TOWARD THE SECOND AMERICAN REVOLUTION

LIBERTARIAN STRATEGIES FOR TODAY

Milton Mueller / Bill Evers
Murray Rothbard / Charles Koch
Leonard Liggio / Ed Crane
David Theroux
LET'S HEAR IT
FOR THE
FIRST AMENDMENT

[WHILE WE STILL CAN]

Government censorship is about to take a great leap forward.
A government agency—The Federal Communications Commission—believes it has the right to act as our parents and restrict the broadcast of certain words at times when children just might be listening—regardless of any literary, artistic, or social value or the fact that this could seriously limit free expression in the broadcast medium.

The FCC acted after WBAI—a listener sponsored Pacifica radio station in New York—broadcast a monologue by comedian George Carlin about “seven words you can’t say on TV” which satirizes how people get uptight by the use of certain words.

Their mailbox clogged with one letter of complaint, the FCC ruled Pacifica to be in violation of the Federal Communications Act. In deciding that a government agency has the right to tell broadcasters what they can or cannot say on the air, they essentially trampled all over the First Amendment.

When Pacifica challenged this ruling, a U.S. Court of Appeals held that the FCC had overstepped its authority in banning “indecent language” at certain hours and that it had wrongly entered into “the forbidden realm of censorship.”

Undaunted, the FCC has now taken the “Carlin Case” to the Supreme Court which will consider this critically important constitutional question: Do all First Amendment rights traditionally enjoyed by free press also extend to radio and television?

Opposing the FCC—standing up for the right to broadcast a free flow of information and your right to hear it—is Pacifica radio. Broadcasting for thirty-two years, Pacifica is known as “First Amendment Radio,” unrestricted by advertisers and committed to the presentation of all points of view.

What happens in the Carlin Case will not only affect Pacifica but the entire broadcast industry as well. And this, of course, affects YOU.

It’s been a tough and expensive battle for us... Now we’re asking for your help. Your contribution to the Pacifica First Amendment Fund will help insure that one of our most basic freedoms—the freedom of speech—will remain intact. And, it will help us keep on broadcasting words that the government would rather not hear.

BANNED?
The Bible
Aristophanes
Shakespeare
Jonathan Swift
Ernest Hemingway
Dylan Thomas
Chaucer
Margaret Mead
George Orwell
Lord Byron
The Nixon/Watergate Tapes

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THIS COUPON FIGHTS CENSORSHIP

YES! I want to help save the public airwaves from the obscenity of government control. Here’s my tax deductible contribution of

__________________________ $100
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53 CLASSIFIEDS
Early in March of this year, the National Center for State Courts announced the results of its latest public opinion poll, which had sought to determine what social problems caused Americans the most worry. Dangerous drugs came in second in the poll, listed as one of America’s most serious problems by 83 percent of those responding. Yet this belief in the drug menace is under attack in the media as never before in American history. A Massachusetts judge made national headlines last year when he threw out cocaine possession charges against a Boston man on the grounds (supported by expert testimony) that the drug was less harmful socially than tobacco and alcohol. A bill to “decriminalize” heroin use has been proposed (and defeated) in the California legislature, and President Carter’s former drug advisor, Peter Bourne, had indicated as far back as 1976 that he was interested in the idea on a national scale. Mass circulation magazines like Playboy and Penthouse have published factually reliable articles on how the only terrifying thing about illegal drugs are the prices you have to pay and the narcotics you have to risk tangle with to get them. Popular books like Robert Sab- bag’s Snowblind and Adam Smith’s Powers of the Mind have begun correcting the factual errors about cocaine and LSD, which have been so carefully spread by government over the past few decades. And the truth about marijuana has become such common knowledge that antipot polemics like the film Reefer Madness are now exhibited as high camp, as objects of sophisticated derision.

Put simply, the media are gradually awakening to the truth about the drug issue: The drugs themselves are relatively harmless, both socially and individually; in no case are they as harmful as alcohol. The drug laws and their enforcers are actually responsible for all the harms allegedly brought on by use of the drugs. Worse yet, they impoverish the taxpayers they pretend to protect, first by absorbing ever and ever larger budgets, then by restricting availability of drugs, thus driving black market prices up and encouraging drug users to steal (again from taxpayers) as a means of maintaining their supplies.

The media are gradually awakening to all this. But, as in any awakening, the light dawns first in the upper parts of the body journalistic, in the head so to speak, and only later in the hind and nether parts. The magazine and book editors have begun to catch on, but the editors of daily newspapers and the news departments of radio and television networks and stations are still excitedly proclaiming the horrors of reefer madness (or its more up-to-the-minute equivalent) without the slightest trace of either sophistication or humor.

After all, the journalists who handle the news on a daily basis have been told so often by the police that dope kills and that more money and more cops are needed to stop it, that they have long since ceased to regard the issue as debatable. Debating it would be like debating whether Venus is the evening star.

But should the veracity of the police in such matters be taken so for granted? It was, after all, the chief of police of Asheville, North Carolina, who told the New York Times in 1914 that cocaine renders its users temporarily invulnerable to bullets, so that they cannot be stopped when they run amok. It was the chief detective of the Los Angeles police in 1932 that “we have had officers of this department shot and killed by Marihuana addicts and have traced the act of murder directly to the influence of Marihuana, with no other motive.” And it was U.S. Commissioner of Narcotics Harry J. Anslinger who informed the readers of the American Magazine in 1937 that a young man had recently axe-murdered his entire family while under the influence of marijuana, then had regained his senses to find himself covered with blood and without memory of his vicious crime, except as a vague “bad dream.”

This last story sprang irresistibly to mind last spring when the March 13, 1978 issue of Newsweek ran the oddly similar story of a 17-year-old New Jersey boy who got high on angel dust (PCP) and “decided to rob a nearby summer home at the seashore. Instead, the youth chose to bludgeon to death the elderly woman who lived in the cottage. He awoke the next morning covered with blood and with no recollection of his brutal act.”

Students of propaganda have known for years that war-time atrocity stories often survive the wars which spawned them: Certain of the highly specific atrocities attributed to the Axis in World War II, for example, had been earlier attributed, in every detail, to the Central Powers in World War I. So it is with the atrocity stories told by the police in their capacity as soldiers in the war on drugs. Some of the same horrifying experiences seem to have befallen widely disparate drug users—heroin users in the teens and again in the fifties, cocaists in the twenties, marijuana smokers in the thirties, and LSD users in the sixties.

Today, of course, the scare drug most often invoked by the police is angel dust (PCP). And already there are indications leaking through the media smokescreen that all
the scare stories about PCP are no more reliable than all the other lies which have gone before.

First of all, PCP is a tranquilizing drug whose most common legal use is as a general surgical anaesthetic for large animals like elephants and horses. Giving PCP to these animals renders them tranquil enough to make even dental surgery possible with safety. Yet according to the Los Angeles Police Department, angel dust renders human beings so superhumanly strong and insensitive to pain that it takes sometimes a dozen deputies to restrain one user when he runs amok. Hmm.

More interesting still is the testimony of one G.G. DeAngelis, a Southern California drug rehabilitation program director, before the National Drug Abuse Conference in Seattle in April. "There are irresponsible people in my profession," he told the conferees, "who want publicity to attract dollars to their programs." These "irresponsible people," De Angelis charged, were feeding "distorted, sensationalized" stories about PCP to the media, "to keep themselves in grant money. They believe a good story will help them get funds."

And probably they're right. Just as there is a "military industrial complex" with a vested interest in keeping Americans scared of the commies and determined to spend for defense, so there is a "drug abuse industrial complex" with a vested interest in keeping Americans scared of drugs and determined to put their money where their fear is. The phrase "drug abuse industrial complex" was first used as long ago as 1973, by the executive director of the National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse, Michael R. Sonnenreich. And Sonnenreich was speaking at a time when the federal government was still spending less than one billion dollars a year on the war on drugs.

But money isn't the entire motive. It is no accident that the forties, alone among the decades of the twentieth century, escaped a major antidrug campaign: That was the decade of world war, the decade in which the bloodthirsty, cruel element in the population—that element which delights in acts of violence and in the grosser sort of harrassment—had no need of domistic victims. There were foreign victims aplenty. But in time of peace these barbarians require a domestic class of underpeople, untouchables whom they can brutalize as they like: a class so despised no act of oppression against it is sufficient to outrage society at large.

This is the position today of the class of drug users. U.S. drug enforcement agents assist foreign police departments in the entrapment, torture, and indefinite imprisonment of American marijuana users—and society at large is not outraged. D.E.A. agents kick in the doors of private homes and destroy their contents, commandeer private cars and tear them to pieces, all in search of a few ounces of white powder not much different from (but probably less dangerous than) refined white sugar—and society at large is not outraged.

But the best educated segment of society, and the most concerned with public issues, has been learning, from books and from magazines, that there is no drug menace—only a campaign of lies calculated to enrich a bureaucracy and provide victims for a class of professional oppressors. And public outrage is in its developing stages.

Libertarians concerned with strategy should seize the drug issue and play it for all it's worth—in winning converts from the left, in stressing the differences between libertarianism and conservatism, and particularly in exposing the state for what it is: an agency capable of carrying out a campaign of oppression against a deliberately chosen class of its own citizens, while financing and justifying the campaign by means of calculated, systematic lying; a criminal organization in the only meaningful sense of the word. Libertarians should familiarize themselves with the facts (a good start would include reading Thomas Szasz's Ceremonial Chemistry, Edward Brecher's Licit and Illicit Drugs, and Lester Grinspoon and James Bakalar's Cocaine), then apply them, with as much imagination as possible, to the current state of politics.

One sample suggestion: It's often been estimated that as much as 50 percent of police budgets in the United States goes for drug, sex and gambling enforcement—and at a time when a nationwide tax rebellion is getting under way! The public is beginning to learn the truth about the "dangerous drug" fraud at precisely the time it has reached the limits of its tolerance for taxes. Libertarians should come up with concrete proposals (and LP platform planks) which reflect awareness of that double issue.

—JR

Are some more equal than others?

I s the Great Bakke Decision, as a New York Times reporter claims, "the most significant civil rights pronouncement the high court has made since it outlawed public school segregation in 1954"? It is true that both decisions were firsts, but the school segregation decision was a unanimous one, and the Bakke decision is so fragmented into six opinions that all who have taken sides on the issue are now announcing that they have won the war (as former Senator Aiken suggested that the United States should do in Vietnam).

Many observers of the Court expected a unanimous but narrow decision based on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which says: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance." On the face of it, Bakke wasn't admitted to the state medical school because of his race (white) and the school was not only a state school, but was receiving federal assistance.

That seemed to many to be a nice, tidy, simple decision—order Bakke admitted; end of case. No great constitutional issues opened up; no fuss. Which was perhaps the hope of the four justices who signed such an opinion, saying that it was "perfectly clear that the question whether race can ever be used as a factor in an ad-

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missions decision is not an issue in this case, and that discussion of that issue is inappropriate,” and that “only if petitioner [the University of California] should prevail on the statutory issue would it be necessary to decide whether the University’s admission program violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.”

But what would happen then to the myriad affirmative action programs enforced by federal administrative agencies, judges, and state law all over the land? The Civil Rights Act has other provisions, forbidding the imposition of numerical quotas to redress discrimination in employment, or to desegregate schools. Maybe, if Title VI of the Act were held to mean what it says in plain language, those antiquota provisions would mean what they said in plain language, too. Was the court willing to imply that the actions which the federal and state governments and courts have been taking to end discrimination were themselves illegal? Some members of the Court were not.

So four of the justices said the Civil Rights Act was perfectly plain, and another four, obviously with all of those government mandated programs in mind, said the Civil Rights Act couldn’t mean what the others thought it meant. “Properly construed,” wrote Justice Brennan, “... our prior cases unequivocally show that a state government may adopt race-conscious programs if the purpose of such programs is to remove the disparate racial impact its actions might otherwise have and if there is reason to believe that the disparate impact is itself the product of past discrimination.”

The two sides were in almost total disagreement in their reasoning. “It seems clear that the proponents of Title VI assumed that the Constitution itself required a colorblind standard on the part of government,” wrote Justice Stevens for one side. “No decision of this Court has ever adopted the proposition that the Constitution must be colorblind,” retorted Justice Brennan for the other side.

The ninth justice, Lewis F. Powell, voted partly with the first group (to order the University of California medical school to admit Allan Bakke) and partly with the second group (the government can take a little race into account, but not out-and-out quotas). But his reasoning was different from everyone else’s, being based primarily not on the Civil Rights Act but on the Fourteenth Amendment, which he says does eliminate some government programs. Nevertheless, since he was the swing vote, his is officially the opinion of the Court.

As the reporting newspapers immediately noticed, there was something for everyone somewhere in the 154 pages of the six opinions issued on June 28th. About all there was for libertarians was the important fact, often overlooked in today’s world, that the individual whose rights had been violated by state policy won his case—won his case by falling through the cracks in the system, maybe, but he was on one side and the bureaucratic apparatus was on the other, and he won. Allan Bakke is finally going to medical school. He has announced that he will enroll in September.

Bakke’s lawyer says the man just happened to believe in his rights. “He’s cursed with a logical mind,” his lawyer said in San Francisco after the decision had been announced. “He was told he could not be discriminated against because of race and he believed it.” Meanwhile, back in Washington, Attorney General Bell was also claiming victory. “We had very little interest in Mr. Bakke as an individual,” he said, revealing the government’s usual position. Well, libertarians are pleased for Mr. Bakke, “as an individual.”

There are a couple of dark spots on the horizon, though, that may turn into thunderclouds. Justice Blackmun defended the Court’s conclusion that the government can have a little racial bias in these words: “In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race. There is no other way. And in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them differently.” Because they are unequal, you see.

This is a naked statement of one of the two traditions of equality which we have inherited—that the function of government is not to treat all inhabitants equally and to pass only laws that apply to all, but to force people to be equal (some, of course—mainly bureaucrats—ending up more equal than others). We should be grateful that Justice Blackmun has put the issue so clearly in public, but we should not let this concept of government as the Great Equalizer go unchallenged in high places.

The other caveat that immediately springs to mind, in reading the first summarized excerpts of this decision, is: What has happened to the concept of state action under the Fourteenth Amendment? Only a few years ago every Supreme Court inquiry into the applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment to a case contained a lengthy discussion of the idea that the Fourteenth Amendment has been held not to restrict the actions of private persons or institutions, but only of states. True, Justice Powell is quoted as calling admission to the state school a “state-provided benefit,” and referring to a “state’s distribution of benefits or imposition of burdens.” But the waters are muddied considerably by his lengthy discussion of college admission policy in general, in which he defends the policies of colleges such as Harvard that include considerations of race, not because such colleges are private while Davis is not, but under the shaky aegis of Academic Freedom. Diversity of a student body, he wrote “clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education. Academic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment.”

Such an argument raises more questions than it answers in the libertarian mind. Is academic freedom to be viewed as a right or not? Are the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of equal treatment, as presently interpreted, now to be called into effect against private institutions if they have no claim to academic freedom? Is the Court prepared to change the traditional limits of the Fourteenth Amendment by ignoring them? Enumerated rights? The rights of man are enumerated in the Declaration of Independence (or some of them are), not in the federal constitution.

The Court, by issuing a set of such divergent opinions, none of which is subscribed to by a majority, has left open almost all of the options for government action. What op-
The true obscenity

Nixon's legacy survives. The defrocked president's four Supreme Court appointees joined forces (this time with Ford appointee John Paul Stevens) on July 3 to further polish the image of the paternalistic state in their decision in the "seven dirty words" case.

In overturning an earlier Court of Appeals decision, the Four Horsemen of Statism upheld a Federal Communications Commission regulation barring "seven dirty words" from the airwaves of America at times that children would be listening. The case stemmed from the broadcast, in 1973, of a 12-minute selection from a comedy album by George Carlin, on New York City radio station WBAI-FM (one of the several noncommercial, "listener supported" Pacifica radio stations around the country).

Carlin analyzed the use of these words in his routine. A listener complained to the FCC, and the commission issued a "declaratory order" barring the broadcast of these "seven dirty words" when children were likely to be tuned in. The Nixonians and their ally declared that broadcasting such "offensive, indecent material" into the homes of America was as much an invasion of privacy as an obscene phone call. Television and radio now have a "uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans," the Court proclaimed, and thus the public has to be protected from such verbal assaults on their privacy.

Whatever one's opinion regarding the behavioral consequences of exposing children to these "seven dirty words"—or even more explicit and provocative sexual material—there is little doubt that the Court, in its ruling, has permitted the state to usurp the function of the parent. But that is the nature of the state: the parent controls the child, the state controls the citizen.

Perhaps the dark shadow being cast by the Nixon Court (indeed, can there be any doubt that these four—Rehnquist, Burger, Powell, and Blackmun—are molded in their sponsor's image?) can be viewed with greater clarity if the WBAI decision is compared with its other recent privacy opinion, in Zurcher v. The Stanford Daily. (See "Raiding the Newsroom" in the July 1R.)

In that case, decided only two weeks previously, the majority (the Four Horsemen plus Kennedy appointee Byron R. White) continued the erosion begun a decade before of constitutional barriers against police searches. Originally, no unincriminated third party or his property could be searched for "mere evidence" of a crime (as opposed to the tools or proceeds of a crime). The Court's 1967 ruling in Warden v. Hayden declared that subpoenas could be used to obtain such evidence from innocent third parties. In Zurcher v. The Stanford Daily, the Court extended this principle to allow unannounced searches, with search warrants. (Subpoenas can be contested in court; warrants must be complied with.)

In essence, the Court declared that the state's interest in (whatever it considers to be) law and order overrides an individual's right to privacy. The police, with a warrant signed by any cooperative magistrate, can walk into your home or office looking for anything they believe might be evidence of a crime.

But now, in the WBAI case, the Court has said that broadcasts can be barred (from your home or office, or anywhere) at specified times if they contain certain "offensive" words. Clearly, to the Supreme Court, a police invasion is less obscene than those "seven dirty words." Our privacy is no longer our own; it belongs to the state, and we are left with whatever crumbs the state allows.

H.L. Mencken's prophecy

A new book published this season is entitled "Mencken: A Study of His Thought." While H.L. Mencken, the Baltimore journalist, may be best remembered for his wit, let us now praise his imagination. In an essay about the "New South" written decades ago, Mencken produced this prophetic tidbit:

"On those dark moments when I fear that the republic has trotted before these weary eyes every carnival act in its repertoire, I cheer myself with the thought that some day we will have a president from the deserts of the Deep South . . . . The president's cousin, LaVerne, will travel the hallelujah circuit as one of Mrs. McPherson's soldiers in Christ, praying for the conversion of some Northern Sodom's most satanic pornographer as she waves his work — well-thumbed — for the yokels to gasp at . . . . The president's brother, a prime specimen of Boobus Clllumnus Rubericus, will . . . . gather his loutish companions on the porch of the White House to swell beer from the bottle and snigger over whispered barnyard jokes about the darkies.

"The president's cousin, LaVerne, will travel the hallelujah circuit as one of Mrs. McPherson's soldiers in Christ, praying for the conversion of some Northern Sodom's most satanic pornographer as she waves his work — well-thumbed — for the yokels to gasp at . . . . The president's brother will record these events with her box camera . . . . The incumbent himself, cleansed of his bumpt­kin ways by some of [Henry] Grady's New South hucksters, will have a charm comparable to that of the leading undertaker of Dothan, Alabama."
The spectacular victory of the Jarvis-Gann initiative in California, drastically cutting property tax rates through constitutional amendment, has signaled clearly a new era in American politics. Big-spending politicians throughout the country are running scared: They know too well that a mass taxpayer revolt could spread like wildfire, a rebellion that threatens the very foundation of the post-New Deal political system. Conservatives and libertarians who had given up hope of ever turning back the inexorable tide of government have gained new hope and enthusiasm. But before they become too elated they should consider the many potential problems that still abound.

The first fact which must be understood is that Jarvis-Gann’s emphasis on property tax was entirely misdirected. The real problem in California and in the United States is not the property tax—which in many ways is not a “bad” tax at all, from an economist’s point of view, if any tax can be considered not “bad”—but the income tax. As Frank Chodorov once said, the income tax is the root of all evil.

Consider these facts: In 1971-72, property taxes in California amounted to $327 per capita. All other taxes, including the income tax, came to $360 per capita, for a total of $687 of state and local taxes per year for every man, woman, and child in the state. By contrast, the average per capita property tax in the United States as a whole was only $202, with $320 per capita for all other taxes—a total of $522 per year. This meant that property taxes consumed 7.1 percent of an individual’s personal income in California and only 4.9 percent nationwide. Similarly, total state and local taxes consumed 14.9 percent of personal income in California and 12.7 percent nationwide.

If we look at the most recent figures, for 1975-76, we see that per capita property taxes have jumped to $415 in California, or an increase of 27 percent. Nationwide, property taxes rose to $266 per capita, or an increase of 32 percent. Thus California property taxes went up less than the national average. In fact, as a percentage of personal income, property taxes in California and throughout the country have gone down. They now constitute 6.4 percent of personal income in California and 4.5 percent nationwide.

On the other hand, income taxes in California have gone up faster than the national rate and almost twice as fast as property taxes have risen. All other taxes per capita now amount to $549 in California and $465 nationwide. This means that such taxes in California have risen 52 percent since 1971-72 and 45 percent nationwide. Thus, total state and local taxes per capita (as a percentage of personal income) is exactly the same as it was four years before: 14.9 percent in California and 12.5 percent nationwide.

Thus, by concentrating their efforts most heavily on property taxes, which are the most highly visible form of taxation for homeowners, tax reduction advocates may simply have shifted the tax burden over to a far worse evil, the income tax. While it is true that Jarvis-Gann prevents the legislature from raising income taxes except by a two-thirds majority, income taxes will rise nevertheless because inflation will push people into higher tax brackets. Furthermore, since property taxes are deductible from gross income for federal tax purposes, California voters have thus increased their federal taxes by something like $2 billion per year, because they will have fewer deductions. Lastly, there will be an inevitable reduction in local government control in California as Sacramento takes over more functions formerly performed by local governments.

True, one can hope that these things will not come to pass, and that California local governments will make every effort to cut back unnecessary government services. But one should never underestimate the power of the bureaucracy. By way of illustration, Henry Jacoby says in his book, The Bureaucratization of the World, that shortly before his death Lenin suddenly came to the realization that despite the Russian Revolution the same bureaucrats who worked for the tsar still ran the government. This same phenomenon holds true after most revolutions. Just look at Vietnam since the Communist takeover. It’s all the same people.

The bureaucrats cannot be dislodged as easily. In many cases they are protected by law or collective bargaining agreements from ever being laid off. In other cases, so much of their salary is paid by the federal government (as in the case of welfare workers) that the government cannot afford to lay them off. Instead they will lay off policemen and firemen who must be paid entirely out of local funds. This also serves the purpose of getting back at the taxpayers, who obviously would rather see the welfare worker laid off and the cops retained. In any case, bureaucratic dynamics ensure that any layoffs which do result will be accomplished according to seniority rules—so that while cops on the beat may disappear, there will be a full complement of administrators down at the station house. So too with teachers. While the ones in the classroom are laid off, leading to increases in class size, you can be sure that no administrator will lose his job and few forced back (continued on page 52)
The Ultimate Tax Shelter

Tax experts are now referring to a small, privately owned corporation as "The Ultimate Tax Shelter." This is especially true since the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1976. This law makes most former tax shelters either obsolete, or of little advantage. Investments affected include real estate, oil and gas drilling, cars for leasing, movies, etc. These former tax shelters have lost their attractiveness. Aside from that, these tax shelters required a large investment. Only a small segment of the population could benefit from them.

I've written a book showing how you can form your own corporation, I've taken all the mystery out of it. Thousands of people have already used the system for incorporation described in the book. I'll describe how you may obtain it without risk and with a valuable free bonus.

A corporation may be formed by anyone at surprisingly low cost. The government encourages people to incorporate, which is a little known fact. The government has recognized the important role of small business in our country. Through favorable legislation incorporating a small business, hobby, or sideline is perfectly legal and ethical. There are numerous tax laws favorable to corporate owners. Some of them are remarkable in this age of ever-increasing taxation. Everyone of us needs all the advantages.

Here are just a few of the advantages of having your own corporation. You can put aside up to 25% of your income tax free. If you desire, you may wish to set up a non-profit corporation or operate a corporation anonymously. You can save from $300 to $1,000 simply by using the handy tear-out forms included in the book. All the things you need: certificate of incorporation, minutes, by-laws, etc., including complete instructions.

There are still other advantages. Your own corporation enables you to more easily maintain continuity and facilitates transfer of ownership. Tax free fringe benefits can be arranged for you from a personal tax return. For an individual earning $20,000 the first $600 are not deductible.

Retirement plans, and pension and profit-sharing arrangements can be set up for you with far greater benefits than those available to self-employed individuals.

A word of caution. Incorporating may not be for you right now. However, my book will help you decide whether or not a corporation is for you now or in the future. I review all the advantages and disadvantages in depth. This choice is yours after learning all the options. If you do decide to incorporate, it can be done by mail quickly and within 48 hours. You never have to leave the privacy of your home.

I'll also reveal to you some startling facts. Why lawyers often charge substantial fees for incorporating when often they prefer not to, and why two-thirds of the New York and American Stock Exchange companies incorporate in Delaware.

You may wonder how others have successfully used the book. Not only a small unincorporated business, but enjoyable hobbies, part-time businesses, and even existing jobs have been set up as full fledged corporations. You don't have to have a big business going to benefit. In fact, not many people realize some very important facts. There are 30,000 new businesses formed in the U.S. each and every month. 98% of them are small businesses; often just one individual working from home.

To gain all the advantages of incorporation, it doesn't matter where you live, your age, race, or sex. All that counts is your ideas. If you are looking for some new ideas, I believe my book will stimulate you in that area. I do know many small businessmen, housewives, hobbyists, engineers, and lawyers who have acted on the suggestions in my book. A woman who was my former secretary is incorporated. She is now grossing over $30,000 working from her home by providing a secretarial service to me and other local businesses. She works her own hours and has all the corporate advantages.

I briefly mentioned that you can start with no capital whatsoever. I know it can be done, since I have formed 18 companies of my own, and I began each one of them with nothing. Beginning at age 22, I incorporated my first company which was a candy manufacturing concern. Without credit or experience, I raised $96,000. From that starting point grew a chain of 30 stores. I'm proud of the fact that at age 29 I was selected by a group of businessmen as one of the outstanding businessmen in the nation. As a result of this award, I received an invitation to personally meet with the President of the United States.

I wrote my book, How To Form Your Own Corporation Without A Lawyer For Under $50, because I felt that many people were confused and would never become a President of their own corporations. As it has turned out, a very high proportion of all the corporations formed in America each month, at the present time are using my book to incorporate.

Just picture yourself in the position of President of your own corporation. My book gives you all the information you need to make your decision. Let me help you make your business dreams come true.

As a bonus for ordering my book now, I'll send you absolutely free a portfolio of valuable information. It's called "The Incom Plan" and normally sells for $9.95. It describes a unique plan that shows you how to convert most any job into your own corporation. You'll increase your take-home pay by at least 50% or more. This means that you'll have no payroll records or withholding taxes to worry about. And you'll be complying with all the I.R.S. guidelines. "The Incom Plan" includes forms, examples and sample letter agreements to make it possible.

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Crosscurrents

by Walter E. Grinder

• England rediscovers the Austrians

That Great Britain is in deep trouble

is hardly news. For well over a decade

the British economy has steadily been

losing the Second Battle of Britain.

Nationalization of industry, exorbitant

taxes, an unbelievably deteriorated Na-

tional Health Service, a regulated and

controlled housing industry, a deeply

embedded labor problem, a plunging

pound, a last-ditch effort to salvage all

by a misguided entry into the statist

Common Market—all of these have left

the English economy but a mere shell of

its once productive and energetic self.

As a consequence, there simply is no net

investment being made in the capital-

producing sector. (It is highly doubtful

that what investment there is—taking

inflation into account—is even enough

to provide the minimum necessary for

capital maintenance. For a look at the

woes of one previously heavily regu-

ulated, labor troubled, and now na-

tionalized firm see, “Saving Leyland Is a

Job for Hercules,” in Fortune, July 3,

1978.)

What net investment there is appears

to be flowing into the somewhat less

regulated consumer goods sector. This,
in turn, places an even greater burden on

the undercapitalized capital goods

infrastructure. In a word, things are a

ess mess.

Somehow, it seems that the road to

nationalization must be followed to the

end of its practical course before serious

questions about its underlying assump-

tions will be entertained. Whatever the

cause, those assumptions are indeed

undergoing serious questioning now. As

might be expected, such turmoil is

ready grist for the Marxist mill, and

many young English minds are gravitat-
ing toward the Marxist alternative. But

anyone who spends much time wander-
ing through the Byzantine maze of

either the Marxist theoretical frame-

work or of socialism in practice soon

finds that Marxism falls far short of

offering a satisfying alternative to real-
world problems. For a convenient cata-

logue of the failures of socialism in prac-
tice see “The Decline of Marxism,” by

Robert G. Wesson of Stanford Univer-
sity’s Hoover Institution, in the Man-
chester Guardian Weekly (June 11).

The English dilemma is, of course,

that of socialism in the broad sense. But

it is a variety of socialism that resulted

from decades of “liberal” interven-
tionism, not a socialism that was foisted

on Britain as a whole cloth, based on

Marxist assumptions. Britain’s welfare

state assumptions and justifications are

to be found not in Marx but rather in

the framework of neoclassical econom-
ic. A quick survey of the White Papers

handed down by the National Enter-
prise Board and the Monopolies and

Mergers Board, and the decisions

reached by the Restrictive Trade Pract-
tices Court clearly show that the the-
oretical basis for intervention, control-
ing, regulating, and nationalizing in-
dustry is the neoclassical concepts of

perfect competition and marginal cost
pricing, i.e., the economics of E.H.

Chamberlin, Mrs. Robinson, the post-
Keynesians, and even that of the Chi-
cago School. The interventionist history

of Britain reads almost as though it was

following, chapter and verse, the path

outlined in Ludwig von Mises’ recently

translated and important theoretical

work, A Critique of Interventionism (as

was prophetically foretold in F.A.

Hayek’s 1944 classic, The Road to Serf-
dom).

It was perhaps almost inevitable that

the conditions would provide fertile soil

for the growth of a theoretical alter-
native, towards which young English

economists could turn—the Austrian

School alternative. But although the

conditions were indeed fertile, there was

also the need for a person or group to

serve as a voice, to give the Austrian

alternative a proper hearing.

I can happily report that not only

have such people appeared, but more

excitingly, there is in fact a growing

resurgence of the Austrian School in

England. The first wave of Austrian

economics came early on, in the works

of Phillip Wicksteed and William

Smart, only to be pushed aside with the

rise of the Marshallian system. Austrian

economics again reigned supreme dur-
ing the years 1930-1935 when Hayek

was the acknowledged intellectual lead-
er at the London School of Econom-
ic—only to be forgotten again during

the rush to join the Keynesian revolu-
tion. Let us hope that the current re-
surgence is more secure and attains a

longer longevity.

I recently attended a conference on

Austrian economics in Birmingham

(sponsored by the Liberty Fund and

conducted by the Institute for Humane

Studies), attended by about 75 young

professors and advanced graduate stu-
dents. Great enthusiasm was shown for

the ideas presented by American Aus-

trians Israel M. Kirzner and Gerald P.

O’Driscoll, both from the economics

faculty at New York University. But

beyond this, good papers and trenchant

comments were presented by British

economists; foremost among them were

Steven Littlechild of the University of

Birmingham, Jack Wiseman of the Uni-

versity of York, David Myddleton of

Cranfield Institute, David O’Mahony of

University College, Cork, and the grand

old dean of subjectivism, G.L.S.

Shackle.

That hasn’t been the only sign of
Austrian activity. In early June the Institute of Economic Affairs published a very important small book, in its Hobart Series, by Steven C. Littlechild, *The Fallacy of the Mixed Economy: An 'Austrian' Critique of Economic Thinking and Policy.* This work is already making a substantial impact and is sure to become influential in both the current debate and in the long-run development of Austrian economics, both in England and in America.

The Littlechild piece is a superb introduction to Austrian economics, concentrating on the Hayek-Kirzner approach to knowledge, change, and the real-world adjustment process. Moreover, the monograph ties these theoretical assumptions to a critique of both neoclassical theory and the sorry British condition. I have some strong reservations about Professor Littlechild’s attempt to fuse the property analysis of the Coase-Demsetz variety with the Austrian economic analysis. And I take issue with Littlechild’s misleading characterization of Professor Murray Rothbard’s clearly stated desire to privatize the public sector as “private government.” But these matters aside, I heartily recommend that this study be widely read and circulated.

A third source of pleasure and surprise was to find that there are so many young Austrian-oriented professors teaching in the higher reaches of Britain’s educational system. Many universities and polytechnics in the London area have at least one such faculty member. Kingston Polytechnical Institute has no less than three young professors, and one of the five economic fields in which students can major is Austrian theory.

Moreover, at the London School of Economics (long time belly of the Fabian beast) Economist Bookstore, one whole window was devoted entirely to the works of Austrian Nobel Laureate F.A. Hayek. (Although Hayek reigned at the LSC during the early 1930s, his influence waned during the late 1930s and 1940s, until he left for the University of Chicago—and ever since there has been no Hayekian influence at the LSC.) As you walked to the bookstore, the featured item that you faced was the same IEA Hobart Paper by Littlechild mentioned above.

*Friedrich Hayek*

In addition to the deserved kudos offered to Steve Littlechild for the estimable work he has done, I would like to single out another young man for his role in the resurgence of interest in Austrian economics in England. John Blundell, who teaches economics at London City Polytechnic, is a tireless worker, organizer, and advocate for the Austrian cause in particular and for liberty in general. He and his lovely wife Christine have, in effect, turned their home into a modern day salon where libertarians can meet and discuss their ideas, hopes, and plans far into the night. May they do as well as the salons of London’s Bloomsbury Set of a generation ago.

• Some thoughts on Hayek

The great Austrian economists are made of sturdy stuff. Ludwig Mises was still writing and teaching when he was 90 years old. It is good to have Professor Hayek following in his mentor’s footsteps as he approaches the latter part of his seventh decade.

His *New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas* (University of Chicago, 1978) is just what the title proclaims—a compilation of essays covering the gamut of this prolific and perceptive scholar’s interest. It is, in effect, a sequel to his earlier *Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics.*

The economics pieces include several key articles. "Competition as a Discovery Procedure" is a clear and succinct statement of the Austrian alternative to the static, neoclassical approach to understanding how in fact the market process functions. “Three Elucidations of the Ricardo Effect” (really the Hayek Effect) shows why and how a policy of inflationism must necessarily lead to a downturn in economic activity and real productivity. There are other excellent chapters on Keynes and Keynesian inflationist policies and on “The New Confusion About Planning.”

The section on the history of ideas includes perceptive articles about Mandeville and Menger, while the philosophy articles include his brilliant "Primacy of the Abstract," and the measured critique of statistics and mathematical economics that comprised his Nobel Prize lecture, “The Pretense of Knowledge.”

Running throughout the whole collection, though, is the theme that Hayek has been pursuing for decades—a sound rehabilitation of what he calls the "spontaneous order" in economic, legal, and social relationships (those beneficial and necessary social institutions that are the “result of human action but not of human design,” a further elucidation of what Adam Smith called the Invisible Hand). On the other side of the coin is his devastating attack on what he terms "constructive rationalism," intervention in voluntary economic and social relations to achieve the ends of "rational economic plans" or of "social justice."

All libertarians and economists are deeply indebted to Hayek for his crucial work in this area. I personally remember that it was my reading of Hayek’s earlier works, especially *The Counter-revolution of Science and Individualism and Economic Order,* that solidified my understanding of the free market and the free society. Even more important for me at the time, Hayek provided me with the certain knowledge that the totally free market could actually work.

I think, however, that Hayek tends to push his case for spontaneity too far, especially in the legal realm. It is true that traditional common law is far superior to modern legislation and statute law. Hayek’s perfectly sound and
understandable apprehension about constructivism apparently has led him to overreact and to become over-enamoured with the British piecemeal, empiricist, antisytematic, and antirationalist tradition running from Hume to Popper. This tradition has all but totally thrown out the natural law baby with the constructivist bathwater. Such a broad rejection is particularly unfortunate in the area of law itself, for the anti-natural-law approach of British empiricism actually undercuts Hayek’s own long and honorable attempt to re-establish the principle of the Rule of Law. I think that this is apparent in his new volume’s essays on “The Errors of Constructivism” and “Liberalism,” as well as the otherwise laudatory volumes I and II of his recent, major, three-volume work, Law, Legislation, and Liberty.

Natural law is a grand standard by which to judge not only statutory law but the common law as well. Natural law is a great body of truths to be discovered and rendered intelligible—not the result of some sort of constructivism. (Nor are there any constructivist, interventionist implications to be derived from natural law.) My criticism is clearly not aimed at Hayek so much as it is against the anti-reason tradition with which he has so comfortably identified himself over the years. Even though I fully appreciate his resurrection of the spontaneous order insights of the Scottish Enlightenment tradition, I have for a long time remained perplexed by Hayek’s infatuation with the Hume-Popper philosophical tradition, and more than just a bit annoyed at his unwarranted and almost Burkean attacks on the French liberal tradition, especially the Marquis de Condorcet.

My suggestion is that you read Hayek for all of his wonderfully perceptive insights, but do so in conjunction with the following important works: First, I suggest that those who have not yet read Brand Blanchard’s classic defense of reason, and his devastating critique of the Humean antirationalist tradition in Reason and Analysis, do so. I guarantee sheer pleasure and enlightenment. Second, be sure to pick up Keith Michael Baker’s marvelous biography, Condorcet: From Natural Philosophy to Social Mathematics (University of Chicago, 1975). Condorcet was one of the truly great French liberals and one who had an immense influence on the French libertarians, especially J.B. Say. His liberating message was later twisted and mangled beyond recognition by the positivist, statistic, and (essentially) reactionary-conservative team of Saint Simone and Auguste Comte. Baker’s important work correctly restores Condorcet to his rightful place in the history of liberal ideas. Furthermore, it seems important that all libertarians be well acquainted with the liberating and optimistic vision of the future found in the Tenth Époche of Condorcet’s final (literally deathbed) statement, Sketch of the Progress of the Human Mind. It is a stirring, poetical testimonial to reason, science, and especially to the potential of the unfettered and inquisitive human mind and the free society.

Perhaps more than anything, it is this exultant optimistic spirit that is missing in Hayek and his British friends, and which is so triumphantly expressed by our French intellectual forebears. A movement devoid of that spirit and devoid of a genuine concern for its members’ eternal yearnings to be free, a movement which is devoid of the conviction that it is possible to succeed in its quest to achieve the free society, it seems to me, is doomed from the start—and, I might add, it probably does not deserve to win. Certainly, without the liberal spirit of Condorcet and of his like-minded ideological colleagues throughout the ages, libertarianism is highly unlikely ever to capture the imagination of a broad base of the young—those who are the only ones who can ever implement our principled vision and bring about the free society. Surely Hayek realized this when he wrote his masterful and inspiring defense of liberal radicalism, “Socialism and the Intellectuals.”

Third and finally, I suggest that the reader find a copy of John Wild’s The Modern Enemies of Plato and Natural Law and study it in detail. Wild’s critique of Popper is a sound and useful antidote to the virulent strain of British, anti-rationalist philosophy. But even more importantly, Wild sets forth a fine restatement of natural law. This timeless work serves as an excellent introduction to the subject.

The spontaneous order in socio-economic relationships, supported by reason, optimism, and natural law, serves as a firm foundation, to which I am convinced the modern libertarian movement should and must be securely anchored. I am convinced that only such a foundation will serve to launch the success of our humane and liberating movement—and ultimately for the achievement of the free and prosperous society for all.
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TOWARD A LIBERTARIAN THEORY OF REVOLUTION

by Milton Mueller

If ever there was a time for libertarians to start talking about a coherent strategy it is now, at the dawn of the tax revolt. No issue should be approached more thoughtfully, with an eye toward long-term effects and the accumulation of hard-core libertarian support, than taxation, embracing as it does the very sustenance of government. The tangled network of issues raised by the successful Jarvis-Gann initiative makes it clear that it is no longer wise to speak merely of how to privatize schools, or how to reduce regulation, or how to reduce this or that particular tax. The California tax revolt succeeded in raising nearly all the issues: schools, frustration with government power, state and federal taxes, even the value of government "services" themselves. As a liberal San Francisco-area newspaper wrote, "with the passage of Jarvis-Gann the whole idea that government provides valuable services to the people has been called into question..." None of the major issues of our time can be properly dealt with in isolation. The times call for a libertarian philosophy of revolution — a model for rolling back the state that can give order and purpose to the multiplicity of libertarian efforts under way.

It is not my purpose here (or within my capabilities) to set forth such a philosophy. This article is merely an attempt to set the stage, to broaden our understanding of what a coherent political strategy is, and to establish the cognitive and political importance of a new libertarian theory of revolution.

Successful political radicalism has three essential elements. First, there is a critical analysis of the existing order, a systematic understanding of the causes of current injustice and oppression. Second, there must be a positive vision of an ideal society toward which to aspire. Finally, there must be a coherent theory of how to get from the existing system to the ideal, a model which explains how the machinery needed to attain the ideal can be forged out of the engine of the status quo.

The libertarian critique of statism is firmly in place. And libertarian intellectuals and artists are busily defining, creating, and expanding our ideal of a free society. But the last element, the theory of change, is not only missing, but most libertarians fail even to understand what it is and why it is so important. The effect of this missing link is to constrict severely the possibility of success for the libertarian movement.

Now, it is common for libertarians to refer to themselves as "revolutionaries." Even Edith Efron, defender of the CIA, FBI, and "America," cannot escape the term. But alas, it is a term we do not yet deserve to apply to ourselves. While libertarians are undeniably intellectual, philosophical radicals, we are not yet radical activists. Our critique and our vision of utopia may very well "go to the root" of ethical and political issues, but we have not thought out a strategic radicalism — an integrated model of how to bring about the kind of vast social changes we seek. To the communist, organizing the proletariat is part of being a communist. Yet there is nothing in libertarian ideology that even says "go forth and multiply," much less
suggests where and how to do it. Libertarian principles are thought of as goals separate and distinct from any particular method of realizing them. This leads to the profound ambivalence and confusion with which libertarians approach political activism. Harry Browne and those who follow his approach should not be perceived as aberrant cop-outs, but as warning signals that we lack a theory of revolution.

This conspicuous absence also affects those who are dedicated to activism, making strategic issues an unintegrated chain of concretes: how to run successful elections, how to organize college campuses, how to approach a particular issue, and so on. While the specific activities produced by such an approach may be of merit, the absence of an overall philosophy of change makes them little more than shots in the dark.

Worse yet, many libertarians continue to think of change as being primarily a problem of "education." Presumably, when enough people are "educated" to become libertarians, the state will collapse. To put forth "education" as a "strategy" is a prime example of the kind of strategic superficiality we are dealing with. Consider the vast social and political schism between the existing political economy of the United States, and the free society defined by the LP platform. To propose "education" as a method of getting from here to there is rather like asserting that libertarianism will succeed by succeeding; it is an empty pronouncement that confuses goals and methods. Who can deny that the movement will benefit by making people into intellectual libertarians by "educating" people? But how do we change minds; whom do we educate; by what method do we disseminate ideas; what do we do with those who agree with us; and what do we do with those who are "educated" well enough to know that their best interests lie in the preservation of the established order? These are genuinely strategic issues, which the nonconcept of "education" only obscures. Walter Grinder and John Hagel, two individuals who are doing some pioneering work in the area of social change and education, have written that "ideas in isolation are impotent; it is only by virtue of their adherents that ideas have any impact on society. For this reason, it becomes essential to focus explicitly and systematically on agencies for social change: the people who will transmit the ideas through the social system." (Emphasis added.)

But this statement, sophisticated and accurate as it is, talks specifically of ideas. Ideas are only half the story. Marxists distinguish between the "objective" and "subjective" conditions of society. To explain this dichotomy very simply, consider a distinction that libertarians cannot have failed to observe: An activist may proselytize that taxation is theft until blue in the face; on such a basis alone, only a tiny number of people will work against taxes or refuse to pay them. Today, the tax revolt has mushroomed, not solely or even primarily because of antitax rhetoric, but because people quite literally cannot afford to pay their property taxes. This is an "objective," structural problem created by the state. Of course, the subjective interpretation of the problem — the decision to accept it or to put one's foot down — is just as important as the tax squeeze in inducing revolt. This is where libertarian "educating" and propagandizing comes into play.

For the moment, then, it is useful to think of social change as roughly following this pattern: The growth and operation of government creates conflicts and oppression (the objective conditions) that libertarians, through organizing and propagandizing (influencing the subjective conditions), mold into a force for freedom. But this is merely an outline of what happens in abstract terms. A new philosophy of revolution must do much more. Based on a careful analysis of the post-World War II welfare-warfare state, it must tell libertarians what objective conditions to be on the lookout for, and how to approach them. A philosophy of social change should be able to signal which conflicts caused by the state have within them the potential of leading to elimination of government power. Further, we need a philosophy of sufficient cognitive power to be predictive, to make it possible for libertarian activists to know in advance what kind of promising objective conditions may arise before they have exploded into full view. This way, libertarian activists will know where to focus their efforts. Thus, when the objective conditions are ripe, libertarians will be there, ready and able to organize mass discontent by offering to the affected people a comprehensive interpretation of and solution to their plight.

Here, imagination is called for. There may be a way of looking at the present political situation — the long-term trends caused by the growth of state power and the reaction of people to those trends — totally overlooked by traditional political thinking. The Marxist concept of the "industrial proletariat" was, after all, an invention of Karl Marx; the "industrial proletariat" has no concrete existence. But, as a way of thinking about social conditions,
the category of the industrial proletariat became a pow­er­ful strategic weapon that gave order and purpose to the communist movement. Libertarians need to do that kind of thinking about social conditions. We particularly need to be on the lookout for a set of objective conditions which link economic and personal freedom, so that we can overcome the infernal left/right dichotomy which pits taxpayers against gays, civil libertarians against privatization of services, and so on.

This is the key to the future growth and success of libertarianism. We cannot offer only a critique of the state and the “liberal utopia”; we libertarians must also define a specific causal relationship between the two. This relationship must be able to show how organized individuals, acting on the basis of the objective conditions created by the present order, could bring about a free society. Such a causal relationship must not rely on nebulous and undefined feelings that people will just “change their minds” when exposed to “the truth.” On the contrary, a libertarian theory of revolution must be firmly rooted in the Austrian conception of purposeful human action. That is, the established order must bear within itself the seeds of its own destruction — not in the stupid, mechanical, Marxist sense, of course, but in the sense that organized, enlightened pursuit of self-interest, within the context created by statism, can naturally lead to the destruction of the state, provided that libertarians have sufficient influence over the subjective conditions.

This is not as simple as it may sound. It is easy to see how a purely libertarian society would be in everyone’s self-interest. Libertarian activists have no trouble convincing special interest groups, from businessmen to welfare recipients, that in the totally free society of the future their interests will be furthered and their rights protected. But right now, in the context created by this particular government, destatizing measures do not always relate directly to their interests — and it is harder than hell to find ways to make them do so. Likewise, it is not hard to think of ways in which statism can be overturned — but it is much harder to think of ways that will assure the emergence of a libertarian society afterwards. Our philosophy of revolution must trace a straight line between our critique of the state and our ideal of a free society. Any strategy that fails to define a concrete relationship between the two is useless.

We have available a recent and telling example of the conceptual and political need for a coherent theory of revolution: the transformation of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) that took place in the late sixties.

Late 1967 and early 1968 were troubled times. Black people were rioting in urban ghettos across the nation; opposition and active resistance to the Vietnam War was reaching massive proportions; nationwide, campus demonstrations were occurring at a rate of about 2,000 a year, or six every day; draft resistance was spreading. To SDS, standing in the thick of things, it began to appear that revolutionary change was actually possible, that there existed a political movement of sufficient depth and breadth to profoundly alter American society. Now, it is important to remember that SDS at this time was not made up of the authoritarian, bomb-planting collectivists of the later Weather Underground. Their support was strikingly diverse. In the words of Carl Davidson, national secretary of SDS at the time, “We have within our ranks communists of both varieties, socialists of all sorts, three or four different kinds of anarchists, anarchosyndicalists, syndicalists, social democrats, humanist liberals, a growing number of ex-YAF libertarian laissez-faire capitalists, and, of course, the articulate vanguard of the psychedelic liberation front.” Thus SDS, flush from the burgeoning protest movement, and sheltered from the rather hostile middle and working classes by the insulation of campus, came to adopt a consciously revolutionary posture.

But how were they to make a revolution out of the complicated, unprecedented, social upheaval afflicting America in the late sixties? Where were they to turn for strategic guidance? Up until then SDS had treated the language and tactics of the “Old Left” — the explicitly Marxist-Leninist left of the thirties — with irreverence and even contempt. But the adoption of a revolutionary consciousness changed all that. As Kirkpatrick Sale wrote in his detailed history of SDS, “gradually quotations from Marx, then Lenin, and then the modern European Marxists found their way into SDS and other movement literature.” Over the next year or so, SDS struggled with a fundamental dilemma: Without a specific, tightly defined theory of revolution, the radical movement would fall apart. With the forces of sectarianism, disorganization, cooptation, and state repression threatening the vitality of the movement, there was simply too much momentum at hand and too much at stake to rely on anything less than a comprehensive philosophy of social change. Yet the only such philosophy immediately available was that of Marxism-Leninism. They had either to invent their own theory — a monumental task that none of them seemed capable of — or embrace the authoritarian, archaic, and clearly inapplicable Marxist dogmas. Ultimately, SDS and the New Left opted for the latter, due to the conceptual pull of a ready-made philosophy of social change. Of course, within a couple of years they had alienated the bulk of American society, and cut themselves off from the campuses, their major base of support (students aren’t “workers,” after all). The organization itself was transformed from a loosely structured “participatory democracy” with a great deal of local autonomy, into a tightly structured lockstep, subordinating the individual to the wishes of the “collective” — i.e., the leadership. The spewing of Marxist jargon took the place of authentic attempts to relate to political reality and communicate with people. The movement came to identify with the dictatorships of China, Cuba, and North Vietnam, and took to bombing and “trashing” as legitimate forms of political expression. The point here is not that Marxism leads to authoritarianism; we already know that. The point is that those seeking a strategy for revolutionary change had nowhere else to go but toward Marxism.

What happened to SDS thus transmits a valuable lesson about the nature and appeal of Marxism. The pull of communism among intellectuals, students, and Third World
nations is not to be explained by the popularity of the political structure of communist nations; nearly everyone recognizes existing communist governments as oppressive, totalitarian monstrosities. Likewise, Marxist economic theory has no real appeal. It is simply untrue and indefensible. Marx’s economic theories were obsolete literally before the ink was dry on the later volumes of Das Kapital, and Lenin’s helpless dithering with the Russian economy after he gained power only provided empirical verification of Marxism’s economic vacuity. The students of SDS and of today are simply not attracted by these aspects of communism.

The older classical liberals and libertarians, fully aware of the utter bankruptcy of Marxist economic theory and the political totalitarianism it engendered, could never seem to understand where the appeal of Marxism lay. Bewildered by it all, they sometimes reverted to rather bitter and unduly pessimistic assessments of man’s nature. Von Mises’s The Anti-Capitalistic Mentality asserts that capitalism has fallen into disrepute because the majority of people, not being highly successful, are too venal to accept the verdict the marketplace has passed on their personal worth. They blame capitalism instead of themselves. (What a depressing theory! If people are really like that, what hope is there for a free society?)

What the classical liberals and contemporary libertarians seem to have missed is that the life-blood of Marxism, the source of its appeal and the core of its existence, is its sweeping and integrated philosophy of revolution. Marxism springs from a deterministic metaphysics of revolutionary change and upheaval. Its analysis of “capitalism” is little more than a description of the political conditions to bring about change. And with strategic genius, communists have adapted their philosophy to every significant social movement of the century: racism, anti-imperialism, the women’s movement, not to mention labor struggles. Today, with more nerve than justice, Marxists are applying the same logic to the struggle over gay rights, despite the fact that not a single communist country on earth affords homosexuals the level of sexual freedom granted by the still-backward United States.

In sum, wherever and whenever there have been masses of people desirous of change — oppressed people, idealists, intellectuals — they have been drawn to Marxism as if by an invisible hand. I do not think that this can be explained fully by assuming that the people involved were statist, authoritarian, or collectivist. The drift to Marxism can be better explained by noting that, in the words of Carl Oglesby of SDS, “there was — and is — no other coherent, integrative, and explicit philosophy of revolution.” It is a classic example of the power of an idea. Indeed, it is difficult to even think about radical political change without using the language and categories of Marxism. “Ruling class”; “reactionary”; “cadre”; “repression”; “working class”; and “imperialism” all are terms straight out of the lexicon of communism, or else terms that have had their meanings permanently affected by the accretion of Marxist overtones.

My purpose is not to suggest that somehow we adopt Marxist revolutionary theory, but simply to demonstrate the cognitive and political force of a coherent philosophy of revolution. We can inherit that kind of influence if we construct a new, distinctly libertarian theory of revolution, one that projects the path between a statist and libertarian society. Libertarians must do the same kind of basic, radical thinking about political change as they have done about economic and ethical issues. Aside from being a prerequisite for the total victory of liberty, a new philosophy of change would deflate the appeal of Marxism. Marxism, it should be obvious by now, cannot be defeated militarily, cannot be suppressed internally, and won’t just go away. But it can be superseded. That is, the valid and objective need for revolution in the world can be taken over and redefined by a new ideology of change — an ideology, moreover, that does not seek to replace one form of dictatorship with another, but seeks a total and permanent end to political power. If we succeed in defining this new philosophy of revolution, Marxism will wither away long before the state does.

Libertarians must do the same kind of basic, radical thinking about political change as they have done about ethical and economic issues as a prerequisite for victory.

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Coming next month:

An interview with Prop. 13’s Paul Gann

August 1978
Libertarians have given considerable thought to refining their basic principles and their vision of a libertarian society. But they have given virtually no thought to a vitally important question, that of strategy: Now that we know the nature of our social goal, how in the world do we get there?

To the extent that libertarians have thought at all about strategy, it has simply been to adopt what I have called "educationism": namely, that actions rest upon ideas, and therefore that libertarians must try to convert people to their ideas by issuing books, pamphlets, articles, lectures, etc. Now, it is certainly true that actions depend upon ideas, and that education in libertarian ideas is an important and necessary part in converting people to liberty and in effecting social change. But such an insight is only the beginning of arriving at a libertarian strategy; there is a great deal more that needs to be said.

In the first place, ideas do not spread and advance by themselves, in a social vacuum; they must be adopted and spread by people, people who must be convinced of and committed to the progress of liberty. But this means that liberty can advance only by means of a developing libertarian movement. We must therefore be concerned not only with the ideology, but also with developing the people to carry the principles forward. Webster's defines "movement" in a way clearly relevant to our concerns: "A connected and long continued series of acts and events tending toward some more or less definite end; an agitation in favor of some principle, policy, etc., as, the Trac-

tarian movement; the prohibition movement."

Some libertarians have criticized the very concept of "movement" as "collectivist", as somehow violating the principles of individualism. But it should be clear that there is nothing in the least collectivist in individuals voluntarily joining together for the advancement of common goals. A libertarian movement is no more "collectivist" than a corporation, a bridge club, or any other organization; it is curious that some libertarians, while conceding the merits of all other such "collective" organizations, balk only at one that would advance the cause of liberty itself. Neither does joining a movement mean that the joiner must in some way submerge his individual sovereignty to the movement or the organization, any more than the bridge club member must submerge his individuality in order to advance the playing of bridge. The individual libertarian, who places the triumph of liberty high on his value scale, decides to join a movement which is requisite to the achievement of his goal, just as does the member of a bridge club or the investor in a steel manufacturing corporation.

If the advancement of liberty requires a movement as well as a body of ideas, it is our contention that the overriding goal of a libertarian movement must be the victory of liberty in the real world, the bringing of the ideal into actuality. This may seem a truism, but unfortunately many libertarians have failed to see the importance of victory as the ultimate and overriding goal.

But why should libertarians not adopt what might seem
to be a self-evident goal? One reason for not making such a commitment is that a person may prefer the libertarian ideal as an intellectual game, something to be merely contemplated without relevance to the real world; another reason for weakening a person’s desire to pursue the goal of victory may be a profound pessimism that he may feel about any future prospects for victory. In any case, holding the victory of liberty as one’s primary goal is only likely in those persons whose libertarianism is motivated and molded by a passion for justice: by a realization that staticism is unjust, and by a desire to eliminate such glaring injustice as swiftly as possible.

Hence, the utilitarian, who is concerned not for justice and moral principle but only for increased productivity or efficiency, may believe in liberty as an ideal, but is not likely to place passionate commitment into achieving it. The utilitarian, by his nature, is far more likely to remain content with partial success than to press on to complete victory. Indeed, such a weakening of the will toward victory was partly responsible for the decline of classical liberalism in the nineteenth century.

It necessarily follows, from our primary goal of victory, that we want victory as quickly as possible. If victory is indeed our given end, an end given to us by the requirements of justice, then we must strive to achieve that end as rapidly as we can.

But this means that libertarians must not adopt gradualism as part of their goal; they must wish to achieve liberty as soon as possible, or they would be ratifying the continuation of injustice. They must be “abolitionists.”

The objection is often raised that abolitionism is “unrealistic,” that liberty (or any other radical social goal) can be achieved only gradually. Whether or not this is true (and the existence of radical upheavals demonstrates that such is not always the case), this common charge gravely confuses the realm of principle with the realm of strategy. As I have written elsewhere:

...by making such a charge they are hopelessly confusing the desired goal with a strategic estimate of the probable outcome. In framing principle, it is of the utmost importance not to mix in strategic estimates with the forging of desired goals. First, one must formulate one’s goals, which...would be the instant abolition of slavery or whatever other statist oppression we are considering. And we must first frame these goals without considering the probability of attaining them. The libertarian goals are “realistic” in the sense that they could be achieved if enough people agreed on their desirability...The “realism” of the goal can only be challenged by a critique of the goal itself, not in the problem of how to attain it. Then, after we have decided on the goal, we face the entirely separate strategic question of how to attain that goal as rapidly as possible, how to build a movement to attain it, etc. Thus, William Lloyd Garrison was not being “unrealistic” when, in the 1830s, he raised the glorious standard of immediate emancipation of the slaves. His goal was the proper one, and his strategic realism came in the fact that he did not expect his goal to be quickly reached. Or, as Garrison himself distinguished: “Urge immediate abolition as earnestly as we may, it will, alas! be gradual abolition in the end. We have never said that slavery would be overthrown by a single blow; that it ought to be, we shall always contend.” (Egalitarianism as a Revolt Against Nature, p. 150)

From a strictly strategic point of view, it is also true that if the adherents of the “pure” goal do not state that goal and hold it aloft, no one will do so, and the goal therefore will never be attained. Furthermore, since most people and most politicians will hold to the “middle” of whatever “road” may be offered them, the “extremist”, by constantly raising the ante, and by holding the pure or “extreme” goal aloft, will move the extremes further over, and will therefore pull the “middle” further over in his extreme direction. Hence, raising the ante by pulling the middle further in his direction will, in the ordinary pulling and hauling of the political process, accomplish more for that goal, even in the day-by-day short run, than any opportunistic surrender of the ultimate principle.

In her brilliant study of the strategy and tactics of the Garrison wing of the abolitionist movement, Aileen Kraditor writes:

It follows, from the abolitionist’s conception of his role in society, that the goal for which he agitated was not likely to be immediately realizable. Its realization must follow conversion of an enormous number of people, and the struggle must take place in the face of the hostility that inevitably met the agitator for an unpopular cause...The abolitionists knew as well as their later scholars that immediate and unconditional emancipation could not occur for a long time. But unlike those critics they were sure it would never come unless it were agitated for during the long period in which it was impracticable...

To have dropped the demand for immediate emancipation because it was unrealizable at the time would have been to alter the nature of the change for which the abolitionists were agitating. That is, even those who would have gladly accepted...
gradual and conditional emancipation had to agitate for immediate and unconditional abolition of slavery because that demand was required by their goal of demonstrating to white Americans that Negroes were their brothers. Once the nation had been converted on that point, conditions and plans might have been made . . . .

Their refusal to water down their “visionary” slogan was, in their eyes, eminently practical, much more so than the course of the antislavery senators and congressmen who often wrote letters to abolitionist leaders justifying their adaptation of antislavery demands to what was attainable. The abolitionist, while criticizing such compromises, would insist that his own intransigence made favorable compromises possible. He might have stated his position thus: If politics is the art of the possible, agitation is the art of the desirable. The practice of each must be judged by criteria appropriate to its goal. Agitation by the reformer or radical helps define one possible policy as more desirable than another, and if skillful and uncompromising, the agitation may help make the desirable possible. To criticize the agitator for not trimming his demands to the immediately realizable — that is, for not acting as a politician, is to miss the point. The demand for a change that is not politically possible does not stamp the agitator as unrealistic. For one thing, it can be useful to the political bargainer: the more extreme demand of the agitator makes the politician’s demand seem acceptable and perhaps desirable in the sense that the adversary may prefer to give up half a loaf rather than the whole. Also, the agitator helps define the value, the principle, for which the politician bargains. The ethical values placed on various possible political courses are put there partly by agitators working on the public opinion that creates political possibilities. (Means and Ends in American Abolitionism, 1969; pp. 26-28)

If the primary and overriding goal of the libertarian movement must be the victory of liberty as rapidly as possible, then the primary task of that movement must be to employ the most efficacious means to arrive at that goal.

To be efficacious, to achieve the goal of liberty as quickly as possible, it should be clear that the means must not contradict the ends. For if they do, the ends are being obstructed instead of pursued as efficiently as possible. For the libertarian, this means two things: (1) that he must never deny or fail to uphold the ultimate goal of libertarian victory; and (2) that he must never use or advocate the use of unlibertarian means — of aggression against the persons or just property of others. Thus, the libertarian must never, for the sake of alleged expediency, deny or conceal his ultimate objective of complete liberty; and he must never aggress against others in the search for a world of nonaggression. For example, the Bolsheviks, before the revolution, financed themselves partially by armed robbery in the name of “expropriating” capitalists; clearly, any use of aggression against private property in order to finance the libertarian movement, in addition to being immoral by libertarian principles, would cut against those principles themselves and their ultimate attainment.

At this point, any radical movement for social change, including the libertarian movement, has to face an important, realistic problem: in the real world, the goal — for the libertarian, the disappearance of the state and its aggressive coercion — unfortunately cannot be achieved overnight. Since that is the case, what should be the position of the libertarian toward “transition demands”; i.e., toward demands that would move toward liberty without yet reaching the ultimate goal? Wouldn’t such demands undercut the ultimate goal of total liberty itself?

In our view, the proper solution to this problem is a “centrist” or “movement-building” solution: namely, that it is legitimate and proper to advocate transition demands as way-stations along the road to victory, provided that the ultimate goal of victory is always kept in mind and held aloft. In this way, the ultimate goal is clear and not lost sight of, and the pressure is kept on so that transitional or partial victories will feed on themselves rather than appease or weaken the ultimate drive of the movement. Thus, suppose that the libertarian movement adopts, as a transitional demand, an across-the-board 50 percent cut in taxation. This must be done in such a way as not to imply that a 51 percent cut would somehow be immoral or improper. In that way, the 50 percent cut would simply be an initial demand rather than an ultimate goal in itself, which would only undercut the libertarian goal of total abolition of taxation.

Similarly, if libertarians should ever call for reducing or abolishing taxes in some particular area, that call must never be accompanied by advocating the increase of taxation in some other area. Thus, we might well conclude that the most tyrannical and destructive tax in the modern world is the income tax, and therefore that first priority should be given to abolishing that form of tax. But the call for drastic reduction or abolition of the income tax must never be coupled with advocating a higher tax in some other area (e.g., a sales tax), for that indeed would be employing a means contradictory to the ultimate goal of tax abolition. Libertarians must, in short, hack away at the state wherever and whenever they can, rolling back or eliminating state activity in whatever area possible.

As an example, during every recession, Keynesian liberals generally advocate an income tax cut to stimulate consumer demand. Conservatives, on the other hand, generally oppose such a tax cut as leading to higher government deficits. The libertarian, in contrast, should always and everywhere support a tax cut as a reduction in state robbery. Then, when the budget is discussed, the libertarian should also support a reduction in government expenditures to eliminate a deficit. The point is that the state must be opposed and whittled down in every respect and at every point: in cutting taxes or in cutting government expenditures. To advocate raising taxes or to oppose cutting them in order to balance the budget is to oppose and undercut the libertarian goal.

But while the ultimate goal of total liberty must always be upheld and the state must be whittled down at every point, it is still proper, legitimate, and necessary for a libertarian movement to adopt priorities, to agitate against the state most particularly in those areas which are most important at any given time. Thus, while the libertarian opposes both income and sales taxes, it is both morally
proper and strategically important to select, say, the income tax as the more destructive of the two and to agitate more against that particular tax. In short, the libertarian movement, like everyone else, faces a scarcity of its own time, energy, and funds, and it must allocate these scarce resources to their most important uses at any given time. Which particular issues should receive priority depends on the specific conditions of time and place.

Within any radical ideological movement for social change there are bound to develop two broad and important “deviations” from the correct centrist, movement-building position we have been discussing. At one pole is the deviation of “left-sectarianism” and at the other the deviation of “right-opportunism.” Each, in its own way, abandons the hope of victory for the radical goal. The left sectarian, in brief, considers any transition demands, any use of strategic intelligence to determine priorities for agitation, any appeal to one’s audience without sacrificing ultimate principles, in themselves a “sellout” or betrayal of radical principles. In the above example, a left sectarian, for example, would consider the transition call for repeal of the income tax as per se a betrayal of the principle of the abolition of taxation, even though that transition demand were clearly coupled with the ultimate goal of a tax-free society. To take a deliberately ludicrous example, the left sectarian might consider not raising the problem of denationalizing lighthouses in our current society a betrayal of the principle of privatizing lighthouses.

In the libertarian movement, sectarians will simply reiterate such formulas as the nonaggression axiom, or A is A, or the need for self-esteem, without grappling with detailed issues. The centrist position, in contrast, is to begin agitation around currently important issues, examine them, show the public that the cause of these problems is statism and that the solution is liberty, and then try to widen the consciousness of one’s listeners to show that all current and even remote problems have the same political cause.

One form that left-sectarianism sometimes takes is that of advocating immediate armed revolution against the existing state, without sufficient support to be able to succeed. In the modern libertarian movement, this deviation was pervasive during its early stage, at the time of the New Left “revolution” in the late 1960s and 1970. The collapse of the latter “revolution” as soon as the state began its armed counter-action at Kent State is testimony to one of the most important lessons of history: that no armed revolution has ever succeeded in a country with free elections. All the successful revolutions, from the American and the French in the eighteenth century, to the Russian, Chinese, and Cuban in the twentieth, occurred in lands where free elections were either nonexistent or severely restricted. Until or unless the United States changes from free elections to dictatorship, the question of armed revolution is, at the very least, totally irrelevant to the American scene.

In contrast to left-sectarianism, which spurns immediate gains toward the ultimate goal, right-wing opportunists openly believe in hiding or working against their ultimate goal in order to achieve short-run gains.

Right-wing opportunism is self-defeating for ultimate goals in several ways. The major reason for putting forth transition demands is as a way-station to ultimate victory; but, by studiously avoiding the raising of ultimate goals or principles, the opportunist, at best, short-circuits the ultimate goal, and betrays it by failing to raise the consciousness of the public in the explicit direction of the final goal. The ultimate goal will not be reached automatically, by itself; it can only be reached if a large group of adherents continues to hold high the banner of that ultimate, radical objective. But, if libertarians refuse to examine and put forward their ultimate goals, who will? The answer is no one, and therefore that objective will never be obtained. Indeed, if libertarians fail to keep their ultimate objective in view, they will themselves lose sight of the objective, and descend into another gradualist, nonlibertarian reform movement, and the main purpose of having a movement in the first place will be lost. Secondly, opportunists often undercut the ultimate objective, and libertarian principle as well, by openly advocating measures that undercut that principle — such as a higher sales tax to replace an income tax (as did the Mid-Hudson chapter of the Free Libertarian Party in early 1976), or a gradualist Four-Year Plan to advertise their moderation and alleged reasonableness.

Even in the short run, opportunism is self-destructive. Any new ideological movement or party must, in order to acquire support — as in the case of new products or firms on the market — must differentiate its product from its established competitors. A Libertarian Party which, for example, sounds almost indistinguishable from right-wing Republicanism (as did the Tuccille campaign for New York governor in 1974), will fail if only because the voter presented with no clear alternative will quite rationally remain with right-wing Republicans.
In sum, both strategic deviations are fatal to the proper goal of the victory of liberty as soon as it can be achieved; left-sectarianism because it in effect abandons victory, and right-opportunism because it in effect abandons liberty. Both sides of this “equation” must be continually upheld.

One curious propensity is that of a certain number of individuals, in the libertarian and other radical movements, to shift rapidly from one diametrically opposed deviation to the other, without ever passing through the correct, centrist position. Apart from psychological instability among these individuals, there is a certain logic to these seemingly bizarre leaps. Take, for example, someone who for years confines his activities to stating pure principle, without ever doing anything in the real world to change the situation for the better, without trying to transform reality. After several years, discouragement at the lack of progress may set in, after which, desperate for some gains in the real world, the person leaps into right-opportunism — and accomplishes little there as well. On the other hand, someone mired in short-run opportunism for years, disgusted with the compromises and immorality of that form of politics, can readily express his disgust and his yearning for pure principle by leaping straight into sectarianism. In neither manifestation, however, is the individual willing to engage in a protracted, lifelong commitment for victory in the real world for principle and as quickly as the goal can be achieved.

I have touched on the concept of “cadre.” Let us now consider the concept in more detail; specifically, who make up the cadre, how is it generated, and what are the proper relations between cadre and various groups of noncadre?

The cadre are simply the consistent libertarians. In the first place, libertarianism is a set of ideas, and hence the original cadre are bound to be largely intellectuals, people who are professional or semiprofessional dealers in abstract ideas. Mises and Hayek have pointed out how ideas filter out from original theoreticians to scholars and followers, to intellectuals as dealers in general ideas, and then to the interested public. Thus the body of intellectuals is of prime importance in influencing the general movement and, ultimately, the general public.

It is to be hoped that the cadre begins as a tiny few and then grows in quantity and impact. But what should be the proper relationship between cadre and noncadre? First, we might put forward the concept of the “pyramid of ideology.” For while “cadre” and “noncadre” may be a first approximation to the real world situation, the actual condition at any given time is akin to a pyramid, with the cadre at the top of the ideological pyramid as the consistent and uncompromising ideologists, and then with others at lower rungs, with varying degrees of approximation to a consistent and comprehensive libertarian vision. Since people usually become cadre by making their way up the various steps or stages of the pyramid — from totally nonlibertarian to completely libertarian — some rapidly, some slowly, this implies that the stages will assume a pyramid form, with a smaller number of people at each higher stage.

The major task of the cadre, then, is to try to get as many people as high up the pyramid as possible. From this task, there follows the importance of ideological coalitions, of working with allies on various ideological issues.

A coalition accomplishes several things. In the first place, it maximizes the influence of the numerically small cadre on important social issues, and does so by allying oneself with people who agree on that particular issue, albeit on few others.

On which issues the cadre chooses to form alliances and work depends on a judgment of importance in relation to the real-world context at the given time and place. Thus, it would be an evident waste of time and energy for current libertarians to find shipping interests with whom we could make a united front agitation in the cause of denationalizing lighthouses. But coalition strategies for abolishing OSHA or the income tax, or legalizing marijuana, or (in the late 1960s) pulling out of the Vietnam War or repealing the draft, might have a high priority in the agitation of the libertarian movement.

While using coalitions with numerically larger allies on concrete issues, the libertarian cadre is also pursuing another strategy — recruiting more people. These recruits can come from the allies themselves, or from the mass of the public who are being informed about the specific issues. Normally, the proper tactic will be to begin with the concerns of the people being worked on, to show that you are with them on this particular issue, and then to “widen their libertarian consciousness” by showing them that to be really consistent on the issues they favor they must also adopt the other libertarian positions. Thus, while working with left-wing civil libertarians in support of commonly held positions, it can be pointed out to them that libertarians are the only consistent civil liberties advocates, that personal freedom cannot exist without private property rights, etc. Similarly, conservative advocates of free enterprise can be shown that outlawing pornography or drugs violates the very system of private property and free enterprise that they profess to favor.

Of course, there are pitfalls in a coalition strategy that must be guarded against. In the late 1960s, I issued a call for a libertarian alliance with the New Left, on the twin vital issues of the day: opposition to the draft and to the Vietnam War (with subsidiary emphasis on opposition to the public school system.) I still think that this basic thrust was necessary — especially to generate a sharp and radical break with the conservative movement. But the problem was that many of our young, tiny cadre, upon cooperating with the left, became leftists, losing their libertarian grip.

The libertarian movement at that time had two grave weaknesses that left us wide open for such defection: (1) it was very small, and therefore had no self-conscious cadre, no organs of opinion, no mutually reinforcing cadre to talk to and deal with, and (2) partly as a result of this tiny size, the libertarian movement of that day had no activity with which to attract young and eager libertarians. Many is the time when a new convert to the libertarian system would ask: OK, now I'm a libertarian, what can I do about it? What activity can I perform? There was no answer. If a
person were a budding young scholar, he could go to graduate school and join the educational wings of the movement; but what if he was not? As a result, the number of defections from cadre, not just to the New Left but to dropping out altogether, were legion.

And this is one of the main reasons why the Libertarian Party has been such a vital and important development in the last few years: It has given to eager young (and older) libertarians a wide and open-ended field for continuing an energetic activity. In short, because of the LP, we have become a genuine movement rather than just a small group of thinkers and talkers (as important as the latter functions may be).

This is also why it is very important to have “open centers” for libertarians — organizations for budding libertarians to visit and study, institutions which demonstrate the existence of an organized ideology and movement. For I am convinced that, for many reasons, including the libertarian heritage that is partially imbibed by most Americans, there are many people who are “instinctively” and inchoately libertarian and don’t know it, and who need only a few open reiterations of the pure radical creed to join up. Finding the movement becomes extremely important for isolated actual or potential cadre. In the late 1940s and for years afterwards, for example, FEE provided the enormous service of being the only open center for laissez-faire in existence, and I vividly remember the vital importance to me and other young libertarians of discovering libertarian ideas and persons through FEE, and the effect this stimulus and reinforcement had in radicalizing our own positions.

One of the most important problems for any minority radical movement is the question of long-run optimism or pessimism. Namely, while the short-run prospects for victory may be non-existent, does the movement believe that, in the long run, it will win? In my “Left and Right: The Prospects for Liberty”, I pointed out that the conservative, here and in Europe, is always a long-run pessimist. The conservative believes that the inevitable march of history is against him:

Hence, the inevitable trend runs toward left-wing statism at home and communism abroad. It is this long-run despair that accounts for the Conservative’s rather bizarre short-run optimism: for since the long-run is given up as hopeless, the Conservative feels that his only hope of success rests in the current moment. In foreign affairs, this point of view leads the Conservative to call for desparate showdowns with communism, for he feels that the longer he waits the worse things will ineluctably become; at home, it leads him to total concentration on the very next election, where he is always hoping for victory and never achieving it. The quintessence of the Practical Man, and beset by long-run despair, the Conservative refuses to think or plan beyond the election of the day.

That conservatism rarely attracts youth is explainable by Randolph Bourne’s incisive comment that “our elders are always optimistic in their views of the present, pessimistic in their views of the future; youth is pessimistic toward the present and gloriously hopeful for the future. And it is this hope which is the lever of progress . . .”

Furthermore, conservatism, with its attachment to the feudalistic, theocratic and militaristic Old Order, deserves to be pessimistic. Many libertarians also have tended to be long-run pessimists, partly in imitation of conservatism (with which some once were allied) but partly because it is easy to be pessimistic in the twentieth century if one focuses on the continued advance of state power. But to adopt this position is to fall prey to what the Marxists call “impressionism” — i.e., responding only to the journalistic, surface march of events without analyzing the underlying laws and essences of the real world.

It should be obvious that long-run optimism is important for the success of any radical movement. In the libertarian movement, pessimism has led either to despair, dropping out, confinement of the ideology to an intellectual game, or to the opportunistic hankering for short-run gains that leads to betrayal of basic principle and which has governed the conservative movement on the other hand, long-run optimism leads both to a buoyant spirit and to the willingness to engage in a protracted and determined struggle for ultimate goals.

All this is psychologically clear. But, if libertarianism is to be grounded on a rational apprehension of reality, is long-run optimism the correct stance to take, or is it only a psychological placebo?

It is my contention, which cannot be elaborated here, that libertarianism will win, and therefore that long-run optimism is not only psychologically exhilarating but also rationally correct. In my “Left and Right: The Prospects for Liberty,” I elaborated the basic reasons for this contention: that, given the commitment by everyone, since the Industrial Revolution, to industrialism and to mass consumption, that the free market is the only economy which will work which enables the industrial system, along with above-subsistence living standards for the growing mass of

Many libertarians tend to be long-run pessimists partly because it is easy to be pessimistic in the twentieth century if one focuses on the continuing advance of state power.

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population, to survive and flourish. In short, moral and economic truth is of course on our side; but, in addition to this sometimes not very comforting fact, freedom is necessary to the survival and prosperity of the industrial world of the modern age.

But this, of course, can still be very long-run, and might be cold comfort to impatient spirits. In various writings since 1973-74, I have concluded that Mises’s long-run prediction of the “exhaustion of the reserve fund” — that the unfortunate consequences of government interventionism will one day become glaringly evident — has now come true. We have seen in the past few years a host of crises: inflationary recession; the breakdown of Keynesianism; crippling tax rates; the failures of Vietnam; the revelations about the CIA, FBI, and Watergate; the crises in crime and the public schools; and much more. At least in the United States, the objective conditions are now and will continue to exist for an accelerated leap forward in libertarianism and for a rapid speeding-up of the “time-table” for victory.

I cannot believe that the visible great leap forward in the quantity and quality of the libertarian movement since about 1973 is unrelated to this new, continuing crisis of the American state. In short, the growth in the “subjective conditions” for libertarian victory (the libertarian cadre and movement) is partly a function of the objective breakdown of statism.

As the Marxists point out, pessimism stems from impressionism and the failure to think dialectically. In short, in libertarian terms, while statism may be marching onward, this march inevitably leads to a growing breakdown of statism which in turn leads to a growing reaction in favor of libertarianism and against the state.

The difference here between libertarians and Marxists stems from their different theories. Thus, while the Marxists believe that capitalism will founder on its “inevitable contradictions,” giving rise to a proletarian movement for its eventual abolition, libertarianism holds that statism, government interventionism, will founder on its inevitable “contradictions,” and that this breakdown will give rise to a libertarian movement among the public for its eventual abolition — and, further, if my analysis of post-1973 is correct, that this breakdown of statism has already begun.

Libertarian victory is thus inevitable in the sense that objective breakdowns of statism are bound to intensify, and also that such breakdowns will tend to give impetus to the growth of libertarian ideas and activists; but, with our belief in individual freedom of will, it is clear that the free and voluntary adoption of libertarian ideas is not determined and therefore cannot be inevitable in the strict sense. But victory can be achieved if the libertarian movement continues to increase in quantity and quality, and if libertarians continue to learn about current political issues, bringing their analysis to bear on problems which the American people face.

It is important for libertarians to realize that most people are, in normal times, not interested in political affairs, and therefore willing to continue passive or active support for the status quo. It is only the development of “crisis situations” [like skyrocketing property taxes in California] crises that result from the breakdown of the existing system and with which the system cannot cope, that the radical movement can accelerate its strength and possibly achieve victory [as it did in the case of Proposition 13 in California]. It is such periods of breakdown that stimulate a massive willingness among the public to think deeply about the social system and to consider radical alternatives. Such crisis situations might be economic ones (such as depression or inflation or skyrocketing taxes), a losing or a stalemated war, or political repression of free speech and activity, or any combination of these.

These crisis situations, as well as the basic soil that prepare them, constitute the necessary “objective conditions” for a successful radical triumph. In addition to these requisite objective conditions, there are also the “subjective conditions” — namely, a movement of sufficient strength and influence to take advantage of these objective conditions: specifically, to prepare in advance by predicting the crisis, to point out how the crisis stems systematically from the political system and is not simply an historical accident, and to point to the radical alternative by which these crises and others like them can be surmounted.

The ruling elite of America and elsewhere is beginning to lose its self-confidence, to suffer a decay of its will. And this indeed is another condition of victory. As Lawrence Stone has pointed out in an analysis of the failure of the ruling class, “The elite may lose its manipulative skill, or its military superiority, or its self-confidence, or its cohesion; it may become estranged from the non-elite, or overwhelmed by a financial crisis; it may be incompetent, or weak or brutal.” (Causes of the American Revolution)

Thus, the objective conditions for the triumph of liberty have now, in the past few years, arrived at last, at least in the United States. Furthermore the nature of this systemic crisis is such that government is now perceived as the culprit; it cannot be relieved except through a sharp turn toward liberty. Therefore, what is basically needed now is the growth of the “subjective conditions,” of libertarian ideas and particularly of a dedicated libertarian movement to advance those ideas in the public forum. Surely, it is no coincidence that it is precisely in these years, since 1971 and particularly since 1973, that these subjective conditions have made their greatest strides in this century. For the breakdown of statism has undoubtedly spurred many more people into becoming partial or full libertarians, and hence the objective conditions help to generate the subjective ones. Furthermore, in the United States at least, the splendid heritage of freedom and of libertarian ideas, going back beyond revolutionary times, has never been fully lost. Present-day libertarians, therefore, have solid historical ground on which to build.

The rapid growth in these last years of libertarian ideas and movements has pervaded many fields of scholarship (especially among younger scholars) and in the areas of journalism, business, and politics. Because of the continuing objective conditions, it seems clear that this eruption of (continued on page 34)
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August 1978
In recent fundraising efforts and direct mail promotions by several libertarian groups there has appeared the following statement by Alan Baron, the Washington editor of Politics Today: "Various recent surveys have indicated that, if any trend in opinion is evident, it's toward libertarianism — the philosophy that argues against government intervention and for personal rights." Interesting thought. Now, Alan Baron is not a libertarian, but a former campaign manager for George McGovern, and a highly respected observer of the national political scene.

Why has Mr. Baron put the label "libertarian" on the trends he perceives in our society? For the very same reason that hundreds of thousands of Americans have become aware of a libertarian alternative to conservatism and liberalism: the Libertarian Party. For all the criticisms of the LP, for all its amateurism and absurd reluctance to recognize its startling potential, the Libertarian Party has nonetheless unquestionably been responsible for turning more people on to libertarianism than all of the other elements of the movement combined.

This doesn't mean other libertarian organizations and causes are not important. Far from it. Scholarly work, direct lobbying, ad hoc alliances, special interest groups, all are essential if we are ever to achieve the libertarian goal of a free society. The point is that within this multifaceted movement it is the role of the Libertarian Party to promote and publicize the philosophy.

The LP is the only grassroots organization that has as its chief concern the dissemination of the entire libertarian program to a popular audience. Its job is not one of theorizing; nor is it to concentrate its resources on promoting one particular libertarian issue. Its purpose is to enlist more individuals in the libertarian movement and thereby facilitate the dismantling of the coercive state apparatus.

Thus far the LP has been remarkably successful in fulfilling this role. The party has received significant national publicity and respectful, objective coverage and commentary from the New York Times, Washington Post, Newsweek, Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times, and other important news outlets far too numerous to mention. There can be no denying that because of the LP the public perception of the libertarian alternative is infinitely greater than would have been the case without the party.

This is an extremely important point. There must be a central force behind the movement for a libertarian society. That force must grow and gather momentum — all the while spinning off subsidiary groups and movements which in turn draw others closer to the attraction of the main, fully integrated movement. Only a thorough understanding of the importance of individual freedom, the interdisciplinary nature of libertarianism and the interdependence of all activities designed to reduce state power will motivate a person to become actively involved. The Libertarian Party is the vehicle that transmits — or precipitates — this understanding for most people.

Thus, working within the Republican or Democratic
Parties is a hopelessly futile venture. A recent study by the Brookings institution demonstrated rather conclusively that the growth of government varies not one iota between Republican and Democratic administrations. Major party politics today is simply a grotesque competition to see who can gain the most control over free men and women.

Only an uncompromisingly consistent libertarian movement can hope to reverse this ceaseless ratcheting upwards of government power — which makes the job of maximizing the effectiveness of the Libertarian Party all the more important. What can be done?

Our immediate objective must be to become a major alternative to the Republicans and Democrats. The point has been made before that political action by libertarians takes advantage of unparalleled opportunities for publicity, as well as of the chance to actually begin dismantling government from within. Neither of these opportunities can be realized if the LP remains a minor party.

The publicity will continue to be generated as long as the party continues to grow. The novelty of the LP is a thing of the past as far as the media is concerned. We must, therefore, demonstrate to the world that we are prepared to move forward with a professional, plausible plan to become a major political alternative.

Alan Baron is correct when he sees a trend toward libertarianism in America. True, most Americans would not yet go as far as we would on most issues, but that is the way it should be. The Libertarian Party already is in the lead on every important issue in the country and the trend is in our direction! We are in a position to point the direction for political change because we are ahead of the people, while the Republicans and Democrats are behind them.

Take, for example, the tax issue. Interviews with national leaders of both major parties on the growing national tax revolt provided splendid comic relief on the evening news. Here were our “leaders" awkwardly contorting into 180° turns in an attempt to catch up to the strongest political movement in the United States since the 1960s' antiwar demonstrations. As with the Vietnam War, the politicians have no real idea of what the people are upset about.

And while libertarians were a part of the antiwar movement, they are in the lead of the antitax movement. (See the July 1978 issue of LR for a good analysis of the role played by the Libertarian Party in the Prop. 13 victory.)

In foreign policy, too, both major parties are totally out of step with the majority of Americans. What are we to make of the leader of the Democratic Party, Jimmy Carter, dusting off the Cold War and trying to out-hawk the Republican right wing? But the important thing about Carter’s attempt to involve the United States in the tribal affairs of Africa, to “get tough” and resurrect the Cold War, is that the American people aren’t listening to him. His cries of “wolf” are falling on deaf ears. Here, as elsewhere, the people, if given a choice, will come closer to the libertarian viewpoint — in this case, nonintervention — than to the position of the Establishment parties.

As a final example, I would point to the increasingly tolerant attitude of most Americans toward the lifestyles of others. To be sure, there is a long way to go; but the vicious call to legislate the personal behavior of others is more often than not looked upon with bemusement by the voters. The mindless, reactionary hatred of the New Right is clearly out of touch with the mood of the nation.

The Libertarian Party is in the forefront of every important political trend in the nation. Candidates and party leaders must start acting in a manner befitting this role. There is no need to be apologetic about being — temporarily — a minor party. We can demonstrate that we are the wave of the future, but we can do so only if we take politics seriously. And that means learning the issues.

Clearly, libertarian principles must underlie every public position LP candidates take. But those principles must be applied to actual political situations. LP candidates must enter into a dialogue that in large part will be determined by what the major party candidates are saying. I can remember my frustration in 1976 when LP presidential candidate Roger MacBride held news conferences and limited his remarks to a general (albeit eloquent) discussion of his “tripod” of issues: a noninterventionist foreign policy, a strict respect for civil liberties, and a free market economy. Fine, the reporters would say, but what about President Ford’s statement on Eastern Europe? Or about Carter’s call for a five percent cut in defense spending? MacBride, who clearly is capable of better, would often respond as though the reporter was insulting him by bringing up such crass things as issues.

Encouragingly, there appears to be a distinct trend toward LP candidates taking a more realistic attitude about campaigning. This year there are several excellent candidates for public office who are doing their homework. One need only hear California LP gubernatorial candidate Ed Clark at a news conference or on a (continued on page 42)
Ever since the 1940 election, the attitudes of the American voter have been recorded by scholars of voting behavior such as those at The Survey Research Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan, and the National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago. The most recent work based on these collections to date is *The Changing American Voter*, by Norman Nie (Chicago), Sidney Verba (Harvard) and John Petrocik (UCLA), sponsored by the Twentieth Century Fund and published by Harvard.

This study depicts the citizenry as changing its political outlook because of its dissatisfaction and great alienation from both of the two major political parties, as well as from the political process itself. Thus a major realignment, comparable to that which occurred during the New Deal, is now taking place among American voters — a realignment that will have a fundamental impact on the future of American politics. Libertarians would do well to study it.

In the past, it was not possible to predict a person's stand on one issue from his stand on another issue — there was little consistency in voter attitudes on issues, if you went by the categories established by political scientists. Consistency existed only with reference to political affiliations. Although one could not predict a person's stand on issues from the stand of his or her parents, the political commitment which was transmitted from generation to generation was party affiliation. The parties' existence had become a permanent fixture, although their positions on issues changed. The alignment of certain social groups with a particular party will often continue over generations, and the party will change its emphasis as the preferences and problems of its "inherited" constituencies change. Thus, party identification has been a powerful tool for predicting voting behavior, while the voter's identification with liberal or conservative concepts is a weak source of voter prediction. In the past, the voter's identification with particular social or cultural groups determined party affiliation and thus voting behavior.

Thus, although 45 percent of residents may answer that the government wastes a lot of taxes, or 24 percent hardly ever trust the government to do what is right, these voters will not align with one party on the basis of these attitudes, but rather will spread their votes between the parties. Similarly, the fact that the number who believe that the government does not care what people "like me" think has increased from 27 percent (1956) to 56 percent (1973) is not translated into alignment with a particular party. Rather, it has led to a major shift away from the Republican and Democratic parties and toward independence. While weak partisanship has remained constant over a quarter century, at about 40 percent, strong partisanship has declined from almost 40 percent to about 25 percent, while independence has increased from less than a quarter to 40 percent. Very significant in this process is the fact that since 1964 the proportion of independents among new voters has jumped to 50 percent or more. Over time, independence from the two major parties will increase dramatically as new voters appear each year. Young voters with Democratic or Repub-
Republican family backgrounds shift to independence, and not to the other party; the proportion of new voters from Democratic family backgrounds who shift to independence is a high 50 percent.

The last epoch of political realignment — the New Deal — came about thanks to the entry of new voters into the active electorate between 1920 and 1932. The shift of new voters to the Democrats occurred, in large part, in response to the Republican support of Prohibition and the Democratic Party's opposition to it, as symbolized by its leader of the 1920s, Governor Al Smith. Compounding the effect of the new voters, northern urban workers who had previously voted Republican (to support GOP sound money policies) shifted to the Democrats because of the violations of personal liberty involved in the enforcement of the Prohibition amendment by the Republican administrations of Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover. The Democrats were carried to power in 1932 on the strength of the coalitions built up against Prohibition. As Samuel Lubell (in The Future of American Politics) emphasizes, the Republican party lost its pluralities in the increasingly important cities during the 1920s. He notes: "The Republican hold on the cities was broken not by Roosevelt but by Alfred E. Smith. Before the Roosevelt Revolution there was an Al Smith Revolution. In many ways, Smith's defeat in 1928, rather than Roosevelt's 1932 victory, marked off the arena in which today's [1950s] politics are being fought."

Yet today's realignment away from the Democratic party is not benefiting the Republican party. During the last 30 years, voters who identify with the Democratic Party dropped from 50 percent to 40 percent of the electorate and Republicans from 35 percent to 16 percent, while independents rose drastically from 15 percent to 44 percent. However, among young voters the current alignment is 32 percent Democratic, 12 percent Republican and 55 percent independent. The inability of the Democrats to recruit new members of the faithful since 1940 has created the potential for the victories of Republican presidential candidates in 1952, 1956, 1968, and 1972, and the near-victories in 1960 and 1976. But the inability of the Republicans to win new voters to the party, rather than to presidential candidates, has had a cumulative, damaging effect on the future of the Republican Party, as a party. The Republican presidential candidates had been viable only because they were the sole real alternatives to the Democratic candidates. But the massive increase of independence among the younger voters is ringing the death-knell of the Republican Party.

One important development during the 1970s has been an increase in ideological identification of voters in their choice of political party or candidate. "Ideologues" in the 1960s represented about a quarter of all voters, increasing to over a third in the 1970s. In addition, "ideologues and near-ideologues" represent half of the electorate. The political analysts warn us not to overstate this substantial growth in the proportion of citizens who think in ideologically structured ways about parties and candidates. The "ideological" category "contains those citizens who refer to parties or candidates using general ideological terms - 'liberal,' 'conservative,' 'socialist,' 'individualist.'" This is related to the large increase in college education among voters, especially young voters. Almost a third of the electorate is now college educated.

Ideological evaluation of parties more than doubled between 1964 (17 percent) and 1972 (36 percent); among the college educated, such evaluation increased, in that period, from 26 percent to 48 percent. One example of the increase in ideological thinking is the attitude toward Big Government. In 1964, 24 percent of liberals considered government too big, as did 39 percent of moderates and 71 percent of conservatives. In 1968, 42 percent of liberals, 55 percent of moderates, and 61 percent of conservatives concurred; and in 1972, 65 percent of liberals, 55 percent of moderates, and 54 percent of conservatives considered government to be too big. By 1972, Big Government was strongly associated with interventionism in foreign policy and in civil liberties.

An important indication of the changes that have occurred is the ideological identification among Democrats and Republicans.

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<tr>
<td>Right</td>
<td>11%</td>
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The clearest feature is that the center declined by 15 percent. The left and moderate left remained nearly stable, and the moderate right and right increased by 11 percent.

(continued on page 42)

Leonard P. Liggio is editor of Literature of Liberty and associate editor of Libertarian Review.
The majority of businessmen today are not supporters of free enterprise capitalism. Instead they prefer "political capitalism," a system in which government guarantees business profits while business itself faces both less competition and more security for itself. As California Governor Jerry Brown puts it, "Sometimes businessmen almost operate as though they'd feel more comfortable in a Marxist state where they could just deal with a few commissars who would tell them what the production goals were, what quota they had... I am really concerned that many businessmen are growing weary of the rigors of the free market." New York Times columnist William Safire agrees with this sobering analysis: "The secret desire of so many top-level managers for controls and regulated monopoly is never openly stated... But today's managerial trend is not toward accepting risk. It is toward getting government help to avoid risk."

Even Henry Ford II has pointed out that "it's not just liberal do-gooders, Democrats, unions, consumerists and environmentalists who are responsible for the growth of government. It's also conservative politicians who favor increased defense programs, especially if the money is spent in their own districts. It's bankers and transporters and retailers and manufacturers who want protection from competitors. It's insurance companies that lobby for bumper and air bag regulations that might lower their claims costs. It's even, if you'll forgive me, car dealers who want state government to protect them from the factory or from new dealers in their territory."

But that is only the tip of the iceberg. It was support from a large portion of the business community, including the Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers, which enabled Nixon to impose wage and price controls in 1971. Much earlier, bankers succeeded in pushing through legal prohibitions on the payment of interest on demand deposits. Moreover, the steel industry has just caused the government to set minimum prices on imported steel.

Businesses often fight bitterly against deregulation, as well as urging new controls. Despite support by both liberals and conservatives in Congress, deregulation of the airline industry has bogged down under heavy pressure from the airlines themselves. Deregulation of the trucking industry has buckled under pressure from the American Trucking Association.

My own industry, oil, is no different. Over the past five years our company has participated in dozens of hearings on regulatory matters before the Federal Energy Administration and the Department of Energy. At virtually all of these hearings, most oil companies have come down on the side of state regulation. Secretary of Energy James Schlesinger summed it up: "The oil industry loves regulation and has been in love with it for many years." Precisely so.

Businessmen have always been anxious to convince a gullible public and an opportunistic Congress that the free market cannot work efficiently in their industry, that some
governmental planning and regulations would be in the "public interest." Indeed, much of the government regulation which plagues us today has come only after businesses have begged and lobbied for it. Nearly every major piece of interventionist legislation since 1887 has been supported by important segments of the business community.

This old business strategy of accommodation with government paid off in the past to some extent, perhaps, but today it falls on its face. Business now suffers as much as the rest of society from the adverse consequences of its own interventionism—the exhaustion of the "reserve fund" predicted by the great economist Ludwig von Mises. Passed at the behest of business, regulations boomerang. A refiner may procure price controls on his purchased crude oil, yet later he experiences shortages and even may find price controls slapped on his own gasoline to capture his politically derived "excess" profits. Oil pipeline companies invite the DOE in to study regional pipeline needs, hoping that their particular project will be favored. But in the future, Washington may well make all pipeline decisions, and even build all pipelines.

Businessmen should realize that the more regulated an industry becomes, the less it can cope with changing conditions in the world. It is no coincidence that the four lowest ranking industries in return on capital today (airlines, railroads, natural gas utilities, and electric utilities) are also the most highly regulated.

The final stage of political capitalism is even worse. Richard Ferris, president of United Airlines (an exception in his industry) predicts, "Continued governmental control will mean airline service as you know it today will be seriously jeopardized. And, as service and equipment deteriorate, you will stand by helplessly as the threat of nationalization becomes reality.' In the electric utility industry, a number of states have already organized agencies to take over from private utilities unable to finance needed additional generating capacity.

Even business's dwindling successes in achieving precisely the regulatory scheme desired by them do not guarantee future control. Just the opposite often occurs. Politically derived benefits for business cause hardships for other special interest groups, who apply pressure on the regulators to turn the regulatory weapon around.

Thus, the business community is growing more and more aware of the shortcomings of this strategy as more and more firms directly suffer the aftereffects of their own pathetic schemes. Moreover, examples of the ultimate consequences of interventionism, especially the plight of the railroad industry in the United States and major industries in Great Britain, are awakening businessmen to their own probable fate.

Businessmen are also becoming justifiably concerned with the rapidly growing anti-business sentiment in this country. Recent public opinion polls show that a large portion of intellectuals and the general public believe that business—especially big business—has undue political power, which it uses to stifle and smash competition and to control prices.

The liberation of business

But business can free itself from this predicament, if only it will. As the Wall Street Journal recently noted, 'Despite the blows they have suffered in the political arena [businessmen] still have the capacity to be highly influential in the political sphere. But they will not bring about such a reversal unless they are able to put aside short-term concepts in favor of those longer-term considerations.' . . . We may be reaching the point where American businessmen will have to decide whether they really believe in the market system. If they don't, it is hard to see who will muster the political forces to defend it against its very real and often intensely committed enemies.' In spite of business's sullied record in defending free enterprise, there are large numbers of businessmen who want nothing more from government than to be left alone.

It is no coincidence that the four lowest ranking industries in return on capital today (air, rail, natural gas, and electric utilities) are also the most highly regulated.

And these numbers are growing quickly today.

To survive, business must develop a new strategy. The great free-market and Nobel Laureate economist F.A. Hayek has prepared a guide for us: Almost everywhere the groups which pretend to oppose socialism at the same time support policies which, if the principles on which they are based were generalized, would no less lead to socialism than the avowedly socialist policies. There is some justification at least in the taunt that many of the pretending defenders of "free enterprise" are in fact defenders of privileges and advocates of government activity in their favor, rather than opponents of all privilege. In principle the industrial protectionism and government-supported cartels and the agricultural policies of the conservative groups are not different from the proposals for a more far-reaching direction of economic life sponsored by the socialists. It is an illusion when the more conservative interventionists believe that they will be able to confine these government controls to the particular kinds of which they approve. In a democratic society, at any rate, once the principle is admitted that the government undertakes responsibility for the
status and position of particular groups, it is inevitable that this control will be extended to satisfy the aspirations and prejudices of the great masses. There is no hope of a return to a freer system until the leaders of the movement against state control are prepared first to impose upon themselves that discipline of a competitive market which they ask the masses to accept. The hopelessness of the prospect for the near future indeed is due mainly to the fact that no organized political group anywhere is in favor of a truly free system.

Before businessmen can serve as effective defenders of individual liberty and the free enterprise system, it is first necessary for them to learn precisely what free enterprise is and what it is not. We must do our homework; we must comprehend "the philosophic foundations of a free society." Only then will we have the necessary resolve to carry out the difficult task ahead.

Armed with understanding, businessmen can confidently proceed with the new strategy, which is composed of three parts: business/government relations, education, and political action

1. Business/Government Relations—The first requirement is to practice what we preach. People see our inconsistencies and—quite justifiably—simply don't believe businessmen anymore. How discrediting it is for us to request welfare for ourselves while attacking welfare for the poor. Our critics rightfully claim that we want socialism only for the rich.

Our credibility cannot be regained if we continue to file, hat in hand, to Washington while mouthing empty, insincere platitudes about free enterprise. We cannot continue to have it both ways. Government will not keep granting us favors on the one hand, while allowing us to run our own businesses as we see fit, on the other. We must stop defending existing interventions and demanding new ones. This might well diminish the impetus for new regulations and win new allies for us among intellectuals, legislators, and the general public.

Then we should advocate the repeal of existing regulations in our industries, as well.

Never ask for tighter regulation of a competitor even if he has the advantage of being less regulated than you are. This starts the suicidal cycle which ends in the destruction of both. Instead we should concentrate on loosening our own regulations. We should defend our own right to be free of unjust regulations, and not try to shackle competitors. Strategically, the critical point is to fight to eliminate, rather than continue, all interventions, even those that provide short-term profits. Only by rigidly adhering to this policy can we begin the step-by-step process of freeing ourselves.

Taxes are particularly troublesome, especially since many free market businessmen believe that tax exemptions are equivalent to subsidies. Yet morally and strategically, tax exemptions are the opposite of subsidies. Morally, lowering taxes is simply defending property rights; seeking a subsidy is asking the government to steal someone else's property for your benefit. Strategically, lowering taxes reduces government; subsidies increase government. Nor is it valid to say that reducing your taxes simply shifts your "fair share" of the tax burden to someone else. There is no "fair" share. Our goal is not to reallocate the burden of government; our goal is to roll back government. We should consistently work to reduce all taxes, our own and those of others.

Finally, we should not cave in the moment a regulator sets foot on our doorstep. Put into practice Henry Manne's recommendation that "the business community utilize available techniques of legal adversary proceedings to announce publicly and vigorously, both as individual companies and through associations, that they will not cooperate with the government beyond the legally compelled minimum in developing or complying with any control programs." As he urges, "publicize as widely as possible the inevitable inefficiencies, mistakes, and human miseries that will develop with these controls ... help the public understand that morality, in the case of arrogant, intrusive, totalitarian laws, lies in the barest possible obedience and in refusal to cooperate willingly beyond the letter of the law." Do not cooperate voluntarily; instead, resist wherever and to whatever extent you legally can. And do so in the name of justice.

2. Education—Business's educational strategy has been guided more by concern with short-term "respectability" and acceptance by the establishment than with long-term survival.

We have voluntarily supported universities and foundations who are philosophically dedicated to the destruction of our businesses and of what remains of the free market. This must stop. We must stop financing our own destruction. Period.

Even when business has supported "free enterprise" education, it has been ineffectual because businessmen have had little understanding of the underlying philosophy or of a meaningful strategy. Businessmen have spent their money on disasters such as buying a "free enterprise" chair at their alma mater and watching in dismay as the holder teaches everything but free enterprise.

Also largely wasted has been the money contributed to those private colleges who make free enterprise noises, but have failed to produce competent graduates dedicated to establishing the free enterprise system. There are too many of these.

The development of talent is, or should be, the major point of all these efforts. By talent, I mean those rare, exceptionally capable scholars or communicators willing to dedicate their lives to the cause of individual liberty. To be effective, this talent must have the knowledge, skill, and sophistication to meet statist adversaries and their arguments head on, and to defeat them. They must have the desire and commitment to unceasingly advance the cause of liberty. Statists have succeeded while we floundered because they've had their talent, their cadre, to develop and sell their programs. During the 15 years I have been actively investing my time and money in reestablishing our free society, our biggest problem has been the shortage of talent. When conscientious, dedicated scholars or communicators worked on a project, we were effective; when they weren't available, we failed.
Thus, business must concentrate its support on those few institutes and university departments that have effective programs for producing a libertarian cadre.

Our own direct defense of business, particularly our media advertising, has been either bungling and pitifully ineffectual, or else downright destructive. We have substituted intellectual bromides for a principled exposition of a point of view. We have taken a conciliatory attitude. Our ads have apologized for profits.

We have accepted the fallacious concept that the corporation has a broad "social responsibility" beyond its duty to its shareholders. We have been made to feel ashamed of private ownership and profits, and have been hoodwinked into characterizing government regulation as "virtuous" and in the "public interest." As a typical example, the Advertising Council, backed by most of the major U.S. corporations, goes as far as to describe regulation as, "the promotion of fair economic competition and the protection of public health and safety." What simple-minded nonsense!

Instead of this bankrupt approach, we need to go on the offensive. We need to cast aside our desire to be popular with our colleagues and the establishment intellectuals, to cast aside our fears of reprisals by government. We need to advertise that the market system is not only the most efficient, it is also the only moral system in history. We need to attack government regulation for wreaking havoc on those it is allegedly designed to help—those least able to fend for themselves. We need to stigmatize interventionism as being intrinsically unjust because it deprives individuals of their natural right to use their lives and property as they see fit. We need to defend the right of "capitalist acts between consenting adults," in the words of Robert Nozick.

A recent demonstration of the need for arguments beyond the standard one of efficiency is the recent Supreme Court decision upholding a Maryland law (passed at the bidding of a service station dealers' association) barring oil producers and refiners from operating service stations. The Court found that, "regardless of the ultimate economic efficacy of the statute, we have no hesitancy in concluding that it bears a reasonable relation to the state's legitimate purpose in controlling the gasoline retail market. . . ." The determinative defense of business will rest not in arguments from efficiency, but in arguments from justice. To claim that the state has the right to "control the gasoline retail market" is totalitarian nonsense.

We must demand the same principled behavior of our organizations as we do of ourselves and our companies. When, for example, the Committee for Economic Development advocates "that public-private partnerships must be an essential part of any national urban strategy," business should withdraw its support. It should do the same if the Chamber of Commerce continues to promote government intervention under the philosophy espoused by a former president: "It's not possible or desirable to remove all the regulations."

New business organizations should be set up which refrain from asking for state protection and subsidies, and which, going further, criticize, expose and lobby against instances of political capitalism, of "the partnership between business and government." Only such organizations can help business regain the respect of the American people. In fact, a group of us is launching just such an organization, The Council for a Competitive Economy.

Such an organization will help businessmen avoid blunders similar to the Wichita Chamber of Commerce when it heavily promoted a one-billion-dollar coal gasification plant, which would have been partially owned by Wichita and subsidized by Washington. The people of Wichita rejected Chamber propaganda that the plant would not cost them anything and voted it down. Again, such an organization will help prevent blunders such as the business community in California opposing Proposition 13. These blunders create an image of business in cahoots with government to tax and exploit the people. Milton Friedman describes this as business following "its unerring instinct for self-destruction."

Business should also stop shackling the free-market position with antilibertarian stands such as hostility to civil liberties and an interventionist foreign policy. What a spectacle it is for the same people who preach freedom in voluntary economic activities to call for the full force of the law against voluntary sexual or other personal activities! What else can the public conclude but that the free-market rhetoric is a sham—that business only cares about freedom for itself, and doesn't give a damn about freedom for the individual?

The public reacts at least as negatively to business calls for still further foreign adventurism. What other feelings can we expect from people taxed and conscripted to save our foreign investments or to enlarge our foreign profits? We should take our own risks abroad, and not expect them to be borne by the American people.

Businessmen have been the first to support any sort of foreign adventurism, if only it is sold under the rubric of
"national security." If business really wants a free market/private property system it must resist government's foreign interventions as well as its domestic interventions. Businessmen must realize that the single greatest force behind the growth of government is foreign adventurism and its daughter—war. America cannot both be policeman to the world and have a free domestic economy; they are mutually exclusive. Our classical liberal forebears in England who struggled for free trade and laissez-faire realized this—the peace movement and the free trade movement are one and the same.

3. Political Action—Businessmen should be involved in politics and political action—from local tax revolts to campaigns for Congress and the presidency. But we should apply the same standards of understanding and principled behavior as in the other parts of our strategy. We must discard our lesser-of-evils approach to politics. This has brought only the continued growth of government.

Many businessmen who do see the need for a new strategy still hold out hope that the Republican Party will become "The Liberty Party," that this is its "philosophical heritage." If this is our only hope then we are doomed. The Republican Party is the party of "business" in the worse sense—in the sense of business accommodation and partnership with government. Historically, it is the party of wage and price controls, of high protective tariffs, of cartelization, of subsidies, of special privileges to business. And worse, the Republican Party is and has been a party of foreign interventionism and adventurism. This is scarcely the heritage upon which to build a "Liberty Party!" It is the embodiment of the old strategy which has failed so miserably.

Other free enterprise businessmen, grasping the futility in attempting to change the Republican Party, have eschewed political action altogether. They have concluded instead that, since ideas determine actions, we should limit our strategy to developing and spreading ideas. It is undeniable that ideas do determine actions and that we should refine and apply our ideas. But ideas do not spread by themselves; they spread only through people. Which means we need a movement. Only with a movement can we build an effective force for social change.

Our movement should have as its goal the fulfillment of the ideal of the free and independent entrepreneur. To accomplish this, our movement must destroy the prevalent statist paradigm and erect, in its stead, a new paradigm of liberty for all people. Our movement must avoid the faulty strategy of conservatives, whose acceptance of statist premises has caused their proposals to be simply moderate versions of the original statist schemes. Our movement must struggle for the realization of the principle of the free market rather than settle for immediately obtainable reforms. For, as Aileen Kraditor writes, "To criticize the (radical) agitator for not trimming his demands to the immediately realizable—that is, for not acting as a politician—is to miss the point... the more extreme demand of the agitator makes the politician's demand seem acceptable and perhaps desirable in the sense that the adversary may prefer to give up half a loaf rather than the whole. Also, the agitator helps define the value, the principle, for which the politician bargains. The ethical values placed on various possible political courses are put there partly by agitators working on the public opinion that creates political possibilities."

Such a movement already exists, the libertarian movement. Libertarianism offers the only systematic worldview that supports the ideal of the free and independent businessman. It only remains for businessmen to support this movement. How each businessman can best support it depends on his own abilities and resources.

Businessmen should not only support the movement's educational and single-issue activist arms. We should also support—with time and money—the Libertarian Party, the movement's political, mass action arm. The Libertarian Party is a vital organ of the libertarian movement, even if it never elects anyone to major office. It exposes large numbers of people, whose interest in questions of government intervention is limited to election time, to free market ideas. And, when we do get a significant number of votes for a libertarian candidate or on a libertarian issue, as with Proposition 13, people do listen. The Party causes libertarians to apply their philosophy to topical political issues, and to act. In sum, the Party transforms libertarianism from purely a political philosophy to a movement, to a force for radical social change.

Business can survive, but it cannot survive without the help of businessmen. By fighting against interventions, however profitable, by advocating a principled, philosophical defense of the free enterprise system, and by becoming a part of the libertarian movement, businessmen can, with pride, be a vital force in restoring our free society. To date, businessmen have not seen fit to do so. Whether businessmen do so in the future may determine whether business, indeed, has a future. Or deserves to.

Charles G. Koch is chairman of Koch Industries.

Rothbard

(continued from page 24)

Libertarianism in many new and unexpected places is an inevitably growing response to the perceived conditions of objective reality. Given free will, no one can predict with certainty that the growing libertarian mood in America will solidify in a brief period of time, and press forward without faltering to the success of the entire libertarian program. But certainly, both theory and analysis of current historical conditions lead to the conclusion that the current prospects for liberty, even in the short-run, are excellent indeed.

Murray N. Rothbard is contributing editor of LR, editor of the Libertarian Forum, and the author of For A New Liberty, Man, Economy and State, and many other works on libertarian theory, economics, and history. This essay is condensed from a much longer monograph on strategic questions; any breaks in continuity between sections is the responsibility of the editor.
How to make "Proposition 13" government work all across the country—and especially in Washington

Yes, we CAN get rid of big government. David Friedman has fresh, sometimes startling ideas

✓ "Greedy capitalists get money by trade. Good liberals steal it."
✓ "Special interest politics is a simple game. A hundred people sit in a circle, each with his pocket full of pennies. A politician walks around the outside of the circle, taking a penny from each person. No one minds; who cares about a penny? When he has gotten all the way around the circle, the politician throws fifty cents down in front of one person, who is overjoyed at the windfall. The process is repeated, ending with a different person. After a hundred rounds, everyone is a hundred cents poorer, fifty cents richer, and happy."

The libertarian case for freedom is no longer unfamiliar. But David Friedman picks up where the others leave off, in two major respects:

• His case for private property is fresh.
• He dares to go beyond attractive theory to offer arresting, workable ways to "sell the State in small pieces."

He demolishes the standard liberal arguments for the mixed economy, again offering new insights. After reading Dr. Friedman, no respectable liberal will ever again urge "human rights, not property rights" without feeling uneasy. As for "public property managed for the public good," Dr. Friedman exposes the repression lurking in a formula most people take for granted.

But David Friedman doesn't stop at theory. The book abounds with practical ideas for getting rid of the big-government mess. The social problems are real: schools, pollution, mass transit, many more. The author doesn't simply say individuals can handle them better. He shows us how.

Many will part company with the author's anarcho-capitalism: how he would move even laws, courts, police, and national defense into the private sector. But everyone who cares about the erosion of liberty—from conservatives to left-individualists—will find bold new ideas here. And those who still believe in government as the problem solver of first or last resort may experience a crisis of faith—if they dare risk reading David Friedman.

First published five years ago, this book appears with new material in this edition.
A n ideological political party without a newsletter is like a human with a defective circulatory system—both will wither and die from lack of nourishment and renewal. A recent informal survey of the state organizations of the Libertarian Party showed that 22 had regular monthly newsletters, 13 had irregular newsletters, and 17 simply relied on the telephone and personal conversation. These 17 silent affiliates of the LP have a core of members who talk to each other and to the national office; but unless they publish newsletters their state parties will never grow and flourish. A newsletter provides a record of achievements, a framework for activities, and the sort of information that increases the awareness of the membership and other interested persons and then spurs them to become involved.

Even where regular state newsletters appear, they often have grave flaws. A fundamental error which has ruined the newsletters in New York and Massachusetts is the spurious notion that party newsletters should be an open forum, printing whatever is submitted. While proponents of this kind of free-for-all admit that such a policy means that personal diatribes and less than keen analyses often get published, they claim that in a “free and open encounter” (to use the ringing Miltonic phrases they borrow and misapply) truth will not be put to the worse.

Milton was arguing in the 1600s against government licensing of publications. While his argument is rhetorically brilliant, he was wrong if he thought that false arguments are never persuasive. Still, he was right to insist that printers must be free of government control even if objective truth isn’t winning out in the marketplace of ideas. In any case, Milton’s argument applies to the world at large. It is not a prescription for how organizations should conduct their internal affairs. No one would suggest that the Methodist church and IBM should fill their publications with whatever interested persons send in. These organizations have purposes (as does the LP). Their publications serve those purposes and are edited accordingly.

In contrast, the open-ended LP state newsletters are filled with ideological pandemonium, self-destructive views on the LP itself, and a constant barrage of venomous bickering. After having made a careful survey of these newsletters, I can assure the reader that this is not a hyperbolic description.

Here are some examples of ideological backsliding from the Massachusetts newsletter: Regular columnist Steve Trinward advocates government laws to prohibit private discrimination against homosexuals, wants to treat smoking on private property essentially as a tort, calls for outlawing limited liability corporations, and justifies a crackdown on people who are behind in paying their taxes. Daniel Kotlow writes a piece endorsing much of Henry George’s opposition to property rights in land. Ann Kotell pushes for ending management in corporations and turning businesses into producers’ cooperatives. (While producers’ cooperatives are certainly legitimate under libertarian principles, such a transformation is by no means...
morally obligatory, as Kotell suggests, and there are economic reasons to expect coops to be commercially unsuccessful.) Similarly, in the New York newsletter, a local FLP group defends its advocacy of the sales tax.

All the positions taken in these articles entail the initiation of coercion and the violation of individual rights. They are not in accord with the LP platform or statement of principles, and no LP newsletter should have printed them.

Now for some examples of the self-destructive views on organizational structure, strategy, and tactics that are endemic in these open-ended newsletters: The Massachusetts newsletter prints a lengthy resignation statement by a state vice-chairman, the basic thrust of which is that he can’t morally accept majority-rule decision-making within the LP. Charles McElwain writes a long piece opposing the existence of party platform positions. Both McElwain and Lee Nason make the mistake of confusing internal principles of party organization with the libertarian principles that ought to be realized in the political structure of the world at large. They think the LP itself is a forerunner, even a working model, of a future libertarian society, that the LP is the new world being born in the shell of the old. The New York newsletter goes so far as to print an article by Noah Fuhrman suggesting that the LP be liquidated as an electoral party and be turned into a pressure group. Why should an LP newsletter print articles that are fundamentally opposed to efficient organization per se, or to effectively promoting libertarian principles in the electoral arena—or that even propose the party commit hara-kiri?

Many tactically and strategically unwise ideas grow in abundance in the open-ended LP newsletters. In Massachusetts, Nathan Curland argues that it is morally obligatory that the steps we take in changing over to a libertarian society be gradual ones. (In fact, it may be practically necessary to move gradually, but it can never be morally necessary to retard the progress of justice and liberty.) In a similar vein, Ann Kotell endorses a holding-action “tax limitation” proposal in Massachusetts instead of criticizing it and calling for tax reduction. Daniel Kotlow speaks out against the idea of an internal LP rule barring endorsements by state parties of candidates of other political parties. (Such a rule has since been adopted by the Libertarian National Committee.) Paralleling Kotlow in New York is a discussion of that state party’s endorsement for city council of a Liberal who supports rent control. Steve Trinward once again tops his compatriots by complaining that successful businessmen are sometimes elected to party offices, and by asserting that running for political office is a statist act even if one’s objective is to roll back governmental tyranny.

In the interstices between the antilibertarian and antiparty sentiments in these newsletters is inanity and triviality: announcements of Star Trek fan conventions, musings on Robert Anton Wilson’s theories of the occult, comments on extra-marital sex and open marriage, in-crowd gossip, and astrological charts of the LP’s destiny.

And there is also the omnipresent personal griping, grousing, and kvetching. New York newsletter editor Glen England recently had to plead with contributors not to engage in “personal attacks,” “ad hominem arguments,” second-guessing other people’s psychological motives, and “just plain nastiness.” Massachusetts LP chairman Nathan Curland wrote in the July 1976 issue of his newsletter:

In this and past issues . . . certain members of the party have taken it upon themselves not simply to attack members’ viewpoints but also their objectives and characters. They have attempted to narrow the definition of libertarian to exclude individuals who do not share their particular values. Cliques have been postulated where none exist. Tactics have been used which are identical to those which we royally criticized [Ayn] Rand for using.

Curiously, the same people who advocate making newsletters into open forums often read other people out of the movement. They condemn people who believe in using their strategic intelligence for their supposedly heartless attitudes, and often demand that the libertarian movement today replicate the psychological coziness they think will characterize a future libertarian world. It is ironic, to say the least, that, in the sphere of activity under the influence of the open forum advocates, they have created an atmosphere of bitterness and rancor.

What a dispiriting load of rubbish to dump on members who are captivated by the libertarian passion for justice and are eager for the knowledge and guidance that could help them participate in the battle for human emancipation.

Underlying the problems with the Massachusetts and New York newsletters (and to a lesser extent with newsletters in some other states) is a misapprehension of the role of a newsletter. The newsletter of a political party should not be an arena for backstabbing. An LP newsletter should be a vehicle for organizing and building up a political party determined to roll back the state in the most effective way (continued on page 42)
Throughout human history, people have struggled with the problems created by government. Generally, such discontent has resulted in mere expressions of desperation, devoid of any comprehension of the true nature of man's socioeconomic condition. On occasion, however, liberal ideas have come to the fore in conditions of strategic social tension and have made profound change possible.

Modern adherents to the libertarian tradition must evaluate carefully successful past mass resistance to state actions, so they can learn how best to create future movements capable of victory over state oppression. Such movements are, by definition, radical in that they seek to understand, make connections among, and operate on the root causes of existing conditions. And nothing short of radicalism is embodied in the libertarian challenge.

To the average American, the word "radical" is associated with the word "student" in something like the way, during the Nixon years, the word "executive" became associated with the word "privilege." And there is good reason for the average American to make this association between radicalism and the young.

By 1960, for the first time in history, youth had come to represent a major autonomous social category. Students outnumbered workers in transportation, agriculture, public utilities, construction, and mining. Not until 1960 had 66 percent of all adolescents completed high school. But from 1960 to 1970, the American college student population increased from 3,789,000 to 7,852,000. The structural transformations in Western society since World War II had resulted in a cultural and identity crisis for youth, along with an institutional framework in which "youth" had become a coherent and self-conscious social class. Adulthood had been postponed for millions by segregating the greater bulk of youth into mass higher education, the conscripted army and the urban ghetto (via urban renewal, minimum wage, etc.). But these same institutions had become enclaves facilitating youth class-consciousness and action. They had reinforced and intensified the grievances, the discontents, the alienation. And the great advances in technology of the mass media provided a structural basis for interlinking the various enclaves into a homogeneous youth consciousness.

The significance of student political activity lies in the fact that future social leaders are largely reared on American campuses. The ideals discussed today in academia will be those advanced in future reform movements. Students enter college in their most formative years, when the development of self-identity and political values is most intensive.

The campus rebellion of the 1960s resulted from the profound changes which developed after World War II in the American social structure and system of higher education. These institutional changes were the result of a dramatically increased government role in society, especially in education. This involvement fostered a major "class conflict," or generational conflict, between "youth" and the mainstream of modern corporate state America.
In *Youth and Social Change*, Richard Flacks traces the unprecedented student radical activism of the 1960s to the following developments:

1. Creation of the system of government-induced mass higher education.

2. Rise of the new stratum of young intelligentsia. Born into this stratum and raised to be socially concerned, this influential group came from primarily prosperous, privileged, liberal families.

3. Students born into the traditional stratum were radicalized due to their desire to become part of the subculture of the new, young intelligentsia.

4. Groupings of large masses of youth in large universities facilitated mass politicization and radicalization. The university system freed youths to devote themselves to social issues, creating an excellent opportunity for intense interaction and development of a broad consciousness. The universities served as self-contained societies in which political conflict could be conducted on a scale so that individuals and small groups could feel they were having effects. The increasing centrality of universities to the functioning of society as a whole meant that such local conflicts had a wide social and historical impact.

Historically, the young had been assimilated into adult culture as they reached physiological adulthood. Prior to World War II, individuals under sixteen were considered adults, that is, full-time workers. Any continued segregation and education of the young had been traditionally reserved only for the male offspring of the elite. In such cases, extended youth was considered necessary and desirable only for those born to rule. And the rest of society had come to view “progress” partly in terms of wanting their sons to become such youths. In advanced countries prior to World War II, these youths (mostly college students) had been conservative, fully integrated into the prevailing order, and ready to assume the elite roles of power. They expressed dissent not by revolting, but by participating in movements of political and cultural reform led by adults. The values they acquired at home or in school and those upheld by the political and institutional elites were sufficiently similar to prevent any discernible generation gap. In addition, these youth were not experiencing vocational difficulty; they looked forward to upward mobility.

After World War II, however, higher educational institutions began a major transformation from being centers for individual cultural refinement and truth-seeking into being an “industry” designed to produce the increasing numbers of upper- and middle-management personnel required by the then-fully-burgeoning corporate state economy. This new corporatist society also required technicians to perform the research and development necessary to promote the kind of technological change embodied in the new order of military-defense complexes, technocracy, and nationally regulated economic activity. Job training shifted from private apprenticeship and vocational schools to “public” high schools, “junior colleges,” and technical schools. This new age of mass higher education was to create at least the illusion that society was providing increasing equality of opportunity to all youths regardless of origins. In the process, lower- and middle-class eagerness for inclusion of their sons in the corps of the formerly elite “youth” was exploited to its fullest. The result was the creation of the “beehemoth” university by the 1960s, separating another 25 percent of those between 21 and 24 from the demands of adulthood.

As Friedrich Hayek has noted, institutional and cultural evolution proceeds as a result of the myriad efforts of countless individuals to adapt to new problems, adopt new procedures, and realize new aspirations. With the growing politicization of society, resulting from government dominance of education and other institutions, a prolonged crisis develops, because this bureaucratic management of society cannot and will not adapt to the needs of social change. As a result, in the 1960s, increasing numbers of youth came to regard the existing culture as incoherent and the future as undesirable and chaotic.

The young are among the first to experience social crises because they have yet to form stable vocational and social attachments, because they most completely and directly experience the socializing effects of existing institutions, and because they are most intensely future-oriented. Many young persons experience cultural crisis as a crisis of identity in which they are unable to define the meaning of life and to accept the models of adulthood offered by the older generation. The crisis of the 1960s resulted from the major shift from a free market in higher education, with its consequent stress on individual competition and entrepreneurship, to a system of massive, stifling, bureaucratic management. Work was no longer defined in entrepreneurial terms, but as successful fulfillment of a career within the bureaucratic or professional hierarchy.

By the 1960s, the fear and apathy of the McCarthyism of the 1950s was declining. Toward the end of the 1950s,

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**The crisis of the 1960s resulted from the major shift from a free market in higher education, with its stress on individual competition, to massive bureaucratic management.**
there had emerged a small mass of alienated, intellectual youths. The greater bulk of these youths were the children of corporate liberal parents who had raised them in a commitment to intellectualism and a critical attitude toward the prevailing culture (particularly with respect to its materialism, its conventional morality, its status seeking, and its mass culture). Academically serious, these youths were brought up involved with the arts and books, and oriented toward intellectual careers and social responsibility.

Finding the youth culture of the 1950s shallow and irrelevant, many of these youths felt excluded from the mainstream. As a result they formed an alternative subculture, of casual dress, bearded faces, drugs, jazz, and folk music, a culture in which friendship, art, ideas, and experience were preferable to the commercialized entertainment, organized athletics and spectator sports, etc., of middle-American youth.

In The Uncommitted: Alienated Youth in American Society, Kenneth Keniston points out that in addition to the development of this small alienated corps of young intellectual nonconformists, there developed a larger group of college youth reared in a nonhumanist, nonliberal background. This second group found the emerging intellectual youth culture attractive in that the 1950s culture appeared superficial to them when placed alongside the hypocrisies they had begun to perceive in American society. For white middle-class youths whose daily lives had been characterized by regulation, competitive pressure, sexual deprivation, and dependency, the experience of defying convention and authority was particularly appealing as a form of emotional release and relief from boredom. The culture originated by small, relatively isolated groups attracted the interest of mainstream youth because all youths shared problems of self-definition, vocation, and sexual identity.

Students also came to question the disciplines of their university curricula, because these disciplines assumed the viability of a culture that in their eyes had become obsolete. Students felt they were being trained for vocations that were either nonexistent or irrelevant to their aspirations. But, as has been mentioned, universities did serve their student populations by gathering them together in groups of 10,000-40,000, under conditions affording considerable free time for intensive communication of their emerging sentiments of social criticism and cultural opposition.

Until the 1960s, radical student movements were regarded as characteristic of underdeveloped, agrarian societies experiencing pressure for modernization under autocratic rule. In such societies, youth revolts result from the conflict between emerging technology and the established rigidity of the social order. Classically, student movements begin when expectations for social reform through the existing political system are frustrated. Youth becomes disillusioned by the gap between its ideals and social and political realities.

But with bureaucratization of Western higher education, a system was created not unlike that typically found in many agrarian societies. And from this situation exploded an unprecedented movement of youths willing to put themselves on the line for questions of “social justice” and abolition of war and the draft.

Of the many student organizations active in the 1960s, the most successful was unquestionably the Students for a Democratic Society. Kirkpatrick Sale’s excellent book, SDS, chronicles the development of this campus phenomenon from its forerunner’s excellent book, SDS, chronicles the development of this campus phenomenon from its forerunner cut according to its mobilization of millions of students on over 400 college campuses to its collapse as a viable political vehicle. At present, the extent of libertarian campus activity could best be compared to SDS in the early 1960s, when small groups of campus intellectuals debated the viability of student political activism as a basis for a general “new politics” in the United States. Several interrelated themes were the topics of all these discussions:

1. The need for intellectuals to become politically involved.
2. The inadequacy of traditional ideologies and categories for guiding political action.
3. The need for a new ideology to provide a general social analysis and basis for the “new politics.”

The early student activists defined their role as educating their fellow students to the need for political engagement and support of off-campus reform movements. Then, in the mid-sixties, the Free Speech Movement in Berkeley demonstrated the potential for large-scale, direct student confrontations. In addition, the FSM demonstrated that although committed activists might comprise only a small fraction of the student body, most students could be persuaded to join actions they could perceive as being in their interests.

With the escalation of the war in the Southeast Asia, and the expansion of the draft, protests soon escalated into national proportions. In April 1965, SDS called for a national student march on Washington and to their amazement, 25,000 participated. In 1967, nearly 100,000 students converged on the Pentagon to demonstrate against American warmaking. By 1968, SDS had over 350 organized campus chapters (there were eight in 1962), with official membership approaching 100,000.

The effect of student activism was immense. The challenge of Eugene McCarthy’s student legions toppled President Johnson in early 1968. After students at Columbia University called for mass revolutionary objectives, a French student revolt in Paris threatened the very existence of the De Gaulle regime. Student activism was the decisive factor in movements to end the draft, decriminalize victimless crimes, investigate police spying, end racial discrimination, and deal effectively with a host of other issues. By late 1968, a Fortune Magazine survey suggested that about 10 percent of the total American student body identified with the new left. In every case, radicalization had resulted from an inability of the bureaucracy to respond to student reform proposals, and from youth’s need for social and ideological identity in a seemingly insane world of war and social inequality.

But SDS could not endure beyond the point of radical-
Neither a program of pure intellectualism nor of pure partisan activity is sufficient. Instead, commitments to both partisan and intellectual ends must be balanced.
Crane

(continued from page 27)
radio talk show to realize the incredible potential of libertarian political action. Here is a representative of the party who is at once reasonable, radical, and knowledgeable. Clark rattles off facts and figures about California taxes, welfare programs, private vs. public education, and on and on.

And he is not alone. In Illinois, Bruce Green is running for the U.S. Senate with the aid of a distinguished board of advisors. In Iowa, Newsweek and Time are carrying full-page ads for Ben Olson and John Ball, LP candidates for the U.S. Senate and for governor, respectively. In South Carolina, Phil Dematteis is attracting considerable media attention with his articulate LP campaign for governor. In Alaska, Dick Randolph will probably be the first LP candidate elected to the state legislature. Randolph and three other LP assembly candidates in Alaska are in a position to win their races because they are combining libertarian principles with a thorough grasp of local issues.

The future of the Libertarian Party is bright indeed if its leadership at all levels will simply develop a professional approach to organization and promotion. We must employ an intelligent division of labor which recognizes the abilities and limitations of individual libertarian activists. With proper leadership there is much that can be accomplished in the immediate future. As an example, a national committee has been formed at the instigation of Nevada LP Chairman, Jim Burns. Known as the "SO in 80 Committee", its job is to insure that the LP presidential ticket is on the ballot in each of the 50 states in 1980. This requires legal research, legislative lobbying, petitioner recruitment, and establishing ballot-drive organizations in each state. The impact of being on the ballot in every state will be enormous and it may well be accomplished through the work of the "SO in 80 Committee." Because of accomplishments in 1976 and this year, the LP should enter the presidential petitioning year with ballot status already secured in ten states. And after that — with professionalism and imagination — the LP will be on its way.

Ed Crane was National Chairman of the LP from 1974 to 1977.

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Again, the center declined and the moderate right and right gained.

This decline of the center and move to the right is distributed across several groups. In the South, middle- and upper-status whites have moved from the center to the right and are also more independent; Border South whites have moved a little more to the right and become more independent. In all, this independence has been of benefit to the Republicans in the South. In the North, upper status white Protestants have moved leftward and have become more Democratic and independent; middle- and lower-status white Protestants have moved more right, but also to the Democratic party or to independence. Catholics have moved to the center and become more independent. Jews are further left, but also more independent. Blacks have become more left-wing and more Democratic.

Since a plurality of American voters is independent, and since there is a larger segment of citizens which could vote but does not due to its very strong negative feelings about the major parties, there is a clear opportunity for a political movement to take the place of the Republican Party as the alternative to the Democrats for millions of voters. Since the large increase in independent voters is the result of the large increase in college-educated voters, the importance of developing a strategy to reach a college-educated electorate is crucial. Having such a large proportion of the electorate so highly educated is something new historically, so the strategy which will have to emerge must combine elements from the history of political parties, especially the role of the social and cultural groups from which coalitions are forged, and from the history of major intellectual movements. These are two areas which have been the subjects most recently of high-quality scholarly research and analysis, so that it is a practical possibility to begin to develop the elements of a libertarian strategy for this new situation in voting behavior.

Evers

(continued from page 37)
possibility. A newsletter should reflect the fact that the LP is united behind its statement of principles and committed to the Libertarian National Committee's strategic vision. Every newsletter should be edited with a firm hand and guided by the purposes for which the LP exists.

In order to fulfill its functions, a state newsletter should be filled with announcements and news about events and activities of local LP units, announcements and news about ad hoc political action groups that are of interest (Amnesty International, Campaign to Stop Government Spying, and tax revolt groups, for example), analysis of events in the news, accounts of organizing experience, ratings of legislators, and reports of doings in the state capital and on local fronts. A state newsletter should be edited with wit and flair—with an air of the excitement that naturally surrounds an effort to liberate humanity—but it should never undermine libertarian principles or the LP's efforts to realize them in the world.

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Books and the Arts

Patriarchy on trial
by Sharon Presley


While few intelligent people would deny that women today face special problems, many would still consider the phrase “oppression of women” to be too exaggerated a term, merely a rhetorical device. The International Tribunal on Crimes Against Women set out not only to show that “oppression” exists but also that “... in different degrees, and that each case is not an isolated case, but typical of what happens in the particular country.”

The Tribunal, a privately organized conference held in Brussels in March 1976, provides shocking and undeniable evidence that the oppression of women is no mere catch phrase but a very real and widespread phenomenon. Government-enforced discrimination against women, institutionalized brutality by the medical profession and the police, persecution of nontraditional sexual practices, and forced motherhood are among the many examples cited in personal testimony of women from over 40 countries. Also reported are such violent and systematic acts of aggression against women as female “castration” and sexual torture of political prisoners.

The range of countries and political systems represented bears witness to the universality of the oppression: democratic nations (Europe and the United States) as well as dictatorial ones (Iran, Portugal); Third World countries (Black Africa) and white racist ones (South Africa, Australia); Marxist nations (Mozambique, Soviet Union) and non-Marxist nations—all come under attack. Nor are religious institutions spared: The Catholic Church, orthodox Judaism, and Islam also receive severe criticism. Discrimination against women, it seems, is ideologically and religiously blind.

In fact, a major pattern that emerges from the testimony is the overwhelming role played in the subjection of women by those twin institutions of coercive power, the state and the church. The majority of crimes cited are perpetrated by governments and aggravated by the pressure of orthodox religion working through law to enforce its values. Not that state or church oppression is unique to women, of course; states throughout the world infringe on the rights of their citizens, women and men alike. But many kinds of especially degrading and brutal crimes are committed on women exclusively, as the testimony graphically illustrates.

One of the most insidious ways that state and church oppress women uniquely is through regulation of their reproductive systems. “The right of women in and outside of marriage to choose not to have children is still not recognized in many countries,” understate the editors in their introduction to 25 pages of testimony on “compulsory motherhood.” In Ireland, not only is abortion completely illegal, but selling contraceptives is a criminal offense, even though 68 percent of Irish women of childbearing age want their sale legalized. In Portugal, the woman who has an abortion, the person who performs the abortion, and any accessories are liable to jail sentences of two to eight years. Even in gentle Belgium and Holland, jail sentences for abortion are prescribed by law.

The testimony shows that the Catholic Church is not the only religious institution that uses the state to oppose abortion. In Israel, a supposedly progressive state, abortion is illegal (as of 1976) unless the woman’s life is in danger, mainly because of pressure from orthodox Judaism. Recent attempts to institute even the mildest reforms are being fought by the conservative Begin government.

One of the ugliest but most important sections in this book deals with physical violence against women: rape, woman battering, and other acts of aggression, which are not only widespread, but are also frequently condoned and abetted by the courts and the police (who in some countries add their own attacks, in the form of sexual torture of political prisoners). In wife-battering cases, for example, the police typically refuse to arrest the husband; the judges refuse to take the charge seriously; and the social agencies turn a deaf ear. Yet in many cases in which husbands have beaten their wives to death, the event was preceded by numerous unheeded complaints from the wife.

“What is astonishing about the testimony on woman battering,” the editors conclude, “is that the police and most social agencies accept even the most extreme forms of violence occurring in the home. Modern societies are supposed to take murder seriously, but women can be all but murdered by their husbands without receiving any protection or even human compassion from those paid by the state to help protect its citizens.”

If the testimony about rape and wife battering is not persuasive enough, the testimony that should make even the hardened antifeminists in this country blanch deals with what the editors choose to call “the castration of women” — clitoridectomy, excision, and infibulation. This unspeakable violence against women is still practiced in many African and Arab countries. Though castration is not officially incorporated into law, neither does the law protect...
On the mutilation of women

The word *castration* almost always refers to men; but anxious as men appear to be about it, females are much more widely subject to castration. We use the word to refer to clitoridectomy (the removal of the entire clitoris), excision (the removal of the clitoris and the adjacent parts of the *labia minora* or all the exterior genitalia except the *labia majora*), and infibulation (excision followed by the sewing of the genitals to obliterate the entrance to the vagina except for a tiny opening).

**Witness 1: Guinea**

"There was a wall around the place where we lived, from which you could see the big baths where women and men came to wash. It was there that one day I saw myself the savage mutilation called excision that is inflicted on the women of my country between the ages of 10 and 12, that is, a year before their puberty. F. was stretched out on the pebbles on the ground. The operation was done without any anesthetic, with no regard for hygiene or precautions of any sort. With the broken neck of a bottle, the old woman banged down hard, cutting into the upper part of my friend's genitals so as to make as wide a cut as possible, since an incomplete excision does not constitute a sufficient guarantee against profligacy in girls.

"In my country, Guinea, 85 percent of the women are *today* excised, and my country is said to be progressive... In some countries this savage mutilation is not enough; it is also necessary to sew the woman up in order to really dispose of her body... The young wife must, before her wedding night, have it reopened with a razor. Her husband can, moreover, always insist on having his wife sewn up again if he is thinking of leaving her for some time.

"I appeal to the solidarity of women to make their dignity as human beings recognized, dignity which is denied by the dispossessing of their bodies and souls.

"I appeal to the solidarity of women to end patriarchal oppression and violence founded on the fear and hatred of our bodies.

"I appeal to the solidarity of women to end these barbarous mutilations."

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**Crimes Against Women, pp. 151-152**

Millions of female infants, little and older girls, still become victims of this barbaric mutilation, and uncounted adult women suffer from the physical and psychic consequences of their sexual "blinding," as the Arabic writer Yussif el-Masri calles female circumcision.

In 1975 in "the International Women’s Year," the UN World Conference of Women left the theme unmentioned. A UN spokeswoman in New York said: "No one wants to touch it." Not least of all because of this dereliction, the humanitarian relief organization "Terre des Hommes" has now started up a worldwide campaign... The case is that about two dozen African and Arab UN members—among them, some that call themselves progressive—feel themselves, according to the extent of the custom, more or less called into question: Ethiopia, Kenya, Togo, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Guinea, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Congo-Brazzaville, Zaire, Nigeria, Ghana, Sudan, Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Libya.

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**Der Spiegel June, 1977**

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the unwilling young victims from such diabolical savagery.

The catalog of other forms of oppression, though not quite as sickening, is long, varied and saddening: state-enforced dependence on men (Australia, England, the United States); protective labor legislation (Spain, Holland); women as property (Ireland, Israel); the brutality and callousness of the medical profession; persecution of lesbians; double oppression of Third World women; degrading sexual objectification; and many others. Small wonder that feminists are so angry and militant.

In addition to the personal testimony offered, resolutions, proposals and strategies for change were presented by some of the groups and individuals at the Tribunal. (As a matter of policy, none were voted on.) The resolutions and proposals mainly condemned particular injustices such as clitoridectomy, rape, and woman battering, and called for repeal of laws against abortion, contraception and even prostitution. Pornography was condemned in two separate proposals, but only one called for antipornography laws. Another proposal called for solidarity between Arab and Jewish woman—and this was long before the Sadat-Begin meetings!

Though the resolutions and proposals were primarily of the kind that most feminists would accept, the strategies for developing solutions were, on the whole, far less satisfactory.

The most interesting strategy suggested came from an international self-help group. Stressing that "control of our lives begins with control of our bodies," the group called for expansion of feminist self-help centers and the right for women to control all aspects of their bodies, such as childbearing and sexuality, without interference from others. The group’s emphasis on self-reliance was underscored by its rejection of governmental solutions. "[W]e have no allies in individual governments," the group proclaimed.

The same distrust of government had been voiced earlier by an Italian group concerned with violence against women: "We don’t believe in legal machinery. There is no way in which any law can restore life or prevent the violence which has already taken place." In view of the role of the state in promoting
crimes against women, the skepticism of these groups seems not only justified but one of the healthiest and most perceptive attitudes to come out at the Tribunal.

But several other groups called for drastic state intervention. A number of Wages for Housework groups, for example, demanded "wages for housework for all women from the governments of the world." This demand would strike some feminists, including myself, as not only drastic but inconsistent and self-defeating. Ultimately the tax money to finance such a scheme comes out of the pockets of working women as well as men. More importantly, such a policy would serve only to promote a dependence on government instead of on individual men, a proposition that seems at odds with the desire for personal autonomy so crucial to the realization of feminist goals.

Also disturbing was the demand of one Danish woman who called for laws against pornography, echoing a cry frequently heard among feminists in this country. "I am prepared," she said, "to use violence against an ideology that says women are inferior to men." But if we coercively impose our values on others, we are no better than the men who have imposed their values on us throughout history. We merely substitute our tyranny for the tyranny of men, a practice scarcely in keeping with the stated feminist desire to reject male authoritarian methods. Furthermore, the rights of women (or men) can hardly be secure in a society that can make exceptions to the rights of individuals to engage in voluntary activities.

While its documentation of the world-wide oppression of women is enough to make the Tribunal important, the radical form of the Tribunal is of considerable significance as well. Dissatisfied with the politics of the UN-declared International Women's Year (IWY), the Tribunal was deliberately set up as an alternative feminist model. As Simone de Beauvoir put it in an article in the Parisian press:

It is not by chance that this tribunal will open after the preposterous Year of the Woman, organized by a male society to confuse women. The feminists gathered in Brussels intend to take destiny into their own hands. . . . They are not appointed by parties, nor by nations, nor by any political group; it is as women that they will express themselves.

Unlike the IWY and similar conferences since, such as the National Women's Conference, the Tribunal was not the creature of any government, nor was it dominated by a single ideological group. The feminists gathered in Brussels—more than 2000 women from over 40 countries—were not the politically influential, nationalist representatives invited to the earlier and highly publicized IWY gathering in Mexico City, nor the carefully selected delegates to the recent National Women's Conference in Houston. Rather, they were "merely" women, speaking for themselves and women like them in their communities. They glorified the actions of no state. They held up no nation as a haven for women.

The women attending the Tribunal were the creatures of no government. They glorified the actions of no state, and they held up no nation as a haven for women.

The participants in the Tribunal also sought alternatives to the hierarchical structure and political machinations of the usual political conference. In contrast to traditional tribunals, this one chose to have no panel of judges. "We were all our own judges," say the editors. Throughout the five days of the conference, concerted efforts were made to keep the Tribunal a nonhierarchical open forum. In spite of the enormous difficulties of such an undertaking, the editors concluded that their efforts were successful. Though there were problems and conflicts, one of the editors was able to state, "I personally have never been to a conference where the organizers were so willing to accept a basically anarchic situation, nor have I previously experienced anarchy working so well."

One drawback, however, to this looseness of structure was the failure of the Tribunal to define the term "crime." Although the implicit definition was, for the most part, "violation of individual rights through personal force or legislative coercion," the vagueness permitted a range which allowed one lesbian to say that women who didn't want to talk to her were committing a crime, while on the opposite extreme, a lesbian from Mozambique spoke of "rehabilitation camps" that everyone (except some Marxists) would acknowledge as crimes in themselves. Like crying wolf, such misuse of the word undercut the effectiveness of its original meaning. If anything unpleasant that is done to a woman is a "crime," then the word, even when used correctly, will be taken less seriously.

How seriously the Tribunal and its evidence will be taken is hard to assess. Certainly, feminists will take it seriously; hopefully this book will also lead others to a better appreciation of the plight of woman today. The Tribunal is at least likely to be a stimulus for the unification of the international women's movement. In addition to promoting a network of communication, the Tribunal has already inspired feminist activities in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Norway, and even South Africa, among others.

One thing is clear from the Tribunal. All over the world, women are no longer sitting still and accepting injustice. They are taking the initiative, in the knowledge that men and governments are not going to do it for them. It is women themselves who will voice the protests, pressure to change oppressive laws, resist the old forms and create new ones.

As Emma Goldman, the great anarchist-feminist (who would have loved every minute of this tribunal), once said, "History tells us that every oppressed class gained true liberation from its masters through its own efforts." The First International Tribunal on Crimes Against Women is a significant step in that direction.

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G.K. Chesterton, Catholic radical

by John P. McCarthy


A few years ago I called together a forum that was to launch a New York chapter of the G.K. Chesterton Society. I placed classified notices in a number of periodicals. Remarkably, the ads which drew the most response were those in the conservative National Review and the anarchist Catholic Worker. In addition, the most celebrated person attending was Murray Rothbard. Such is the universality of Chesterton's appeal.

By way of understanding the political attitudes of Chesterton, an early-twentieth-century English poet, journalist, novelist, editor, and prominent convert to Catholicism, I would suggest as the type of contemporary cause with which he would most identify something like that of the several score Italian-American families of Corona (Queens), New York whose homes were to be demolished by right of eminent domain in order to construct a school to service projected private high rise apartments under construction nearby. The Coronians' cause was championed by such diverse advocates as the columnist Jimmy Breslin and the New York "Pejeadist" Vito Battista, the perennial and sometimes successful candidate of the United Taxpayers Party. (Back in the 1930s, Corona was not so successful in its fight, losing a large section of acreage affectionately called "The Corona Dumps" to a state-sponsored festival of progress, specifically the 1939 World's Fair, which snobbishly rechristened the Dumps as "Flushing Meadows.")

Most commentaries on Chesterton are of a literary or theological character. Margaret Canovan instead devotes herself to a study of his political and social ideas, which she labels as radical-populist. Admitting the difficulty of defining populism, she attempts to describe it as "a faith in the common sense of ordinary, hard-working people, especially country people, and an intense suspicion of metropolitan society, plutocrats, bureaucrats, and intellectuals." Populists defend small property, but are "hostile to the landlords, moneylenders, and other intruders who threaten the small farmer's security." They "dislike complex arrangements and subtle compromises," and distrust "professional politicians." While populism has been a significant element in American political history, it has had few proponents in "deferential," "collectivist" England. Chesterton's family was middle-class and liberal, a social position and attitude which were beginning to appear increasingly irrelevant in the early twentieth century, with its collectivism and total warfare. And it is his continued commitment to traditional liberalism and orthodoxy Christianity at a time when such were out of fashion among the intellectual set which moved him into the populist field. In short, Chesterton stood for the liberty and independence of the common man against the prevailing tide of social imperialism and state capitalism.

Like his great friend and ally, Hilaire Belloc, Chesterton first made a name for himself as an opponent of the Boer War. Scarcely a pacifist, he opposed that English imperialist venture as an assault on Boer particularism and as a subordination of England's true interests to special financial interests. A true "Little Englander," his patriotism was that described by Edmund Burke as loyalty to one's own local platoon in society. After the Boer War he challenged such later Edwardian fashions as teetotalism, eugenics, and collectivist new liberalism, all of which could ultimately be reduced to attempts by the wealthy to use intellectuals theories to restrict and regulate the poor. The remarkable similarity between the new liberalism, for example, which called for the positive state to enlighten and improve the quality of mankind, and the heritage of Tory paternalism, made him quite suspicious of their alleged differences.

But while his views on most issues were identical to those of Belloc, his analyses were less systematic and structured, more idiosyncratic and paradoxical. His basic message was that reformers usually neither take into account nor care for the wishes of those whose conditions they ostensibly want to improve. The average man was interested in owning his own home, for example. Yet the landlords and the plutocrats had driven him from the land and forced him into slums, and now reformers wanted to force him into compounds. And the alienation and anarchy (in the worst sense) of public housing has confirmed Chesterton's fears.

Along the same lines, he thought compulsory state education would scarcely bring about social improvement. His reason was that it did not transmit parental certainties but rather catered to experimentation: "The trouble in too many of our modern schools is that the state, being controlled so specially by the few, allows cranks and experiments to go straight to the school room." Rather than being taught the older certainties, the child was forced "to submit to a system that is younger than himself." The only effective schools were those in which the teachers really represented the wishes of the parents: the public (that is, in England,
private) schools. The disillusionment of urban Black America with public education is further confirmation of GKC's perception.

Chesterton and Belloc campaigned against a number of especially horrendous programs of the Edwardian reformers. One of these was eugenics, which had been prompted partly by the poor physical condition of army recruits during the Boer War. While not advocating the extremes of the Nazis, the British eugenacists championed eugenic classification of the population with the employment of tax privileges and penalties as well as segregation and sterilization to direct reproduction. Social programs like compulsory medical inspection in schools and homes for mental defectives originated in a desire to segregate and inhibit reproduction by the "unfit." Along the same lines, during the same period, a Mental Deficiency Act was passed, allowing lifelong incarceration on the word of two doctors. Beatrice Webb's minority report on the reform of the Poor Law was filled with suggestions for punitive treatment of the non-industrious poor, including work camps, forced migration, and denial of family life.

Chesterton ultimately based his liberalism and democracy on his belief in Christianity. He held that the departure from Christian orthodoxy had opened the door for all the other fads and fanaticisms (like materialism and determinism) that denied human freedom. Christianity, on the other hand, held that all men are made in the image of God and that all are capable of sinning. By giving a precise and determined definition of man as a free and responsible being, Christianity gave a surer guide for man to direct his life than did the changing enthusiasms of intellectuals in league with the wealthy.

Canovan's study of Chesterton's thought is quite thorough, accurate, and sympathetic. She does not evade his weaknesses, specifically his paradoxical militancy for the Entente cause in World War I, his antisemitism, and his softness towards Mussolini. The first was almost certainly a consequence of the influence of Hilaire Belloc and his historical perspective on Prussia as being outside the mainstream of the Catholic and Latin heritage (whose curious champions at this stage, consequently, would have to be seen as Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Wilson). The same pre-Latin historical bias and contempt for corrupt parliamentary politics prompted him to give qualified support to Mussolini, especially to his patriotic and antiplutocratic rhetoric. Chesterton's antisemitism was, in a way, the reverse side of the extreme Zionist position: that Jews constitute a separate nation and accordingly ought to be formally recognized as such. Canovan sees his literary and artistic antisemitism as parallel to the often vicious stereotyping of Americans by contemporary European leftists. Their jealousy delight in any embarrassment or hardship affecting Americans is akin to the pre-Holocaust contempt common to radicals like Chesterton for the power and success of Jewish financial circles.

During World War I, G.K. Chesterton took over The Eye-Witness, the weekly founded by Hilaire Belloc and by his brother, Cecil Chesterton. It became G.K.'s Weekly and continued until his death. It became the principal organ for the distributist movement, which sought to propagate a social and economic alternative to the emerging servile state. That alternative was the widespread ownership of capital, even if positively encouraged by state-imposed penalties on consolidation and amassment. Like all such movements it inevitably attracted cranks and had some severe weaknesses. Yet the ideas are not without value as an alternative to state capitalism, especially since they espouse private ownership of capital and attack centralized control. Furthermore, the Chesterton-Belloc critique gives one of the finest insights into the close collaboration between large-scale private enterprise and the state in bringing about state capitalism. Margaret Canovan is to be commended for her tight and lucid analysis of the complex and subtle thought of Chesterton. Reading her ought to intensify the renewed interest in Chesterton himself.

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**The decolonization of Asia**

**by James J. Martin**


Allies of a Kind is a book so expensive that it may be that only the British Museum may be able to afford to buy a copy. Its subtitle is quite deceptive; about 80 percent of this book has nothing to do with the Anglo-American war against Japan in the Pacific. Most of the book is concerned with the geopolitical realities involved from the start in the Pacific war. Much of this is well done and provides useful insights and observations. Christopher Thorne's primary concern is with the effect of the war on European colonialism and the long-range plans for Eastern Asia of the Anglo-American "allies"—nations which increasingly collided more rudely with each day of the war. A side theme involves the attitudes, views, and actions of various Asiatic lands towards their future—a future independent of Occidental solicitude in their behalf.

Thorne frankly admits that the part played by Britain in the defeat of Japan was "a fairly small one," and that it was "largely an American war." His summary of the prewar period is not especially noteworthy, but he gets somewhat better as the war becomes a reality. In one instance of much interest to this reviewer, Thorne displays the stigma of the conventional, establishment type despite his effort to appear as a moderate iconoclast. He dodges the Pearl Harbor story almost entirely, although he lists a single forthright revisionist book on the subject. By default, he accepts the fable of those whom Arthur Krock described as "the posse of apologists" who had managed to "explain away" the event, to the comfort and security of the Roosevelt regime. Only in his indignation over the acid remarks of Churchill's production minister, Oliver Lyttelton—who in mid-

August 1978
1944, in a speech, referred to American poses of innocence about precipitating hostilities in Hawaii as a "travesty"—does Thorne explicitly reveal his attitude, essentially agreeing, with those whom Harry Elmer Barnes identified a quarter of a century ago as the "Blackout Boys."

Allies of a Kind is an account which rests primarily on previously published sources, although Thorne also derives lessons from sources which have lain unobserved—probably deliberately so—by the establishment's chroniclers. Although he has included much interesting and absorbing gossip, gleaned from private papers and other manuscript sources, plus a number of interviews with those who were involved in the events, Thorne comes up with a set of conclusions which do not substantially alter the record. Those conclusions which deal with the realities of the diseased state of European colonialism, and with the ripeness of this plundered booty for usurpation by others—in this case the Japanese—or by locals through national revolts, once the war was underway, plus his reiteration of subdued assertions that the war in the Pacific was a "racist" conflict, will draw the most attention from the generation not even born when the Far East was breaking into flames, well before the United States became a formal belligerent.

This is a rather belated moment to expect anything startlingly new in a post mortem on the disastrous consequences of the Pacific phase of World War II to British colonial realities and imperial visions. This unmatched catastrophe was obvious to many even before it began to take solid shape after September 1939. This study more corroborates history than establishes it as an original conclusion, since so much of the documentation consists of wartime material, not subsequent revelations.

As early as December 1941, Member of Parliament Richard R. Stokes observed that Britain was already cast as America's Helgoland off the coast of Europe; the succession of British military and naval catastrophes experienced a bare ten weeks later similarly forecast an almost total eclipse in Asia. Gordon Lonsdale, the Soviet spy buried in the British intelligence service, remarked in his book, Spy, that the postwar settlement of Europe was what World War II in the west was all about—suggesting that what happened after 1945 was clearly visible as a main war objective to begin with, and which the war events simply ratified. The same thing can be said for the settlement which followed in Asia after 1945: Most of its dimensions were evident even before Pearl Harbor, no less foreshadowed by the situation in late 1944.

While H.L. Mencken once described Franklin Roosevelt's achievement in the

Most dimensions of the settlement in Asia following the end of World War II were evident even before the attack was made on Pearl Harbor.

Pacific war as amounting to towing ashore the corpse of the British Empire, Thorne repeatedly emphasizes the points that this is all FDR planned to do in the first place. He gives copious attention to the phobia of the Administration, from the top down, toward re-establishing any of the swamped colonial regimes in the Far East. This emphasis brings back to prominence a theme which was very much muffled in the closing two years of the war; one which, though exacerbated by the publication of Elliot Roosevelt's As He Saw It in 1946, substantially went into oblivion after the opening propaganda shots of the Cold War in the same year—notably that of Winston Churchill, in his famous Fulton, Missouri, "iron curtain" bugle call for mobilization, which forecast the possibility of yet a new war for the "allies of a kind."

To describe the Chinese-Indian-British-American efforts on mainland Asia against the Japanese as feeble and pathetic is probably charitable beyond expectation. One divines this with little difficulty in Thorne's devious prose—and the record was open a generation before he started to write this book. The poisonous relations among the British, American, and Chinese commands are dwelt upon, and their joint inability to mount any offensive worth the name against Japanese forces on mainland East Asia until the very last months is examined from many angles.

The venomous hatred of the U.S. chief of the China-Burma-India Command (CBI), General Joseph Stillwell, for China's Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (for whom Stillwell worked as chief of staff) has been documented with delight by a long string of anti-Chiang and pro-Mao American writers for four-and-one-half decades. Not so well known was Stillwell's hostility toward the British, his scathing opinion of Lord Mountbatten, and his designation of the letters S.E.A.C., Britain's South East Asia Command, as really meaning "Save England's Asian Colonies."

Thorne repeatedly lays open the serious shortcomings of Churchill as a strategist. The prime minister's tactics in the Pacific were supported only by his stubborn conviction that the British Empire's main way stations in India, Burma, Malaya, and East Asia were salvageable. He even advanced Occidental cultural and racial arguments for returning them to British control. The full consequences of the revolution in Asian ideas, brought about by the stunning Japanese military and naval successes, never seem to have done more than graze Churchill's consciousness. But they made an impact, before war's end, on the America's number-two-ranking Japanophobe (H.L. Stimson was number one), Stanley Hornbeck, chief of the State Department's Far East desk. He was a long-time hard-liner favoring a confrontation with Japan long before Pearl Harbor, and a devotee of Chiang to such depth that well into the end phase of the Pacific war he saw no possible threat to Chiang's coming domination of China from Mao and the Chinese Reds. Few people in high places were so consistently wrong on so many counts as Hornbeck. But one must give him credit for suspecting well before the 1945 cease-fire that the defeat of Japan would turn out to be a futile achievement.

Sure to catch in the craw of some of Thorne's readers is his gentle, understanding, and warmly sympathetic por-
trayal of the Maoist sympathizer wing of the U.S. State Department, seeking ex post facto to establish the rectitude of their slant on the future of China. To be sure, they did not “lose” China, as conservative rhetoric characterized it: No one had China to award to anyone. The issue here is still the failure of the Roosevelt and Truman regimes to support Chiang with the necessities to ensure his control of China, after the bales of flaming propaganda they presented to the American people asserting that the “saving” of China was responsible for the steps that led to American involvement in the Pacific war. In harmony with the bombast of 1938-46 one would have expected American administrations after that time to pour into China everything that was needed to prevent the land falling into the hands of the Reds. After all, this is precisely what was being done from 1947 on in Europe: Why not the identical program in Asia? Was this too logical or reasonable?

This failure of policy, and not the stealthy subterranean actions of pro-Maoist cheerleaders in diplomatic posts, undid Chiang’s Chinese Nationalist cause. This writer cannot grant that these individuals were that significant in producing the neglect of Chiang. American administrations have been noteworthy on many occasions in their studied neglect of the State Department over the decades and in doing exactly the opposite of recommendations from that center of often convoluted ignorance, which has often matched the contortions of the famous circus act of the last century, the Boneless Wonders. (Roosevelt utterly ignored State in the fateful Casablanca conference.)

Nevertheless, this writer could not summon the tears to devote to Thorne’s trembling concern for the welfare of Messrs. John Paton Davies, John Carter Vincent, John Stewart Service, and other hearties who went down like clipped saplings in the years Joseph McCarthy and the dominant anticommunist sentiments generated by the Korean War set the tone of policy in the land. (The brigade who moan about “McCarthyism” and the awfulness of the “communist witch hunt” never seem to remember that there was a war going on during much of it all.)

One may also be less than amused by Thorne’s veiled support for Philip Jaffe and the Amerasia Institute for Pacific Relations transmission belts. He repeats the standard line found in a stack of New Masses concerning Jaffe’s edition of Chiang’s book China’s Destiny (and later Chinese Economic Theory), works which went into two hundred printings in their first year of existence alone, and which were read by or probably familiar to nearly every literate Chinese outside the Maoist orbit. What really got in Jaffe’s line of vision was the promise by Chiang in the former book of extended future war with the Maoist Reds. So he and others invented the simulated smokescreen of indignation over Chiang’s anti-Western plans for the future—the party line while Japan remained Mao’s main obstacle. Once Japan had been defeated, the tactics switched from bewailing Chiang’s anti-Western views to the total calumny of his regime, and the flooding of the United States with hysterical books denouncing him as the monster of the Far East. At the same time, they depicted Maoists as genial “agrarian reformers.”

The main cause of the U.S. debacle in the Far East was the mindless nightmare which Roosevelt and Truman called their policy toward China.

(According to the Senate Judiciary Committee, these amiable Red reformers exterminated some 32,000,000 people while effecting their “reforms.”)

One can hardly believe as sophisticated a writer as Thorne could produce Chapter 19, which deals with China. His delicate lateral arabesque, like a blindfolded man waltzing about among a lot of eggs, through all the Maoist journalists and ferocious anti-Chiang left-liberals and malicious administration functionaries, leaves one quite breathless with admiration. You are left with just enough staying power to appreciate the civilized, curried, sly undermining Thorne gleaned from the deathless views expressed in a generation-after-the-fact interview with Owen Lattimore. But whether or not the latter was a “conscious instrument” of Chinese communism, the mindless nightmare which the Roosevelt and Truman regimes called their “policy” toward China is still the main cause of the debacle. Their dream apparently was to wreck simultaneously Euro-American colonialism, Japan, and Chiang, leaving no remaining possibility but the 20th century’s answer to Genghis Khan and Tamerlane, Mao Tse-tung.

One must give Thorne credit for assessing the trendy sort of racist commentary built upon the clichés of the last decade-plus, which has rejoiced in the most primitive manifestoes issued by racial minorities, while simultaneously issuing horrendous interdicts upon the expression of racist sentiments by majorities. This little game does not have much longer to go, but in any case, it was not necessary to tiptoe around this issue as it affected the Pacific War. Thorne cites the cultivated, stuffy, pro-Western racism of various Occidental leaders from Churchill on down—a view in harmony with the world narcotic politics of the last dozen years or so, which finds only whites capable and guilty of racist views and sentiments. The ancient racial-superiority convictions of much of the nonwhite world find no expression as a moderating counterbalance.

Of course World War II in the Pacific was a race war. Norman Thomas in 1945 described it as an “organized race riot.” Thorne might have cited some examples from the mountain of racist commentary written while the war and emotions were hot, by any of several dozen Western journalists, war correspondents, and politicians of all ranks. Less than a week after Pearl Harbor, American song writers had copyrights on 260 tunes, mainly with insulting titles such as “You’re a Sap, Mr. Jap,” and “We’re Gonna Take a Fellow Who is Yellow, and Beat Him Red, White and Blue.” Thorne might also have interviewed a goodly swath of the men who actually fought the war, instead of confining himself to sterilized public documents citing gun-shy and
self-serving top politicos. He might have polled the former’s sentiments, asking how often they had shot prisoners and bagged enemies who were swimming in the ocean after having been shot down from their planes and ships; he might have asked how often they knocked out the gold teeth of the dead, used their polished shin bones for letter openers and their skulls for ash trays.

And it should not be forgotten that the Japanese fought the war on just as racist a basis. The only problem for either side was the one facing the Anglo-American and Western colonial element, which had to soften the racial line because of their yellow-skinned allies in China—for whom, to listen to a major element of American Propaganda, at least, the war was being fought in the first place. (The ancient Chinese distaste for all white people as evil-smelling “barbarians” does not surface in this one-sided presentation of wartime racism.)

In summary, Thorne wavers back and forth between presenting compassionately the view of British Empire establishment spokesmen, who resented the steadily growing hostility from both official and public opinion figures in the United States toward the reestablishment of European colonialism in Asia, while supporting with equal warmth the view that the British and other colonies in East Asia were doomed even before the commencement of hostilities, and that their eclipse was desirable. Related to this is his favorable view of the spread of communism in China, and of other “national liberation” movements, combined with his dim realization that the Roosevelt regime and much of American public opinion were jointly laying the groundwork for the upcoming form of imperialism—one not characterized by the soldier with fixed bayonet at the guard box in the foreign compound, but by absentee control in the form of monetary and other material “foreign aid,” and by the complex and intricate economic blackmail related to foreign trade. These were to be demonstrated to be far more effective in controlling the “natives” than any number of hussars.

Thus it is not to be wondered at that more than 30 years after the “victory” in the Pacific represented by this New Imperialism, that a book by the staff of Tokyo’s most important newspaper, Asahi Shimbun, titled The Pacific Rivals, could go on for hundreds of pages without even having index mentions of “England,” “Great Britain,” “United Kingdom,” or any other part of the lands of this former adversary, and include only two mentions of Churchill, both in postwar contexts relating to the Cold War.

One can introduce other speculative ruminations. The two-centuries-old impulse to resolve all of Asia and the Pacific into Euro-American colonies (only Thailand and Japan were not in 1941) terminated with the conversion at last of Japan into an American province under the proconsulship of General Douglas MacArthur. But as the corral gate opened to admit that last important wild stallion, all the others gradually escaped. The desultory efforts of the Occidental wranglers to get some of them back one way or another in the succeeding generation were futile.

It was once a classic but perhaps oversimplified definition of a colony as a region which served as a supplier of food and raw materials to its imperial “motherland,” and as a market for the latter’s manufactured goods. It would appear that with the decline in quality and the increase in price of many American manufactured products that a subtle return of the United States to its former colonial status, at least in part, is now going on, as evidenced by the steady increase in the importance of American agricultural products to European and Japanese markets (almost $12 billion worth last year), and by the increasing difficulty American manufactured products are encountering in entering these same markets. The erosion of the status which descended upon the United States at the conclusion of the two wars in 1945 is already far advanced, and the whole matter of neo-imperialist relations is now open for serious examination.

The new rules of imperialism make physical presence in the colony a no-no. Who will emerge as the imperial presence and who will undergo the status of the colony under the sophisticated conventions now prevailing in the commercial and monetary worlds has already been suggested by the events of the last decade. The situation promises to be even more convoluted in the time ahead.

James J. Martin is the author of American Liberalism and World Politics, Revisionist Viewpoints, The Saga of Hog Island, and Men Against the State.
An answer to Solzhenitsyn
by Tibor R. Machan

In his much publicized spring commencement address at Harvard University, Alexander Solzhenitsyn returned to the theme he advanced first in his acceptance speech for the Freedoms Award from the Freedoms Foundation at Valley Forge; namely, that the West is morally bankrupt and ought to be pursuing, not political or legal freedom, but a "spiritual emergence." Mr. Solzhenitsyn emphasized mostly what is lamentable about the West, though he did not deny the value of certain features of Western life. He described the central principle of Western life as one under which "governments are meant to serve man, and man lives to be free and to pursue happiness. (See, for example, the American Declaration of Independence.)" And he alleged grave errors in this idea. He said that "every citizen has been granted the desired freedom and material goods in such quantity and of such quality as to guarantee in theory the achievement of happiness, in the morally inferior sense which has come into being during those same decades."

For all this Mr. Solzhenitsyn blames humanism, the absence of a belief in a "Supreme Complete Entity," and the view that only material being exists. "If humanism were right in declaring that man is born to be happy, he would not be born to die. Since his body is doomed to die, his task on earth evidently must be of a more spiritual nature. It cannot be unrestrained enjoyment of everyday life."

There is much more to Mr. Solzhenitsyn's talk than such non sequiturs, of course, and some of it is extremely instructive. But much of it is unfortunately vague and mystical to the point of ineffability. And where Mr. Solzhenitsyn is clear, he is often wrong. For example, the pursuit of happiness mentioned in the American Declaration of Independence does not specify happiness of the purely hedonistic variety. The ancient Greek Ideal of eudaimonistic happiness could as well have been involved, especially since we know that the Founding Fathers had read the ancients carefully.

The problem with human ideals "beyond happiness" is well exhibited in Mr. Solzhenitsyn's own talks; namely, that it is quite unclear what man is to strive for if his life on earth is really, ultimately, meaningless. I am sure I do not understand him when he speaks of that spiritual dimension he believes we must aspire to. And I am sure he is wrong to think that the alternative is the crass materialism and utilitarianism which he claims has been the leitmotif of Western culture. Obviously, Western culture has been hedonistic and utilitarian, but it is precisely the hallmark of these positions that they lead to behavior which is easily seen, observed, counted, taken into evidence. But where does Mr. Solzhenitsyn get his evidence to assert that "Active and tense competition permeates all human thoughts" in the West "without opening a way to free spiritual development"? Such development usually takes place in private when one is in other than tribal or primitive cultures. Friends, lovers, colleagues, close kin, neighbors, teammates, and thousands of other personal associations are an active force for spiritual development in the West.

To these private spiritual matters the superficial news services give little heed, but one would have thought Mr. Solzhenitsyn could at least imagine their existence. Unfortunately he has missed them. He thinks we have failed to rise to our spiritual challenge. And, no doubt, not to grasp Solzhenitsyn's message is to prove this beyond the shadow of a doubt. Or is it?

With enormous respect for his literary and historical accomplishments, and with great admiration for the personal challenge he has met over and over again in his life, I must nevertheless ask that Mr. Solzhenitsyn make himself clear to us, not to some specifically chosen few who don't need the message he appears to be communicating. It is my impression, as a refugee from something rather like the political and cultural circumstances Solzhenitsyn has experienced with so much greater intensity, that insistence on political liberty is an indispensable accompaniment to the search for personal spiritual excellence.

Women and men that we are, choice lies at the bedrock of our moral life. We are nothing if we have no choice—we are bound to traditions placed upon us by our parents, religions, laws, officials, and numerous other sources of pressure. But among all these, law has the most stifling effect, morally speaking, because when the law commands, the command is backed by deadly force. Tradition, education, parents, culture, and other peaceful pressures may be accepted or rejected by choice—by personal resolve to either yield or resist. But the law threatens those who fail to yield with the ultimate loss, namely the loss of choice and of life. This threat must be minimized if human dignity is to have a chance in human social existence. Yet it is this threat that Solzhenitsyn blames the West for trying to minimize.

If I understand Mr. Solzhenitsyn at all, I believe his scolding of the West is misdirected. It is necessary that we have, not less, but more concern with
the liberty of individuals from the coercion of others, including the state. And this necessity arises because only in liberty can each person aspire to the morally and spiritually good life.

Mr. Solzhenitsyn seems to be basing his case in part on his own extremely unusual situation and that of a few of his mates in Soviet prisons and labor camps. For him those horrible times led to eventual spiritual growth. He seems to have flourished as a person in consequence of the suffering that he lived through. It is not unlikely that under those miserable conditions a full reliance on the life of the mind—the imagination, the spiritual reflection, the contemplation of the world’s mysteries, even a faith in something ineffable—was the only source of moral and spiritual growth.

But does Mr. Solzhenitsyn really wish his own case upon us? He tells us that “Six decades for our [Russian] people...” Without liberty, in complete or semi-slavery, the very chance of personal salvation in one’s lifetime is destroyed.


does not fly in the face of evidence, science, common sense, and whatever is available for understanding to any rational person. This is not the reductive materialism that comprises Mr. Solzhenitsyn’s caricature of Western culture. It is a far more robust and spiritually comprehending view of life, without, however, any of the hopeless mysteriousness men and women have heard for centuries from eloquent and sincere persons like Alexander Solzhenitsyn.

Legalistic liberty alone does not guarantee spiritual and moral excellence—this much Mr. Solzhenitsyn has got right. Except in very unusual cases (and the reliance on such cases can conceal a form of elitism of the spiritually and intellectually fortunate), suffering spells not only doom but also depravity and degradation. And when suffering comes from the violation of each person’s natural right to liberty, it constitutes horrible injustice to boot. Without liberty, in complete or semi-slavery, the very chance of personal salvation in one’s lifetime is destroyed. I would hope that we can listen and learn when Mr. Solzhenitsyn speaks, but not permit ourselves to forget the preciousness of liberty simply because a man of great courage and imagination has let himself be diverted from it.

Tibor Machan escaped from Hungary in 1953 and now teaches philosophy at SUNY College, Fredonia, New York.

Public Trough

(continued from page 8) into the classroom. Furthermore, the teaching positions most parents would consider least important, such as those for remedial reading or other kinds of special education, will surely be retained, since the federal government foots almost all of the bill for them.

These scenarios should be taken merely as a warning, since obviously I, too, favor tax reduction any way we can get it. But we must not be naive about our adversaries. There will be a backlash. And it will be nasty. If there is ever a really serious attempt to excise bureaucratic fat in a meaningful way, there might very well be bloodshed before it is over. Those bureaucrats will fight before they will give up what they have. And they can be vindictive, too.

Although I sincerely hope that the Jarvis-Gann initiative succeeds and that tax revolt sweeps the country, we have to be prepared for the worst. The liberals are already talking about eliminating the property tax nationwide and substituting a federal income tax instead. Although it sounds ridiculous, if the bureaucrats fight back as I think they will, it may happen. And then we will be worse off than we were before.
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