Argentina: Colonial Heritage or Liberal Decline?
“Charles A. Hale singled out Latin America’s liberal experience in the Nineteenth Century as its distinctive feature among developing regions.”
Between the 1880s and the First World War, Argentina experienced an almost unparalleled period of economic and social expansion that transformed the basic features of the country. The spectacular economic growth prompted by the incorporation of new lands and the subsequent increase in cereal production and exports, the influx of European capital, and immigration, in a relatively stabilized political situation, amazed some witnesses, who predicted that “no bounds can be set to the wealth that awaits enterprise in this fair land.”¹ Population increased from around 2 million to more than 7 million people; railway length grew from around 3,000 kilometers to more than 31,000 kilometers; exports rose from around 60 million gold pesos to more than 400 million gold pesos (with similar figures for imports); and so on. Politically, after a long period of internal strife, the federalization of the city of Buenos Aires in 1880 marked the beginning of an era of relative stability. The effective application of the Constitution of 1853, securing individual rights and private property, and a series of laws organizing the judiciary and fixing a common unit of currency, among others, established an adequate institutional framework.
In The Cambridge History of Latin America, Vol. V (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) two articles (Roberto Cortés Conde, “The Growth of the Argentine Economy, c. 1870-1914,” and Ezequiel Gallo, “Argentina: Society and Politics, 1880-1916”) provide an excellent basis for the understanding of this period in Argentine history.
Cortés Conde’s own El Progreso Argentino 1880-1914, (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1979) is worth noting as a remarkable work of economic history, especially interesting for his challenge of some widely accepted theses, namely, those concerning the structure of land tenure and the evolution of wages during the period. Cortés Conde rejects the interpretation that explains the formation of the structure of land tenure during the nineteenth century as a conspiracy by a landowner elite and instead investigates the economic factors that influenced the origins and development of a market in land. The author also argues against those, such as Hobart Spalding (La clase trabajadora argentina [Buenos Aires: Editorial Galerna, 1970]) and Adolfo Dorfman (Historia de la industria argentina [Buenos Aires: Escuela de Estudios Argentinos, 1942]), who claim that during the period of great economic expansion the wages of workers deteriorated in real terms. Based on new evidence, Cortés Conde finds that during those years—and despite fluctuations within the period—there was a sustained increase in real wages.
Ezequiel Gallo’s La Pampa Gringa (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1983) concentrates on the colonization of the province of Santa Fe and its impact on the agricultural boom; his “Agrarian Expansion and Industrial Development in Argentina, 1880-1930,” in Raymond Carr, ed., Latin American Affairs, St. Antony’s Papers, No. 22 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970) emphasizes the positive connections between the expansion of agriculture and the possibilities of industrial growth. Both articles in The Cambridge History of Latin America provide extensive bibliographies covering the period.
While these authors recognize the importance that liberal institutions had on this process of radical transformation of the country, there are several other interpretations that either deny that this transformation was as dramatic as liberal historians believe, or dismiss the influence of liberal ideas on the process. Some of these studies regard the predominance of liberalism as an intellectual disguise of policies that aimed at the satisfaction of a small elite’s class interests. Unfortunately, these studies tend to base their arguments on the use of rhetorical terms (such as “class interests”) rather than on a strict analysis of historical evidence.² Such an approach, moreover, very frequently neglects the analysis of ideas as important factors shaping economic and political institutions.³
Economic and Cultural Determinism
In “The Reconstruction of Nineteenth Century Politics in Spanish America: A Case for the History of Ideas” (Latin American Research Review, Vol. 8, 1973), Charles A. Hale singled out Latin America’s liberal experience in the nineteenth century as its distinctive feature among developing regions. Hale identified two types of interpretations of Latin American history that underestimate this liberal experience. The “cultural” interpretation, which Hale locates in works like Richard Morse’s “The Heritage of Latin America” (in Louis Hartz, et. al., eds., The Founding of New Societies [New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964), stresses the importance of the colonial heritage of a corporatist, hierarchical, and authoritarian socio-political order, as determining all subsequent institutional developments. The liberal experience of the nineteenth century is represented in this cultural interpretation as “an aberration from more permanent patterns.” Similarly, Howard J. Wiarda, in “Toward a Framework for the Study of Political Change in the Iberic-Latin Tradition: The Corporative Model” (World Politics, Vol. 25, 1973), has written of a traditional “corporative framework” that reflects “a historic hierarchical, authoritarian, and organic view of man, society and polity.” Instead of being transformed by the ideological currents of the nineteenth century, this basic colonial structure apparently survived in a different form, merely adopting the new imperative of change and modernization.
Charles A. Hale singled out Latin America’s liberal experience in the Nineteenth Century as its distinctive feature among developing regions.
A detailed description and analysis of the “cultural vices” that permeate Latin American society can be found in Stanislav Andreski, Parasitism and Subversion: The Case of Latin America (New York: Schocken Books, 1969, pp. 23-54), and in Lawrence E. Harrison, Underdevelopment Is a State of Mind: The Latin American Case (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1985).
The second type of interpretation that underestimates the liberal experience in Latin America is what Hale calls the “economic” interpretation, exemplified by Stanley J. Stein and Barbara Stein in The Colonial Heritage of Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970) and various kinds of dependency theories, which focus on Latin America’s dependency on the more economically advanced nations as the key to its historical development. According to this view, it is this economic dependency that determined the structure of Latin American political and economic institutions. The changes that occurred during the nineteenth century are interpreted in some of these studies as reflecting the emergence of a new colonial relationship rather than as a radical historical transformation.
Quite recently, David Rock has combined both “cultural” and “economic” interpretations in his study Argentina, 1516-1982 (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1986), considering the country “a classically ‘colonial’ society.” The period of social and economic transformation of the late nineteenth century, says Rock, was not as effective as liberal historians believe. During this period, he argues, “the host society deflected foreign influences to extend and deepen many of its own historic propensities.” Rock’s reliance on “historical propensities” and economic dependency to explain Argentina’s decline in this century shares the deterministic features of the economic and cultural interpretations.
Many of these theories are based on dubious historical evidence (see, for example, D.C.M. Platt, “Dependency in Nineteenth Century Latin America: An Historian Objects,” Latin American Research Review, Vol. 15, 1980). A very recent work by Lance A. Davis and Robert A. Huttenback, Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire: The Political Economy of British Imperialism, 1860-1912 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) also casts doubt on the assumption of the “profitability of the Empire,” an assumption very frequently simply taken for granted in dependency theories.
Ideology
In addition, there is very little room left—if any—in these interpretations for the interaction between ideological changes and institutional development. Institutions and historical events appear to be totally predetermined by the colonial cultural heritage, or by the alleged economic dependency of the country. As an alternative to these views, it could be argued that historical developments in Argentina were primarily influenced by important ideological transformations that not only affected liberalism, but ultimately produced its decline and substitution by different mixtures of nationalism and corporatism. In this alternative interpretation, therefore, the interaction between ideas and political action takes a central place; special emphasis is put on the connections between different bodies of ideas predominant in a certain period of time and the resulting institutions, policies, and programs. The focus on economic and social history that has dominated academic literature on Argentina needs to be complemented by more research on the ideological changes that shaped political, economic, and social events.
One of the first ideological changes that affected liberalism in Argentina reflected a pattern similar to intellectual trends in European liberalism. Larry Siedentop has pointed out the importance of Tocqueville and the French Doctrinaires Guizot and Royer-Collard in establishing a tradition of political thought based on a theory of social change and a recognition of the role that social conditions play in the shaping of political institutions. It was this tradition that induced the Argentine liberals of the “Generation of 1837” (Alberdi, Sarmiento, and Echeverría) to abandon Bentham and Rousseau and begin “to learn something of national inclinations, customs and races, and of historical antecedents” by way of Tocqueville, Guizot, and the historians Thierry and Michelet, as Sarmiento put it in Facundo o Civilización y Barbarie en las pampas argentinas (1845; Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de America Latina, 1979). Charles Hale has described this ideological change as “the decline of classic constitutionalism” (“Political and Social Ideas in Latin America, 1870-1930,” in The Cambridge History of Latin America, Vol. IV, op. cit., 1986). The new constitution makers were more concerned with existing social conditions in their own countries than with the principles of political philosophy embraced by the men of the Independence period. The ways in which this was reflected in the ideas of the men who inspired the Argentine Constitution of 1853 are dealt with by a small number of works dealing with the history of ideas in Argentina, including José Luis Romero, A History of Argentine Political Thought (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963) and especially Natalio Botana, La Tradición Republicana (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1984) and Tulio Halperin Donghi, “Para que la inmigración? Ideología y política inmigratoria y aceleración del proceso modernizador: el caso argentino (1810-1914)” (Jahrbuch für Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas [13] 1976).
Rock’s reliance on “historical propensities” and economic dependency to explain Argentina’s decline in this century shares the deterministic features of the economic and cultural interpretations.
Among the conditions focused on by the new constitution makers was, first of all, a constant preoccupation with the vast, deserted territory of the country, scarcely populated by natives and Spaniards who were notable, according to Sarmiento, for “their love of idleness and their inability for industry.” This was the basis for the almost obsessive concern with the promotion of immigration and with the civilizing influence that Alberdi and his contemporaries attributed to the European immigrants. Alberdi was convinced that only through the creation of a liberal economic system and the abolition of the mercantilistic institutions established since colonial times could Argentina attract “the population, capital and industries” she lacked. The economic doctrines of the Constitution were, therefore, inspired by “the great industrial school of Adam Smith,” as Alberdi explained in 1855 in his Sistema Económico y Rentístico de la Confederación Argentina segun su Constitución de 1853 (1855; Buenos Aires: Editorial Raigal, 1954).
The influence of positivism and of various kinds of evolutionary theories was felt in the development of new intellectual trends, such as sociological and legal theories built on biological foundations.
There was another serious problem that had to be considered: the continual threat of civil war caused by a lack of unified power. The resulting tendency to perpetuate internal struggles, prompted by local caudillos, was a serious obstacle to the country’s stability and a permanent invitation to disorder. Alberdi sought the solution in the establishment of a strong central power. Inspired by the Chilean Constitution of 1833, he supported a “constitutional president that could assume the faculties of a king when anarchy disobeys him as a republican president.” The constitution of 1853 clearly reflected these two features, the promotion of progress by means of widespread economic and civil liberties, and a strong, centralized power, concentrated in the national executive.
These were the leading characteristics of the period inaugurated with the presidency of Julio A. Roca and the federalization of the city of Buenos Aires in 1880. In addition to the institutional powers that the Constitution granted to the national executive, the establishment of the city of Buenos Aires as the federal capital gave the national government greater control over economic and political developments.
At the same time, the process of institutional secularization that culminated with a law establishing free lay primary education in 1884, undermined the position of the Catholic Church. Fear of the consequences of this process of centralization and the undermining of a countervailing power was expressed by some of the leaders of the opposition (including Leandro N. Alem, later founder of the Unión Cívica Radical, the main opposition party) during the congressional debates on the federalization of Buenos Aires in 1880 (see Leandro N. Alem, Mensaje y Destino, Vol. VI [Buenos Aires: Editorial Raigal, 1955]). Similar concerns were expressed by José Manuel Estrada, leader of the Catholic opposition, during the debates on lay education (José Manuel Estrada, Discursos, Vol. I [Buenos Aires: Ediciones Estrada, 1946]).
The transformation of the social and economic bases of the country, impelled by fantastic material progress, was not accompanied by a similar modernization of the country’s political institutions. Facilitated by a general attitude of indifference in the population towards political matters, power remained concentrated in a few hands, secured by frequent electoral frauds. In 1906 a British diplomat described the situation, noting that “people are so busy in the Argentine Republic now in making money...that they have generally no time to revert to the former practices embraced in the South American words ‘la política.’ ”⁵ Some of the consequences of the progress of social mobility and its influence on the economic assimilation of the European immigrants are traced by Gino Germani, “La inmigración masiva y su papel en la modernización del pais” (in his Política y sociedad en una época de transición [Buenos Aires: Editorial Paidós, 1966]) and by Francis Korn, Buenos Aires: los huéspedes del 20 (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1974).
By the turn of the century, the new era of progress was revealing the first signs of a new intellectual transformation. The influence of Comtean positivism and of various kinds of evolutionary theories was felt in the development of new intellectual trends, such as sociological and legal theories built on biological foundations. In addition, belief in the inevitability of progress, as expounded by Herbert Spencer, suited perfectly the conditions of Argentina. Spencer’s idea that progress was “not an accident, but a necessity”⁶ gave support to the optimism occasioned by the economic expansion, and helped to consolidate a new ideology of progress that modified the ideological spectrum of early twentieth century Argentina. Most useful among the few works on the subject in their illustration of the connections between biological theories and social thought are: R. Soler, El positivismo argentino (Buenos Aires: Editorial Paidós, 1968); Marcelo Monserrat, “La mentalidad evolucionista: Una Ideología del progreso,” in E. Gallo and G. Ferrari, eds., La Argentina del Ochenta al Centenario (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1980); and the above-cited article by Charles Hale in The Cambridge History of Latin America. Much more work is needed, especially on the impact that these new intellectual trends had on the determination of policies, e.g., laws restricting immigration, regulation of working conditions, state provision of welfare services, etc.
The conservative governments that followed the military reacted to the problems created by the depression by granting a much more active role to the State in the economic sphere.
Relatively more effort has been devoted to the nationalist reaction that grew during the decades preceding the military coup of 1930. Sandra McGee Deutsch in her Counterrevolution in Argentina, 1900-1932: The Argentine Patriotic League (Lincoln, Neb.: The University of Nebraska Press, 1986) exaggerates the influence of “class interests” on the attitudes of some of the nationalist organizations. Marysa Navarro Gerassi, Los Nacionalistas (Buenos Aires, Editorial Jorge Alvarez, 1968), Enrique Zuleta Alvarez, El nacionalismo argentino (2 Vols., Buenos Aires: Ediciones la Bastilla, 1975), and David Rock, “Intellectual Precursors of Conservative Nationalism in Argentina, 1900-1927” (Hispanic American Historical Review [67] May 1987) provide useful information on the intellectual roots of some of the nationalist writers, especially Ricardo Rojas, Manuel Gálvez, and Leopoldo Lunes). While many of these works explain the growing influence of nationalism as a reaction against the consequences of the liberal and progressive ideas that had transformed the country, there is no specific discussion of the influence that nationalism exerted on liberalism itself, and how this may have contributed to the decline of liberal ideas.
Much has been written about the corporatist ideas supported by some of the participants in the military coup of 1930. Romero’s book on Argentine political thought, cited above, gives a good description of the popularity that the idea of a corporatist state based on “functional representation” enjoyed during the 1930s. General Uriburu, head of the military coup, declared as President: “When the representatives of the people cease to be merely representatives of party committees, and take their seats in Congress as workers, ranchers, farmers, professional men, industrialists, and so on, democracy for us will have come to be something more than a beautiful word.” Despite the fact that these ideas did not take institutional form, nor were incorporated in the Constitution as some of their supporters desired, they certainly helped to shape the ideological climate of the 1930s. In addition, the conservative governments that followed the military reacted to the problems created by the depression by granting a much more active role to the State in the economic sphere, as exemplified by the creation of the Central Bank and regulatory agencies for agriculture, increases in tariff protection, and expansive fiscal and monetary policies. The attempts that these governments made to maintain the economic relationship with Great Britain during the decade helped to inflame still more the nationalist reaction against foreign capital. When in 1943 another military coup opened the door to the arrival of Juan Perón to power, very little of liberalism remained as a living body of ideas. Peronism accentuated the authoritarian, nationalist, and populist features of a corporatist structure basically created during the 1930s. Rather than the beginning of a new era, in the field of ideas Peronism represented the climax of a process that had begun during the previous decades.
As mentioned, interpretations of Argentine history that underrate the importance of liberal ideas during the country’s impressive development are frequently based on theories that attribute deterministic powers to the country’s colonial cultural heritage or economic relationships with the more advanced nations. The role that individuals, guided by general ideas and principles, have as agents of change and historical transformation is greatly reduced. They almost disappear, as Isiah Berlin put it, in “the night of impersonality, in which human beings are dissolved into abstract forces.”⁸
The study of the successive ideological transformations that undermined the liberal tradition, and its eventual substitution by different mixtures of nationalism and corporativism, could provide the basis of a much needed alternative interpretation of Argentina’s past.
Notes
¹Lloyd’s Publishing Company, Twentieth Century Impressions of
Argentina (London, 1911), p. 82.
²On the rhetorical uses of the concept of “social class,” see P. N.
Furbank, Unholy Pleasure, or the Idea of Social Class. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1985), chapter 1, and Francis Korn, “El
Poder de las palabras,” in Liberalismo y Sociedad (Buenos Aires:
Ediciones Macchi, 1984).
³On the importance of ideology in the shaping of institutions see
Douglass North, “Three Approaches to the Study of Institutions,” in
David C. Colander, ed., NeoClassical Political Economy (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1984), p. 39.
⁴Larry Siedentop, “Two Liberal Traditions,” in Alan Ryan, ed.,
The Idea of Freedom: Essays in Honour of Isaiah Berlin (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 153–174.
⁵W. Haggard to Sir Edward Grey, December 16, 1906. Public
Records Office, F.O. 371/194.
⁶Cf. Robert Nisbet, History of the Idea of Progress (London:
Heinemann, 1980), pp. 229–236.
⁷To a large extent, the nationalist reaction against some of the
consequences of the modernization process, e.g., the influence that
immigration had on the cultural traditions of the country, seemed to
reflect the type of opposition to the values of an “open” society so
thoroughly examined by Popper and Hayek. Cf. Karl Popper, The
Open Society and its Enemies (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1945) and F. A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty (3 Vols.,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973, 1976, 1979).
⁸Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford University Press,
1969), Introduction, p. xxxiv.
Eduardo A. Zimmermann is a Claude R. Lambe Fellow of
the Institute for Humane Studies pursuing a Ph.D. in history
at St. Antony’s College, Oxford.