Belief and Moral Judgment
Should we apply moral judgments, such as “immoral,” to beliefs per se? Smith begins his discussion of this difficult problem.
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Should we apply moral judgments, such as “immoral,” to beliefs per se? Smith begins his discussion of this difficult problem.
Smith explores the nature of belief, knowledge, ethics, the difference between moral and prudential decisions, and some ideas about virtue.
Smith explains the value of Neo-Thomistic books for libertarians and Randians, and what is meant by the virtue of reasonableness.
Smith explains how questions like “Why should I be rational?” and “Why should I be moral?” involve a bait and switch tactic.
Smith discusses the source of moral obligations and the general approach of Aristotelian ethics.
Smith discusses axiology (the study of value) and David Hume’s celebrated argument about “is” and “ought.”
Smith explains some fundamental tenets of the moral sense school of ethics, especially as found in the writings of Francis Hutcheson.
Smith criticizes Hume’s claim that reason cannot motivate actions, and explains how moral sense philosophers dealt with the problem of differing moral standards.
Smith resumes his discussion of whether beliefs per se can be immoral.
Smith criticizes the argument of W.K. Clifford that we have a duty to mankind to base our beliefs on the best available evidence.
Smith discusses various meanings of “belief” and “doubt.”
Smith discusses the claim that some beliefs are immoral and the role of credibility in choosing our beliefs.
Smith discusses the inevitability of holding some false beliefs and what can be done to minimize this problem.
Smith discusses the crucial difference between science and philosophy, and how human fallibility has been used to defend skepticism.
Smith explores the indispensable role of value commitments in our quest for knowledge.