The Right to Distribute in David Schmidtz’s Elements of Justice
David Schmidtz argues that theories of distributive justice are limited when their focus on dividing outcomes obscures the liberty, productive agency, and cooperation that create wealth and enable mutual benefit, even in the face of historical injustices.
"Soldiers Playing Cards and Dice (The Cheats)" by Valentin de Boulogne (c. 1618/1620)
David Schmidtz begins the final chapter with a treatment of John Rawls’s famous insight that changed the course of political philosophy over the past half-century: utilitarianism fails to take seriously the separateness of persons. A throughline of Schmidtz’s discussion in Elements is the Rawlsian claim that society is a cooperative venture for mutual advantage wherein each of us has separate projects and aspirations. Utilitarian aggregation, however, calls for sacrificing some people for the sake of others if this maximizes overall good, which (to put it mildly) is not obviously fair to those who stand to be sacrificed.
Instead, we should regard justice as the outcome of a bargaining process among individuals. Rational contractors seek an institutional structure that supports reciprocity, that is, mutual benefit.
Rawlsian “justice as fairness” seeks results that leave nobody with grounds for complaint. What could foreclose complaint is a contextual matter. In a simplified world where we come to the table having produced nothing, this may involve entitlement to equal shares of a pie, but it doesn’t have to. What about arrangements where we motivate each other to work hard in ways that grow or multiply the pie? Instead of splitting the pie in half, I may encourage you to bake a second pie by using my oven, in which case I keep two-thirds of the pie and you keep four-thirds. Here the shares are unequal, but I don’t have rational grounds for complaint because two-thirds of a pie is more than half, and your effort coupled with my capital investment made that increase possible. I don’t have a further claim on what you helped create.
Years before he wrote A Theory of Justice, Rawls proposed what Schmidtz calls the “precursor” to his later and more famous difference principle. The precursor states: “Inequalities are to be arranged to the advantage of everyone affected: Everyone should get more than what would have been an equal share in a more equal but less productive scheme.”1 This sounds like a principle that advocates of free markets could support with enthusiasm.
However, Rawls worried that the precursor was incomplete because there are indefinitely many ways in which all could be advantaged. He thought we needed a complete theory that would specify how to divide the gains. While we could focus on results most favored by bakers, Rawls prioritizes those who may fare least well in a cooperative venture, the least advantaged workers to whom reciprocity is owed. His later “difference principle” attempts to be more specific by contending that inequalities are to be arranged to the greatest advantage of the least advantaged productive members of society. The difference principle applies only to the basic institutional structure. It should not guide case-by-case decisions, as that would cripple economic activity by forcing producers to calculate whether their every action would, at that moment, work to the greatest advantage of the least advantaged. Such reasoning would likely be impossible; even if it weren’t, it would be incompatible with the coordination of expectations and long-term economic planning.
A fluid, vertically mobile society may work to the benefit of the least advantaged who start poor but are able to work their way up. Fairness does not mean security, certainly not the “security” of a rigid economic class system and a minimum wage (or minimum income) under which the least advantaged may remain stuck at the bottom. Schmidtz asks whether members of the least advantaged class would prefer to start off poorer if that institutional structure allowed them to finish richer than they would otherwise be in a less vertically mobile society. If so, they would reject a minimum wage (and a minimum income) unless it fostered upward mobility.
Interestingly, many Rawlsians paper over Rawls’s first principle of justice, the principle of maximum equal liberty: each person is equally entitled to the most extensive sphere of liberty compatible with a like liberty for all. By contrast, libertarians familiar with Rawls stress that he is correct to prioritize this over the difference principle. Why? Prioritizing the difference principle over maximum equal liberty might allow tremendous breaches of liberty, such as Jim Crow laws, if such laws happened to support the greatest advantage of the least advantaged. But liberty makes possible vast opportunities for production and exchange, and thus the bounty for which the least advantaged may cherish their smaller shares. “Liberty is a precondition of there being a rising tide in the first place, especially the kind of tide that lifts all classes.”2
Conversely, the appearance of stagnation and a zero-sum world is guaranteed when people fixate not on income as such but on how to divide it into income shares, equal or otherwise.
Schmidtz turns the discussion to Robert Nozick, who criticizes the difference principle because it doesn’t account for what people have already done, only what they will do henceforth. The principle proceeds as if we’re coming upon unowned resources unattached to specific people’s holdings and efforts. However, patterns of inequality arise not merely as random givens but also through human interaction. Nozick offers the example of Wilt Chamberlain, an elite basketball player who charges his audience money to watch him play. Given popular demand to watch him play, Wilt grows immensely richer than everyone else. Any favored initial distribution, such as wealth or income equality, is upset by people freely paying Wilt to play. Ignoring history risks treating all resource distributions as random and unowned, rather than as the result of what certain people have done for willing buyers.
Ignoring history is a mistake. “To Nozick, Wilt’s advantages are not what Wilt finds on the table; Wilt’s advantages are [what] Wilt brings to the table. And respecting what Wilt brings to the table is the exact essence of respecting him as a separate person.”3 Rawls rightly observed that utilitarian views fail to respect persons as separate, but his focus on distributions respects only our separateness as consuming agents. Nozick also respects our separateness as productive agents by acknowledging the history of how many distributions could unfold through free wealth-creating action that does not involve unjust treatment of anyone.
For Nozick, if people make a voluntary initial claim on something previously unowned or transfer this claim through exchange or as a gift, the whole process is just. Outcomes are not preordained or used to test whether some pattern is just. If Wilt voluntarily plays basketball and we voluntarily pay to watch, an outcome where Wilt becomes much richer than us is entirely just despite the resultant inequality.
People own their talents, including the ways they bring them to bear on the external world. If we take seriously the maximum equal liberty principle, how could we not have property rights, not only in ourselves but in parts of the external world? Rights are side constraints that trump, not merely outweigh, other considerations. What justifies rights so conceived? Here Nozick and Rawls can come together despite the latter’s resistance. Schmidtz suggests that rights serve the function of upholding Rawls’s cooperative venture for mutual benefit: “we cannot live well together unless we treat each other as having rights.” Also, we cannot live well together unless we treat our rights as limited. “That is how we know Wilt’s right to enjoy his property in peace does not include a right to build biological weapons in his garage.”4
If history matters more than Rawls acknowledges—as Nozick claims—then what about our actual world and the rectification of past injustices? Few current holdings have an entirely unblemished history if we go back far enough in time. We may sit on land that was stolen from previous peoples. We may enjoy certain advantages that were legally denied to the ancestors of blacks, Native Americans, and other historically marginalized groups. Nozick has little to say about handling such matters, and Schmidtz suggests why: “his theory is about justice as how we treat each other rather than justice as cleansing the world’s distribution of original sin.”5 In Nozick’s mind, “the point of undoing a wrongful transfer is simply to undo a wrongful transfer,” not to make current holdings match a favored distribution.6
People own their talents, including the ways they bring them to bear on the external world.
G. A. Cohen observes that Nozick’s theory requires the enforcement of property rights, which itself is coercive. I have nowhere to live, so I pitch a tent in your backyard. You will likely call the state to forcibly remove me, and this is a restriction of my freedom in favor of yours. Why should your liberty be privileged over mine? Perhaps there’s a good reason why, but Cohen contends that friends of property rights can’t merely assert the landowner has the upper hand by default.
Schmidtz observes that my property rights that restrict your liberty are a problem only if they fail to create the sorts of personal jurisdiction that gives people stable expectations for how to go about their lives. The aim of society is not zero coercion—since any law or social rule is potentially coercive—but rather the sort of coercion that allows us to get along better than alternatives. A world without red lights would render green lights recipes for gridlock at best. Attempting to maximize rather than coordinate freedom of movement would be a disaster both for traffic and for our interactions:
Traffic laws help us to stay out of each other’s way. Property laws let us do more; they also help us to engage in trade, with the result that our traffic . . . leaves fellow travelers not only unimpeded but enriched. The traffic of a healthy economy is a boon, not merely something to tolerate.7
For Cohen, lack of money is a lack of freedom. Money is a ticket that buys opportunities that also increase the worth of one’s freedom. Granting this, Schmidtz observes that a government cannot create more seats in a stadium just by printing more tickets and likewise cannot create more wealth just by printing more currency. Work creates wealth, and we can’t reliably work if people are free at any time to pitch tents on, heavily regulate, or levy massive taxes on spaces and affairs that extend beyond our bodies. “Where property rights are treated with respect, we find that nearly all are wealthier—which is to say, more free in Cohen’s sense—than their grandparents were.”8
Acknowledging rectification for past wrongs requires acknowledging its limits too. “Dwelling too much on the past is wrong for the same reason that ignoring the past altogether is wrong: Excess in either direction reduces stability in transactions, thus making it harder to go forward in peace.”9 We should be alert to redressing past injustice, but we cannot carry on in peace unless there is a limit on our obligation to undo the past.
The point is to make amends, “but for making amends to succeed, there has to be uptake: Victims and their descendants, for their own sakes, have to embrace the aim of achieving closure.” Descendants of victims, for their own sakes, “must accept that guilt is not a weapon to be used against a perpetrator’s descendants forever.”10 The future matters even when the past can’t be undone. “There is no injustice in being willing to carry on. Or even when something is not quite right with carrying on, it is a lesser evil than an endless cycle of vengeance.”11
As Nelson Mandela said of South Africa’s future: “We can have prosperity, or we can have revenge. But we cannot have both. We need to choose.”12 Victims of apartheid or Japanese American internment could have chosen a path of revenge rather than reconciliation toward perpetrators of apartheid and internment. That they chose reconciliation doesn’t alter the fact that revenge is tempting. But settling scores undermines everyone’s ability, including victims’, to move on in peace and prosperity.
Might unequal and arbitrary natural distributions of talent and resources call for rectification, as Rawls believed? Oddly, Rawls rejects the arbitrariness of arbitrary inequality (that does not advantage the least advantaged) yet never objects to the arbitrariness of arbitrary equality (that does not advantage the least advantaged). Schmidtz observes that the word “arbitrary” has two meanings: “Natural distributions can be arbitrary, meaning random. Or choices can be arbitrary, meaning capricious. In one case, no choice is made. In the second, an unprincipled choice is made.”13
A random manmade lottery is fair, while a rigged lottery is not. A natural “lottery” is neither fair nor unfair because it is a fact, not a practice. That Jane may be more talented than Joe is not caprice but chance. No person had the power to intend that Jane be more talented. “Life is about playing the hand you are dealt. Being dealt a bad hand is not the same as facing a stacked deck. A deck is stacked only if a dealer deliberately stacks it, declining to leave the matter to chance.”14
Being born with a cleft palate is a problem. “The problem is not that a cleft palate is unjust but that it is bad . . . We are not trying to fix an improper distribution of cleft palates. We are trying to fix cleft palates.”15 Likewise, being born with more talent is not a problem for the less talented if the world is positive sum. In such a world, the less talented benefit from having more talented people around who aim to cooperate for mutual advantage. Or at any rate they should want such talented people, not only for the material benefits they can bring, but as sources of inspiration.
In assuming that undeserved inequalities are also unjust, Rawls views redress as moving from undeserved inequality “in the direction of undeserved equality rather than, say, deserved inequality.”16 Opportunities are what they are. They are not guaranteed to be equal. However, in a positive-sum world, we hope that people with better opportunities make better use of them because that’s the key to prosperity for everyone. The less talented benefit from encouraging the more talented to prosper. This allows them to take seriously how the more talented—and thereby themselves—are separate persons, not mere units of utility to be distributed more equitably rather than maximized on utilitarian grounds. Rawls began his project by acknowledging how utilitarianism failed to respect persons as separate. Unfortunately, his focus on distributions commits the same error in a different form.
Schmidtz concludes Elements by insisting that we need an incomplete theory of justice. Completeness is not a virtue. That is partly why he considers Rawls’s precursor superior to the difference principle: it is incomplete. Theorizing about justice aims to articulate principles of justice, but principles of justice are not rules. “Rules are meant to determine our thinking about what to do; principles are meant to guide it.” Schmidtz’s map is a guide for practical wisdom, not a rulebook: there are four basic types of principle, perhaps more, no one of them reduces to the others, and they do not add up to a decision procedure.17
Maps are incomplete. They often reveal numerous, and roughly equally good, paths to the same destination. Navigating the various neighborhoods sometimes calls for maps that show the terrain in finer grain, but more importantly we first need maps that don't distort the neighborhoods on a global level. To honor desert, we must foster societies where people can earn what they are due for their efforts. To foster reciprocity, we must gladly return favors or pay them forward where they are due. To honor equality, we must aspire to treat each other as fellows engaged in a cooperative venture for mutual advantage. To address need, we must support the institutions that encourage the productivity by which communities meet needs. All of this requires that we not focus so much on distributions and shares that we lose sight of what makes the world a place where we are glad to be each other’s neighbors. The Elements of Justice is an outstanding map for guiding our exploration of those neighborhoods.
Notes
1. David Schmidtz, The Elements of Justice (Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 187
2. David Schmidtz, The Elements of Justice (Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 195
3. David Schmidtz, The Elements of Justice (Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 202
4. David Schmidtz, The Elements of Justice (Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 205
5. David Schmidtz, The Elements of Justice (Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 208
6. David Schmidtz, The Elements of Justice (Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 209
7. David Schmidtz, The Elements of Justice (Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 211
8. David Schmidtz, The Elements of Justice (Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 211
9. David Schmidtz, The Elements of Justice (Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 212
10. David Schmidtz, The Elements of Justice (Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 213
11. David Schmidtz, The Elements of Justice (Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 214
12. PLACEHOLDER
13.David Schmidtz, The Elements of Justice (Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 217
14. David Schmidtz, The Elements of Justice (Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 218
15. David Schmidtz, The Elements of Justice (Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 219
16. David Schmidtz, The Elements of Justice (Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 225
17. David Schmidtz, The Elements of Justice (Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 227