of Baltimore put into his books not only made them unmistakably his; it also made them endure. We celebrate this year the centennial of his birth. He would have been 100 years old September 12, had he lived. But it is no matter that Mencken has been dead this past quarter-century. His works live. Like old wine or old cheese, they only improve with age. And like the oysters of his native Baltimore, they are things of prolonged and kaleidoscopic flavors; they are nourishing and exquisite dishes. They are pearls of literature, believe me, and not for swine.

Jeff Riggenbach is executive editor of LR.

An honest record

JUSTUS DOENECKE


TO MUCH OF THE PUBLIC, particularly to those born in the decades after Pearl Harbor, those who opposed American intervention in World War II were a most unsavory lot. From 1939 through 1941, large sections of the media portrayed them as appeasers, individuals welcoming Axis domination overseas and fostering reaction at home. Indeed, the frequently used label "isolationist," if somewhat derogatory, was less pejorative than many.

The Lindberghs in particular received abusive treatment. President Roosevelt publicly referred to aviator Charles A. Lindbergh as a "copperhead," and interventionists accused his wife Anne of presenting fascism as an irresistible "wave of the future."

At the height of the interventionist controversy, Anne Morrow Lindbergh wrote, "Each day that I read the lies about us in the newspapers I think there must be some honest personal record to show what it really was like." Fortunately, she now shares her own record with us, thereby putting all historians to shame.

The introduction sets the tone for the diaries, and puts them in context as well. After noting that most Americans see World War II as a just war against evil forces, she writes, "Few of us question what preceded Hitler or examine critically the conditions that caused his rise to power. Few stop to consider what consequences followed our enthusiastic embrace of Stalin and, inevitably, of his aims and ends." She tells of the influence upon her of the powerful novelist Erich Maria Remarque, whose All Quiet on the Western Front (1929) made her a pacifist, and the revisionist historian Sidney Bradshaw Fay, author of Origins of the World War (1928) and one of her instructors at Smith College. Refuting certain criticisms of her husband, she asserts that Charles's military mission to Germany in 1936 was performed at the request of army intelligence, and she denies that Charles had any influence upon the Munich conference. She quotes able historians to challenge the claim that only reactionaries and bigots opposed full-scale entry into the war.

What might make the preface even more significant is her account of official intimidation. The Federal Bureau of Investigation tapped their phone. The Roosevelt administration tried to fire government officials, such as Colonel Truman Smith, thought to have been writing Lindbergh's speeches. Repeatedly, she notes, interventionist opponents took his words out of context, omitting main points so as to pin the label of treason on him.

Mrs. Lindbergh begins this volume of her diaries in April 1939, with her return to the United States after several years of self-imposed exile in Europe. Five months after she got back, when the European war broke out, she predicted that the conflict would be long and inhumane, with the United States eventually intervening to save Britain and France. "We will never see peace again," she wrote on September 3, "even after war ceases. The world will be in turmoil, revolution, terror. My husband and my friends will go in the beginning of this long struggle and my children in the end of it. I am an old woman already."

By mid-September, Charles
Charles and Anne Morrow Lindbergh standing in front of their plane in 1934, at least five years before their opposition to World War II unjustly branded them as traitors.

was broadcasting against Roosevelt's cash-and-carry proposals, and Anne strongly supported his anti-interventionism. She, like Charles, loved France deeply, but — also like Charles — she saw the conflict as ruinous. On October 28, she mused, "A cessation of hostilities—what harm could it do, what good might it do? Not to yield to Hitler, not to disarm, but to stand fast behind the Maginot line and cease hostilities long enough to avert a suicidal conflict which will destroy everyone, winners and losers, with Russia there to eat up the remains."

Some of the best sections of her book deal with her provocative thesis, "the wave of the future." Seeing how the phrase was misinterpreted to imply endorsement of fascism, she wrote, "Will I have to bear this lie throughout life?" Far from being an Axis apologist, she called Hitler "that terrible scourge of humanity" and continually voiced horror over German atrocities. At one point, she says that she would rather have the United States enter the war than have a wave of anti-Semitism sweep the nation.

Charles too was no iceberg. "The flower of the Allied armies!" he cried out upon hearing of the abortive Belgian campaign. "I can't keep those troops out of my mind. I know what hell is going on there, what hell."

To Anne Morrow Lindbergh, Nazism was "scum which happens to be on the wave of the future." She thought of "some new and perhaps even ultimately good conception of humanity coming to birth—or trying to come to birth through these evil and horrible forces, these abortive attempts." Indeed, at one point, she saw world cooperation in the offing. Speaking of the interventionists, she wrote, "I want evil to be vanquished as much as they — only my mind tells me, perhaps wrongly, that it cannot be done the way they think it can." At times, she despaired of the Germans ever possessing "any sense of humanity"; at other times, she absolutely refused to accept "the complete wrongness or rightness of either side."

The entire family, even including their children at school, received much hostility, and few could have withstood it. In January 1941 she commented, "I am now the bubonic plague among writers and C. is the anti-Christ." She noted with irony how far interventionism had permeated all those with whom she grew up: "The East, the secure, the rich, the cultured, the sensitive, the academic, the good — those worthy intelligent people brought up in a hedged world so far from realities." The people backing the America First
Committee, on the other hand, were "not smart, not rich, not intellectual, dowdy, hard-working good people, housewives, shopkeepers, etc. I suppose it is the heart of America, those people who protest against war and then give their sons and their blood and their money without grudging or making a great fuss over it, taking their generosity just as a matter of fact."

Some comments in particular are revealing. She expresses anger over the "petty, personal, and bitter mud-slinging" of columnist Dorothy Thompson, and was hurt by the poet Carl Sandburg as well. She compares the pseudo-psychological attack of British diplomat Harold Nicolson unfavorably to the principled critique of Walter Lippmann, almost the only intellectual who did not resort to personal attack. When the British accused them of being ungrateful guests (they had spent several years in Britain), she responded, "The attitude seems to be that you should sell your country out of personal loyalty or gratitude to another country." When she pleaded for feeding occupied Europe, the newsmen headlined her address, "Anne Lindbergh Suggests We Feed Hitler's Europe."

She ably captures the general hysteria as well. She notes the anti-parachute units organized in Philadelphia, the Bundles for Britain campaign of the smart set, Elizabeth Arden's V for Victory lipstick. When actress Lillian Gish joined America First, critic Alexander Woollcott "told her no one would speak to her again." The Reverend L.M. Birkhead, head of Friends of Democracy, Inc., boasted that for ten thousand dollars, he would "do the same job" on Charles that he did on Father Coughlin.

Through her deftly drawn portraits, the reader can well see the rich variety of individuals opposed to intervention. One meets international lawyer John Foster Dulles ("that sane cool air of tolerance, moderation, non-emotionalism"), poet W.H. Auden ("perhaps the most unworldly person I have ever met"), peace lobbyist Frederick J. Libby ("bright and hard—like a button"), elitist theorist Lawrence Dennis ("rather reserved and extremely sensitive"). Diplomat Joseph P. Kennedy is "this great breezy, ambitious, wealthy, and somehow nice man"; journalist John T. Flynn, a "healthy American—an old-fashioned liberal"; socialist leader Norman Thomas, "infamed about 'Humanity' but not about men as individuals"; press lord William Randolph Hearst, "that gray and lifeless mask." The best mind in the struggle, in her eyes, belonged to Philip La Follette, former governor of Wisconsin, though that of America First chairman Robert E. Wood came close.

War brought her no rest, but only long separations from her husband, who was occupied with defense work. In the middle of 1943, she wrote how much older she felt than her friends, and this reaction is quite understandable. Far from being insensitive to the conflict, she felt Europe's suffering deeply. Her diaries close with the death of aviator Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, a man whom she believed could have offered much to France's recovery.

This book will go down as one of the great memoirs of the wartime period. If read carefully, it offers an accurate as well as an understanding picture of certain major themes in American isolationism. In addition, Mrs. Lindbergh comes through as a woman of exceptional sensitivity; indeed, of a certain nobility.

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of the equation $E = mc^2$ reflects clear thinking and the profound grasp of a subject, so does the elegant simplicity of Harper's presentation. And simplicity has a virtue of its own: it can make important insights unforgettable.

For the libertarian movement, unforgettable means useful. For we have a very, very big teaching job to do, and to do quickly. Harper has provided us with a superb primer which explains some of the known laws of cause-and-effect in economic matters, and defines the basic economic concepts, like scarcity, production, ownership, specialization, market, trade, money, price, value, wages, profit, capital, and wealth.

His essays seem to have explained everything which a non-libertarian needs to learn about economics in order to recognize for himself, forevermore, the dangerous implications of the economic policies commonly supported (or proposed) by non-libertarian politicians and their backers, and by well-meaning do-gooders with their slogans like "Fund Human Needs," "People before Profits," and "Economic Democracy.”

I used to be one of them myself, and I am convinced that the sloganeering of rank-and-file do-gooders (leaders are another matter) results from ignorance, not from anti-liberty philosophical conviction. Harper, too, observed that ignorance was the major problem:

"Why is it that intellectuals are so willing to pave the road to serfdom? It is not, in most instances, an intentional crime. They do not know that it leads toward serfdom. With the best of intentions, they cherish a sincere desire to improve the lot of their fellow men...." (1945)

Since I know directly that most such people are emphatically not "Leftists" in terms of disrespect for liberty, as a convenient shorthand I will call the do-gooders "Ignodogs" (Ignorant Do-Gooders). This is meant as a far more affectionate term than "Leftists."

A crucial question which separates the sheep from the goats (and also the Citizens' Party from the Libertarian Party) is this: does the desire "to improve the lot of your fellow men" give you the right to compel others to

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**“Baldy” Harper Speaking for Himself**

The following short samples from Harper's essays are meant to convey some of his thinking and style, but certainly only a small fraction of his insights on each of these important subjects. Drawn from essays in both volumes, paragraphs now adjacent here were seldom adjacent in the books. Dates of earliest publication are provided in parentheses.

On Libertarian Dogma:

"The root of progress is a sincere love of truth per se. Devotion to truth in the abstract must surpass love for any specific belief one holds at the moment, if the pursuit is to continue rather than to bog down in stagnant dogma." (1956)

On Unregulated Prices:

"Price has an important function to perform. It equates the wanting of things with the supplying of things. The two are in balance only at the free market price." (1957)

"An increase in the price of any product quickly discourages consumption and (more slowly but surely) encourages production; the result is a surplus. A decrease in price has the opposite effect and results in a shortage. At some specific intermediate price, and only at that price, there exists neither a surplus nor a shortage." (1946)

"In other words, the free market equates the volume supplied and the volume demanded. Man-made devices have been tried for centuries in the attempt to duplicate the free market's performance in solving this riddle, but none so far has been found to succeed so well." (1946)

On Fair Prices:

"Buyers and sellers are often mistakenly said to be combatants, in serious conflict in every exchange. But the process of trading is really cooperation rather than conflict. In every instance of a voluntary exchange, both parties have seen at the time of the exchange an advantage in consummating it, otherwise one or the other would have vetoed its taking place. Each prefers what he is to get more than what he gives in exchange. Each trade in a free market...enjoys unanimous and hearty approval. In each trade, to be sure, the unanimity is only for two persons — the only ones involved with proper concern. But since each other trade is likewise unanimous for the concerned part of society, unanimity prevails for the whole of the free market activity. The process of the free market calls to mind the rule of the Society of Friends, by which unanimity is required for a decision... The free market works like that." (1962)

"Prices are merely the record of the voluntary action of consumers, acting freely in the market place, buying items of their individual choice at prices agreeable to them, using their own money for the purpose." (1948)

"Any economic commodity has value only because (1) people want it and (2) it is scarce. Nothing has a fixed or intrinsic value aside from other things. Value is determined by each person's subjective judgment at any given time, and this keeps changing for all sorts of reasons. The subjective and changing nature of value is why every control, without exception, brings trouble and distress." (1968)

"When one condemns the processes of a free market, as he is doing when he endorses any form or degree of price control, he is invalidating the rights of either buyer or seller. The line of reasoning which leads to the conclusion that price controls are justified has no logical terminus short of an argument for complete dictatorship." (1945)

On Fair Wages:

"It is often asserted that employees are the equivalent of slaves, because the employer can pay them whatever he may desire and the employee can do nothing about it. But that is not so... The employer-employee relationship amounts to this: The employer, who has the tools and other capital required for efficient production, and who presumably has the know-how of management, proposes to the employee that they form a sort of partnership; the employee accepts it or not, voluntarily, dependent on whether or not he judges it to be a better prospect for him than any alternative. The employee may, in fact, take the initiative and make the original proposition to the employer, because he strongly desires to cooperate in such an arrangement.... Whatever the route to a final deal, the employer-employee relationship is similar..."
work for that same goal?
The answer is “yes” if you believe in the doctrine of social rights, and “no” if you believe in the doctrine of individual human rights.

Under the doctrine of social rights, every individual who does not freely choose to work or to sacrifice for others and for the goals of others, may properly be forced to do so. The power to enslave the unwilling may be held by officials democratically elected by a majority, by ruling coalitions, or by tyrants, and may be exercised in the name of “the needy,” “the economy,” “the general welfare,” “progress,” “efficiency,” “the country—or (we have also seen) in the name of “the proletariat,” “the Aryan race,” “the Fatherland,” or “the Ayatollah.”

Under the doctrine of individual human rights, every individual’s right is to be free from coercion; such individuals may or may not choose service to others as one of their personal goals. Some will, and some won’t. Without the freedom to choose, there is no such thing as a generous choice or a moral act of any kind.

These two incompatible doctrines of “rights” are compared with great clarity by Harper. They are not presently understood. When the two doctrines are understood, a few will knowingly side with slavery (while continuing to give lip-service to liberty), but I predict many more will become intelligent advocates of human rights which (as Harper shows) are “really just another name for freedom itself.”

Within the two Harper volumes is a second primer, which defines liberty and then explores its relationship to human rights, justice, tolerance, moral codes, peace, private property, progress, government, majority rule, and to the laws of cause-and-effect in human relations and to truth.

Harper defines truth as the natural laws of cause-and-consequence, and he
to two persons trading a cow and a horse, where both parties to the deal are beneficiaries.” (1949)

On Inflation:
“Inflation is an increase in the quantity of functional money in the economy.” (1972)

“... higher prices are the result of inflation, and are not the same thing as inflation. This distinction is important for any correct diagnosis of the inflation disease, if one would hope to treat the disease instead of dabbling with its symptoms.” (1948)

“Inflation means too much money. The way to prevent inflation is to close down the money factory. It is just that simple. All the complicated gibberish one hears and reads about inflation simply blocks an understanding of the essentials of the problem....

“... What the government does is like a counterfeiter.... When a private citizen counterfeits money, the wrath of other citizens is aroused. They say, “He did no useful work to get that money....yet he takes useful things out of the market without producing other useful things to go into the market as we do. The effect of his chicanery is that prices go up, and the rest of us receive less and less for our money.”

“That is a correct statement of what happens under counterfeiting.... When the government makes new money and spends it, the effect on the supply of things in the market and the effect on prices are exactly the same as when any private counterfeiter does so.” (1968)

“.... so everyone’s money becomes diluted and every dollar is taxed in buying power. [Inflation] should always be thought of as a tax.” (1958)

“The inflation-tax causes privation and unrest, in response to which the state commonly imposes yet another intervention—price control. Unless reversed, one control leads to another, until the completely authoritarian state emerges.” (1968)

“Under the spell of rising prices...we find some agents in government engaging in the old game of throwing decoys.... One is reminded of the trick of the robber who commits a crime and then joins the angry mob in search of the robber. In this inflation crime, persons who have been parties to the crime divert attention from themselves by accusing innocent persons.” (1948)

On Liberty:
“Freedom is the absence of coercion of a human being by any other human being; it is a condition where the person may do whatever he desires according to his conscience and wisdom.” (1938)

“A hermit is unconcerned about liberty. Liberty becomes a matter of concern only when there arises the danger of losing it, or after it has been lost. Loss of liberty is possible only because of the things persons do to one another. The problem of liberty is, then, exclusively in the realm of relationships among persons.

“A relationship between persons must be either voluntary or involuntary. Liberty remains inviolate in any voluntary relationship because, being voluntary, the act is in accordance with the wishes of the participants.” (1949)

“A maximum of voluntary associations and a minimum of involuntary associations is the highest order to which men of good will can aspire.” (1970)

“Strange is a concept of ‘liberty’ which allows you to be forced to pay the costs of promoting acts of which you disapprove or ideas with which you disagree.... Being forced to support things directly in conflict with one’s wisdom and conscience is the direct opposite of liberty, and should under no circumstances be allowed to parade under the esteemed banner of liberty. It should be labeled for what it is.” (1949)

On Unrealistic, Utopian Goals:
“Ideals serve a vital function which should never be forgotten in the discouraging failure to attain the ideal fully and completely. That purpose is this: Ideals are the only possible means by which one can make better choices. Ideals are the health of liberty, since choices are the essence of liberty, and ideals are the guides for exercising those choices.” (1970)
makes explicit his assumption that such laws exist in the social sciences as well as in the so-called hard sciences, whether or not we have yet discerned such laws.

He proposes that whenever behavior is almost universally regarded as either good (e.g., helpfulness) or bad (e.g., theft), either right or wrong, moral or immoral, it is regarded that way because of its observed consequences. His hypothesis is that the species can discover the laws of the social sciences as it discovers the laws of the hard sciences, by observation, testing, and by sticking to stable, precise definitions of terms.

Truth is a recurrent theme in Harper's essays. It is clear from his writings that he had a passion not only for liberty and justice, but also for truth as an even more fundamental and libertarian value.

Harper argues that the repeatedly observed consequences of abolished liberty provide powerful scientific support for the hypothesis that liberty is the only arrangement which is in harmony with the laws of human nature, with truth.

And he points out, if it is the nature of truth to be internally consistent, then there can be no conflict between the truths which pertain to economics, liberty, and morality (the individual's exercise of freedom in choices which affect others). The harmony of economic principles, moral principles, and liberty is another of his key insights.

Harper's essays have the uncommon power to convince reasoning people of all ages that the "selfish" pursuit by individuals of their own goals under a system of true liberty (reciprocal freedom from coercion) is inherently moral, and is the only social arrangement which can foster peace, full-employment, human rights, charity, and other important humanitarian goals — the very same "unselfish" goals presently credited to the Ignodogs but not to the libertarians.

Even teenagers will have no trouble reading and remembering Harper's essays — an enormously important matter if we wish to help them (and their parents) evaluate the apparently lofty slogans of the Ignodogs, and if we are counting on today's teenagers to become our future helpers in achieving liberty on this planet.

What Harper wrote in the 1940s, '50s, and '60s about inflation, price controls, "the just price," unemployment, "fair wages," profits, "special interests," subsidies, taxation, ownership, government, peace, etc., is just as applicable to today's news as it was to the news of those decades. By contrast, what most living economic pundits say today does not even hold for six weeks.

The fact that Harper's essays are "dated" should be regarded as another virtue, because this very fact should help Harper's new students to see that timeless principles (or truths) do exist in economics and in other human transactions.

In spite of Harper's wisdom and profundity, his work reveals the genuine humility of a truth-seeker, and provides an important model also in this respect for his students.

Another bonus is Harper's strong streak of whimsy, which is especially evident in his delightful essays, "The Graduated Gadinkus Tax" and "To Shoot a Myth."

A collection like this renews my appreciation for the technologies of papermaking, printing, and distribution. Large chunks of the accumulating capital of human wisdom are put at the service of all, for the equivalent price today of a restaurant meal, half a pair of shoes, or a ticket on a ski lift. Both of the Harper volumes have been almost flawlessly put together — with good organization, appealing layout, relatively large type, and generous interline spacing. The Institute for Humane Studies (IHS) did a first-rate publishing job, which this first-rate material deserves. I only regret that the books do not have an index, and are not wrapped in eye-catching and irresistible covers.

With these two volumes, IHS has provided liberty-lovers with a potent helper indeed, and now we either will or won't help to get the books into the hands of teachers of political science, "civics," history, economics, sociology, and philosophy, into libraries of all sorts, and into the widest possible circulation.

While relatively few of the rank-and-file Ignodogs themselves will read these 1,000 pages unless the libertarian movement becomes noisier, if each libertarian would read both volumes, he (she) would surely become a far more competent, confident, and persuasive noise-maker!

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Women, and friends

BRUCE MAJORS


LOUISE BERNIKOW'S Among Women is not a book of argument, but a book of observation. The central observation is that depictions of female friendships are not allowed in art, and the cultivation of female friendship does not go unpunished by culture.

A woman can have relationships with men. This can be the subject of literature, and it is, beginning with Eve and her relationships with Adam, the Serpent, God, Abel, and Cain. Women can fight with each other over a man. This can be the subject of literature, and it is, beginning with Aphrodite, Athena, and Hera offering bribes and starting wars over who will be judged the fairest by Paris. Can two women be friends? Can they continue to be friends under the demands of dates, lovers, husbands, and children? World literature writes "No."

Bernikow observes this problem, and in the process begins to address it. First she makes female friendships present. She gives us the histories of the patriarchal transformations of European fairy tales, bringing the original matriarchal folktales back into view. She collects the stories of female relationships that can be found — in literature, in history, and in her own life — and sorts them into chapters, each one about a different kind of relationship: mothers and daughters, sisters, friends, lovers, women in conflict, light and dark women. Among Women is both a book of, and a bibliography for, the stories of female interaction. Second, Bernikow provides models and assurances of female friendship. If female friendship becomes self-aware, remembering its own heritage and expressing itself through such institutions as political unions and employment networks, patriarchy might not be around to produce this—or any other—problem.

Part novel, part biography, part diary, Among Women is a pleasure to read, and a good light introduction to radical feminist thought.

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Robert Redford's controversial directorial debut, Ordinary People, features Judd Hirsch as the doctor who actually helps his young patient (Timothy Hutton). Donald Sutherland and Mary Tyler Moore star as the boy's parents.

On View
A Helping Hand

DAVID BRUDNOY

HE AIN'T HEAVY, FATHER; he's my brother: the wisdom of Father Flanagan's Boys Town, if memory serves. Our lives, however, are and have been case studies in isolation, well in advance of the awkwardly named Me Generation. Parity in relationships is hard enough, but the inequality that is intrinsic to any true helper-helped association is even more difficult to endure. Who, nowadays, can comfortably talk about the person who "uplifted" him? Who can say the one who saved me without cringing, unless of course he is speaking of God?

We are so embarrassed that we consider it maudlin to talk about that person who made all the difference in any particular life, so embarrassed, in fact, that we're given to distancing these rare instances by calling the helper a guru and the helped a devotee. Almost any sort of connection between people is acceptable to moderns except one which frankly acknowledges a decisive, irreplaceable person who, from a higher level, reaches down and saves one from some awful destiny. Try it out at the next cocktail party and watch folks disappear.

The classic case in our time of the type of relationship I'm thinking of was that between Helen Keller and Annie Sullivan, The Miracle Worker. But, since that popularized study of a real story appeared, there have been few that approached it for its power, much less its authenticity. Psychiatrists "curing" their analysands are commonplace in movies but not often found in movies worth more than a momentary glance. Think of that sentimental drivel a couple of years ago, I Never Promised You a Rose Garden, to recall the standardized approach to this subject.

Ordinary People
And then consider Robert Redford's first directorial effort, Ordinary People, which came to us early in the fall after a dismal summer of instantly forgettable movies. Much has been said and written of the sterling performances by Donald Sutherland and Mary Tyler Moore as the parents of a boy (Timothy Hutton) who has just come home from the hospital where he was recovering from a suicide attempt. And of Hutton much has been said and written of the brilliant, seemingly effortless portrayal. Nearly lost in the praise for the movie is the sensationally effective work by Judd Hirsch as the psychiatrist, this arising perhaps from the overall fineness of the movie as well as from one unfortunate ingredient in it.

The Jarretts are archetypal Wasps, Dr. Berger (Hirsch), something of a Protestant's adoring vision of the beneficent Jew. Maybe the very idea of gentle psychiatrist went out with Jung; certainly Jewish psychiatrist has become a shared cultural cliché and in Redford's hands something of a hindrance to appreciating the film as a universally valid metaphor. The problem that bedevils young Conrad Jarrett is certainly not unique: it is generalized guilt, the sense of being undeserving of life and happiness. This is a sensation of almost epidemic proportion. What the psychiatrist leads his patient to understand is simply that most of us are not responsi-
ble for the hard luck of others—in this case, that of Conrad's brother, Buck, who died in a boating accident from which Conrad was spared—and that the inability of a parent to love fully is the parent's problem, not the child's. It is all so easy in the abstract, though, as any thoughtful psychiatrist will tell us, awfully hard to grasp in the particular. I imagine that affluent Protestant American Caucasians are no more prone to the problem than anybody else in this country, nor Jews any more capable of getting the idea and transmitting it than anybody else.

Ordinary People unnecessarily complicates the theme by positing the family in trouble as Wasp and the savior as Jewish. I understand that this is central as well to Judith Guest's novel, but Mr. Redford and screenwriter Alvin Sargent would have bettered the story by doing without the Jew-Gentile polarity.

In any case, the interaction between Dr. Berger and Conrad is as interesting, and as beautifully realized, as one would have bettered the psychiatric scenes, that between the troubled man and his indrawn, almost unfeeling mother. Without overdoing the psychiatric scenes, without overplaying the catalytic nature of the doctor-patient sessions in Conrad's slow, painful move toward recovery, Ordinary People manages with quite extraordinary skill to present to us something that has become very unfashionable on screen. Judd Hirsch isn't obliged to come on like an element out of ancient Hebrew lore, dispenser of home truths and father to all who nestle under his wing. His Berger is of the floppy sweaters and humble office approach; Berger's technique, the conversational and commonsensical, not that of the mysterious and almost mystical stony silent shrink, patiently waiting, if need be for years, for his client to do all the work.

There is in this film a humane quality that centers on the doctor and eventually extends to the youngster; Conrad learns to accept his parents' limitations and to forgive himself. Or, more accurately put, to transcend the feeling that he has done anything that requires forgiveness. Conrad's awareness is nothing short of a peculiar epiphany, Berger's service, nothing less than a decisive helping hand. I have felt since seeing the film and hearing what others had to say about it that much of the negative reaction to it boils down to uneasiness about the vital role of his doctor in the boy's life. Hundreds of thousands of us may this very minute be living the psychiatrist-patient model, fervently hoping it works, but few of us, evidently, want to see it so successfully shown on screen.

The Elephant Man

At least we are accustomed to outwardly "normal" people taking refuge with psychiatrists. We are not comfortable with the hideously deformed, the historically most extreme example of which was one John Merrick, a portion of whose ghastly story has been made into a successful Broadway play and, from other sources, a movie of the same name, The Elephant Man. The film, only the second by David Lynch, plays footloose with some of the less dramatic ingredients in Merrick's life, making a cruel monster out of the man who exhibited him as a carnival freak, though the result is hauntingly wonderful. Merrick was so miserably misshapen, so grotesque from head to toe save only for one normal arm and his genital region, that he could not be even incrementally helped by late-nineteenth century medicine.

For Merrick, the crucial helping hand was that of Dr. Frederick Treves, who in later life became Surgeon Extraordinary to Queen Victoria and who, in his thirties, discovered Merrick, then in his early twenties, and rescued him from a life as an exhibition. The Elephant Man details Treves's efforts on Merrick's behalf for a few years in the 1880s, showing us this creature of whom Treves wrote: "The most striking feature about him was his enormous head. From the brow there projected another mass of bone. It protruded from the mouth like a pink stump, turning the upper lip inside out and making of the mouth a mere slobbering aperture.... The back was horrible, because from it hung, as far down as the middle of the thigh, huge sacklike masses of flesh covered by the same loathsome cauliflower skin." Treves went on, but enough is enough.

The movie operates on several levels. Its most striking feature, aside from the figure of Merrick (John Hurt) that we are presented courtesy of Christopher Tucker's appallingly accurate make-up, is its juxtaposition of the monstrous physiognomy of Merrick with the awesome sights and sounds of the Victorian machine age. Shot in black and white, which perhaps mercilessly shields us from the fullest visual horror of Merrick's incurable deformity, the film literally groans with the sounds of the city, the
As an economist, F.A. Harper was naturally interested in and concerned about the economy and preserving economic liberty.

"... agents of government have been mainly responsible for the inflation we have had. And if inflation is to be curbed, agents of government must reverse the processes of past years. Since inflation is basically a money question, and since control over money resides with the government, the placement of guilt for past events as well as responsibility for the future rests clearly on its shoulders."

But F.A. Harper was interested in many fields besides economics. Liberty was always a major concern. Preserving and promoting liberty underlie his beliefs and this led him to examine all fields of human endeavor.

"The most deserving glories of peace are to be found in the calm of battles not fought, and in the personages of those who prevented them from being fought."

Volume I of the Writings of F.A. Harper contains four essays, two of which have been previously sponsored by I.H.S. "Why Wages Rise" and "Liberty: A Path to Its Recovery" are both included in this volume's 437 pages. The other two essays are: "The Crisis of the Free Market" and "High Prices."

in vignettes: the Princess Alexandra, Princess of Wales, conveying to the doctors at the London Hospital her mother-in-law's gratitude for their sheltering of the elephant man, thus shaming a lesser faction of the staff into expressing its higher attributes; the actress, Mrs. Kendal (Anne Bancroft), first patronizing Merrick and then arranging for him to see his very first play, "Puss in Boots," and from the stage dedicating the performance to him and bringing the glittering crowd to its feet in tribute to the honoree; the mean-spirited exploitation of Merrick by a hospital night porter ... and many more.

But in no way is it more striking than in its vibrant demonstration of the difference that can be made in one man's life by the concern of another man. In the most basic sense, *The Elephant Man*, Hopkins steps back from his accustomed intense approach to movie parts, his voice only once rising above a well-modulated gentle manly drone, his gestures only occasionally more animated than those expectable in a polite fellow casually observing a routine deformity.

A voice and a posture are all that Hurt can add to the make-up covering him, but these, remarkably, make Merrick not so much a horror in our eyes as a noble soul impossibly burdened by his shape. The transformation both of the "elephant man" from unendurably ugly to, somehow, beautiful, and of the doctor from dispassionate scientist to champion of his pathetic ward, carries the concept of doctor-patient to rarely charted territory. As the images of industrialism and squalor provide a neat (perhaps a shade too neat) backdrop for the near-fabulous human story, so the gloriously intense caring the men express for each other provides an escape hatch from the setting's symbolic inhumaness.

*The Elephant Man* is rich in stories, so the gloriously invidious one provided by director John Cassavetes has written an impossible fanciful tale for his wife, set the adventure saga in an almost immaculately tidy Gotham, and weighted the scales against his endeavor by unearth ing an ancient figure, the gun moll, as his heroine. By any reasonable estimation *Gloria* ought to collapse of its own silliness or at least give way to terminal irrelevance because of its ridiculous ending.

Cassavetes further hampers his movie by handing the kid lines that no child anywhere, at any time, would ever say of his own volition, and he blithely sails through the project's gaping holes as if a couple of dozen of them won't be noticed. Yet he succeeds, if not fully — if not in the creation of a movie as satisfying in its narrative, in its entirety, as in some of its parts — he succeeds because Gloria, tough broad writ large, becomes something we hunger for. She becomes a variation of the earth mother: comforter, rescuer, enfolder. Some earth mother: "I don't like kids. I hate kids." And then: "I'll kill anybody that's tryin' to kill me." And then, taking the boy to a graveyard, which doesn't happen to be the one where his family is buried, she tells him to say goodbye to his parents. "Just kneel down and say whatever comes into your heart." Any grave will do. The gesture's what counts. Gloria lives by a sensible code that might be spelled out as follows: make your peace with the dead, kill the bastards, and survive. Some earth mother.

John Adames is not going to be the next Justin Henry (Kramer vs. Kramer), not if he is in future no more fortunate than in *Gloria* in the dialogue he has to mouth and the premature adulthood he seems so anxious to convey. Age seven when the movie was shot, Adames expresses himself like a high school jock. It doesn't help the movie much, this weakness in an important character. But Gena Rowlands walks away with the film, finally staking out a claim for herself, long overdue, not only among the critics, who have always admired her, but also among audiences, who until now have barely known of her existence. Miss Rowlands is unusual in looks, not beautiful, in the ordinary sense, but a knockout just the same. Her Gloria is a bravura role, the more finely realized given all the baggage she has to struggle with to get the role out from under.

Gloria Swenson — is the name somehow familiar? ho ho — finds herself quite against her own good sense the surrogate momma to a child she doesn't like. The kid doesn't like her, either. They'd both be better off if they went their separate ways, she back to respectable ex-moldom, if that's a word, he to some less blond person's flat in Spanish Harlem (Phil's supposed to be half Puerto Rican). But by and large, give or take a couple of separations, they stick together like Siamese twins. He is her cause. She is his — everything. Helping hands don't come more encompassing than that.
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