Is the Great Society in “Ideological Disequilibrium”?
“Ordered large-scale interaction among human beings must be supported by a structure of permanently interacting small groups.”
Friedrich August von Hayek has again drawn our attention to the fact that collectivist notions that once were adequate to understand and to guide life in small groups of hunter-gatherers may seriously distort our views of the great society. This puts freedom itself at risk because “ill-considered notions of what is reasonable, right and good may change the facts and the circumstances in which we live...” (p. 27). This raises two questions that might merit further exploration. First, how could our “ill-considered” small group notions survive the experience of living in a great society for an extended period of time? Second, can there be a more adequate conviction system or ideology that supports the maintenance of the institutions of the great society and at the same time is itself supported by common experience in this society?
It does not seem completely convincing to answer the first question simply by pointing out that the biological evolution of human instincts could not keep up with cultural evolution. Our ideas may be influenced by our instincts. But they are also shaped by our experience. We are no helpless victims of our natural inclinations. We can learn; we can modify our behavioral dispositions in the course of time. As Hayek himself insists, traditions shape our view of the world. If common experience of individuals who are living in a great society would not reinforce collectivist views somehow then they certainly would have been gradually weeded out. There must be something in the structure of a great society itself that systematically supports ideas which eventually under-mine the basis of that society.
As Hayek himself notes, “the structures of the extended order are made up...of many, often overlapping, sub-orders within which old instinctual responses, such as solidarity and altruism, continue to retain some importance by assisting voluntary collaboration” (p. 18). In a great society individuals can successfully pursue their ends most of the time only by way of membership in subgroups like clubs, the family, or the firm. The success of these subgroups will in general be Furthered considerably if they can command feelings of solidarity, altruism, or loyalty among their members. Therefore, in the market for subgroup membership within the great society there will be a high premium on individuals who react in collectivist ways. This provides an incentive to nourish old instinctual responses assisting voluntary collaboration.
Voluntary collaboration is easier to achieve in smaller groups than in larger ones. Therefore, as David Hume (cf. book III, chap. 7 of the Treatise of Human Nature) was already well aware, ordered large-scale interaction among human beings must be supported by a structure of permanently interacting small groups. In turn, small group values will be supported by the very processes that create and maintain the extended order as an unintended side-effect. Due to our natural inclination to apply feelings derived from our experiences in one area to all phenomena that are sufficiently similar, we will extend our experience in subgroups to the extended order itself, and thus tend to think about it in collectivist terms too. Our instinctual responses are reinforced rather than extinguished by cultural evolution in diverse subgroups of the great society.
With these observations in mind the second question concerning the gradual reform of our system of public conviction gets real bite. Theoretical enlightenment alone will not suffice to correct ill-considered collectivist notions. A system of public conviction will influence choices on a politically relevant scale only if it is rooted in the common experience of everyday life. However, as has been argued, the structure of any society—including the great society—systematically supports small group views. It seems that a state of “equilibrium” in which common experience and common opinion systematically support each other and the great society itself has not yet been reached.
Now, the great society as an unintended side-effect of small group interaction is essentially a market society too. It is a society of several property and freedom of contract. Participation in market games may lead to more adequate views of society that counteract small group experience. Mutually beneficial contracting does not presuppose common ends, aims, or values. People who live under a regime of “several property” may be seduced into accepting the view that this regime leaves clearance for “several right and wrong” too. Besides conceiving society from the point of view of collective action people eventually may also tend to think of it as a mutually beneficial outcome of implicit contracting between sovereign individuals.
This suggests that a pedestrian version of some form of non-constructivist contractarianism—of the Buchanan or Nozickean types—may be the most likely candidate for a conviction system that supports the great society and at the same time is supported by common experience within this society. Then “do ut des” and “reciprocity” should eventually rank higher in our public value system than “solidarity,” “love,” and “giving without expected reward.” This is very much in line with Hayek’s high esteem of Mandeville (though less so with some of his remarks about religion, in the narrower sense of that term). It will diminish, however, to a certain extent the efficiency of those small groups on which the stability of the extended order also depends. Taking into account this trade-off, further research may be needed to determine the optimum from the point of view of maximum stability for the great society.
Ordered large-scale interaction among human beings must be supported by a structure of permanently interacting small groups. In turn, small group values will be supported by the very processes that create and maintain the extended order as an unintended side-effect.